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 This thesis focuses on a long-misunderstood person – Edward, Lord Herbert of 
Cherbury (1582-1648), a diplomat, philosopher, and historian. He has been labelled 
‘the father of English deism’, a title invented by John Leland (1691-1766) more than 
a hundred years after his death. Although this label has recently been challenged, 
modern scholarship continues to pay disproportionate attention to Herbert’s religious 
ideas, while research on political and historical aspects of his thought remains quite 
underdeveloped. This thesis places Herbert in the context of contemporary issues of 
religion and politics, including the controversy over the royal supremacy, the 
relationship between King and Parliament, and debates over the lawfulness of 
resistance to tyrants in the Early English Civil War. It argues that his viewpoints on 
these issues reflected his deep concern for the freedom and authority of individual 
conscience. Herbert held that laws enacted in the name of the royal supremacy 
should not force individuals to accept anything contrary to the judgement of their 
consciences. He also suggested that the safety and liberty of the people took priority 
over the prerogatives of the King, and that Parliament, as the highest court in the 
kingdom, had the authority to protect the people’s consciences from the oppression 
of the King’s unlawful commands. Finally, Herbert held that resistance to tyrants was 
indeed lawful and that conscience granted that a tyrant’s misdeeds could lawfully be 
bridled. 
The thesis is based on a close analysis of Herbert’s religious treatises, his 
manuscript collections deposited in the National Library of Wales, and his historical 
works, including ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the Church’ and The Life and Raigne 
of King Henry the Eighth. His manuscript collections and historical treatises in 
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particular have never been properly examined. The main contributions of the thesis 
are to restore Herbert’s thought to its seventeenth-century context, broaden the 
research on Herbert to include his political thought, and reveal that the common 
purpose of his works of philosophy, religion, and history was to save the people from 
unjust religious coercion. This approach provides a more comprehensive 
understanding and a more complete picture of Herbert’s thought, and challenges 
several commonly held views of Herbert: that Herbert’s thought was a precursor to 
eighteenth-century deism, that his theory of common notions represented the whole 
picture of his thought, and that his historical works were of little value and aimed 








This thesis focuses on a long-misunderstood person – Edward, Lord Herbert of 
Cherbury (1582-1648), a diplomat, philosopher, and historian. In the middle of the 
eighteenth century John Leland denounced Herbert as ‘the father of English deism’, a 
label unchallenged until very recently. This label suggested that he was a forerunner 
of those who believed that religion had to be placed on rational foundations rather 
than on a belief in Scriptural authority. As a result, the attention of most previous 
scholars has been directed to his religious thought, and research on other aspects of 
his thought is very underdeveloped. By contrast, this thesis places him in the context 
of contemporary issues of religion and politics, including controversies over the 
power of kings over the established church, the relationship between the King and 
Parliament, and the lawfulness of resistance to tyrants in the Early English Civil War. 
It argues that his viewpoints on these contemporary issues reflected his deep concern 
for the freedom and authority of individual conscience. Herbert held that individual 
conscience weighed more heavily than the king’s authority, that Parliament could 
best protect the people’s conscience from the oppression of the king’s unlawful 
commands, and that conscience granted that the people could lawfully resist a tyrant. 
This thesis provides the first detailed account of Herbert’s participation in 
contemporary issues of religion and politics, and it does so by analysing his religious 
treatises, his manuscript collections deposited in the National Library of Wales, and 
his historical works, including ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the Church’ and The 
Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth. Many of these sources have received little 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This doctoral thesis focuses on a long-misunderstood person – Edward, Lord Herbert 
of Cherbury (1582-1648).1 He has often been described as ‘the father of English 
deism’, a title coined by John Leland (1691-1766) that became a cliché prevalent till 
the present day.2 Modern scholarship, as the following literature survey will show, 
has given disproportionate attention to Herbert’s religious thought. This thesis, in 
contrast, will investigate Herbert’s thought from a new perspective by putting him in 
the historical context of the early seventeenth century and by shifting the focus from 
his religious thought to his historical and political thought. Aiming to broaden the 
horizon of research on Herbert, this thesis intends to present Herbert’s view on 
contemporary issues of religion and politics by incorporating and analyzing his 
religious treatises, his historical works – including ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the 
Church’ written in 1635 and The Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth published 
in 1649 – and his private collections deposited in the National Library of Wales. The 
goal of the thesis is to show that Herbert was involved not merely with the deistical 
controversy in the eighteenth century but also with very important questions 
concerning religion and politics in his own time. Herbert’s viewpoints on the royal 
supremacy, the relationship between King and Parliament, and the resistance to 
tyrants not only echoed his theory of conscience as presented mainly in De Veritate 
                                                     
1 ‘Cherbury’ was sometimes spelled ‘Chirbury’. Among modern works, ‘Chirbury’ was only used in 
Rossi’s study of Herbert and in the article of George Herbert (now Earl of Powis). Mario M. Rossi, La 
vita, le opere, i tempi di Edoardo Herbert di Chirbury., 3 vols (Firenze: G. C. Sansoni, 1947); George 
Herbert, ‘A Further Note on Lord Herbert of Chirbury and His Son Richard’, Huntington Library 
Quarterly 46, no. 4 (1983): 331–32. John Butler argued that the spelling ‘Chirbury’ is correct while 
‘Cherbury’ is wrong, which was confirmed by Lord George Herbert (the ‘ir’ spelling was used in the 
patent of nobility for Edward Herbert). See John Butler, ‘Introduction’, in DRG, 23. However, over the 
centuries the spelling ‘er’ has become a widely recognised usage, and for this reason I retain it in my 
thesis. 
2 Sidney Lee, ‘Introduction’, in AB, xxxv. For Leland’s viewpoint see John Leland, A View of the 
Principal Deistical Writers (London: Printed for B. Dod, 1754), 4–5. 
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(published in 1624), but also revealed his deep concern for the freedom and authority 
of the individual’s conscience. 
The first section of this chapter examines the development of research on Herbert 
mainly over the past century and outlines the purpose and structure of this thesis. The 
second section introduces six manuscripts related to contemporary issues of religion 
and politics from Herbert’s collections now deposited in the National Library of 
Wales. These works will form the intellectual basis of the discussion in chapters 4 and 
5. 
 
1.1 A critical literature survey 
 
This thesis focuses on the latter part of Herbert’s career, from 1624, when he lost the 
position of ambassador to France, till his death in 1648. Though he did not obtain any 
more prominent position at court, he became a scholar and completed many important 
works during this period. Before he was recalled from France he had already been 
acquainted with many important continental scholars such as Isaac Casaubon 
(1559-1614), Marin Mersenne (1588-1648), and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645); Herbert’s 
best-known work De Veritate had benefited greatly from their writings. 3  After 
Herbert returned to England he stayed at court to seek the opportunity to provide his 
services. In 1625 he became a member of the Council of War, and before 1630 he was 
commissioned by King Charles I to write The Expedition to the Isle of Rhe in defence 
of the failed military expedition launched by his patron the Duke of Buckingham.4 
Then, he started The Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth at the command of the 
                                                     
3 AB, 56; R. W. Serjeantson, ‘Herbert of Cherbury before Deism: The Early Reception of the De 
Veritate’, The Seventeenth Century 16, no. 2 (2001): 218–19; R. D. Bedford, The Defence of Truth: 
Herbert of Cherbury and the Seventeenth Century (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1979), 
213. 
4 AB, 141; Eugene D. Hill, Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury (Boston: Twayne, 1987), 51–53.  
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King and was permitted to exploit the Cotton Library and royal libraries. During the 
1630s Herbert had collected a large amount of printed works and private papers, and 
he continued to do so until his death. At the same time, he had constructed a network 
with contemporary scholars, including Sir Robert Cotton (1570-1631) and John 
Selden (1584-1654). In 1640 Herbert sat as a member of the Lords and when the Civil 
War broke out in 1642 he chose to join the King in York;5 however, he soon withdrew 
to Montgomery before surrendering his castle to the parliamentary army in 1644. 
During the 1640s, Herbert continued his scholarly work. He not only wrote his 
autobiography (first published in 1764 by Horace Walpole) but also completed his 
final religious treatises, De Religione Laici (published in 1645), De Religione 
Gentilium (published posthumously in 1663 in Amsterdam), and A Dialogue Between 
A Tutor and his Pupil (published in 1860).  
 Herbert’s later career and writings, however, have long been regarded as a series 
of failures mainly due to a continuation of the Life of Herbert by Sir Sidney Lee (first 
published in 1886). Although it could be argued that Herbert obtained little public 
success at court, the same was not true of his scholarly achievements. Lee seems not 
to have acknowledged the value of Herbert’s later writings because of his lack of 
public success during these decades. Lee claimed that Herbert reached the peak of his 
career when he was ambassador to France, between 1619 and 1624, and that after that 
his public life was ‘a dreary series of disasters’.6 According to Lee, Herbert continued 
to seek a position at court though he kept suffering ‘defeat and disgrace’.7 By 
completing The Expedition to the Isle of Rhe, The Life and Raigne of King Henry the 
Eighth, and ‘On the Royal Supremacy over the Church’, Herbert aimed at little more 
than obtaining royal recognition; among these writings, Lee singled out ‘On the Royal 
                                                     
5 AB, 146.  
6 Sidney Lee, ‘Introduction’, in AB, xxi.  
7 Ibid.  
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Supremacy over the Church’ as a ‘very imperfect and servile’ piece of work.8 As to 
Herbert’s De Veritate, Lee commented that it was ‘little better than abortive’.9 
Furthermore, Lee stated that the outbreak of the English civil war ‘seemed to him 
[Herbert] more opportune than ever for pressing his demand for recompense and 
recognition’. 10  Lee gave his readers the impression that Herbert became an 
opportunist during his later career. This narration proved influential. Later scholars M. 
H. Carré, Mario M. Rossi, and R. H. Hutcheson agreed that Herbert obtained no great 
achievement in the latter part of his career, and that the birth of his works depended 
on the opportunities given by circumstances.11 Similarly, Margaret Bottrall wrote that 
Herbert had ‘twenty years of frustration’ after he was deprived of the office of 
ambassadorship to France.12 E. E. Kimmelman had the same opinion that Herbert 
after 1624 ‘lingered in the shadows of the court, never to achieve status or power’.13 
 The twentieth century witnessed a growing interest in Herbert’s works, and this 
can be attributed to the publication of Herbert’s verses and the translations of 
Herbert’s religious treatises from Latin to English, which made the works more 
accessible to general readers. G. C. More Smith, a scholar and antiquary, published 
Herbert’s English and Latin verses in 1923.14 M. H. Carré translated the third version 
of De Veritate and published it in 1937, while R. H. Hutcheson published a translation 
                                                     
8 AB, 141-44.  
9 Sidney Lee, ‘Introduction’, in AB, xxxiii.  
10 AB, 144.  
11 After referring to Lee’s work, Carré asserted that Herbert’s later career was ‘a distressing story of 
disillusionment, of vain struggles for recognition’ and that his historical works ‘were elaborate 
endeavours to attract the royal favour’. See Carré, ‘the introduction’, in DV, 11. Hutchson agreed with 
Lee that Herbert ‘begged for his title’ and sought for royal recognition, but he was aware of Lee’s harsh 
attitude towards Herbert. See DRL, 21. For Rossi’s comment, see Rossi, La vita, le opere, i tempi di 
Edoardo Herbert di Chirbury., vols 2, 464. I am indebted to the work of Eugene Hill for Rossi’s point 
of view; Hill, Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, 13. 
12 Margaret Bottrall, Every Man a Phoenix; Studies in Seventeenth-Century Autobiography (London: 
Murray, 1958), 57. 
13  Elaine Escoll Kimmelman, ‘Lord Herbert of Cherbury as Historian’ (PhD Thesis; Harvard 
University, 1977), 9. 
14 G. C. Moore Smith, ed., The Poems, English and Latin, of Edward Lord Herbert of Cherbury 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923). 
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of De Religione Laici in 1944.15 The above three publications are the main scholarly 
editions to date. Exploiting the original manuscripts of Herbert now kept by the 
National Library of Wales, J. M. Shuttleworth published a new edition of Herbert’s 
autobiography with a less harsh introduction in 1976, nine decades after the original 
publication of Herbert’s autobiography by Sir Sidney Lee.16 J. A. Butler translated 
Herbert’s De Religione Gentilium and published it in 1996, which replaced an old 
translation published in 1705 by William Lewis.17 
 Indebted to the publications and translations of Herbert’s works, scholars started 
investigating the original meaning of the works, especially the best known of these, 
De Veritate. Ever since Herbert obtained his title ‘the father of English deism’ due to 
the five religious common notions argued for in the work –18 a title to suggest that he 
was a progenitor of those who believed that religion had to be placed on rational 
foundations rather than supernatural beliefs –,19 it has been viewed as a work on 
religion rather than philosophy.20 Charles de Rémusat (1797-1875) and W. R. Sorley 
                                                     
15 Interested in Herbert’s philosophy, Carré translated Herbert’s work from Latin to English with an 
intention to promote English research on De Veritate. See the preface by Carré in DV. Hutcheson found 
Herbert’s work interesting when he reviewed the study on seventeenth-century scepticism. See DRL, 
preface. Different but secondary versions of De Religione Laici had been noticed – by secondary I 
mean they were not published by Herbert but remained as private manuscripts. Herbert G. Wright 
published a manuscript of De Religione Laici deposited in the National Library of Wales, while S. E. 
Sprott noticed another copy kept by Sir William Osler Library at McGill University. Both of them are 
different copies of the same work. See Herbert Wright, ‘An Unpublished Manuscript by Lord Herbert 
of Cherbury Entitled “Religio Laici”’, The Modern Language Review 28 (1933): 295–307. S. E. Sprott, 
‘The Osler Manuscript of Herbert’s “Religio Laici”’, The Library 11 (1956), no. 2 (1): 120–22. 
16 Edward Herbert, The Life of Edward, First Lord Herbert of Cherbury Written by Himself, ed. J. M 
Shuttleworth (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), ix–xxiii. 
17 DRG. For the weakness of Lewis’ translation (Edward Herbert, The Antient Religion of the Gentiles, 
trans. William Lewis [London: Printed for John Nutt near Stationers-Hall, 1705]), see Butler’s 
introduction to his translation DRG. 
18 They are as follows: that there is a supreme God, that it is our duty to worship this Sovereign Deity, 
that the obedience to practice virtue is a dominant part of religious worship, that repentance is needed 
to expiate one’s vice and evil behaviour, and that a reward or a punishment exists in the afterlife. See 
DV, 289-300. 
19 Justin Champion, ‘Deism’, in The Columbia History of Western Philosophy, ed. Richard Henry 
Popkin and Stephen F. Brown (Columbia University Press, 2005), 437–38; Leland, A View of the 
Principal Deistical Writers, 4–5.  
20 In the former part of the twentieth century, Charles Lyttle stood against the tide. He insisted that 
Herbert was not a deist, that his autobiography ‘is permeated by this spirit of scrupulous candor’ and 
that De Veritate was ‘his daring manifesto of freethought theism’. See Charles Lyttle, ‘Lord Herbert of 
Cherbury, Apostle of Ethical Theism.’, Church History 4 (1935): 252–53. 
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(1855-1935) were the forerunners to focus on Herbert’s philosophical themes without 
preconceiving him as a deist.21 In the latter part of the twentieth century, some 
scholars joined them to examine and reevaluate the philosophical themes of the work. 
Showing that Herbert was searching for the way to truth, R. H. Popkin argued that 
Herbert wrote De Veritate against Pyrrhonism, though he failed to attain that goal.22 
Another similar but more comprehensive work was R. D. Bedford’s The Defence of 
Truth published in 1979. It not only analyzed Herbert’s philosophical system and its 
origin, but also doubted whether Herbert could be regarded as a forerunner of the 
deistical movement in the eighteenth century.23 
 Some scholars such as D. A. Pailin put effort into casting away Herbert’s 
prejudicial title ‘the father of English deism’. After showing that the title was invented 
by John Leland (1691-1766) and became a widely accepted label of Herbert till the 
present,24 Pailin demonstrated that the meaning of the word deist ‘depends upon who 
is using it and about whom it is being used’; hence, to say that Herbert is a deist is not 
an adequate or a clear statement.25 Moreover, it is questionable that English deism 
derived from Herbert’s works, according to Pailin.26 Similarly, R. W. Serjeantson, by 
tracing the responses of Herbert’s contemporaries to De Veritate, found that in his 
lifetime it was never regarded as a work against revealed religion, and that in the eyes 
of Herbert’s contemporaries he was far from a ‘conspicuous enemy of Christianity’.27 
Meanwhile, some scholars have tried to investigate the true meanings and purposes of 
                                                     
21 Charles de Rémusat, Lord Herbert de Cherbury, Sa Vie et Ses Oeuvres Ou Les Origines de La 
Philosophie Du Sens Commun et de La Théologie Naturelle En Angleterre (Paris, 1874); W. R. Sorley, 
‘The Philosophy of Herbert of Cherbury’, Mind 3, no. 12 (1894): 491–508. 
22 Richard H Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes. (Assen: Van Gorcum, 
1964), 155–65. 
23 Bedford, The Defence of Truth, 256.  
24 For Leland’s viewpoint see Leland, A View of the Principal Deistical Writers, 4–5. 
25 Pailin, ‘Should Herbert of Cherbury Be Regarded as a “Deist”?’, 128–31. 
26 Ibid., 122–28.  
27  Serjeantson, ‘Herbert of Cherbury before Deism’, 217–27. CF: ‘He [Herbert] was not a 
self-conscious radical who set out to overturn traditional Christian self-understanding’. Pailin, ‘Herbert 
of Cherbury and the Deists’, 200. 
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De Veritate and his religious treatises. Pailin maintained that Herbert proposed his 
theory intending to tackle both ‘the bigotry of those who held fanatically to the truth 
of certain beliefs’ and the scepticism of those who doubted anything can be known. 
Furthermore, Pailin thought that Herbert’s five religious common notions aimed to 
save people from the abuse of the priestly class.28 Agreeing with Pailin’s last point, J. 
A. Butler stressed that De Veritate was ‘an eirenic religious treatise’, and by this work 
Herbert intended to ‘protect lay-people from the distortions of religious authority’.29 
R. A. Johnson, by analyzing young Herbert’s experience and the worship habits of his 
mother Magdalen Herbert, deemed Herbert as ‘a reformer of political theology’, and 
he maintained that Herbert’s five religious common notions were responses to ‘the 
crisis of political theology precipitated by the many bloody and long-lasting religious 
wars of that era’.30 
 The abovementioned development of research on Herbert indicates that his 
philosophical and religious works have received a better evaluation recently; but it 
also shows that Herbert’s religious thought, especially the five religious common 
notions, has continued to receive disproportionate attention. Scholars have devoted 
the lion’s share of their efforts to discussing De Veritate and other religious treatises, 
including De Religione Laici and De Religione Gentilium. 31  Meanwhile, other 
important aspects of Herbert’s thought remain quite underexamined or even neglected. 
In the twentieth century most research investigating Herbert’s verses and 
                                                     
28 Pailin, ‘Should Herbert of Cherbury Be Regarded as a “Deist”?’, 132. 
29 Butler, Lord Herbert of Chirbury (1582-1648): An Intellectual Biography, 173.  
30 Johnson, Peacemaking and Religious Violence: From Thomas Aquinas to Thomas Jefferson, 195–96. 
By ‘a reformer of political theology’ Johnson meant that Herbert intended to appease theological 
disputes and religious wars in this era by proposing his religious common notions. 
31 For research focusing on Herbert’s five religious common notions or his critic on priestcrafts, see 
Peter Harrison, ‘Religion’ and the Religions in the English Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 61–85; A Tadie, ‘Lord Herbert of Cherbury’s Idea of Ultimate Reality and 




autobiography belong to small scale studies.32 Similarly, there exist only a few 
studies on Herbert’s historical thought. In addition to a doctoral study ‘Lord Herbert 
of Cherbury as Historian’ by E. E. Kimmelman,33 the twentieth century witnessed 
only short discussions of Herbert’s historical thought.34 Intending to attract general 
readers’ attention to every aspect of Herbert’s thought, Eugene Hill published Edward, 
Lord Herbert of Cherbury in 1987, introducing all of Herbert’s works, including De 
Veritate, religious treatises, historical works, verses, and autobiography.35 Hill’s work 
suggests that Herbert’s thought, especially other aspects, deserves more attention from 
readers. 
 At the same time I intend to demonstrate two weaknesses of the research that 
focuses only on Herbert’s religious tenets. First, although Herbert became well-known 
or notorious several decades after his death due to the five religious common notions, 
these notions are only part of his larger system of thought, and they are not in 
themselves sufficient. As Herbert said, his theory of truth is ‘the product both of 
Nature and of Grace’, or the outcome of universal providence and particular 
providence – common notions belong to Nature or universal providence.36 In another 
place Herbert stated that ‘I am aware of the commonly held opinion that Common 
Providence is not sufficient without the concurrence of Grace and Particular 
                                                     
32 J. Hebel, ‘“A Divine Love” Addressed by Lord Herbert to Lady Bedford?’, The Modern Language 
Review 20 (1925): 74–76; Basil Willey, ‘Lord Herbert of Cherbury: A Spiritual Quixote of the 
Seventeenth Century’, Essays and Studies 27 (1941): 22–29; Don A. Keister, ‘The Birth Date of Lord 
Herbert of Cherbury’, Modern Language Notes 62, no. 6 (1947): 389–393; Don A. Keister, ‘Donne and 
Herbert of Cherbury: An Exchange of Verses’, Modern Language Quarterly 8, no. 4 (December 1947): 
430–34; Paul Delany, British Autobiography in the Seventeenth Century (London: Routledge & KPaul, 
1969), 125–27; Thurston Dart, ‘Lord Herbert of Cherbury’s Lute Book’, Music and Letters 38 (1957): 
136–148; Jeffrey P Powers-Beck, Writing the Flesh: The Herbert Family Dialogue (Pittsburgh, Pa.: 
Duquesne University Press, 1998), 120–43.  
33 Kimmelman, ‘Lord Herbert of Cherbury as Historian’, 1977. 
34 W. Moelwyn Merchant, ‘Lord Herbert of Cherbury and Seventeenth-Century Historical Writing’, 
Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion, 1956, 57–63; D. R Woolf, The Idea of 
History in Early Stuart England: Erudition, Ideology, and ‘The Light of Truth’ from the Accession of 
James I to the Civil War (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 132–40. 
35 Hill, Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury. 
36 DV, 77.  
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Providence’.37 In brief, common notions are not the whole picture of Herbert’s theory, 
and so far, the role of Grace or particular providence in Herbert’s thought has been 
neglected by scholars, including those who have recently challenged Herbert’s title, 
‘the father of English deism’. Secondly, such research often separates Herbert’s 
religious tenets from his entire system, or separates them from Herbert’s personal 
experience, his intentions, and historical contexts. For instance, by relating Herbert to 
a discussion of heathen religion and priestcraft during 1660 to 1730, Justin Champion 
suggests that Herbert’s anticlericalism is a field worth exploring;38 however, this 
argument was far from Herbert’s irenic intention and may leave readers with the 
impression that Herbert intended to subvert Christianity. 
The importance of Herbert as a scholar in the latter part of his career is also 
underestimated. Lee discredited the value of Herbert’s treatises written during this 
period, and thought that they were composed only to attract royal recognition;39 
however, this is not the case. In 1631 when Herbert was writing The Life and Raigne 
of King Henry the Eighth, Herbert’s friend Sir Robert Harley said that ‘my Lord 
Herbert is a greate scholar’.40 Depicting Herbert as ‘an industrious Collector, as well 
as a curious Judge of the most Valuable and Critical Books’, William Lewis, the 
contemporary translator of De Religione Gentilium, stated that Herbert was a man of 
letters and that he ‘kept a constant Correspondence with most of the Learned Men in 
his Time’.41 James Ussher, a well-known scholar and later Archbishop of Armagh and 
                                                     
37 DRG, 55. 
38 He also believed that Herbert is ‘of particular importance in the development of this deistical history 
of religion’. See Justin Champion, The Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken: The Church of England and Its 
Enemies, 1660-1730 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 140–48. 
39 AB, 141-44.  
40 Sir Robert Harley to John Brinsley, 1631, December 8. Richard Ward, ed., The Manuscripts of His 
Grace the Duke of Portland, vol. 3–4 (London: Printed for H.M. Stationery off., by Eyre and 
Spottiswoode, 1894), 30. 
41 Herbert, The Antient Religion of the Gentiles, trans. William Lewis, viii.  
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Primate of All Ireland, had heard of Herbert in 1624,42 and was due to give the 
sacrament to Herbert on his death-bed (although in the event he refused to do so).43 
The public record also reveals that Herbert had been acquainted with Sir Robert 
Cotton in 1626.44 Even Sir Sidney Lee, who had a negative view of the latter part of 
Herbert’s career, recorded that Herbert had visited France and met Pierre Gassendi 
(1592-1655) in September 1647; this indicates that Herbert kept in touch with 
contemporary scholars before his death.45 
 As Herbert’s religious works have been misunderstood, so have his historical works 
suffered unfair evaluations and neglect. Herbert’s historical works began receiving 
negative comments from the mid-eighteenth century. Denouncing Herbert as a man of 
‘infidelity’ whose object was ‘to show the all-sufficiency of natural religion’, Charles 
Mills (1788-1826) sarcastically described The Life and Raigne of King Henry the 
Eighth as ‘a book which has been always characterised, by writers who have never 
read a line of it, as a master-piece of historic biography’.46 Mill’s contempt for 
Herbert’s historical work seems to have derived from his distaste for Herbert’s 
‘deistical tenets’. In addition to Mill’s comment, some believed that Herbert was a 
eulogist for King Henry. Horace Walpole (1717-1797), who published Herbert’s 
autobiography, regretted that he ‘should have palliated the enormities of Henry VIII’ 
and thought it ‘strange, that writing a man’s life should generally make the biographer 
                                                     
42 See the letter from Sir Henry Bourgchier to James Ussher, 5 January 1624 in Charles Richard 
Elrington, The Whole Works of the Most Rev. James Ussher, D.D., Lord Archbishop of Armagh, and 
Primate of All Ireland.: With a Life of the Author, and an Account of His Writings, vol. 16 (Dublin: 
Hodges, Smith, and Co., 1864), 417–18. 
43 According to Aubrey, this was because Herbert expressed an indifferent attitude towards the 
sacrament. See John Aubrey, Aubrey’s Brief Lives, ed. Oliver Lawson Dick (London: Secker and 
Warburg, 1950), 135. 
44 John Bruce and William Douglas Hamilton, eds., Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the 
Reign of Charles I, 1625[-1649] Preserved in the State Paper Dept. of Her Majesty’s Public Record 
Office. (London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, & Roberts, 1858), vols XLI, 494–495. 
45 AB, 158. 
46 Charles Mills, History of Chivalry, or Knighthood and Its Times, vol. 2 (London: Printed for 
Longmans, Hurst, Rees, Orme, Brown and Green, 1825), 148. 
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become enamoured of his subject’. 47  Similarly, James Granger (1723-1776) 
commented that Herbert ‘has cast the monstrous vices of that merciless tyrant [King 
Henry VIII] into shade, and has displayed to great advantage, his gallantry, 
magnificence, and generosity’.48 
 Modern scholarship exhibits a more positive attitude towards Herbert’s historical 
works, but there exist only few or small-scale studies. Although still believing that 
Herbert’s ‘account of Henry VIII was eulogistic’ and that Herbert wrote it intending to 
obtain a higher position at court, Margaret Bottrall noticed that Herbert exploited 
royal archives to complete the work.49 Mario Rossi and W. Merchant, disagreeing 
with the previous view, thought that Herbert depicted Henry with irony and disliked 
him.50 When introducing The Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth, Hill stated 
that ‘the hasty or superficial reader will find such a book an apologetic narrative; the 
careful reader will notice the qualifying elements of irony and of deadpan ridicule’.51 
In addition to those who only commented on and mentioned Herbert’s historical 
works, E. E. Kimmelman’s doctoral thesis investigated the construction and style of 
The Expedition to the Isle of Rhe and The Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth. 
She compared Herbert’s historical writings with those of his predecessors and 
contemporaries, including Edward Hall (1497-1547), John Foxe (1448-1528), Francis 
Godwin (1562-1633), and Francis Bacon (1561-1626). She also argued that Herbert 
was a rationalist, in the sense that he sought for ‘human and natural causes and effects 
[of history] without reference to a long-range providential scheme’.52  Christine 
                                                     
47 Horace Walpole, A Catalogue of the Royal and Noble Authors of England, vol. 1 ([Twickenham]: 
Printed at Strawberry-Hill, 1758), 191. 
48 James Granger, A Biographical History of England, from Egbert the Great to the Revolution, vol. 3 
(London: W. Baynes and Son, 1824), 146. 
49 Bottrall, Every Man a Phoenix; Studies in Seventeenth-Century Autobiography, 76–77. 
50 Merchant, ‘Lord Herbert of Cherbury and Seventeenth-Century Historical Writing’, 61. For Rossi’s 
statement, I am indebted to Hill’s work. See Hill, Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, 58. 
51 Hill, Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, 51. 
52 Kimmelman, ‘Lord Herbert of Cherbury as Historian’, 101, 146–56. 
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Jackson argued that by this work Herbert tried to disseminate his religious ideas and 
his comments on the religious reformations of the early sixteenth century.53 Giving a 
positive evaluation on what Herbert achieved by The Life and Raigne, another article 
of Jackson’s treated Herbert as a royal historian, and summarized Herbert’s various 
topics and aspects of the reign of the King.54  However, research on Herbert’s 
historical works is still at an early stage. Key issues remain to be examined, such as 
Herbert’s attitude towards King Henry and towards martyrs. Moreover, so far no 
study has been done on another short piece of Herbert’s work, ‘On the King’s 
Supremacy in the Church’, which he was commissioned to write by King Charles I.  
Herbert’s views on contemporary religious and political issues represent a topic 
that is well worth investigating, but that hitherto has not been carefully examined. 
This thesis focuses on Herbert’s contribution to three such debates: those concerning 
the royal supremacy over the Church, the relationship between King and Parliament, 
and the lawfulness of resistance to tyrants. All three issues assumed fundamental 
significance during the later decades of Herbert’s life. The royal supremacy formed 
not only the core tenet of the English Reformation instigated by King Henry VIII, but 
also the justification used by King Charles I to launch his Church reforms in the 
1630s, while the Puritans argued that Charles abused it to create new doctrines and 
liturgies.55 The relationship between King and Parliament deteriorated significantly 
during the reign of Charles I, especially once he embarked on his eleven-year personal 
rule after several fierce clashes with Parliament in the late 1620s. The development of 
this relationship also generated crucial constitutional issues, such as the nature and 
                                                     
53 Christine Jackson, ‘Lord Herbert of Cherbury and the Presentation of the Henrician Reformation in 
His Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth’, The Seventeenth Century 28, no. 2 (2013): 139–161. 
54 Christine Jackson, ‘“It Is Impossible to Draw His Picture Well Who Hath Several Countenances”:  
Lord Herbert of Cherbury and The Life and Raigne of King Henry the VIII’, in Henry VIII and History, 
ed. Thomas Freeman and Thomas Betteridge (Ashgate, 2012), 135–48. 
55 See section 3.1 below. 
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limit of the King’s prerogatives to levy non-parliamentary taxes, and the power of 
Parliament to prevent the King from abusing the law of the kingdom. The lawfulness 
of resistance to tyrants is the third core issue of this thesis. The issue of resistance 
came to prominence in the early 1640s, and was strongly contested by royalists and 
parliamentarians, since it was also a case of conscience or a moral dilemma for every 
subject. As a courtier and a member of the Short Parliament, Herbert was fully aware 
of the development of the relationship between Charles and Parliament, and witnessed 
the clashes between the King and his opposition, though most of the time he did not 
personally get involved. This thesis investigates his views on these important 
contemporary issues of religion and politics, mainly using his ‘On the King’s 
Supremacy in the Church’, The Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth,56 and his 
collections currently deposited in the National Library of Wales (catalogue reference 
code E5/3). Meanwhile, his other printed philosophical and religious works, private 
letters, and manuscripts are also considered. By doing so this thesis will not only 
balance modern scholarship’s disproportionate attention to Herbert’s religious thought, 
but also improve our understanding of Herbert’s thought more generally, including its 
historical, religious, and philosophical aspects, and the interactions between the three.  
By examining Herbert’s views on contemporary issues of religion and politics, 
the thesis intends to show that these views reflected his belief in the freedom and 
authority of the individual’s conscience. His discussion of these issues was united by a 
common thread: a concern that the individual conscience should be protected from the 
harm posed by worldly insititutions and authorities. This thread connects Herbert’s De 
Veritate, his religious treatises, The Life and Raigne, and manuscript collections 
concerning issues of religion and politics. This finding will supplement the argument 
                                                     
56 Again, this includes three versions of The Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth: Jesus College 
Manuscripts 71-74, Ashmole 1143, and Bodleian 910. 
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proposed by those who have recently challenged Herbert’s reputation as a deist, 
contending that Herbert’s De Veritate and five religious common notions were eirenic 
in purpose and that they aimed to save people from the abuses of clergymen. While 
this argument is effective, it does not reach to the heart of Herbert’s concerns: his 
preoccupation with individual conscience. As I will show below, Herbert aimed to 
save people’s consciences from moral dilemmas derived not only from the authority 
of clergymen, but also from worldly authorities such as that of the king. 
 
Chapter 2 investigates Herbert’s theory of conscience and the similarities and 
differences between his theory and those of a group of contemporary writers on 
conscience, commonly known as the English casuists. It provides the essential 
understanding of Herbert’s idea of conscience to the following chapters. The first 
section discusses the definition of conscience of the English casuists. Conscience is 
both a rational faculty receiving moral principles, and an intellectual faculty applying 
them to a particular case. The authority of conscience was higher than those of 
worldly institutions, since it is the deputy of God in the mind of every human being. 
Conscience is bound to obey the law of God, while it is required to obey human laws 
when they do not contradict the former. The second section presents Herbert’s theory 
of conscience. Herbert agreed with the English casuists on several points, including 
the definition and the authority of conscience. However, Herbert prioritized the 
importance of common notions as the most reliable source of moral principles, while 
the English casuists had no such emphasis. In addition, Herbert particularly stressed 
that an individual should seek help from both the common notions and grace when 
having moral dilemmas, since he believed that the common notions and grace – or, 
universal providence and particular providence – help people to live moral lives and, 
in the end, lead them to salvation. 
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Chapter 3 investigates Herbert’s view on the scope and limit of the king’s power 
over the Church by examining his ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the Church’ and The 
Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth. It first shows Herbert’s justifications for 
supporting the royal supremacy against the papal supremacy, including the corruption 
of popes and the distance between England and Rome. Herbert’s arguments match 
contemporary views, but the key point is that Herbert used his philosophical theory to 
justify them. The chapter then reveals that Herbert agreed with the contemporary view 
that supremacy was a jurisdictional, rather than a sacerdotal matter. However, he 
stressed the powers that kings should not claim. This distinguishes his view from 
those of his contemporaries. Moreover, he emphasized that neither kings nor 
clergymen had the power to change the foundation of religion, i.e. the religious 
common notions. The last section demonstrates that although Herbert generally 
supported the royal supremacy, he did not think the King had the right to execute 
those who refused to take the oath of allegiance on grounds of conscience. He 
particularly denounced the Six Articles enacted in 1539 as laws prejudicial to the 
liberty of conscience. In Herbert’s view, therefore, conscience weighs more heavily 
than the royal supremacy, and this marks the limit of the king’s power over the 
Church. 
Having established in Chapter 3 that, in Herbert’s view, the King held supreme 
but not unlimited power over the Church, in Chapter 4 the thesis examines his view 
on the relationship between King and Parliament, particularly the issue of whether the 
power of Parliament could check royal prerogatives. It argues that Herbert was 
interested in the history of Parliament and that he believed that Parliament had the 
authority to protect subjects’ consciences from the oppressions of the unlawful 
commands of the King. By analysing his personal relationships, the first section 
shows that he shared with contemporary scholars and some members of the Commons 
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an interest in Parliament and its authority. The second section presents Herbert’s 
strong concern for Parliament in his The Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth. 
Laws passed in Parliament held high authority, and opinions of Members of 
Parliament, including those opposed to the King’s policies, received much respect 
from King Henry. In addition, that Herbert inserted his opinions in speeches of MPs 
indicated that these speeches had great value to Herbert. By analyzing Herbert’s 
private collection deposited in the National Library of Wales, the third section reveals 
that he collected various manuscripts related to Parliament, including its records, 
proceedings, and resolutions and works on Parliament. Among these collections, a set 
of treatises on the antiquity of Parliament and various manuscripts on its authority 
strongly suggest that Herbert in principle agreed that Parliament held the highest 
sovereignty in the kingdom, and that it was Parliament’s duty to protect people’s 
consciences from the oppression of the unlawful commands of the King. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the lawfulness of resistance to tyrants, a controversial issue 
which emerged in the early 1640s after the relationship between Charles I and 
Parliament continued to deteriorate. This chapter argues that Herbert agreed in 
principle that Parliament could lead the people to resist, and the resistance was lawful 
in point of conscience. The first section presents the answer the English casuists gave 
to this question. They all maintained that the people could disobey the unlawful 
command of a king, but by no means could they resist. The second section reveals 
both royalists’ and parliamentarians’ arguments and shows that Herbert’s collections 
reflected the parliamentarians’ key points. Like the English casuists, both royalists 
and parliamentarians used moral principles derived from nature, Scripture, and human 
laws, and both held that conscience held high authority. Both sides also agreed that 
the people could disobey the unlawful commands of a king, and that the King’s 
abusing laws cannot justify the people’s taking up arms. However, each side used 
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different interpretations of Scripture and laws of the kingdom to reach different 
conclusions on the case. The royalists held that the King is under God only, and that 
he is above the laws of the kingdom and the people; hence, the people could not resist. 
By contrast, the parliamentarians maintained that the King is under both God and the 
laws of the realm, that the king’s power is limited, and that the safety of the people 
precedes the king’s prerogatives. Presenting the parliamentarians’ key arguments, 
Herbert’s collections held that when the king became a tyrant, inferior magistrates or 
Parliament could lawfully lead the people to resist. 
 By focusing on hitherto neglected sources, namely Herbert’s historical works and 
manuscripts in his private collections, Chapters 3, 4, and 5 demonstrate that Herbert’s 
concern for the controversy of the royal supremacy, the relationship between the King 
and Parliament, and the issue of resistance to tyrants reflected a common 
preoccupation with the moral dilemmas suffered by subjects in his own time. His 
views on these issues also reflected his conviction that the authority of individual 
conscience was higher than those of worldly institutions and should be protected. 
These findings challenge the impression that the five religious common notions 
formed the most important part of Herbert’s thought, and that the significance of his 
work is best understood in the intellectual context of the late seventeenth century and 
early eighteenth century – especially the development of anti-clerical and deistical 
thought. In fact, as this thesis will show, Herbert had a very close connection with 
developments in early seventeenth-century thought, and he was concerned with many 
important contemporary cases of conscience. 
 
1.2 Herbert’s collections of Religion and Politics in the National Library of Wales 
 
Herbert’s collections deposited at the National Library of Wales, in addition to his The 
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Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth and ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the 
Church’, provided crucial evidence of Herbert’s views on contemporary matters of 
religion and politics. Among these collections, modern scholars have hitherto 
examined and used manuscripts of Herbert’s autobiography (catalogue reference code 
E/1), religious treatises (E/2), verses (E/3), and some letters (E/4, E5/4, and E/6),57 
but they have omitted 49 items concerning King, Parliament and affairs of state 
(E/5/3).58 Most of these items were unidentified manuscripts, and only Mario M. 
Rossi has paid attention to them and has provided his transcriptions of some 
manuscripts (E5/3/44, a part of E5/3/45, and E5/3/49) with his notes.59 These sources 
deserve more attention partly because Herbert spent half of his life collecting them, 
and partly because they consist of a large portion of Herbert’s collections. This section 
will first provide a brief history of the provenance and circulation of Herbert’s 
collections, and then examine the origins and contents of six key manuscripts 
concerning contemporary issues of religion and politics. These sources will be further 
used in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
1.2.1 A brief history of Herbert’s collections 
 
The history of Herbert’s collections can be traced back to the 1630s when he became 
a scholar and wrote the history of King Henry VIII. Herbert collected a large amount 
of printed works and private papers during this period and continued doing so until his 
death. Although the detailed history of their circulation is difficult to investigate, it is 
                                                     
57 Julia Griffin, ‘Studies in the Literary Life of Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury.’ (University of 
Oxford, 1993); John Shuttleworth, ed., The Life of Edward, First Lord Herbert of Cherbury (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1976); W. J. Smith, ed., Herbert Correspondence (Cardiff: University of 
Wales Press, 1963); Wright, ‘An Unpublished Manuscript by Lord Herbert of Cherbury Entitled 
“Religio Laici”’.  
58 In addition to E5/3, E5/1 contains several scattered folios of The Life and Raigne of King Henry the 
Eighth, while E5/2 is a manuscript of The Expedition to the Isle of Rhe. 
59 Rossi, La vita, le opere, i tempi di Edoardo Herbert di Chirbury, vols III, 492–504. 
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still possible to construct a general overview based on the surviving collections now 
kept in libraries around the world. Jesus College, Oxford, is the first library to have 
acquired a part of Herbert’s collections: about 931 volumes – mainly in Greek and 
Latin – were bequeathed to it after Herbert’s death.60 These books were handed over 
to Dr. Chaunsell, head of Jesus College, under the supervision of John Selden and Sir 
Henry Herbert.61 Jesus College seems to be the only library that obtained a bequest 
from Herbert, and the remaining collections then became the family’s heritage kept by 
his heirs. By the mid-eighteenth century, Herbert’s heritage and collection belonged to 
Henry Arthur Herbert (1703-1772), who came from the Herbert family of Dolguog 
and was created Baron of Herbert of Cherbury in 1743. Five years later, he received 
the further title of Earl of Powis, which meant that he inherited all the heritage of the 
Herbert families (the Cherbury branch, the Powis Castle branch, and the Montgomery 
and Dolguog branch).62 Meanwhile, Herbert’s collections were mixed with those of 
other family members. From this time till the mid-twentieth century, Powis Castle 
kept these collections and provided private access to readers such as Horace Walpole 
(1717-1797), who borrowed the manuscript of the autobiography of Edward Herbert 
from Henry Arthur Herbert,63 and Mario M. Rossi, who analyzed and ‘rearranged’ the 
                                                     
60 Peter Beal, Index of English Literary Manuscripts. Vol.1, 1450-1625 (London: Mansell, 1980), 169. 
61 See the letter from John Selden to Sir Henry Herbert, Nov. 1, 1648. Rebecca Warner, Epistolary 
Curiosities: Series the First: Consisting of Unpublished Letters of the Seventeenth Century, Illustrative 
of the Herbert Family, and of the Reigns of James I., Charles I., Charles II., James II., and William III. 
(Bath: Printed by R. Cruttwell, 1818), 39–40. There is a catalogue for these books, see Christian James 
Fordyce and Thomas Malcolm Knox, ‘The Library of Jesus College, Oxford: With an Appendix on the 
Books Bequethed Thereto by Lord Herbert of Cherbury’, Proceedings and Papers of the Oxford 
Bibliographical Society, 1937, 75–115. 
62  ‘Herbert of Cherbury Manuscripts and Papers- National Library of Wales Archives and 
Manuscripts’, accessed 16 March 2016, 
https://archives.library.wales/index.php/herbert-of-cherbury-manuscripts-and-papers-2. 
63 See the original dedication by Walpole to Henry Arthur Herbert. Edward Herbert, The Life of 
Edward Lord Herbert of Cherbury, Written by Himself, ed. Horace Walpole (Strawberry-Hill, 1764). 
According to James Granger (1723-1776), the first edition of Herbert’s autobiography only had 200 
copies, which were equally divided between Earl of Powis and Walpole. James Granger, A 




collections in the 1940s.64 
In the twentieth century the Herbert family collections at Powis Castle started to 
be transferred to libraries around the world. The National Library of Wales acquired 
the lion’s share. According to the information provided by its catalogue, it was 
Edward Robert Henry Herbert, the fifth Earl of Powis, who deposited them in 1956 
and 1965, and since then these collections have been rearranged many times. The 
present catalogue shows that the Herbert family collections are divided into four 
groups,65 among which Herbert of Cherbury’s collection is the largest. In addition to 
the National Library of Wales’ acquisition, the British Library and the National 
Archive of Kew collected some materials as well; the former owns some of Herbert’s 
literary works (mainly in BL Add. MSS, Harley MSS, Sloane MSS and Egerton 
MSS),66 and the latter acquired thirteen volumes of Herbert family papers and 
Herbert’s correspondence and diplomatic papers.67 Moreover, other libraries around 
the world obtained about 230 books of Herbert’s collections from Powis Castle in 
various sales, notably at Sotheby’s, on 16 January 1956 and 20 March 1967.68 
 
1.2.2 An analysis of Herbert’s collections of religion and politics 
 
                                                     
64 Beal, Index of English Literary Manuscripts. Vol.1, 1450-1625, 168. It is a pity that Beal did not 
state how Rossi rearranged them. 
65 They are: (1) Edward Herbert, first baron Herbert of Cherbury, manuscripts and papers, (2) Herbert 
family of Cherbury and Dolguog papers, (3) Herbert family of Powis Castle papers, and (4) 
miscellaneous political and literary papers. 
66 For the list of the Herbert collection in the British Library, please see Index of Manuscripts in the 
British Library., vol. 5 (Cambridge: Chadwyck-Healey, 1984), 245. And there is a very brief 
introduction of Herbert’s letters of the Harley MSS, please see A Catalogue of the Harleian 
Manuscripts in the British Museum, vol. 1 (London: Printed by GEyre and AStrahan, 1808), 137 and 
vols. 2, 137. 
67 Beal, Index of English Literary Manuscripts. Vol.1, 1450-1625, 168. The list of libraries that owned 
Herbert’s collections are, according to Beal, Cambridge University Library, the Huntington Library, 
Yale University Library, Trinity College Library (Dublin), St John’s College Library (Cambridge), the 
Fitzwilliam Museum (Cambridge) and Harvard University Library. Herbert’s collection in the National 
Archive of Kew could mainly be found by the shelf-mark PRO/30/53.  




Six manuscripts concerning matters of religion and politics will be introduced here 
before being used in Chapters 4 (‘The Relationship between the King and Parliament’) 
and 5 (‘Conscience and Resistance in the Early English Civil War: ‘Whether 
Conscience Grants that the People could Resist a Tyrant?’’). They are: ‘Of the 
Antiquity of Parliament’ (E5/3/30), ‘Arguments in Parliament Concerning the Liberty 
of the Subject’ (E5/3/34), ‘Discourse on the High Court of Parliament and the 
Authority of the Same’ (E5/3/42), ‘Account of 'ye present troubles'; and a Treatise on 
Obedience to Magistrates’ (E5/3/44), ‘Treatise on the Powers of King and Parliament’ 
(E5/3/46), and ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative and the Right of Parliament to 
Resist Royal Power’ (E5/3/49). Most of the manuscripts are copies transcribed from 
other works, the origins and authors of which are not specified. As mentioned, these 
manuscripts have barely been noticed by most modern scholars, with the notable 
exception of Mario M. Rossi, who published transcriptions of some of them with his 
notes, but still did not identify their origins. 69  A fresh transcription of these 
manuscripts is provided in the Appendix to this thesis. In this section, I will reveal the 
original works and their authors – except E5/3/44 and E5/3/42, since both manuscripts 
provide no clue for their authorship – and their main contents one by one. After this is 
done, I will disclose an additional manuscript in Herbert’s collection ‘Notes on the 
King, Parliament and the Civil War’ (E5/3/45), which also touched the topic of 
Chapter 5, but its main argument, as I will show, was neither relevant nor 
contradictory to that of the same chapter. 
 Herbert’s collection ‘Of the Antiquity of Parliament’ (E5/3/30) consists of 19 
folios with five short treatises written in a professional secretary hand. Among these 
five treatises, four bear the name of their authors; they are Sir John Dodderidge 
[Doddridge] (1555-1628), Francis Tate (1560-1616), William Camden (1551-1623), 
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and Joseph Holland (d. 1605). The topic and the authors indicate the origin of this 
manuscript. It belongs to the works of the Society of Antiquaries, which thrived from 
1590 to 1607 and was composed of many lawyers, scholars, and heralds. The 
members held conference from time to time and shared their papers with each other. 
Other manuscripts with the same content of ‘Of the Antiquity of Parliament’ have 
already been studied by Pauline Croft, who found out that this set of articles was 
widely circulated in early seventeenth century England and that they were likely 
composed between 1604 and 1605.70 Thus, Herbert’s collection is obviously a copy. 
Although it is not certain at what time Herbert obtained this manuscript, it is 
reasonable to suppose that he might have owned a copy before the early 1630s for the 
following three reasons: because this set of articles had a large number of copies at 
that time, because Herbert was a colleague of Sir Robert Cotton (the fifth author of 
Herbert’s manuscript) in the Council of War,71 and because Herbert had access to 
royal libraries and Cotton’s Library when writing the history of King Henry VIII.72 
Moreover, according to William Lewis, after Herbert left France, he was collecting 
the works of William Camden.73 
 It seems, at first glance, that ‘Of the Antiquity of Parliament’ is a complete 
manuscript with its title and ending. However, a comparison of this manuscript with 
those published in 1658 and in 1771 reveals this not to be the case. Herbert’s version 
lacks two very short treatises, composed by an anonymous author and Arthur Agard 
                                                     
70 Pauline Croft, ‘Sir John Dodderidge, King James I, and the Antiquity of Parliament’, Parliaments, 
Estates and Representation 12, no. 2 (1992): 99 and 104. The materials Croft used comes from Thomas 
Hearne, A Collection of Curious Discourses (W. and J. Richardson, 1771), 281–310. However, this set 
of articles was first published in 1658. See John Dodderidge, The Several Opinions of Sundry Learned 
Antiquaries (London: Printed for William Leake, 1658), 1–96. 
71 William Douglas Hamilton, ed., Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of Charles 
I (London, Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, & Roberts, 1858), vols XLI, 494. 
72 Christine Jackson, ‘Lord Herbert of Cherbury and the Presentation of the Henrician Reformation in 
His Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth’, Seventeenth Century 28, no. 2 (2013): 144; Edward 
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(1540-1615) respectively. A possible explanation for this absence might be that their 
viewpoints were already covered and discussed by other authors. Herbert’s 
manuscript also lacks the former part of Dodderidge’s treatise, which implied the 
radical view that Parliament preceded the monarchy in history. This means that the 
copyist only transcribed the latter part of Sir John Dodderidge’s treatise which 
introduced the composition of Parliament. It is tempting to think that Herbert might 
have asked the copyist not to transcribe the former part of Dodderidge’s treatise 
because of its radical implications. However, this is unlikely to be the case: as I will 
show in Chapter 4, other manuscripts (E5/3/42 and E5/3/46) agreed that Parliament 
preceded the monarchy. It is more likely that both the original manuscript and 
Herbert’s copy (E5/3/30) lack the former part of Dodderidge’s treatise, since 
Dodderidge’s treatise in E5/3/30 bears the title ‘Of the Antiquity of Parliament’ as 
others had and there is no page missing in this manuscript.  
 Treatises in ‘Of the Antiquity of Parliament,’ usually consisting of an 
introduction to the history of Parliament, its composition, and the duty of the King to 
attend it, argued that the history of Parliament could be traced back at least to the 
Saxons; only Dodderidge said that it was as long as human history.74 Francis Tate, for 
instance, stated that the history of English Parliament was immemorial and that 
Parliament ‘contynued here in the tyme of the Saxons, Danes, and Normans’, while 
William Camden argued that institutions similar to Parliament existed ‘before the 
Romanes arrival’.75 In addition to their common argument, it is worth noting that 
Dodderidge’s treatise presented an interesting point that the Commons were 
                                                     
74 This idea was welcomed by Parliament in the late sixteenth century and became more prevalent 
afterwards. Meanwhile, the contrary view held by Arthur Hall of Grantham, that there was no 
Parliament before 1236, was suppressed by Parliament in 1581. See Croft, ‘Sir John Doddridge, King 
James I, and the Antiquity of Parliament’, 103.  
75 ‘Of the Antiquity of Parliament’ (National Library of Wales, n.d.), fols 8, 10. Also see John 
Dodderidge, The Several Opinions of Sundry Learned Antiquaries, 65–66, 74; Thomas Hearne, A 
Collection of Curious Discourses, 301, 303. The spelling I followed Herbert’s collection.  
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indispensable when summoning a Parliament. Dodderidge said that ‘if the Comons 
doe not appeare, there can be noe Parliament though all the great peeres of the 
Parliament were present with the King; For the proctors, knighte, Cittizens and 
Burgesses of the Realme doe represent the whole’.76 This point was so radical that it 
could be said to have implied the supremacy of the Commons over the Lords, which 
was later put into practice on 4 January 1649 when the Commons declared its absolute 
sovereignty and abolished the Lords. 
Like ‘Of the Antiquity of Parliament’, ‘Arguments in Parliament Concerning the 
Liberty of the Subject’ (E5/3/34) was written in a professional secretary hand. As its 
given titles and times ‘1628 April 7–May 16’ suggest, it comes from the 
Parliamentary debate wherein the Commons resolved that the liberty of the subject 
should be protected. This resolution was a prelude to the Petition of Right and it was 
mainly against the king’s and his privy council’s unlawful taxation and imprisonment 
of subjects without showing cause. After the resolution was made, the Commons on 
the same day sent four people, including Sir Dudley Digges (1583-1639), Edward 
Littleton (1589-1645), John Selden (1584-1654), and Edward Coke (1552-1634), to 
hold a meeting with the Lords in order to persuade them to support their resolution.77 
Their speeches, published in 1642, were exactly the origin of this manuscript.78 
Although the surviving manuscript was incomplete since it only encompassed the 
addresses of Digges and Littleton, the final and separated page that came after the 
speeches of Selden and Coke suggests that the original manuscript, at least, included 
                                                     
76 ‘Of the Antiquity of Parliament’, fol. 5. Also see John Dodderidge, The Several Opinions of Sundry 
Learned Antiquaries, 38; Thomas Hearne, A Collection of Curious Discourses, 292.  
77 Robert C Johnson et al., Commons Debates, 1628, vol. 2 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 
332; John Rushworth, Historical Collections Of Private Passages of State, vol. 1 (London: D. Browne, 
1721), 525–27; The Parliamentary or Constitutional History of England, vol. 7 (London: Printed; and 
sold by T . Osborne; and W. Sandby, 1751), 407–9.  
78 A Conference Desired by the Lords and Had by a Committee of Both Houses, Concerning the Rights 




all the speeches of this meeting.79 But it is doubtful whether it included the long 
debates which followed until 16 May, as the given title suggests. 
 ‘Discourse on the High Court of Parliament and the Authority of the Same’ 
(E5/3/42), also written in a professional secretary hand, is a booklet consisting of 34 
folios. The manuscript stated that it was extracted from some ‘good Authors,’ seven of 
whom were named in the manuscript.80 Among these seven authors, Edward Coke 
was the most important since his work Reports (1572-1617) was widely cited 
throughout the manuscript, including the preface, 4th part, 7th part, 8th part, 9th part, 
10th part, and 11th part.81 John Fortescue held the second place in importance, and his 
work De laudibus legum Angliae was often quoted as well. From this information we 
can conclude that the manuscript was completed no earlier than 1617, though it is 
most likely that it was composed during the early 1640s, as the following two 
paragraphs will indicate. 
 E5/3/42 argued that Parliament held the highest sovereignty and, meanwhile, that 
the King had no arbitrary power over the kingdom. The manuscript opens with the 
maxim ‘where noe Councell is, the people fall, but where many Councellors are, there 
is health’ (Proverbs 11:14), indicating that Parliament was the best means to preserve 
the public safety and tranquillity. It then discusses, in turn, the antiquity of Parliament 
(fol. 1v), the purpose or end of Parliament (fol. 2r), the process of summoning 
Parliament (fol. 2v-9v), the prerogative and duty of the members and their attendants 
and servants of Parliament (fol. 10r, 13v, 15r-15v), the places and sittings in 
                                                     
79 The content of this manuscript includes the following pages of the printed version which is a 
91-pages book. See Ibid., 1-12, 16-21, 72.  
80 The seven authors are Edward Coke (1552-1634), John Davis (1550-1605), John Fortescue (c. 
1397–1479), Edmund Plowden (1518–1585), Thomas Egerton (1540-1617), Christopher Brooke (c. 
1570-1628), and Henry de Bracton (1210-1268). 
81 Edward Coke, The Selected Writings and Speeches of Sir Edward Coke, ed. Steve Sheppard, 3 vols. 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2003). 
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Parliament (fol. 17r-22v),82 the power of the Lords to examine the error of the King’s 
Bench (fol. 24r), the process of enacting a law (fol. 25r-26r), the King’s prerogative 
and Parliament as the highest court (fol. 27v-32r).  
E5/3/42 is likely to have been composed during the early 1640s when King 
Charles and the Long Parliament were contending for the kingdom’s sovereignty. It 
claims that Parliament, not the King, held the sovereignty on three grounds. The first 
point was that Parliament originated in the time of the Saxons – echoeing the main 
theme of manuscript E5/3/30. Moreover, E5/3/42 claims that Parliament’s 
jurisdictional power remained unchanged after William the Conqueror ascended the 
throne as the King of England. This point showed that the antiquity of Parliament was 
greater than that of the Crown. The second point argued that the King and the 
clergymen were summoned to Parliament,83 implying that the King was only a part of 
Parliament and that it was not the King who created Parliament. The third point was 
cited from the statement of John Fortescue that the ‘acte of Parliam[en]t and statute in 
England are not made only by the Prince pleasure but alsoe by the assent of the whole 
Realme’.84 The anonymous author said that the King had his prerogative, such as 
summoning Parliament and Convocation and remitting the penalty of a subject by 
proclaimations,85 but that the King’s prerogative was ‘Royall only and not pollitique 
over his subiectes’.86 The King’s prerogative was not unlimited, and actions such as 
confiscating and forfeiting the property and land of a subject could ‘only [be done] by 
authority of this high Courte of Parliament’.87 
Among the three remaining manuscripts, I will discuss ‘Treatise on the Powers 
                                                     
82 These included Vicegerent, King’s heir and successors, Archbishop of Canterbury, other Bishops, 
Lord Chancellor, Lord Treasurer, Lord President, Lord Privy Seal, Lord Constable, Lord Marshal, Lord 
Admiral, and Lord Steward. 
83 ‘Discourse on the High Court of Parliament and the Authority of the Same’, fol. 27v. 
84 Ibid., fol. 10r. 
85 Ibid., fol. 32r. 
86 Ibid., fol. 32r. 
87 Ibid., fol. 30r. 
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of King and Parliament’ (E5/3/46) first since it focuses on the very core of the conflict 
of the English Civil War – who, the King or Parliament, has the highest sovereignty in 
the kingdom? Then the discussion will shift to ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative and 
the Right of Parliament to Resist Royal Power’ (E5/3/49) and ‘Account of 'ye present 
troubles'; and a Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’ (E5/3/44). Both of these 
manuscripts focus on a secondary but still a very crucial controversy during the civil 
war: whether subjects or Parliament could lawfully resist a tyrant. 
‘Treatise on the Powers of King and Parliament’ (E5/3/46) is an incomplete work 
that contains eight folios without its title and ending. Some pages may be missing 
since the contents of folios 4v and 5r do not match. Moreover, it is doubtful that the 
order of these folios is correct since the first word of folio 1r is the same as the last 
word of the last page. After analyzing the content, I determined that this manuscript 
comes from The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes (1643) by William 
Prynne (1600-1669), who was an MP and a well-known propagandist of the Long 
Parliament. After comparing the manuscript to the published version, I am certain that 
the order of this manuscript is incorrect. 88  Starting from ‘allay, abolish, and 
resume…’, folio 5r should be the first folio. The last folio, then, should be folio 4v, 
which starts from ‘Royall assent is simply necessary…’.89 When read in this order, 
the content of this manuscript becomes more coherent. 
After confirming the folio order, the next step is to analyze how and what the 
copyist (I believe he is Herbert, as I will explain after the discussion of E5/3/44) 
                                                     
88 William Prynne, The Treachery and Disloyalty of Papists to Their Soveraignes: Together with the 
First Part of the Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes (London: Printed for Michael 
Sparke, senior, 1643). This book was first published on 28 March 1643, and what I refer to here is the 
enlarged second edition published in May 1643. Its title, thus, is slightly different from that of the first 
edition. I use the second edition because the printing errors are fewer, and because it encompassed the 
whole content of Herbert’s manuscript (E5/3/46). In the following, I refer this work as The Soveraigne 
Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes, its most familiar title. 
89 But I will still follow the original order when I cite it in order to let readers have quick and easy 
access to it.  
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transcribed from Prynne’s work. The surviving manuscript was, in fact, a copy 
transcribed from the first part of The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and 
Kingdomes, from page 40 till page 105. It was transcribed by skipping most of the 
historical illustrations and only writing down the points of principle and 
fundamentals.90 However, the scope of the original manuscript is very likely to be 
larger than this range (from page 40 to 105) since what we see today is a surviving 
manuscript. Some folios transcribing the contents before that of 5r – i.e. Prynne’s 
work from pages 1 to 40 – and after that of 4v – i.e. Prynne’s work from page 106 to 
112 – may be missing since the first folio 5r starts in the middle of a sentence and the 
last folio 4v ends in the same manner. In brief, originally ‘Treatise on the Powers of 
King and Parliament’ must have been a complete work, though only eight folios 
presently survive. This conjecture is supported by internal evidence. After a more 
detailed study of Prynne’s work, I found out that the point made on page 40 (‘the 
whole kingdome in Parliament, may not onely augment, but likewise abridge, allay, 
abolish, and resume some branches of the Kings royall power and prerogative…’) is 
the fourth point of the proposition on page 33 (‘the High Court of Parliament, and 
whole kingdome which it represents, may in diverse respects be truly and properly 
said, to be the Highest Soveraigne power of all others, and above the King himselfe’). 
This proposition is the third one used to answer the challenge raised on page 5 (the 
royalists’ accusation that Parliament ‘trayterously invaded the Kings Prerogatives’). 
This finding means that the copyist must have also transcribed the question and 
propositions from page 1 to 39 before he transcribed the points in page 40; otherwise, 
the transcription would commence in the middle of a sentence and with a subordinate 
point. Likewise, it is very probable that the original manuscript continued until the 
                                                     
90 For instance, the copyist skipped all the examples in the English history of Parliament disposing the 
crown. Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes, 79–85. 
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very end of the first part of Prynne’s work. The surviving manuscript stops in the 
middle of a sentence when transcribing the fourteenth point in page 105, but the 
remaining pages from 106 to 112 belong to the same point. To sum up, the original 
manuscript must have encompassed the whole first part of Prynne’s work. 
 However, it is doubtful whether the original manuscript encompassed the second, 
the third, and the fourth parts of The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and 
Kingdomes, since the remaining folios do not include any content transcribed from 
these later parts. Moreover, although Prynne’s work was often published as one book 
with four parts, the publication date of each part varied, and each of them was 
published many times separately during the Civil War. Herbert was also likely to have 
been more interested in the first part of Prynne’s work – the theoretical discourses on 
Parliament’s sovereignty over the crown – than the remaining parts, which were 
detailed justifications of the Militia Ordinance and of several radical powers and 
privileges of Parliament including imprisoning and restraining ‘malignants’ without 
the King’s consent. This supposition is based on the following reason. From Herbert’s 
philosophical works we know that he sought to avoid commenting on specific 
controversial issues. He wrote De Veritate with the aim ‘not of arousing controversy, 
but of closing it’,91 and his De Religione Laici shows that it is impossible to know 
every controversy around the world.92 Thus, it is probable that Herbert was more 
interested in Prynne’s theoretical points, than in their radical applications set out in the 
later parts. 
 The main theme of The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes is that 
Parliament is ‘the Highest Soveraigne power of all others, and above the King 
                                                     
91 DV, 74.  
92 DRL, 103, 109. 
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himselfe’.93 It was composed at a time when the central consensus on the principle of 
King-in-Parliament could not be maintained.94 Representing the Long Parliament’s 
stance, Prynne’s treatise was one of the classical works during the Civil War not only 
because it favoured Parliament’s power over the King’s in principle but also because 
it justified Parliament in taking up arms against the King and assuming executive 
powers.95 
 The remaining two manuscripts – ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative and the 
Right of Parliament to Resist Royal Power’ (E5/3/49) and ‘Account of 'ye present 
troubles'; and a Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’ (E5/3/44) – focus on the 
question of resistance to tyrants. The former manuscript contains only two sheets and 
presents five questions and their answers. The latter was written in six sheets 
incorporating two separate treatises: the first is ‘A Short Narration of Occurrences in 
the Kingdome of Scotland, and of the Present Troubles, Together with Their Causes, 
and Progression’ (folios 1r-2v) and the other is titled ‘Questions Touching upon 
Obedience to Magistrates in Eminency’ (folios 3r-6r). Both manuscripts were written 
in secretary hand with numerous difficult contractions. Mario M. Rossi provided 
transcriptions in the Appendix of his work, but did not provide more detailed 
explanations. 96  Besides, it also appears that the second sheet of the second 
                                                     
93 The structure of the first part of The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes is as follows. 
Prynne first presented the royalists’ challenge that Parliament encroached on the King’s power on 
levying taxes, jurisdiction, and his legislative power. (Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments 
and Kingdomes, 5.) Then he answered with two main arguments. First, what the Long Parliament did 
was not an invention, and it did not infringe upon the King’s power. According to Prynne, it was papists, 
not Parliament, who had ‘sent out Writs and summoned Parliaments in the Kings name, and forced the 
King to call a Parliament without and against his full consent.’(Prynne, 9–32.) Secondly, Parliament is 
above the King since it represents the kingdom. This proposition was supported by seven points and the 
seventh point was supported by a further fourteen points. (Prynne, 33–112.) 
94 David L Smith, The Stuart Parliaments, 1603-1689 (London; New York; New York: Arnold; 
Co-published in the U.S.A. by Oxford University Press, 1999), 129–31. Jeffrey Denys Goldsworthy, 
The Sovereignty of Parliament History and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon, 2001), 78–141. 
95 For more detailed arguments from Prynne, see section 3 of chapter 4. 
96 Rossi, La vita, le opere, i tempi di Edoardo Herbert di Chirbury, vols III, 492–499. 
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manuscript (E5/3/44) has been erroneously replaced by another;97 the content of the 
first page does not match with the second, and the content of the second is different 
from that transcribed by Rossi in the 1940s. However, this issue will not affect the 
discussions in Chapters 4 and 5 since both chapters’ focuses have little relationship 
with the content of ‘A Short Narration of Occurrences in the Kingdome of Scotland, 
and of the Present Troubles, Together with Their Causes, and Progression’. Hence, my 
analysis in the following paragraphs will focus on ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative 
and the Right of Parliament to Resist Royal Power’ (E5/3/49) and ‘Questions 
Touching upon Obedience to Magistrates in Eminency’ (the latter part of E5/3/44). 
After transcribing ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative’ (E5/3/49), I found out that 
it originates from The Glorious Name of God, the Lord of Hosts (1643) by Jeremiah 
Burroughs (1600-1646), an Independent minister. Having been suspended and 
deprived of his living in 1636 and 1637 respectively for refusing to accept the new 
rituals of Laudianism and the Book of Sports, Burroughs moved to the Netherlands 
until the Long Parliament gained control.98 It was when he came back to England that 
he published The Glorious Name of God, the Lord of Hosts with the permission and 
support of the Long Parliament. 
 At first glance, ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative’ seems to be an incomplete 
manuscript since it only contains five questions with answers. The content of the 
manuscript shows that the copyist transcribed from page 27 to page 35, focusing on 
the dialogue about whether the people or Parliament could resist a tyrant. Moreover, 
this manuscript heavily condensed Burroughs’ sentences and skipped all his biblical 
                                                     
97 The date of my access to these manuscripts was September 2015. 
98 James Reid, Memoirs of the Lives and Writings of Those Eminent Divines, vol. 1 (Paisley: Printed 
by Stephen and Andrew Young, 1811), 155–56. Burroughs published Irenicum (1646) in his later years, 
attempting to ‘heal divisions among Christians’. This work might share the same motivation with 
Herbert’s religious works, but so far there is no further evidence showing any connection between 
Herbert and Burroughs. 
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illustrations. However, I argue that even with these five questions with answers only, 
it could be a complete manuscript when we consider further how the copyist 
transcribed Burroughs’ work. It was likely that discussions other than these five 
questions were not transcribed simply because they did not directly touch the topic – 
resisting a tyrant. Moreover, when we consider the fact that these five questions were 
transcribed perfectly with openings and endings (the ending of the last answer 
finished in the middle of the last page), we may reasonably say that the original 
manuscript may encompass these five questions only, and nothing more. 
‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative’ aimed to justify the Long Parliament’s 
resistance to King Charles with three main arguments. The first point claimed that the 
resistance was not against the King, but was ‘defensive onely, to defend our lawfull 
liberties, our estates, which we inherit as truly as the King inherits any thing he 
hath’.99 Moreover, the resistance aimed also to preserve the King’s safety and his 
power from evil counsellors. 100  The second main point argued that the Long 
Parliament was resisting the personal command of the King, not the authority of the 
King. As Burroughs stated, the resistance was ‘not against the King, being onely 
against his personall Co[mma]nd, not his legall power’.101 The third main point, 
echoing E5/3/46, stated that Parliament, not the King, held the sovereignty, since 
Parliament was the highest court in the kingdom and the place where the last appeal 
                                                     
99 Jeremiah Burroughs, The Glorious Name of God, the Lord of Hosts (London: Printed for RDawlman, 
1643), 27–28; ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative and the Right of Parliament to Resist Royal Power’ 
(National Library of Wales, n.d.), fol. 1r. Prynne also had the same opinion. See Prynne, The 
Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes, 112. It is worth noting that both sides claimed to act 
defensively. See Michael J. Braddick, ‘History, Liberty, Reformation and the Cause: Parliamentarian 
Military and Ideological Escalation in 1643’, in The Experience of Revolution in Stuart Britain and 
Ireland, ed. David L Smith and Michael J. Braddick (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 117. 
100 ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative and the Right of Parliament to Resist Royal Power’, fol. 1r; 
Burroughs, The Glorious Name of God, the Lord of Hosts, 28. As I have noted before, the copyist 
shortened Burroughs’ sentences; thus, in order to stay close to the text to which Herbert had access, the 
sentences cited here come from the manuscript not the printed version.  
101 Burroughs, The Glorious Name of God, the Lord of Hosts, 28. 
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was to be made.102 
 The origin of ‘Account of 'ye present troubles'; and a Treatise on Obedience to 
Magistrates’ (E5/3/44) remains obscure. It may have been written during the Civil 
War since the handwriting is the same as ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative’ (E5/3/49). 
The first short treatise of this manuscript, ‘A Short Narration of Occurrences in the 
Kingdome of Scotland, and of the Present Troubles, Together with their Causes, and 
Progression’, likely describes the revolt in Scotland in 1639 when Herbert headed 
north to join the King. The second treatise, ‘Questions Touching upon Obedience to 
Magistrates in Eminency’, is on the same topic as ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative’. 
It ends with the following words: ‘Read Bp[Bishop] Bilson of the true difference 
between Xian[Christian] subjection, and unxian[unchristian] Rebellion the 3d pt…’. 
This clue shows its connection with The True Difference Betweene Christian 
Subiection and Unchristian Rebellion (1586) by Thomas Bilson (1547-1616).103 
‘Questions Touching upon Obedience to Magistrates in Eminency’ seems to be 
not a transcription of Bilson’s published treatise, however, but a reflection or a new 
work composed after reading it. Three pieces of evidence were found by comparing 
the manuscript with Bilson’s treatise. The first piece of evidence is their dissimilar 
lengths. Bilson’s treatise contains up to fifty-nine pages of discussion on the topic of 
resistance to tyrants, while ‘Questions Touching upon Obedience to Magistrates in 
Eminency’ contains only four folios.104 Numerous dialogues were used in Bilson’s 
treatise, whereas only six questions with their answers are presented in the manuscript. 
                                                     
102 Burroughs, The Glorious Name of God, the Lord of Hosts, 30–31; ‘Treatise on the Royal 
Prerogative and the Right of Parliament to Resist Royal Power’, fol. 1v. CF: ‘The Courts or person to 
whom the last appeale is to be made, is the Supreamest power’. Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of 
Parliaments and Kingdomes, 93; ‘Treatise on the Powers of King and Parliament’ (National Library of 
Wales, n.d.), fol. 3v. 
103 Thomas Bilson, The True Difference Betweene Christian Subiection and Unchristian Rebellion 
(London: Imprinted by Iohn Iackson and Edmund Bollifant, 1586). 
104 Bilson, 255–313. ‘Account of “Ye Present Troubles”; and a Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’ 




It is impossible to condense all the points of Bilson’s treatise into six questions. The 
second piece of evidence is their different context. Bilson’s treatise was composed of 
countless debates between Theophilus the Christian and Philander the Jesuit. Bilson 
wrote it with an eye to defend the power of the King and the Anglican Church against 
the intervention of the Roman Catholic Church, which claimed that the Pope could 
depose the King and that the people could resist and assassinate the King. 105 
‘Questions Touching upon Obedience to Magistrates in Eminency’, in contrast, stands 
not in the context of Bilson’s treatise, but focuses only on the question of whether a 
tyrant could be resisted. The third piece of evidence is their different presentation. 
Although the points of Bilson’s treatise and those of the manuscript are similar, their 
wording varies greatly and a crucial illustration of the manuscript – the biblical case 
of David resisting Saul – could not be found in the third part of Bilson’s treatise.106 
These three pieces of evidence indicate that the manuscript is likely to be a new work, 
not merely a transcription or an abstract of Bilson’s treatise (a more detailed 
comparison will be presented in the following paragraphs).  
  It seems not to be a coincidence that Herbert had access to Bilson’s The True 
Difference Betweene Christian Subiection and Unchristian Rebellion. Bilson argued 
that subjects could resist a tyrant under some conditions, an argument that during the 
civil war soon drew the attention of those who favoured parliamentary sovereignty. 
Extracted from pages 279 to 280 of Bilson’s treatise, a selected piece of Bilson’s 
argument was first published in 1641 and again in 1643.107 This piece of information 
                                                     
105  William Richardson, ‘Bilson, Thomas (1546/7–1616)’, The Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, accessed 22 April 2016, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/2401. 
106 ‘A Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’, fols 4v-5r. 
107 For the 1641 edition, see Sir Walter Scott, A Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tracts, on the Most 
Interesting and Entertaining Subjects: Reign of King Charles I, vol. 4 (Printed for T. Cadell, W. Davies, 
1810), 29–30. For the 1643 edition, see Thomas Bilson, A Discourse upon Questions in Debate 
between the King and Parliament. With Certaine Observations Collected out of a Treatise Called, The 




indicates that Herbert might have composed ‘Questions Touching upon Obedience to 
Magistrates in Eminency’ when Bilson’s treatise was revived. Although it remains 
unknown which edition(s) of Bilson’s work Herbert was acquainted with, this 
question does not carry too much weight for our discussion since the content of the 
1641 and 1643 editions encompassed the whole argument that the English Parliament, 
representing the whole kingdom, had the power to resist a tyrant under some 
conditions.108 
 This manuscript E5/3/44 shows three main points. The first point confirms the 
established proposition that under no circumstances could private men take up arms 
against their princes.109 As the manuscript states, even though ‘Princes become 
Tyrants’, ‘no Private Person is warranted to lay his Hand upon the Lords anointed or 
to make Publique talke of his faults’.110 The second point, however, justifies the 
resistance to a tyrant under some conditions. Although private men are not entitled to 
resist a tyrant, ‘the nobles and peeres of a state’ have the power to do so. ‘Though one 
may not lay hands upon the Lords anointed’, the author wrote, ‘yet one may hold a 
mad mans hand’.111 Moreover, the nobles and peers could lawfully resist a tyrant 
since they ‘were standing as Protectors and defenders of the just Rights of a kingdom, 
and professing onely to keepe the King in his duty whether hee goes about and 
resolves to depopulate the states by insufferable Anarchie’.112 When resisting a tyrant, 
the nobles and peers ‘serve not the king, but the Crowne, and Countrey’.113 But it is 
                                                     
108 The third part of Bilson’s treatise contains 313 pages. Except pages 279 to 289, other pages deal 
mainly with the attacks and doubts of Philander the Jesuite and most of the cases discussed focus on 
the idea that there is neither religious nor political justification for resisting either a king or a tyrant. 
109 ‘Private man’ here means a person who is not a noble or a peer of the state. 
110 ‘A Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’, fol. 3r.  
111 Ibid., fol. 3v. I am indebted to Dr. Felicity Green for helping me decipher this sentence. Rossi had 
different transcription here: ‘though we may not lay hands upon the Lords anointed, yet one may held 
away mans hand.’ Rossi, La vita, le opere, i tempi di Edoardo Herbert di Chirbury, vol. III, 493. But I 
am afraid the phrase ‘held away mans hand’ did not have much sense in this context. 
112 ‘A Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’, fol. 5r. 
113 Ibid., fol. 4r.  
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worth noting here that this point does not justify the execution of a tyrant or a king as 
the Long Parliament did in 1649. The author stressed that ‘the Princes at first must 
moderately bee resisted’.114 And if ‘this mild remedy’ could not stop the tyranny, the 
nobles and peers could apply more extreme measures against their prince; at that time, 
they ‘may dethrone him’ when he infringes ‘his oath taken at his coronation’ and the 
‘covenante between him, and his Vassalle must bee lost into’.115 Thus, a stubborn 
tyrant should not be tried and executed by the nobles: ‘may hee as Saul fall upon his 
owne sword (1 Samuel 31:4)’.116 This statement implied that only God could punish 
princes, whereas the nobles could only stop his tyranny. The third point of the 
manuscript shows that the King could not act arbitrarily but should protect the 
people’s well-being. ‘The Law of God, and Nature teacheth that being now the father 
of the K[ing]dom, hee is not to waste his childrens Inheritance, indeed the peoples 
right, but to preserve and upheld it,’ the author said.117 After presenting this argument, 
the author gave a more striking statement that ‘for heere the people are more antient 
then the King; and for the people were kings ordained’.118  These three points 
basically fit the arguments of the moderate Parliamentarians: the Long Parliament 
could lawfully resist King Charles I, but they could not execute the King.119 
 The three main points of ‘Questions Touching upon Obedience to Magistrates in 
Eminency’ echoed the contents of Bilson’s treatise, but the manuscript should be 
considered a new work, not a transcription, because of the differences in wording. The 
                                                     
114 Ibid., fols. 3r-3v.  
115 ‘A Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’, fol. 3v. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid., fol. 5v. CF: Rossi’s transcription: ‘The law of God, & Nature teacheth that being now the 
father of the Kdome, hee is not to waste his childrens Inheritance, that is the popular right, but to 
preserve & enforce it’. Rossi, La vita, le opere, i tempi di Edoardo Herbert di Chirbury, 495. 
118 ‘A Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’, fol. 5v. 
119 Even though Parliament won the civil war, most of the Parliamentarians – not pamphleteers who 
doubted the need of a king – still sought for a settlement with the King before the Army decided to 




first point that under no circumstance could private men resist their princes was 
emphasized and repeated many times in Bilson’s treatise. When commenting on 
pagans resisting their prince, Bilson wrote that ‘They [pagans] had murdering of 
tyrants, which God hath prohibited to all Christians toward priuate men’,120 and that 
‘priuate men may disobey a wicked prince but not beare armes against him’.121 
Facing the tyranny of their princes, ‘the [Christian] subiect hath no refuge against his 
soueraigne, but only to God by praier and patience’.122 Likewise, the second point of 
the manuscript fitted the content of Bilson’s treatise, and it was also encompassed in 
the 1641 and 1643 editions. After maintaining that Protestant doctrines did not allow 
subjects to resist their prince, Bilson then presented an exception by saying that 
‘Cases may fall out even in Christian kingdoms, where the people may plead their 
right against the prince, and not be charged with rebellion’.123 Bilson then made a 
further explanation that ‘the nobles and commons’ could ‘joyne together to defend 
their ancient and accustomed liberty, regiment and laws’ if their prince ‘should goe 
about to subject his kingdome to a foraigne realme, or change the forme of the 
common-wealth from impery to tyranny, or neglect the laws established by common 
consent of prince and people to execute his owne pleasure’.124 Moreover, both the 
manuscript and Bilson’s treatise applied the same justification of the nobles and peers 
resisting their prince: ‘the laws of the land appoint the nobles as next to the king to 
assist him in doing right, and withhold him from doing wrong, then they be licensed 
                                                     
120 Bilson, The True Difference Betweene Christian Subiection and Unchristian Rebellion, 260.  
121 Ibid., 268. CF: ‘God neuer required the people to displace their king, but not to consent to his 
wickedness’. Ibid., 271. 
122 Ibid., 262. CF: ‘priuate men, they must hold great difference between doing and suffering 
wrong…neither is there here proposed any other remedy for priuate men that are vnder a tyrant, but the 
amending of their liues, and therewithal praiers and tears’. Ibid., 268. 
123 Scott, A Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tracts, 4:30; Bilson, The True Difference Betweene 
Christian Subiection and Unchristian Rebellion, 279–80; Bilson, A Discourse upon Questions in 
Debate between the King and Parliament. With Certaine Observations Collected out of a Treatise 
Called, The Diffrence between Christian Subjection, and Unchristian Rebellion., 15–16. 
124 Bilson, The True Difference Betweene Christian Subiection and Unchristian Rebellion, 279-280. 
38 
 
by mans law, and so not prohibited by Gods to interpose themselves for the safe-guard 
of equity and innocence; and by all lawfull and needful meanes to procure the prince 
to be reformed’.125 In brief, according to Bilson, the nobles and peers may resist a 
tyrant for saving the kingdom and the crown, an assertion that matches the second 
statement of the manuscript. 
 However, in addition to their different wordings and expression, the manuscript 
applied three additional biblical illustrations (1 Samuel 14:45, 2 Kings 9:34, and 1 
Samuel 25:21) to support its argument when presenting its second point – among 
which Bilson’s treatise touched only one illustration in a different context.126 This 
could be a simple but a crucial piece of evidence that the manuscript was not a 
transcription of Bilson’s treatise but a new work. Bilson’s treatise also agreed with the 
third point of the manuscript that the King could not act arbitrarily. The princes, said 
Bilson, could not infringe ‘the foundation, freedome, and forme of their 
common-wealth, which they [the people] foreprized when they first consented to have 
a king’.127 The commonwealth and its law were superior to the princes, according to 
                                                     
125 Ibid., 280. 
126 ‘A Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’, 3v-5r. The first illustration was the case ‘betweens Saul 
and Jonathan, where the people delivered the good sonne out of the bad fathers hands’; it was 
mentioned by Bilson in his treatise, but not when he justified the resistance of a tyrant under some 
extraordinary conditions. See Bilson, The True Difference Betweene Christian Subiection and 
Unchristian Rebellion, 271. The second illustration was the depiction of Jezebel. Even though she was 
an evil person, she ‘was honourable because she was a king’s daughter’. The third illustration was the 
case between David and Saul, which was widely cited and discussed during the civil war. Burroughs, 
for instance, mentioned this case in his work (see Burroughs, The Glorious Name of God, the Lord of 
Hosts, 38–39). However, this case could not be used to justify Parliament in resisting the King, 
according to Henry Ferne. Representing the royalist party, Ferne said that David was entitled to resist 
Saul ‘for he was anointed and designed by the Lord to succeed Saul, and therefore he might use an 
extraordinary way of safeguarding his person’ (see Henry Ferne, The Resolving of Conscience upon 
This Question: Whether upon Such a Supposition or Case, as Is Now Usually Made, [That] the King 
Will Not Discharge His Trust but Is Bent or Seduced to Subvert Religion, Lawes and Liberties, Subjects 
May Take up Arms and Resist? And Whether That Case Be Now? [Cambridge: Printed by Edward 
Freeman and Thomas Dunster, 1642], 5). In order to refute Ferne’s point, Burroughs chose to 
reinterpret not this case but the meaning of anointing. Burroughs maintained that anointing was not the 
king’s prerogative. The Bible shows that churches, priests, prophets, magistrates, and captains could be 
anointed too, said Burroughs; furthermore, ‘the Anointing here is apparently meant of the people of 
God, of the Church, of the Saints…and Kings should not touch people that are Gods Anointed’ 
(Burroughs, The Glorious Name of God, the Lord of Hosts, 36–38). 
127 CF: ‘I never said that kingdoms and common-wealths might not proportion their states as they 
thought best, by their publique laws, which afterwards the princes themselves may not violate’. Ibid., 
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him. However, Bilson’s statement still had some slight but crucial differences 
compared to the manuscript when presenting the third point. The manuscript stressed 
‘the Antient Nature of People’ by saying that ‘the people are more antient then the 
King; and for the people were kings ordained’; this strong statement was not present 
in the third part of Bilson’s treatise.  
Following the former discussion, I intend to argue that ‘Questions Touching 
upon Obedience to Magistrates in Eminency’ is likely to be a work by Herbert and 
that both ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative and the Right of Parliament to Resist 
Royal Power’ (E5/3/49) and ‘Treatise on the Powers of King and Parliament’ (E5/3/46) 
might have been transcribed by the same person. First, a crucial piece of evidence is 
the handwriting. Among the collections of the British Library there are two autograph 
drafts by Herbert; one is a draft of De Veritate (British Library, Add. MS 7081) dated 
‘20 Julij 1619 EHerbert, on 126 folio leaves’ while the other is an unfinished or 
incomplete work The Amazon (British Library, Add. MS 88926).128 After seeing these 
manuscripts, I am of the opinion that their handwriting bears much resemblance to 
E5/3/44, E5/3/49, and E5/3/46; thus they might have been of Herbert’s own hand as 
well.129 However, like Herbert’s signature,130 the style of his handwriting might vary. 
The handwriting of Herbert in the earliest version of The Life and Raigne of King 
Henry the Eighth (Jesus College Manuscript 71-73) looks more beautiful and neat.131 
                                                                                                                                                        
38. 
128 Beal, Index of English Literary Manuscripts. Vol.1, 1450-1625, 181. Peter Beal, ‘CELM: Edward, 
Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1582?–1648)’, accessed 10 April 2016, 
http://www.celm-ms.org.uk/authors/herbertedwardofcherbury.html#bodleian_id566782. 
129 I accessed the manuscripts of De Veritate and The Amazon in March 2016. Some photographic 
evidences of E5/3/44, E5/3/46, and E5/3/49 can be seen in my Appendix, while it is a pity that 
collections in the British Library are prohibited to have any photographic copy. 
130 I found three kinds of signature of Herbert. One is a capital ‘H’. See Herbert’s collection deposited 
in the National Library of Wales: Robert Cotton, ‘Treatise on the Exercise of Supreme Power by 
Diverse Princes’ (National Library of Wales, n.d.), fol. 2. Another is his family name ‘Herbert’. See 
British Library, Add. MS 7081. Another is composed of two lowercase of ‘ed’ with curved tail. See 
British Library, Sloane 3957 (another draft of De Veritate dated 15 December 1622, in 232 folio leaves 
and with autograph revisions.). 
131 There were three to four hands in these manuscripts, according to Beal. And Herbert’s hand is 
40 
 
In addition to this evidence, there is also the internal evidence of the way the 
manuscripts were transcribed. Numerous sentences of E5/3/49 and E5/3/46 were 
condensed by the copyist and many illustrations and paragraphs were omitted; this 
showes that the copyist must have been a scholar who was very familiar with these 
controversies. After considering the above-mentioned evidence, it is probable that the 
copyist and the author of E5/3/44 is Herbert himself. 
 In addition to the above six manuscripts, ‘Notes on the King, Parliament and the 
Civil War’ (E5/3/45) also focuses on contemporary matters of politics. However, its 
main argument – that the English Civil War would definitely not bring well-being to 
the Common Wealth – is neither closely related to the topic of Chapter 5 (Conscience 
and Resistance in the Early English Civil War: ‘Whether Conscience Grants that the 
People could Resist a Tyrant?’), nor does it contradict its arguments.132 E5/3/45, 
being an incomplete manuscript written in two booklets and of uncertain origin,133 
presented the main concern of a ‘moderator’ who intended to persuade both sides 
against taking up arms in the Civil War. As the author in the first sentence stated, ‘the 
moderator endeavours to prove that the decision by the sword, hath, and will bee 
destructive to us’. The author aimed to ask the reader to ‘inquire how farre it [the civil 
war] tends to the g[ene]rall good, by what hath already happened, and what must 
                                                                                                                                                        
revealed conspicuously in the pages with his large corrections and revisions. Beal, ‘CELM: Edward, 
Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1582?–1648)’. I accessed these manuscripts in September 2015. 
132 Chapter 5 focuses on an early Civil War controversy whether conscience grants that the people 
could resist a tyrant, but arguments in E5/3/45 cannot fit the discussion. 
133 Without a title, the manuscript might have lost some folios between folio 9v and 10r since their 
content does not match. Moreover, some folios might have also been lost in the end. E5/3/45 is likely 
to be a collection of Herbert, not a work written by him. Rossi said that it was not written by Herbert 
since his autograph often brings many corrections and revisions. Rossi, La vita, le opere, i tempi di 
Edoardo Herbert di Chirbury, vol. III, 499. In addition to this reason, two pieces of internal evidence 
support the same supposition. In the manuscript many times the author of this manuscript stated ‘saith 
hee [the moderator]’ as if the author had been recording the opinion of a moderator. ‘Notes on the King, 
Parliament and the Civil War’ (National Library of Wales, n.d.), fols 1v-3r. A clear example: ‘But how 
justifiable, how necessary, and on which side this warre was defensible, or offensive, I shall not (saith 
hee) vndertake to debate, or determine’. 
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happen in the prosecution of it’.134 The author then doubted that the Civil War would 
bring a good religion,135 a possible good law and liberty,136 and possible happiness of 
the Common Wealth.137 Aiming to avoid the War and make peace between both sides, 
the viewpoints of E5/3/45 do not touch the issue of obedience and resistance. 
Moreover, although this manuscript could show that Herbert was aware of the 
viewpoint of the moderator during the Civil War, this does not in any way contradict 
the main argument of chapter 5; that is, Herbert inclined to agree that conscience 
grants that the people could resist a tyrant.138  
  This section has revealed the origins and basic contents of Herbert’s seven 
manuscripts concerning matters of religion and politics. Again, these manuscripts 
deserve more attention and examination, and they are reliable sources that reveal 
Herbert’s intellectual interests. These manuscripts were kept with his letters and 
manuscripts of his autobiography, verses, philosophical work, religious treatises, and 
historical works. Moreover, forty-nine items concerning King, Parliament and State 
affairs were collected by Herbert when he was writing the history of King Henry VIII 
in the 1630s, and when he was a member of the Short Parliament. In this section, the 
analyzed six manuscripts provide a preliminary base for this thesis to show that 
Herbert was concerned about contemporary issues of religion and politics. Chapter 4, 
                                                     
134 ‘Notes on the King, Parliament and the Civil War’, fols 2v-3r. 
135 CF: ‘If Religion bee the principall reason [of the Civil War], how few hopes haue wee to see it 
rectified by Warre, the nurse of barbarism’. See Ibid., fol. 3v. 
136 The author stated that ‘new Statutes’ erected by the sword ‘would be put short lived, or vse lesse; 
for no Politique ties, no not the most sacred assurance of an oath could ever make Princes observe the 
execution of them’. At the same time, the author said that ‘our liberties are not like to bee much 
enlarged, or secured by it [the sword]’ since ‘Martiall Law will ever Long disseize vs of our 
Possessions, our Estates, and Lives’. Ibid., 5r-5v. 
137 A large amount of armies, said the author, ‘must need consume cattle and sheepe, and the farmers 
stock, and so beget a famine with its companions, the plague, small pox, flux’. ‘Notes on the King, 
Parliament and the Civil War’, fol. 5v. Furthermore, the treasure of the Land wilbe consumed, trade 
vtterly decayed, Arts Lost; Learning changed into martiall Discipline’. The farmers and the cities would 
neither be able to survive long themselves, nor support the armies. ‘Notes on the King, Parliament and 
the Civil War’, fols 6v-7r. 




by exploiting E5/3/30, E5/3/34, E5/3/42, E5/3/46, and E5/3/49, will argue that 
Herbert was interested in the history and authority of Parliament and was in favour of 
Parliament’s sovereignty over the King. Next, Chapter 5, by using E5/3/44, E5/3/46, 
and E5/3/49, will argue that Herbert in principle agreed that the people could lawfully 
resist a tyrant. 
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Chapter 2: Herbert’s Theory of Conscience 
 
This chapter focuses on Herbert’s theory of conscience and its close relationship both 
with the philosophical theory presented in De Veritate and with the theories of 
conscience advanced by contemporary English casuists, including William Perkins 
(1558-1602), William Ames (1576-1633), Robert Sanderson (1587-1663), Jeremy 
Taylor (1613-1667), and Richard Baxter (1615-1691). Herbert’s theory of conscience 
shared many ideas with those of the English casuists, including the definition and the 
authority of conscience. However, it was also connected to his own philosophical 
theory, particularly in his claim that conscience was guided by the common notions 
and by grace, both of which were fundamental ideas in De Veritate. By proposing his 
theory of conscience Herbert anticipated in discussing many important contemporary 
cases of conscience. His concern for conscience formed a fundamental part of his 
thought in general, and his insistence that individual conscience should be protected 
from any encroachment of other authorities provides the common core theme of the 
following chapters. 
The main issue concerning conscience in the seventeenth century arose out of 
conflicts between external authorities and individual conscience, such as between the 
prescribed teachings of national churches and an individual’s religious beliefs, 
between public duty and private conscience, and between an individual’s political 
allegiance and religious stance. This kind of conflict could be traced to the 
Reformation in the sixteenth century, when the Roman Church and its clergy were 
accused of claiming the exclusive right to interpret the Bible, where the foundation of 
conscience was usually laid. Martin Luther, dissatisfied with the Roman Church and 
its systems of penitence – especially its selling of indulgences in return for 
absolution – claimed that individuals were entitled to a kind of freedom of conscience 
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given by God.1 Arguments over the oppression of individual conscience continued 
after the Western Church divided. The emergence of Protestant denominations and the 
creation of national churches made the situation even more contentious, and the birth 
of the Anglican Church was no exception. When the Anglican Church was created, 
Catholics were the first group to face the moral dilemma of either taking the oath of 
political allegiance to the Crown or preserving their own religious stance.2 In other 
words, facing the danger of losing their property and life, Catholics or recusants often 
faced a conflict between their public duty and their private conscience. The victims 
could only preserve either their religious beliefs or their bodies but not both, and the 
well-known case of Thomas More was discussed by Herbert in his The Life and 
Raigne of King Henry the Eighth.3 
Scholars have described the seventeenth century as the Age of Conscience, partly 
because clashes between external authorities and individual conscience continued and 
became even worse.4 The beginning of the seventeenth century saw the Gunpowder 
Plot, when the Catholic Robert Catesby and his followers’ consciences were justified, 
as they claimed, in attemping to murder King James I and his members of Parliament. 
In the same year, 1605, after the plot failed, the English Parliament reacted by passing 
the Popish Recusants Act, demanding that Catholics take the oath of allegiance and 
                                                     
1 Richard Sorabji, Moral Conscience through the Ages Fifth Century BCE to the Present (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 4.  
2 Both the Act of Succession of 1535 and the Oath of Supremacy and Act of Uniformity of 1559, for 
instance, brought such moral dilemmas to Catholics. Moreover, as Alexandra Walsham has pointed out, 
during the reigns of Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth when the Anglican Church changed its positions, 
those who were unwilling to accept the prescribed liturgies of the Established Church adopted some 
ways to express their disagreements. These included sitting behind the pillar when the minister was 
preaching and attending the service but praying privately. See Alexandra Walsham, ‘Ordeals of 
Conscience: Casuistry, Conformity and Confessional Identity in Post-Reformation England’, in 
Contexts of Conscience in Early Modern Europe, 1500-1700, ed. Harald Braun and Edward Vallance 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 34–37. 
3 L&R, 392a-394a. 
4 Keith Thomas, ‘Cases of Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England’, in Public Duty and Private 
Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England: Essays Presented to G.E. Aylmer (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1993), 29. Moral dilemmas or problems of conscience could be seen in other issues such as marriage 
problems, business ethics, duelling, and suicide in the seventeenth century; however, conflict between 
religious and political allegiance was still the main issue in this era. See Ibid., 46-48.  
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deny the power of the Pope to depose a king. Four decades later, when the Civil War 
broke out, both royalists and parliamentarians justified taking up arms on grounds of 
conscience and asked the people to join their side. The Civil War brought numerous 
moral dilemmas to the people, especially to those who were reluctant to be drawn into 
the war. 
Modern scholars have also connected conscience with the development of 
casuistry, which flourished from the mid sixteenth century to the mid seventeenth 
century. Casuistry was the study of cases of conscience where casuists provided 
suggestions and guidance on difficult moral questions. The work of casuists included 
applying moral principles to a specific case – for instance, that telling a lie was 
immoral was a principle, but people might get confused whether we could be justified 
in lying to a murderer in a specific case – and tackling cases where different moral 
principles appeared to clash. Casuistry first developed in the Roman Church in the 
thirteenth century and many works were published for providing guidance and 
resolutions of matters of conscience.5 It became prevalent in sixteenth-century and 
seventeenth-century Europe but gradually gained a pejorative meaning of 
equivocating and using specious reasoning to justify sins.6 The bad reputation was 
usually related to Jesuits who taught priests how to maintain their religious beliefs and 
not be convicted of crimes in Protestant regimes at the same time.7 Casuistry became 
                                                     
5 Edmund Leites, ‘Casuistry and Character’, in Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe, ed. 
Edmund Leites (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 119. 
6 J. P. Sommerville, ‘The “New Art of Lying”: Equivocation, Mental Reservation, and Casuistry’, in 
Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe, ed. Edmund Leites (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 159–62. The French usage presented the same pejorative connotations. See 
Margaret Sampson, ‘Laxity and Liberty in Seventeenth-Century English Political Thought’, in 
Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
72–74. Trying to wash off the bad reputation of casuistry, some modern scholars argued that casuistry 
was a form of moral reasoning. See James F. Keenan and Thomas Shannon, The Context of Casuistry 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1995), Introduction; Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen 
Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (Berkeley; London: University of 
California Press, 1988). 
7 Thomas, ‘Cases of Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England’, 32; Sommerville, ‘The “New Art 
of Lying”: Equivocation, Mental Reservation, and Casuistry’, 159–84. 
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prevalent after the Reformation when many people were troubled by conflicts 
between retaining their religious beliefs and taking political allegiances; moreover, 
people at the same time were in need of advice for other related issues, such as how to 
interact with heretics and people of different religions, and whether a Protestant and a 
Catholic could lawfully get married. Meanwhile, the discovery and expansion of the 
new world also brought new moral issues that increased the need for casuistry.8 
Casuistry gradually receded in late seventeenth century England when religious 
toleration expanded after the Glorious Revolution, and it diminished across the 
Continent as well. This waning of casuistry also accompanied the growth of the spirit 
of individual autonomy – i.e. the belief that people should decide and direct 
themselves independantly on moral and spiritual issues – something that made 
casuistry redundant.9 
 Herbert’s epistemological work De Veritate, his religious works (De Religione 
Laici, De Religione Gentilium, and A Dialogue Between a Tutor and His Pupil), his 
historical work The Life and Raigne, and his personal collections can all be 
reinterpreted by putting them into the context of casuistry of this age. First, Herbert 
composed these works during the heyday of casuistry, c. 1550-1650. He shared many 
topics with casuists, including the questions of whether one should take the oath of 
allegiance and give up one’s religious belief, and of what religion a layman should 
adopt in this unsettled era. Secondly, as I have mentioned above, casuistry occupied a 
                                                     
8 New moral issues included problems of commerce, ownership of the ‘new’ land, and how to interact 
with people of different religion. James F. Keenan, ‘William Perkins (1558-1602) and the Birth of 
British Casuistry’, in The Context of Casuistry (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1995), 
107. Also see footnote no. 4 of this section. 
9 Sorabji, Moral Conscience through the Ages Fifth Century BCE to the Present, 4–5. Edmund Leites 
pointed out that the last English great casuist was Jeremy Taylor (1613-1667) and by the early 
eighteenth century casuistry had become unnecessary. Moreover, individual’s moral will gained its 
importance, as New Platonists said that ‘the truly moral will achieve a union with God’; at the same 
time, the bindings of religion became weaker, while the authority of the law and political power 
stronger. See Leites, ‘Casuistry and Character’, 120–32; Thomas, ‘Cases of Conscience in 
Seventeenth-Century England’, 52–53. 
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very important role in this age mainly because many new problems of conscience 
emerged. It was the same with the birth of Herbert’s epistemological and religious 
works. The existing moral principles and rules, as the modern scholar Keenan stated, 
could not meet the needs of the people of this age, and hence there was an 
‘epistemological vacuum’. 10  Herbert’s De Veritate, an epistemological work, 
searched for a universal theory that could provide solid knowledge for people, and 
then remove their inner fears and scruples.  
However, works that could be discussed in the casuistical context did not mean 
that they could be categorized as works of casuistry or that their authors were casuists; 
it depends on the meaning of casuistry one adopts. In a narrow or restricted sense, 
casuistry was practiced by clergymen and using some particular methods of reasoning 
such as syllogisms. English casuists William Perkins, William Ames, Robert 
Sanderson, Jeremy Taylor, and Richard Baxter were either Anglican clergymen or 
Protestant divines or theologians.11 In a broad or general sense, the works of casuistry 
included those which could provide advice or guidance for an individual’s moral 
dilemma; their authors might not necessarily be priests or divines, and their methods 
were not restricted. The political works of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Thomas 
Hobbes (1588-1679), and John Locke (1632-1704) were discussed in this sense. Thus, 
when I put Herbert’s work into the casuistical context, I do so in the broad sense of 
the term. Herbert’s works did not belong to the works of casuistry in the restricted 
sense, but by discussing them in the casuistical context we are able to interpret 
Herbert’s works from another angle, and hence shed some light on them. For instance, 
the five religious common notions in De Veritate and De Religione Laici have often 
                                                     
10 Keenan, ‘William Perkins (1558-1602) and the Birth of British Casuistry’, 107–8. 
11 Other casuists were of the same case, including Joseph Hall, bishop of Norwich, John Sharp, 
archbishop of York, and Thomas Barlow, bishop of Lincoln. See Harald Braun and Edward Vallance, 




been regarded as religious tenets. However, within the context of casuistry we can see 
the five religious common notions as the advice Herbert provided for people when 
they faced the oppressions of religious sects and of the clergy. Meanwhile, the main 
question of De Veritate and De Religione Laici, therefore, is transformed into a case 
of conscience: what should people do when facing the oppression of religious sects, 
and how could people search for the best religion and obtain the peace of conscience? 
By viewing the five common notions of De Veritate and De Religione Laici in a 
different way we can see that Herbert intended to address the problem of conscience 
and solve the dilemmas many people faced. Moreover, with the help of the context of 
casuistry we are able to investigate which groups of people discussed the same cases 
of conscience and what foundations they adopted when coping with the same 
problems, and then position Herbert’s discussions in that general context.  
The first section will present the definition of conscience in the seventeenth 
century via the works of English casuists. Believing that conscience held high 
authority, they defined conscience as a rational faculty and an intellectual activity 
presenting through a syllogistic dialogue. As a faculty, conscience received moral 
principles from nature, Scripture, or teachings of church traditions. As an intellectual 
activity, it gave judgement to every particular action. The second section will present 
Herbert’s theory of conscience and compare it with those of the English casuists. 
Herbert shared many key points with the English casuists on the basic theory of 
conscience. He had a similar definition of conscience, and he agreed with them that 
God implanted some common notions or moral principles in the mind of every human 
being. Moreover, like the English casuists, Herbert stressed the importance of the 
individual’s conscience over the authorities of worldly institutions and of the 
clergymen. However, Herbert’s theories differed in some respects from those of the 
English casuists. Herbert suggested that common notions are far more reliable than 
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Scripture and church traditions regarding the sources of moral principles. Moreover, a 
troubled conscience, in addition to resorting to common notions for the best solution, 
should seek help from grace, since both conscience and grace guide people to live 
moral lives and to reach salvation. The contribution of this chapter is to reveal 
Herbert’s theory of conscience, which has never been explored. Guided by both the 
common notions and grace, the concept of individual conscience constituted a 
fundamental part of Herbert’s thought, and the common theme of his religious and 
historical works. Moreover, by showing the similarities between Herbert’s theory and 
those of the English casuists, this chapter challenges the idea that his philosophical 
and religious treatises were wholly distinctive in his time and that they anticipated 





2.1 Conscience in Seventeenth Century England 
 
Casuistry, which was prevalent in seventeenth century England, constituted the 
main content of the theory of conscience in this era and was viewed as a necessary 
skill of local ministers, allowing them to guide parishioners who were afflicted with 
moral dilemmas. When discussing the parson’s accessory knowledge, Herbert’s 
brother, George Herbert, maintained that the ideal parson should ‘greatly esteem also 
of cases of conscience, wherein he is much versed’.12 Although the English casuists 
published fewer works than the Catholic casuists – the Roman Church published more 
than six hundred works on casuistry after the Council of Trent –13 casuistry did not 
remain static in England. In fact, in this period the English casuists sought to develop 
a different system of casuistry from that of the Roman Catholics to meet the need of 
people.14 As William Ames said in the opening of his Conscience with the Power and 
Cases Thereof (1639), ‘this Practical teaching was much wanting’.15 
 According to the English casuists, conscience is a rational faculty of the practical 
understanding. William Perkins said that conscience ‘is a part of the understanding in 
all reasonable creatures, determining of their particular actions’ and that ‘conscience 
is not placed in the affections or will’.16 Following Perkins’ theory, William Ames 
stated that conscience ‘belongs to the Understanding, not to the Will’.17 Robert 
Sanderson, agreeing with them, said conscience is ‘a Faculty or a habit of the practical 
                                                     
12 George Herbert, ‘A Priest to the Temple, or, The Country Parson’, in The Works of George Herbert, 
ed. F. E. Hutchinson (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1941), 229–30. 
13 Thomas, ‘Cases of Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England’, 38. 
14 William Perkins, the pioneer of English casuistry, stated in the dedicatory of his The Whole Treatise 
of the Cases of Conscience (1608) that ‘we have just cause, to challenge the Popish Church, who in 
their Case-writings have erred’. William Perkins, ‘The Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience’, in 
William Perkins 1558-1602, English Puritanist: His Pioneer Works on Casuistry, ed. Thomas F. 
Merrill (Nieuwkoop: BDe Graaf, 1966), 82. 
15 William Ames, Conscience with the Power and Cases Thereof (London, 1639), to the reader. 
16 William Perkins, ‘A Discourse of Conscience’, in William Perkins 1558-1602, English Puritanist: 
His Pioneer Works on Casuistry, ed. Thomas F. Merrill (Nieuwkoop: BDe Graaf, 1966), 5.  
17 Ames, Conscience with the Power and Cases Thereof, 1. 
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understanding’.18 Meanwhile, conscience was defined as an intellectual and practical 
activity judging actions.19 In other words, conscience ‘determines or gives sentence 
of things done, by saying unto us this was done, this was not done, this may be done, 
this may not be done; this was well done, this was ill done.’20 During the said activity 
moral actions were thus done ‘by the use of Reason and Argument’;21 this process at 
the same time implies that conscience is not an infallible mechanism and that the 
accuracy of conscience’s judgement could be improved by the development of one’s 
reasoning. By defining conscience as a rational faculty and as an intellectual activity 
the casuists connected moral principles with moral actions. The definition of the 
casuists, however, did not carry the modern notion of individualism or the notion of 
respect for the authority of an individual’s idea of morality – conscience had an 
established standard and an established way of function.22 Moreover, conscience did 
not operate as a passive accuser merely warning the mind of the sinner;23 it was an 
active mechanism. 
 Echoing their definition of conscience – conscience as a faculty and as an 
activity –, the English casuists said that conscience was composed of synderesis and 
conscientia, linked through a syllogistic dialogue. 24  Synderesis comprises the 
fundamental moral principles acquired either by nature or by nurture, while 
conscientia is the application of the moral principles to specific actions through the 
                                                     
18  Robert Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience: Discussed in Ten Lectures, trans. Robert 
Codrington (London: Printed by ThoLeach, 1660), 3.  
19 CF: ‘The proper end of conscience is, to determine of things done’. Perkins, ‘A Discourse of 
Conscience’, 6. CF: ‘Conscience is not a contemplatiue judgement’ but a ‘practicall judgement’. Ames, 
Conscience with the Power and Cases Thereof, 1. 
20 Perkins, ‘A Discourse of Conscience’, 6. 
21 Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 2.  
22 Walsham, ‘Ordeals of Conscience: Casuistry, Conformity and Confessional Identity in 
Post-Reformation England’, 32. 
23 Camille Slights, The Casuistical Tradition in Shakespeare, Donne, Herbert, and Milton (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), 10–11. 
24 This description originates from the theory of Aquinas, see Thomas Wood, English Casuistical 
Divinity during the Seventeenth Century (London: SPCK, 1952), 68. 
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use of reason. In other words, conscience – as a faculty – receives moral principles 
which form synderesis and then conscience – as an activity – makes its moral 
judgements in a process called conscientia; therefore, moral actions are outcomes of 
the mechanism of synderesis and conscientia.25 The mechanism could be shown by a 
syllogistic dialogue, consisting of a major premise (a moral principle), a minor 
premise (a fact or a state), and a judgement as in the following example: 
Major: Whatever is unjust ought to be avoided 
   Minor: All theft is unjust 
  Therefore all theft is to be avoided 
Partly because the syllogism can show the components and the mechanism of 
conscience, and partly because it can also explain the place and role of it (which I will 
explain below), the English casuists maintained that in ‘syllogism alone is contained 
the whole nature of Conscience’.26  
 Concerning the way synderesis gains its moral principles, the English casuists 
presented more detailed explanations. According to Sanderson whose theory could 
encompass those of other casuists,27 man could acquire the moral laws from three 
lights: the light of nature, the light of Scripture, and the light of doctrine – or, to put it 
another way, the light innate, the light inferred, and the light acquired.28 The first 
                                                     
25 There are four kinds of outcomes depending on whether the principle used complies with the law of 
God and whether the judgement is sure or unsure: right conscience, erring conscience, scrupulous 
conscience, and doubtful conscience. Slights, The Casuistical Tradition in Shakespeare, Donne, 
Herbert, and Milton, 12–17; Wood, English Casuistical Divinity during the Seventeenth Century, 
74–78; Braun and Vallance, Contexts of Conscience in Early Modern Europe, 1500-1700, xvi–xviii.  
26 Ames, Conscience with the Power and Cases Thereof, 4. CF: ‘The Nature of Conscience has always 
thought fit to explain it by a practical syllogism’. Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 10.  
27 Sanderson’s theory can encompass theories of the Catholic Church as well. Generally speaking, the 
Catholic casuists maintained that both Scriptures and the teaching of the Church tradition comprise the 
moral principles in mind, while the Protestant casuists emphasized that Scripture alone is sufficient to 
form the moral principles. Walsham, ‘Ordeals of Conscience: Casuistry, Conformity and Confessional 
Identity in Post-Reformation England’, 33. 
28 CF: ‘The actions of reasonable creatures are governed by laws, and these laws are put into a man’s 
soul or mind as into a treasury or repository: some in his very nature, some by after-actions, by 
education and positive sanction, by learning and custom’. Jeremy Taylor, The Whole Works of the 
Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, ed. Reginald Heber, vol. 11 (London: Printed for Longman, Orme, Brown, 
Green and Longmans, 1822), 369. The work I cited was his Ductor Dubitantium: or, The Rule of 
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light ‘proceeds from the law of Nature’, and by the said light God implants ‘certain 
propositions and practical principles’ in the mind of every human being when God 
creates man. 29  The moral principles man acquired by this light are ‘common 
notions … which the Apostle doth say is written in the Hearts of men’,30 said 
Sanderson. Moreover, these principles – such as that ‘good is to be done, [and] evil is 
to be avoyded’ and ‘that God is to be worshipped, and no man [is] to be injured’31 – 
belong to the primary and universal level and leave no room for controversy.32 It is 
worth noting that by the light innate not only Christians but also non-Christians are 
able to acquire fundamental moral principles. The second light is the light of Scripture, 
by which man obtains moral principles from the written word of God. Since the 
principles acquired via this light contain both those of the universal level and ‘those 
that are but local, personal, or alterable laws’,33 the English casuists maintained that 
the principles in the Bible should be examined carefully before application. 
Furthermore, they placed greater emphasis on the moral laws taught in the New 
Testament than those taught in the Old Testament since many laws – including the 
moral, the ceremonial, and the judicial – were prescribed by Moses particularly for 
the Jews; hence, these laws might not bind the conscience of Christians.34 As Baxter 
put it, ‘the covenant mixt of grace and works, proper to the Jews, with all the Jewish 
law as such’ by no means binds the conscience of Christians and other peoples around 
                                                                                                                                                        
Conscience printed from vol. 11 to 13 of the whole series. 
29 Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 132.  
30 Ibid. CF: ‘For the law of nature is nothing but the law of God, given to mankind for the conservation 
of his nature, and the promotion of his perfective end’. Jeremy Taylor, The Whole Works of the Right 
Rev. Jeremy Taylor, vol. 12 (London: Printed for Longman, Orme, Brown, Green and Longmans, 
1839), 213. 
31 Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 133.  
32 ‘It is not lawful to doubt of the truth of them, nor is it possible for any one who understands the 
sence of the words, to erre concerning them’. Ibid. 
33 Richard Baxter, A Christian Directory (London: Printed by Robert White, 1673), 683–85. 
34 Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 136-142; Jeremy Taylor, The Whole Works of the Right 
Rev. Jeremy Taylor, vol. 13 (London: Printed for Longman, Orme, Brown, Green and Longmans, 
1839), 223–29; Baxter, A Christian Directory, 904-905 (case no. 155 and 156). 
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the world.35 The final way to acquire the moral principles is via the light of doctrine, 
an acquisition accomplished by ‘the discourse of Reason and Authority … [and] the 
Judgement and the Practice of the Church’.36 This means that the learning of the 
moral laws could be improved by the teaching of the Church – that is, by the teaching 
of the established Church, according to Sanderson. 
 Individual casuists might put different emphases on the way a man acquired his 
moral principles though all casuists agreed that God is their ultimate origin.37 Perkins 
stressed the importance of the light of Scripture more than the other two lights. He 
maintained that ‘Scriptures of the olde and new testament containe in themselves 
sufficient direction for all actions’ and that ‘whatsoever is right and good therein [in 
nature], is contained in the written word of God’.38 Although Perkins agreed that the 
law of nature could provide some moral principles, he declared it ‘corrupt, imperfect, 
[and] uncertain’. Moreover, he did not deem the ecclesiastical tradition, especially the 
Catholic tradition, a good way to know the moral principles.39 Holding a different 
view from Perkins, Sanderson laid great emphasis on the importance of the light of 
nature as the guide of conscience since this light provided the infallible common 
notions to every human being. He argued that ‘the holy Scripture, or the word of God 
written, is not the Adequate Rule of Conscience’, partly because Scriptures contained 
secondary principles and other laws particularly for the Jews. Furthermore, since 
non-Christians had conscience as well, there had to be some moral laws more 
universal than those in the holy Scriptures prescribed particularly for Christians; 
otherwise, there would be no guide for the conscience of gentiles, which was contrary 
                                                     
35 Baxter, A Christian Directory, 904. 
36 Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 143-144.  
37 There is no such difference concerning conscientia since it is basically the man’s ability to reason 
and to judge. 
38 Perkins, ‘A Discourse of Conscience’, 42. 
39 ‘And as for the best unwritten traditions, let all the Papists in the world answere if they can’. Ibid.  
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‘to reason, experience, and the expresse testimony of the Apostle’.40 Sanderson did 
attach some weight to Scriptures; he stated that the Bible did provide many important 
moral laws.41 However, the Bible was not the adequate rule of conscience but the 
‘Adequate Rule of Faith, and of things supernaturally to be believed, as also of all 
moral actions so far as they are spiritual, and ordained to a supernatural end’.42 But 
the difference between Perkins and Sanderson is not fundamental, and it is a matter of 
emphasis only. In fact, Perkins’ idea of Scriptures contains the light of nature and 
reason; he widely cited the works of the ecclesiastical tradition when he was writing 
his work.43 For Sanderson, similarly, both the light of nature and the light of Scripture 
are part of ‘the will of God’. 44  Perkins, comparatively speaking, was mainly 
concerned with the conscience of Christians, while Sanderson had concern for the 
conscience of all human beings. 
 From the definition of conscience or the syllogism, the role and place of 
conscience could be shown. Presenting a moral principle, the major premise indicates 
that conscience is a lawgiver or dictator. Showing a fact or a state, the minor premise 
demonstrates that conscience is ‘a Witness’.45 Delivering a judgement, conscience is 
like ‘a Judge’ or ‘an arbitratour’.46  Through the roles shown in the syllogism 
conscience is able to accuse the sinner, excuse the innocent, and console the falsely 
accused.47 These roles led the English casuists to describe conscience as ‘the little 
god’ in the mind of every human being;48 it is ‘the image of God’, ‘God’s vicar’, and 
                                                     
40 Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 119.  
41 Ibid., 120-122.  
42 Ibid., 125-126.  
43 Slights, The Casuistical Tradition in Shakespeare, Donne, Herbert, and Milton, 30. 
44 Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 126-127.  
45 Ames, Conscience with the Power and Cases Thereof, 3. 
46 Perkins, ‘A Discourse of Conscience’, 5. 
47 CF: ‘There is no where to be found, a more faithful Admonisher, or a more diligent Accuser, or a 
severer Witnesse, or an uncorrupt Judge, or a sweeter comforter, or a more importunate Enemy’. 
Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 1-2.  
48 ‘It is (as it were) a little God sitting in the middle of mens hearts’.William Perkins, A Discourse of 
Conscience (Printed by Iohn Legate, 1608), 9. CF: ‘The Conscience of man is a mans judgement of 
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‘God’s deputy’.49 They therefore asserted that conscience is ‘a thing placed of God in 
the middest betweene him and man’ or ‘an intermediary between man and God’ and 
that ‘the Conscience is immediately subject to God and his will, and therefore it 
cannot submit itselfe unto any creature without Idolatry’.50 
 In addition to discussing the role and place of conscience, the English casuists 
maintained that God alone has authority over individual conscience. ‘The Law of God 
onely doth bind the Conscience of man,’ while ‘mans lawes, doe not bind the 
Conscience’, wrote Ames.51 Before presenting the adequate rule of conscience, 
Sanderson stated that ‘God alone hath a most proper and direct command on the 
Consciences of all men; so that none but God alone hath power to impose a Law upon 
the Conscience of any man’.52 In Sanderson’s view, only God is the ‘Lawgiver’ and 
gives ‘Rewards and Punishments according to the quality of every conscience’.53 But 
it is worth noting that this point does not dispense men from obeying human laws; 
man is bound to obey them as long as they either comply with God’s law or are not 
contrary to God’s law – i.e. as long as they are indifferent things.54 
 Since only God had authority over the individual’s conscience, the English 
casuists stressed that the conscience had greater authority than other worldly 
institutions. The English casuists maintained that their works were written to guide 
                                                                                                                                                        
himself, according to the judgement of God of him’. Ames, Conscience with the Power and Cases 
Thereof, 1. 
49 Taylor, The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, 11:370–71. 
50 Perkins, ‘A Discourse of Conscience’, 5–6. In another place he said ‘it is placed in the middle 
between man and God, so as it is under God, and yet above man’. Perkins, ‘The Whole Treatise of the 
Cases of Conscience’, 99. Also see Ames, Conscience with the Power and Cases Thereof, 6. CF: ‘By 
nature the state of Conscience is placed as it were in the middle betwixt both, beneath God, but above 
Man, subject unto God as Hand-maid, but set over man as a Mistresse’. Sanderson, Several Cases of 
Conscience, 37. 
51 Ames, Conscience with the Power and Cases Thereof, 6. 
52 Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 112.  
53 Ibid., 114.  
54 ‘The Laws of men, and the mandates and orders of our Superiours, do oblige the Conscience, but by 
no power or authority, but by the vertue of the Commandement of God’. Ibid., 111.  
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people’s consciences rather than to dominate them. 55  Introducing his Ductor 
Dubitantium: or, The Rule of Conscience, Jeremy Taylor wrote that he intended ‘to 
afford to the world a general instrument of moral theology, by the rules and measures 
of which, the guides of souls may determine the particulars that shall be brought 
before them’.56 Baxter, whose casuistical work followed the path of Ames’, said he 
wrote his work in a ‘directing way’ whereby he gave readers ‘the answer in a direction, 
[and] an ingenious reader can tell what question it is that is answered. And so, many 
hundred cases are here resolved’.57 Moreover, the English casuists criticized Roman 
Catholic priests for determining the solutions to the moral questions the people met 
with in their daily lives. 58  Meanwhile, they denied that the statement of the 
authorities was sufficient to secure a good conscience. ‘It is not enough’, wrote Ames, 
‘for a good conscience to adhere to the authority of men, though they be learned and 
godly; because the conscience is not by itselfe to be subjected to the judgement of 
man’.59 Sanderson had the same opinion that ‘the example of some holy man, or the 
authority and judgement of a man famous for learning and piety’ could not keep the 
peace of the conscience of men.60 However, stressing the authority of the individual’s 
conscience and reducing the importance of the statements of the authorities did not 
mean that individuals could always perfectly solve moral dilemmas on their own. The 
English casuists still encouraged lay people to solve their moral dilemmas with the 
advice of their local parson –61 since casuistry required both good knowledge and 
                                                     
55 The works of the Roman Catholic casuists were written mainly for clergymen, while the works of 
the English casuists were for everyone. Braun and Vallance, Contexts of Conscience in Early Modern 
Europe, 1500-1700, xiv; Keenan and Shannon, The Context of Casuistry, ix; Keenan, ‘William Perkins 
(1558-1602) and the Birth of British Casuistry’, 112. 
56 Taylor, The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, 11:362–63. 
57 Baxter, A Christian Directory, vii. 
58 Braun and Vallance, Contexts of Conscience in Early Modern Europe, 1500-1700, xiv. 
59 Ames, Conscience with the Power and Cases Thereof, bk3, 86. 
60 Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 70-71.  
61 ‘When a question requires the reason of many rules, it is not every hand that can apply them; men 
will for ever need a living guide; and a wise guide of souls will, by some of these rules, be enabled to 
answer most cases that shall occur’. Taylor, The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, 11:363.  
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experience –62 but they emphasized that the final moral decision should be left to the 
individual. 
 The English casuists stressed the importance of individual conscience not only 
because God alone had the authority over it but also because they were concerned 
about the individual’s salvation.63 Perkins in The Whole Treatise of the Cases of 
Conscience (1608) asked, ‘how a man may be in conscience assured of his owne 
salvation?’ and answered, by living a holy life according to the teaching of 
Scriptures.64 As James F. Keenan pointed out, Perkins gave birth to his work on 
casuistry in response to the anxiety and confusion of the people in his parish; 
moreover, Perkins intended to require them to be self-understanding and 
self-governing.65 In brief, individuals should be responsible for their own lives. 
 This section has presented English casuists’ theory of conscience. Conscience 
was both a rational faculty receiving moral principles and an intellectual activity 
applying principles to a particular case. The individual’s conscience held higher 
authority than worldly institutions, since conscience was the little god in the mind of 
every human being. Conscience was bound to obey the law of God, while it was also 
required to obey human laws which did not contradict the former. Individuals should 
seek help from their local ministers when faced with moral dilemmas, but the final 
decision should be made by the individual. The discussions of this section form the 
base of the next section and of Chapter five. In the next section, Herbert’s theory of 
                                                     
62 The common skills of a casuist include mastering the language of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew. 
Moreover, a casuist should be skilled at arts and sciences and reasoning. See Thomas, ‘Cases of 
Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England’, 35–36. J. S Morrill, Paul Slack, and D. R Woolf, Public 
Duty and Private Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England: Essays Presented to G.E. Aylmer 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 35–36. 
63 Keenan, ‘William Perkins (1558-1602) and the Birth of British Casuistry’, 112–13; J. S Morrill, 
Slack, and D. R Woolf, Public Duty and Private Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England: Essays 
Presented to G.E. Aylmer, 33. 
64 Perkins, ‘The Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience’, 111–18. 
65 Keenan and Shannon, The Context of Casuistry, ix; Keenan, ‘William Perkins (1558-1602) and the 
Birth of British Casuistry’, 122. 
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conscience will be compared with those of English casuists. They shared many points 
on the definition of conscience, sources of moral principles, and the authority of 
conscience. Their differences will be revealed as well. Herbert’s theory of conscience 
was based on his theory of truth, and Herbert emphasized the importance of the 
common notions as the most reliable sources of moral principles. Moreover, grace, 
like the common notions, could guide the troubled conscience. In Chapter 5, the 
English casuists’ theory will be applied to a controversy in the early English civil war: 
whether conscience grants that the people could resist a tyrant. The English casuists 
all agreed that the people could disobey the unlawful command of a king, while by no 
means could they resist by force. However, Chapter 5 argues that Herbert held the 




2.2 Herbert’s theory of conscience 
 
Herbert’s theory of conscience is discussed in his philosophical and religious treatises, 
but is an issue that is usually neglected and omitted in discussions of his works. Since 
Herbert’s theory of conscience was based on his theory of truth, I will examine his 
theory of truth first – especially the roles it assigns to the common notions and to 
grace – before presenting his theory of conscience. In addition, this section, by 
building on the findings of the first section, will show the similarities and differences 
between Herbert’s theory of conscience and those of the English casuists. 
 
2.2.1 Common notions and grace in Herbert’s theory of truth 
 
Herbert’s theory of truth is worth reexamining for two reasons. First, the theory forms 
the basis of his theory of conscience. As will be discussed below, according to 
Herbert’s theory of truth, the common notions are the most important source of our 
moral principles. Hence, it is important to begin by discussing how the common 
notions are obtained, and how we may confirm whether a proposition belongs to the 
common notions, before considering Herbert’s theory of conscience. The second 
reason is that grace and the common notions – or particular providence and universal 
providence – both play important roles in Herbert’s theory of truth and his theory of 
conscience. As suggested in Chapter 1, however, previous scholars have given 
disproportionate emphasis to the common notions while neglecting the importance of 
grace. In fact, Herbert held that the common notions were not sufficient; as he said, 
‘Common Providence is not sufficient without the concurrence of Grace and 
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Particular Providence’.66 Moreover, as will be argued later, Herbert held that a 
troubled conscience should not only resort to common notions, but also seek help 
from grace. Therefore, Herbert’s view on how grace may be obtained – giving us 
access to revealed truth – and how grace works, should also be considered first. 
 In his epistemological work De Veritate, Herbert provided a comprehensive 
statement about how an individual acquired moral principles and about their origin, 
the common notions. According to Herbert, knowledge of the common notions is 
obtained through the highest level of human faculties, natural instinct. Natural instinct 
is the first level of the four fundamental faculties and it ‘conforms with Common 
Notions’.67 In Herbert’s theory, truth, no matter which level it belongs to, could be 
apprehended only through the conformity ‘between objects and faculties’ – this was 
Herbert’s definition of truth and the way he described a truth.68 As a fundamental 
faculty, natural instinct is implanted by God in the mind of every human being and ‘it 
is the immediate instrument of divine Providence’; ‘Common Notions and natural 
instincts, therefore, here have the same meaning’.69 In other words, individuals could 
acquire common notions, including the common notions of moral principles, due to 
the universal prevalence of the natural instinct in the human mind. Figure 1 illustrates 
the relationship between the human faculties, including conscience, and their objects, 




                                                     
66 DRG, 55.  
67 DV, 116. CF: ‘Natural Instinct… which springs from the faculties which conform to Common 
Notions’. DV, 115.  
68 Truth is ‘a matter of conformity between objects and faculties’. DV, 78. Cf: ‘the whole of my 
doctrine of truth is based upon the proper conformity of the faculties with their objects’. DV, 80. Hence, 
there are four kinds of truth: intellectual truth, truth of concept, truth of appearance, and truth of the 
object. See DV, 90-103.  
















Figure 1: The Relationship between Human Faculties and Objects 
 
The left side of Figure 1 shows the hierarchy of the four fundamental classes of 
faculties of human beings. According to Herbert, when a faculty of a given class is 
brought into conformity with its corresponding object, a truth of the same class is 
generated. Although Herbert classified conscience as an agent or medium belonging 
to the internal faculties,70 as section 2.2.2 will show, he later stated that conscience 
was the supreme faculty of the internal faculties and ‘a sacred bond linking the higher 
order to the lower’ since it could receive the moral principles of the common 
notions.71 Hence, in this diagram, conscience stretches across the internal faculties 
and natural instinct. 
 
After showing that every human being is able to acquire the common notions, 
Herbert then explained the criterion to be used to determine whether a particular 
proposition belongs to the common notions. He wrote that ‘Universal consent, then, 
                                                     
70 For the definition of each of the four faculties, please see DV, 146, 208, 233.  
71 DV, 188. CF: ‘Conscience is only satisfied when all the faculties are in conformity’ and ‘all the 
internal forms of consciousness are subject to the faculty of conscience’. DV, 205. 
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will be found to be the final test of truth’,72 and explained that ‘whatever is believed 
by universal consent must be true and must have been brought into conformity in 
virtue of some internal faculty’.73 This means that an individual could confirm 
whether a piece of knowledge belongs to the common notions via the natural instinct 
in the mind; a truth would ‘possesses the witness of some faculty, [while a] falsity will 
have no such witness’.74 Thus, ‘universal consent is the teaching of Natural Instinct 
and is essentially due to Divine Providence’. 75  In brief, because of universal 
providence every human being is endowed with natural instinct, and by natural 
instinct every man is able to acquire the same common notions; this process in the end 
generates universal consent. It is worth noting that universal consent signifies that 
theoretically everyone will agree on a truth when his or her faculty is in conformity 
with the objects under the right conditions,76 but in reality whether an individual 
attains this perfect understanding depends on particular providence or ‘the Divine 
wisdom’.77 By presenting the abovementioned point Herbert again ‘maintain[ed] that 
universal consent (which has not been established without the aid of Divine 
Providence) is in the last resort the sole test of truth’.78  Herbert provided an 
illustration of universal consent: religion. He argued that because all peoples in all 
time periods had religion, it must be a common notion; furthermore, any religious 
articles that are universally accepted (such as that a Supreme Deity exists, and ought 
to be worshipped) must be acknowledged as common religious notions.79 
                                                     
72 DV, 117. 
73 DV, 116. 
74 DV, 118. 
75 DV, 117. 
76 About the conditions of each level of truths, please see DV, 90-107.  
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 Common notions are necessary for human beings. Herbert explained that ‘if we 
had not been endowed with Common Notions’, we would never be able to distinguish 
between objects, or understand the general nature of things, since ‘our reasoning 
faculties have nothing beyond the Common Notions to which they can appeal on 
doubtful points’.80 Herbert also maintained that ‘where there is uncertainty, we must 
have recourse to the Common Notions themselves, for they alone can resolve it’.81 
When an individual misunderstands the nature of an object, errors must not be 
referred to the common notions but ‘either to the fact that the object is inappropriate, 
or to the conditions [such as time and place] through which the objects are brought 
into right conformity’.82  Moreover, ‘when they [common notions] are arranged 
systematically they reflect the eternal wisdom of the universe’ and provide ‘a way 
which cannot deceive us, for they lead straight to happiness’.83 Therefore, necessity 
becomes one of the characteristics of the common notions.84 
 Although both Herbert and the English casuists agreed that common notions are 
one of the sources of moral principles, as section 2.2.2 will show, Herbert stressed 
their importance and insisted that they are the foundation of the universe, while the 
English casuists had no such emphasis. As the ‘excellent witnesses of divine 
Providence’, common notions present ‘the wisdom of nature’, ‘the teaching of natural 
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instinct’ and ‘the exact and surest criterion of Catholic truth’.85 Moreover, Herbert 
held ‘them also to be the basis not only of human judgement, but also of the divine, 
eternal counsel of the universe’ and warned that ‘to deem them anything less would be 
blasphemy’.86 However, it is worth noting that maintaining that common notions are 
the foundation of the universe is not equivalent to saying that common notions are the 
creator of the universe – similarly, it would be an exaggeration to say that the idea of 
common notions alone forms Herbert’s religion. The place of the common notions in 
Herbert’s theory is that they, together with the particular providence or the Grace, 
manage the operation of the universe.87 Describing the mechanism of conscience, 
Herbert in De Religione Gentilium wrote that ‘the Common Notions sit as judges [at 
the court of conscience], and the Supreme God is the arbitrator’; this implies that 
common notions did not hold the place of God.88 
 Individuals, in addition to being able to acquire truths through the conformity of 
human faculties and objects, could obtain revealed truth by grace. Herbert provided 
two personal experiences of obtaining grace,89 while describing how an individual 
receives grace or revelation in Chapter Ten of De Veritate. He wrote that ‘when in a 
moment of intense faith we make a special appeal of God, and feel within us His 
saving power and a sense of marvellous deliverance, I do not doubt that the mind is 
touched by Grace, or particular providence’.90  Similarly, when one attempts to 
confirm whether a fact comes from revelation, one ‘must employ prayers, vows, faith 
and every faculty which can be used to invoke particular and general providence’; if 
the fact belongs to revelation, ‘the breath of the Divine Spirit must be immediately 
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felt, for in this way we can distinguish the inner efforts of the faculties for truth from 
revelations which come from without us’.91 By Herbert’s statements in De Veritate 
we know, at least, that grace is likely to be obtained by employing our prayers, vows, 
and our God-given faculties, but we still cannot know the exact method or process. 
Although Herbert did not provide a comprehensive way to obtain grace, he 
believed grace would certainly be given if individuals try their best to use all their 
faculties to invoke and receive grace.92 Herbert concluded that the doctrine of grace 
‘was only grudgingly acknowledged by the ancients, as may be gathered from their 
surviving works’, but he maintained that grace or special providence is a common 
notion because ‘the worship of the Divine Power was recognised in every age’.93 In 
other words, since Herbert noticed that the ancients without the help of the Bible 
practiced the worship of God, which is the second religious common notion, he 
believed that this worship was carried out with the help of God’s grace. Presenting the 
same viewpoint in De Religione Gentilium, Herbert stated that pagans ‘partook fully 
of Divine Grace, especially because they knew about the most rational and intelligible 
parts of true divine worship’.94 Herbert held the view that God’s grace is prevalent in 
every age, and as he wrote that ‘God does not suffer us to beseech Him in vain, as the 
universal experience of divine assistance proves’.95 Moreover, ‘the All Wise Cause of 
the universe does not suffer itself to be enclosed within its own sphere, but it bestows 
general Grace on all and special Grace on those whom it has chosen’, Herbert 
claimed.96 
  Grace would not contradict the common notions since in Herbert’s theory both 
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share the same destination: guiding people to live moral lives and then to salvation.97 
When discussing the truth of revelation, Herbert maintained both that ‘the breath of 
the Divine Spirit must be immediately felt’, and that ‘revelation must recommend 
some course of action which is good; in this way genuine revelations may be 
distinguished from false and wicked temptations’.98  The content of grace, like 
common notions, would never lead people to live an evil life but a moral life. 
According to Herbert, a revelation showing an evil content must not be a real 
revelation, and he provided a classic illustration in A Dialogue between a Tutor and a 
Pupil. Giving the example of Genesis 22:1-10 where Abraham offered his son Isaac as 
a sacrifice, the pupil asked the casuistical question ‘what a rational man should do in 
such a case, suppose we heard a strange voice now commanding us to kill one another, 
what should I think of it?’.99 The tutor answered ‘I say then, that according to the 
dictates of common reason, I should believe that this voice came rather from wicked 
spirit, than from God’ since ‘all homicide, particularly that of a parent’s destroying his 
own child with his own hands, without any offence given by him’ is ‘so repugnant to 
the laws of God and nature’.100 The tutor, moreover, ‘cannot but extremely wonder, 
that Abraham being a wise man, should believe that the voice came from the great and 
wise God’.101 In Herbert’s view, all bloody sacrifice is contrary to God’s goodness; 
therefore, if a supposed revelation commands a bloody sacrifice, it must be a fake 
revelation. Furthermore, according to Herbert’s study, all kinds of bloody sacrifices 
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‘seem to have been from the Egyptians, and thence derived to the Hebrews’.102 
 Since Herbert believed that grace and the common notions would definitely lead 
people to live moral lives and pave the way to salvation, he not only denied the 
human sacrifice as the word of God but also denied the doctrine of predestination. 
Denouncing the idea that ‘God has created and condemned certain men, in fact the 
larger part of the human race, not only without their desire, but without their 
knowledge’, Herbert commented, ‘this idea is so dreadful and consorts so ill with the 
providence and goodness, and even the justice of God’.103 Moreover, he thought that 
‘to declare that God has cut us off from the means by which we can return to Him … 
is a blasphemy so great that those who indulge in it seek to destroy not merely human 
goodness, but also the goodness of God’.104 Meanwhile, he suggested that ‘it is more 
charitable to suppose that the whole human race has always possessed in repentance 
the opportunity of becoming reconciled with God’.105 Herbert’s correspondence with 
his family ally Sir Robert Harley confirmed the abovementioned point. Harley once 
said that ‘his Lordship [Herbert] says he loves a puritan but not a predestinator’.106 
And from their correspondence we see Herbert had nursed the idea since 1618, when 
he told Harley that ‘I think there is in every religion and ever was and ever wilbee 
enough taught to bringe a man to happiness eternall. For I must never beleeve God’s 
providence which extends to man and every creature besides, only to faile in that 
point which is both the most necessary and to which the rest are subordinate’.107 
Herbert, moreover, added that ‘the notion is written in my hart that God’s providence 
is over all his works’ and ‘yf you aske mee how this is wrought, I may say I cannot 
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tell’; ‘this is then the derivation of my beliefe’.108 
 In Herbert’s later years, when he was writing De Religione Gentilium, his 
opposition to the doctrine of predestination continued. In the opening of the work, he 
made it clear that he was opposed to the idea that ‘those who had never heard of 
Christ were doomed to eternal perdition’,109 and the goal of his work was to prove 
that ‘the best of the pagans, through God’s infinite mercy, might be eligible for eternal 
salvation’.110 The doctrine of predestination, in Herbert’s view, is contrary to the 
universal providence Herbert believed in. He stated that ‘I could not conceive that the 
same God either could or would leave anyone deprived, either by Nature or by Grace, 
of the way to obtaining a happier state’.111 In brief, since Herbert believed that both 
universal providence and special providence or common notions and grace would 
guide people to live moral lives and finally to salvation, he could not accept the 
doctrine of predestination. 
 Since grace shares the same destination with the common notions and its content 
should not be contrary to goodness, it could be argued that in Herbert’s theory grace 
could be replaced by the common notions. Although Herbert wrote that by grace 
‘some new aspect of God is revealed, [and] we pass beyond the normal level of 
experience’,112 he also stated that ‘if we do not possess a supernatural and miraculous 
sense we should be obliged to hold that God confined Himself to His universal 
providence, and disclosed Himself only through those faculties of faith and prayer 
which are implanted in every normal human being’.113 Moreover, when presenting 
the five religious common notions, Herbert asserted that ‘in this connection the 
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teaching of Common Notions is important; indeed, without them it is impossible to 
establish any standard of discrimination in revelation or even in religion’.114 This 
assertion implies that we could establish the criterion of revelation and religion since 
we have common notions and common notions seems to be superior to revelation. 
Furthermore, after insisting that ‘the only Catholic and uniform Church is the doctrine 
of Common Notions’, Herbert said that if ‘anyone receives some truth by revelation’, 
‘he must use it as occasion warrant, remembering that unless he is entrusted with a 
message of interest to all, he should reserve it to himself’.115 Therefore, although 
theoretically both grace and common notions will guide people to live moral lives and 
although he stated that ‘I do not hesitate to repeat that our actions are perfected and 
brought to completion only by Grace[,] yet under the guidance of the inner 
consciousness I maintain that the principles of good actions spring from Common 
Notions’.116 It is the statement of the supremacy of the common notions that led 
readers to think that he denied the existence or the value of revelation. 
 In Herbert’s theory particular revelation or special revelation occupies a narrow 
scope. Since revelation is a particular message to a specific person, and since it could 
only be confirmed by the faculty of the receiver, the validity of revelation is confined 
to the receiver only and extends no further. People who receive revelation from others 
must account it ‘not revelation but tradition or history’, and hence, it is a probable 
truth to non-receivers.117 As Herbert said, ‘the truth I have defined is based upon our 
faculties, while the truth of revelation depends upon the authority of him who reveals 
it’.118 Showing the same view, Herbert in De Religione Laici wrote that ‘the Faith 
that regards the past [including the delivered revelations] is a firm belief in what is 
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narrated, yet such as depends chiefly on human authority… and is more or less 
probable according to circumstances’ since ‘it is subject, furthermore, to no faculty [of 
men]’.119 
 Although Herbert placed strict limits on the truths of revelation, it should be 
stressed that in his theory the help of particular revelation or grace is necessary for 
living a moral life and for acquiring truths, and to that extent the overall importance of 
revelation is not diminished. As we will see in section 2.2.2.3 ‘Conscience and Grace’, 
Herbert provided two personal experiences of receiving help from grace, which will 
further confirm its importance in his theory. 
 
2.2.2 Herbert’s theory of conscience 
 
Herbert was interested in the theory of Conscience; in De Veritate he stated that ‘I am 
preparing an entire treatise on Conscience’.120 Although Herbert seems never to have 
started this treatise, and although no related manuscript written by him has survived, 
he touched on the definition of conscience in his other works. Having discussed the 
relationship between the common notions and grace, this section deals with Herbert’s 
theory of conscience as set out in his religious treatises De Veritate, De Religione 
Laici, De Religione Gentilium, and A Dialogue between A Tutor and His Pupil. It will 
in turn address Herbert’s definition of conscience, the sources of the moral principles 
and their varied importance, the help provided by grace to conscience, and the 
connection between the conformity of individual conscience and salvation. 
Meanwhile, by discussing Herbert’s theory of conscience and by comparing it with 
those of the English casuists I intend to show its two characteristics. (1) Herbert had a 
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different view on the sources of moral principles, and he deemed common notions, 
rather than Scripture and teachings of church traditions, to be the most reliable 
source – though this does not mean that he denied the value of Scripture and teachings 
of church traditions. (2) Herbert’s theory of conscience was an extension of his theory 
of truth. Truths in his epistemological theory were obtained under the guidance and 
help of both universal providence and particular providence or common notions and 
grace, and thus were the functions of individual conscience – conscience obtained 
moral principles from the common notions, while it also relied on grace to save it 
from moral dilemmas. Similarly, just as the goal of his epistemological theory was to 
help people obtain salvation, so was it the goal of his theory of conscience. 
 
2.2.2.1 The definition of conscience 
 
Herbert defined conscience as ‘the common sense of the inner senses’ or ‘the common 
consciousness of the inner forms of awareness’.121  This means that conscience 
belongs to the inner senses which constitute the second level of the four fundamental 
classes of faculty, the internal senses.122 Each sense has its faculty and each faculty is 
an ‘inner power which develops the different forms of apprehension in their relation 
to the different forms of the objects’.123 To describe conscience as the common sense 
or the common consciousness of men denotes that conscience holds the supreme role 
among the internal faculties and that ‘conscience is only satisfied when all the 
faculties are in conformity [with their objects]’.124 In other words, the object of the 
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conscience ‘is the conformity of all the other faculties’,125 and conscience in practice 
is the guidance of our action ‘with the aim of reaching a decision concerning what we 
ought to do’.126 In sum, as the highest inner faculty, conscience guides the use of the 
faculties and judges every particular action whether it should be done.127 By the 
abovementioned definition Herbert agreed with the English casuists that conscience is 
both a rational faculty and an intellectual activity.128 
Herbert also agreed with the English casuists that conscience ‘has always been 
present in every man’ and that ‘it is imprinted on the hearts of all men’.129 The 
existence of conscience, Herbert said, ‘is due to Nature or Universal Providence’.130 
Presenting the same viewpoint, in De Religione Gentilium Herbert maintained that 
‘divine goodness gave the same intellect, freedom of will and other faculties to the 
pagans’;131 the human faculties, including conscience, are not exclusive to Christians 
only but belong to all human beings. Just as the English casuists maintained that 
conscience was implanted directly by God, Herbert stated that conscience is ‘a faculty 
which has been built into the soul by God to judge between good and evil’.132 
Similarly, just as the English casuists did, Herbert depicted conscience as a witness 
since ‘no word or thought can escape its sway or be hidden from its gaze’. Conscience, 
meanwhile, is also an accuser or consoler because ‘its special function is to take 
pleasure in moral action and to induce a physical repugnance and remorse in the 
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presence of evil’.133 Conscience, therefore, became ‘a guardian of divine justice’ in 
our minds.134 
 
2.2.2.2 The common notions, biblical authority and the 
traditions of the church 
 
Herbert discussed moral principles and moral judgement of conscience even though 
he did not refer to synderesis and conscientia, the two specific terms the casuists used 
to explain the composition of conscience.135 According to Herbert, conscience as ‘an 
agent or medium’ receives moral principles derived from common notions, and ‘by 
the high authority of the Common Notions’ conscience ‘examines not only what is 
good and evil, but also their different degrees’.136 Clearly in Herbert’s theory moral 
principles come from common notions. He maintained that ‘we must believe that the 
Common Notions are the fundamental standards of good’ and that ‘we find great 
unanimity of opinion in moral philosophy since it is entirely composed of Common 
Notions’.137 After the people received the common notions, Herbert said, ‘Common 
Notions should be clearly arranged, so that they [people] might have a rule of 
conscience’ – but he did not provide the method of arranging them.138 Constituting 
the moral principles, common notions are the highest guidance of conscience, 
according to Herbert. Common notions are ‘principles which it is not legitimate to 
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dispute; they form that part of knowledge with which we were endowed in the 
primeval plan of Nature’ and ‘Reason is the process of applying Common Notions as 
far as it can, and has nothing beyond them to which it can appeal’.139 When 
conscience ‘is troubled, whether its perceptions are right or not, [it] can reach a 
decision only by having recourse to the Common Notions’.140 
 The common notions Herbert proposed correspond to the light of nature or the 
light innate of the English casuists. Both Herbert and Sanderson used the same term 
κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, i.e. common notions.141 Sanderson said that ‘It has pleased God that 
certain propositions, and practical principles, which the Philosophers called κοιναὶ 
ἔννοιαι’ were implanted in the heart of every human being.142 ‘These common 
Notions are that Law of God’ and ‘they have the same authority and estimation of the 
Law or of a Rule imposed by God upon us’, Sanderson added.143 Similarly, Herbert 
maintained that ‘Common Notions, the κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι of the ancients’ are sources of 
moral principles and they ‘are found in all normal persons; which notions are, so to 
say, constituents of all and are derived from universal wisdom and imprinted on the 
soul by the dictates of nature itself’.144 Both Herbert and Sanderson maintained that 
God imprinted common notions on all people throughout history and the notions 
formed a very important part of moral principles.145 The light of nature of the English 
casuists is equivalent to ‘Nature or General Providence’ in Herbert’s theory (which is 
different from ‘Grace or Special Providence’), and ‘Common Notions are so called 
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because they are understood by all normal men’.146 
 As mentioned above, in De Veritate Herbert provided a theory of how to 
ascertain moral principles and their origin, the common notions. Herbert stated that 
every human being could know the common notions, including the common notions 
of moral principles, by their natural instinct, the highest level of human faculties. 
Moreover, Herbert stressed the importance of common notions and held that they 
were essential for human beings and that they were the foundation of the universe. 
 Since common notions are the foundation of the universe and are essential for 
human beings, the importance of them, when it comes to the sources of the moral 
principles of the human being, supercede those of other sources such as the Bible and 
church traditions. According to Herbert, the Bible is not as reliable as the common 
notions since individuals received the knowledge of it not through our own faculties 
but through the delivery of history. In other words, before the examination and 
confirmation of an individual’s faculties the content of the Bible belongs to history 
and to the truth of probabilities. Herbert explained that ‘all tradition and history, [or] 
everything in short that concerns the past’ belongs to the category of the truth of 
probability, since they were not confirmed by our own faculties, and the certainty of 
such things could only ‘depend on the authority of the narrator’.147 In De Religione 
Laici, Herbert maintained that a religion known through historical tradition could only 
be probable because ‘so many things can be added, exaggerated, or altered by the 
decision of anyone at all’, and again he stated that the authority of such knowledge 
came from the narrators.148 Moreover, ‘granted that all things set forth by renowned 
authors were true, still these will not be your truths, but theirs who came to know 
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these things by virtue of rightly conformed faculties’.149 
 Herbert held the opinion that not everything in the Bible ‘is endowed with equal 
authority’ and suggested that the Bible contains different levels of truths.150 In De 
Veritate he suggested amending the Bible since ‘carelessness or the passage of time 
has allowed to creep into a sacred or profane book any passage which maligns God or 
calls in question those divine attributes which are universally recognised’.151 At the 
same time, he implied that people should ‘charge its [the Bible’s] interpreters with 
error, in that they have departed from the writer’s meaning and even from the analogy 
of faith, since they have stated views which conflict with Common Notions’.152 
Similarly, in De Religione Laici Herbert mentioned that some paragraphs of the Bible 
are controversial ‘because some contend that there have been certain interpolations or 
excisions; because the original text, especially indeed the Hebrews, is ambiguous; 
because the authors are various, and in some places even discrepant’.153 Moreover, 
Herbert said that some paragraphs of the Bible might be corrupted ‘since the words 
recorded in Scripture of villains, women, beasts, nay of the devil himself, are slurred 
over, [and] clearly the sayings of even the best men cannot be considered divinely 
inspired at all times’.154 Facing the fact that the Bible contains different levels of 
truths, including the corrupted paragraphs, Herbert thought that the question which 
remained is ‘what in the Holy Bible is the very word of God, and further what is most 
necessary to salvation’.155 In De Religione Gentilium, Herbert once became more 
straightforward by questioning the notions of the Fall and the doctrine of Original Sin 
in the Bible. He held that these notions contradicted God’s benevolent nature, and 
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asserted that ‘the principle of evil cannot be derived from Adam’ – though Herbert 
avoided claiming that these passages of the Bible held no authority, and wrote twice 
that ‘[he] shall leave it to the theologians to deal with the principle of evil and its 
derivation from the Fall’.156 
 Since the truths in the Bible vary, Herbert thinks that they should be examined by 
individuals’ faculties before individuals accept them as the words of God. According 
to Herbert, the unexamined content of the Bible is similar to the knowledge of history 
and these truths ‘we shall find serve to confirm the divine attributes written in our 
hearts’.157 When there is no conformity between our faculty and a historical statement, 
Herbert does ‘not think that any confidence can be placed in the statement’ and he 
‘call[ed] those probable which are not yet self-evident’.158 When ‘we read some story 
of past events which exhibit wisdom, courage, piety, justice and prudence, we may 
find that our analogous faculties, or Common Notions, are stirred to respond, so that 
we feel at peace with ourselves’.159 In brief, a historical statement is a truth when it 
could be brought into harmony with our corresponding faculty; otherwise, it is not a 
truth. From his general statement it could be argued that when the words of the Bible 
are in conformity with human’s highest faculty, the natural instinct, these words could 
be viewed as common notions or the real words of God. Moreover, Herbert 
maintained that individuals had the right to examine any religious statements they 
heard from others or from history. In De Religione Laici, Herbert wrote that ‘mankind 
is given complete liberty regarding Faith about the past, and regarding doctrines 
proceeding from such Faith’; ‘whether he readily believes history … whether he 
doubts it … or whether he rejects it’, the individual ‘may reckon that he decides 
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nothing save at the command of right reason’ since ‘the rational faculty which is for 
ever appropriate to every man is capable of deciding’.160 Here an interesting issue 
may be raised: Herbert’s theory might cause the problem that people might attain 
different opinions concerning a statement of history, since individuals’ faculties might 
bring different judgements. However, this would not be the case for Herbert’s theory. 
People would arrive at the same opinion as long as everyone used the same given 
faculties under the same conditions – this would be the outcome of universal consent. 
Furthermore, common notions and grace, or universal providence and particular 
providence, would guide people to attain the same truth, according to Herbert – this 
also means that Herbert held a unitary view of truth that all human beings can 
apprehend internally via their faculties.161 
 By analyzing Herbert’s statements on the Bible, we see his view that it contains 
common notions, other lower levels of truths, and probable truths. After posing the 
question, ‘what in the Holy Bible is the very word of God, and further what is most 
necessary to salvation’, Herbert answered, ‘here in the first place, surely, we find our 
catholic truths, which as the undoubted pronouncements of God, transcribed in the 
conscience, are to be set apart and preserved’.162 This means that the Bible contains 
the five religious common notions – in Chapter 10 of De Veritate, Herbert confirmed 
that the Ten Commandments are common notions ‘since their injunctions are implicit 
in every kind of law and religion’.163 Then, by reading the history of the Hebrews, 
individuals ‘will find no small heap of miracles published among them – prophecies, 
rites, sacraments, ceremonies, and especially the religious cult of that nation’; Herbert 
suggested that people examine them so that ‘what we call our catholic truths should 
                                                     
160 DRL, 95-97.  
161 In Herbert’s theory, grace shares the same purpose and function with common notions. For this 
point, see sections 2.3.2.3 and 2.3.2.4. 
162 DRL, 101.  
163 DV, 312-313. 
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thereby be more clarified, better expressed, more sanctified’.164 Then there remains 
‘urged promises and certain special covenants, secret and allegorical allusions, nay 
even some expressions too concise or incoherent, and difficult to understand’.165 
Herbert thought that the remaining words would cause controversies and suggested 
that we view them as probable things whose certainties were based ‘on the authority 
of the prophet’.166 
In De Veritate and De Religione Laici, Herbert tended not to have detailed 
analyses of any particular paragraph of the Bible since he was aware of the fact that 
his viewpoint might cause controversy or opposition.167 In the opening of De Veritate 
Herbert stated that ‘the work is published with the aim not of arousing controversy, 
but of closing it, or at any rate, making it unnecessary’.168 Throughout the work 
Herbert did not refer to any specific work, any particular author or religious 
denomination, except in Chapter 11, ‘On Probability’, where he gave a general 
comment on the Bible. After stating that religious statements of the past were 
probable truths, Herbert maintained that ‘I regard this Book [the Bible], in distinction 
from all other books, with profound respect’ but then suggested people amend the 
Bible since the views of some paragraphs – again, Herbert in this treatise did not 
mention any specific paragraph – ‘conflict with Common Notions’.169 Similarly, 
when Herbert at the end of De Religione Laici anticipated a possible criticism of his 
work, that ‘those of our country may say that I ought to speak more eloquently of the 
Holy Scriptures’, he answered that ‘no one thinks more nobly of them, for I have 
asserted strongly that the best laws for living rightly and happily, or eternally, are 
                                                     
164 DRL, 101.  
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167 The abovementioned Ten Commandments discussed in De Veritate is the only exception. 
168 DV, 74. CF: ‘it is not at all to my purpose to write about any individual religion, and especially 
about those articles which are violently disputed’. DRL, 127.  
169 DV, 316.  
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delivered in the Scriptures, although this is not the place to discuss them all one by 
one’.170  
 Although Herbert held the view that the Bible contains different levels of truth 
and even contains words contrary to the common notions, he neither excluded it from 
being the guide of individual’s moral actions nor maintained that the Bible holds no 
authority. The Bible, as he said, was just a historical work, but after numerous 
deliveries and transformations, it had been mixed with other levels of truths and 
stories and thus had become less reliable than common notions. In De Veritate Herbert 
stated that ‘the sacred scriptures, accordingly, occupy the highest place among books’ 
and he found ‘nowhere else a surer source of consolation and support’.171 These 
positive statements on the Bible could be more than a mere defence of Herbert from 
possible criticism since, as mentioned above, he held the view that the Bible 
contained paragraphs, such as the Ten Commandments, corresponding with the five 
religious common notions and may lead people to live moral lives.  
 In parallel with his view of the Bible, Herbert held the opinion that the teaching 
of church traditions is not as reliable as that of common notions. After Herbert 
proposed the five religious common notions in Chapter 9 of De Veritate – namely  
that ‘there is a Supreme God’, that ‘this Sovereign Deity ought to be Worshipped’, 
that piety ‘is and always has been held to be the most important part of religious 
practice’, that vices and crimes must be expiated by repentance, and that ‘there is 
Reward or Punishment after this life’ –172 he maintained that ‘such, then are the 
Common Notions of which the true Catholic or universal church is built’ while ‘the 
church which is built of clay or stone or living rock or even of marble cannot be 
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claimed to be the infallible Church’.173 Moreover, ‘the true Catholic Church is not 
supported on the inextricable confusion or oral and written tradition to which men 
have given their allegiance’.174 Furthermore, Herbert asserted that ‘anyone who 
courts uncertain doctrines in place of the sure truths of divine providence, and forges 
new articles of Faith, forsakes this [catholic] Church’.175 This means that all church 
traditions in the world are inferior to the five religious common notions, and that the 
teaching of church traditions should comply with them. Arguing the same point in A 
Dialogue between a Tutor and His Pupil, Herbert stated that his five religious 
common notions were universal and that ‘anything that contradicts the said principles 
must not by any means be admitted upon what pretence soever of faith’.176 
 It might seem that Herbert denied the value of all religious institutions and all 
religious doctrines except the five religious common notions; in other words, the 
content of religion seems to become very narrow. Herbert anticipated this objection. 
In A Dialogue the pupil once asked ‘will not my religion thus lie in too narrow a 
room?’ and the tutor replied that we shall not waste our time on controversial 
doctrines and by these five notions alone we could live a moral life.177 The tutor in 
fact did not directly answer the question but only seized his final destination in his 
mind: how to lead a moral life and attain eternal salvation. By the answer of the tutor 
to his pupil we see that Herbert, again, avoided commenting on any particular church 
                                                     
173  CF: ‘The only Catholic and uniform Church is the doctrine of Common Notions which 
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176 Dialogue, 6-7. ‘Religion [based on the five common notions] being thus far stated, according to 
common reason and universal consent, you may descend afterwards to the particular faiths taught each 
where, (for they all move about these five centers) and then consider whether their additions consist 
with these common principles; for anything that contradicts the said principles must not by any means 
be admitted upon what pretence soever of faith.’ 
177 ‘Why should you require a more ample religion, when the five articles alone will give you a just 
exercise for your whole life, while thus you either think good thoughts, speak good words, or do good 
actions; and would you not think your time thus better employed, then in studying of controversy…’? 




 However, Herbert set a positive value on religious institutions and their doctrines. 
First, he agreed ‘that immense comforts can be drawn from ecclesiastical doctrines 
that are scarcely adduced’.178 Similarly, after he presented the five religious common 
notions in De Veritate, he stated that ‘I do not deny that sacred ceremonies can form 
part of religion’ and that ‘I find that some ceremonies are included in every religion 
and serve to embellish it; so far they are valuable’.179 Furthermore, he suggested that 
‘let the canons of Faith also, when they decree nothing opposed to these things [the 
common notions], deservedly to be added, as well as laws and rites which make for 
the people’s salvation’ – here, it suggests that Herbert agreed churches could regulate 
things indifferent on condition that they do not violate the five common notions.180 
Presenting the same viewpoint in A Dialogue, Herbert stated that individuals could 
accept ‘all pious doctrines among foreigners, as far as they are grounded on common 
reason, and concur with the precepts of a good life, taught in our church’.181 Secondly, 
Herbert had no doubt that some clergymen could guide people to live moral lives even 
though he attributed most superstitions to clergymen.182 In addition to listing some 
social functions of the clergymen, 183  Herbert stated that people should ‘revere 
everywhere priests of virtuous and exemplary life’.184 Thirdly, Herbert maintained 
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that ‘faith in the historical narrative remains the Church’s prerogative’ although at the 
same time, as he treated the Bible, he asserted that ‘the liberty of passing judgement 
shall remain with mankind’.185 
 Other illustrations supporting the fact that Herbert did not belittle the value of 
church traditions come from De Religione Gentilium. When arguing that pagans share 
the same conscience with Christians, Herbert stated that ‘not only are [there] some 
common notions, derived from universal wisdom (by which the world is governed), 
engraved on the conscience, but also those general axioms of theological or moral 
virtue, those rules and disciplines which correct the will and which determine what is 
good and just’.186 This means that moral axioms and theological doctrines may guide 
the people’s action as well. Herbert, then, gave two examples:187 ‘do as you would be 
done by’ and ‘when in doubt, choose the safest route’.188 The first axiom is not only 
the teaching of the Bible Matthew 7:12 and Luke 6:31 but also a natural law widely 
recognised in the seventeenth century.189 Describing it as ‘the very Law of nature’, 
Perkins stated that it concerns ‘that Equitie which we looke for at the hands of all 
men’.190 Showing the same view, Benjamin Camfield, a contemporary who wrote a 
treatise on the Golden Rule, said that ‘it were written on the Tables of all our Hearts’ 
and ‘this Precept of our Blessed Saviour is no more than a plain Law of Nature, 
obliterated by evil habits and custom, revived and brought to light again by Christ’.191 
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The second theological doctrine is the axiom of tutiorism of casuistry, suggesting that 
when in doubt, an individual should choose the safest option with the least possibility 
of sin.192 Although by this doctrine we could not see more about Herbert’s view of 
other related doctrines such as probabiliorism or probabilism,193 we know that he 
thought the basic doctrine of tutiorism could guide people’s conscience.194 
 This section has shown that in Herbert’s view the common notions were more 
reliable sources of moral principles than either biblical authority or the traditions of 
the Church. However, it is well worth noting that Herbert still attributed some 
importance to the Bible and church traditions. He held that both were able to guide 
people to solve their cases of conscience and live moral lives, though the importance 
of their contents and teachings may vary and should be carefully examined by the 
individual’s faculties before receiving them. This belief challenges the impression that 
Herbert discredited the whole value of biblical authority and church traditions. 
 
2.2.2.3 Conscience and Grace 
 
It is of much importance that Herbert mentioned that a troubled conscience, in 
addition to having recourse to the common notions, should also seek the help of God’s 
grace or particular providence. According to Herbert, ‘conscience can be a great 
danger, either as a result of scruples which make it too tender, or as a consequence of 
                                                                                                                                                        
wrongly attributed Camfield’s work to William Leach, which is quite misleading. See Jeffrey Wattles, 
The Golden Rule (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 78. 
192 Slights, The Casuistical Tradition in Shakespeare, Donne, Herbert, and Milton, 13. 
193 Probabiliorism were shared by most Protestant casuists, recommending individuals follow the 
strongest possibility when they have a doubting conscience, while probabilism was usually held by 
Jesuits, suggesting individuals could choose any option of any possibility. See Slights, The Casuistical 
Tradition in Shakespeare, Donne, Herbert, and Milton, 14-15.  
194 CF: ‘7. In doubts I choose what is safest. 8. In probabilities, I prefer that which is the more 
reasonable, never allowing to any one a leave of choosing that which is confessedly the less reasonable 
in the whole conjunction of circumstances and relative consideration’. Taylor, The Whole Works of the 
Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, 11:359. 
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callousness, a condition which ends in impenitence’; thus, he suggested that ‘we must 
not only have recourse to Common Notions in all our actions, but we ought to make 
use of certain spurs, vigilance, meditation and prayer, lest we fall in the midst of the 
way’.195 Moreover, ‘the sense of grace works within us, [and it is] a special aid which 
is entrusted to our inmost being’.196  
 Grace or particular providence could guide people to solve their problems and 
strengthen their minds when they are trapped in moral dilemmas. Though Herbert, as 
analyzed before, did not provide a clear statement about how to obtain grace – in 
Chapter 10 of De Veritate he said only that grace could be received by using our 
prayers, vows, and our God-given faculties – he did provide two personal experiences 
of obtaining grace in his works and the first one lies in the first chapter of De Veritate. 
Herbert stated that he attained his theory of truth via both the guidance of God’s grace 
and his God-given reason; this confession has received little notice from modern 
scholars but it can be an illustration of much importance. After saying that ‘the 
multitude of sects, divisions, sub-divisions and cross-divisions in the schools 
hopelessly distract the wits of the learned and the consciences of the unlettered’ and 
his own conscience as well,197 Herbert resorted to ‘no other hold but that of God’ and 
prayed ‘with sincere faith, with prayer, and with all the powers at my disposal by 
which I could invoke His Grace and Special Providence I besought His saving 
help’.198 After the invocation Herbert then examined the contemporary works ‘with a 
view to mastering the accepted doctrine of truth’ and ‘proceeded to collect definitions 
of truth from all the various authorities’.199 He then found his theory of truth which 
                                                     
195 DV, 187.  
196 DV, 165.  
197 DV, 75. Again, Herbert did not mention any specific sects or schools here since his work ‘is 
published with the aim not of arousing controversy, but of closing it, or at any rate, making it 
unnecessary’. DV, 74.  
198 DV, 77.  
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was ‘the product both of Nature and of Grace’.200  It is worth noting that the 
manuscript of De Veritate dated 20 July 1619 shows that Herbert recorded this 
personal experience in writing and used it to develop his theory of conscience.201 
Thus, by this time Herbert had established both his theory of truth and his theory of 
conscience. 
Herbert shared his second experience of particular grace at the end of his 
Autobiography, where he stated that he received the divine imprimatur of De Veritate. 
This story is very well-known partly because Herbert stopped writing his 
autobiography after recording this experience, and partly because some scholars, such 
as Horace Walpole and Sir Sidney Lee, have argued that it contradicts to his other 
statements on revelation or particular providence.202 At the end of the Autobiography, 
Herbert expressed his worry that ‘as I knew it [De Veritate] would meet with much 
opposition, I did consider whether it was not better for me a while to suppress it’.203 
Falling into a moral dilemma, Herbert stated that: 
Being thus doubtful in my chamber, one fair day in the summer, my casement being opened 
towards the south, the sun shining clear, and no wind stirring, I took my book, De Veritate, in my 
hand, and, kneeling on my knees, devoutly said these words: “O thou eternal God, Author of the 
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revelation?’ Walpole, A Catalogue of the Royal and Noble Authors of England, 1:190. For Lee’s 
comment, please see AB, 134n. There was also a debate about whether the experience of Herbert was 
written out of a sincere confession. See Eugene D Hill, Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury (Boston: 
Twayne, 1987), 114. 
203 AB, 133.  
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light which now shines upon me, and Giver of all inward illuminations, I do beseech Thee, of 
Thy infinite goodness, to pardon a greater request than a sinner ought to make; I am satisfied 
enough whether I shall publish this book, De Veritate; if it be for Thy glory, I beseech Thee give 
me some sign from heaven; if not, I shall suppress it.”204 
No sooner had Herbert spoken these words ‘but a loud though yet gentle noise came 
from the heavens, for it was like nothing on earth’; this noise comforted and cheered 
Herbert and he then stated that ‘I took my petition as granted, and that I had the sign I 
demanded, whereupon also I resolved to print my book’.205 The abovementioned two 
experiences of Herbert reveal that grace or particular providence, like the common 
notions, can help people solve their moral questions, and that anyone can invoke the 
help of God.206 Moreover, from his experiences and confessions we know that 
Herbert thought that grace, like the common notions, is sometimes needed to solve 
moral questions. Grace or particular providence, like the common notions or universal 
providence, would definitely guide people to live moral lives and then to salvation.207 
 
2.2.2.4 The authority of conscience and salvation 
 
Although Herbert and the English casuists put different emphases on the principles of 
conscience, Herbert agreed with them that conscience holds high authority. 
Conscience is responsible for the final moral judgement of a particular action; as 
Herbert put it, ‘I establish also a tribunal of divine Providence in conscience … so that 
                                                     
204 AB, 133.  
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206 ‘Men have been convinced, as I have observed above, that they can not only supplicate that 
heavenly Power but prevail upon Him, by means of the faculties implanted in every normal human 
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all that is holy and sacred may be here investigated as before a supreme court or 
parliament, beyond which there is no appeal’.208 As the highest inner faculty where 
‘all the causes of the inner faculties are pleaded’, conscience is not only ‘the court of 
the spirit and the body that is held in the hall of conscience, but the court of God’.209 
Since conscience ‘has full knowledge of Common Notions’, it ‘thus constitutes itself 
a guardian of divine justice’.210 There was nothing unusual about Herbert’s asserting 
this since the English casuists agreed with this view as well.  
 In Herbert’s theory conscience was deeply connected with the individual’s 
salvation. He stated that ‘there is no hope of inner peace except when it [conscience] 
is brought into due conformity’ and that ‘in it, above all, the great contract of 
salvation is expressed and eternal blessedness assured, and it is to it that all the 
common notions are referred’.211 Conscience was connected with the individual’s 
salvation because it possessed full knowledge of common notions, which, together 
with grace, would not only lead people to live moral lives but also guide people to 
salvation.212 As Herbert maintained, ‘[God], by giving us the means which proceed 
from His Common Providence to use for our salvation, will by His Grace enable us to 
enjoy eternal blessedness’. 213  Since conscience is guided by both universal 
providence and particular providence, human beings are destined to seek happiness 
and salvation.214 Moreover, since human faculties are given by God and belong to 
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universal providence, ‘all the faculties, when they are in due conformity, serve to 
promote eternal salvation’.215 As the highest faculty of human being, natural instinct, 
according to Herbert, ‘aims at Eternal Blessedness as its final end’;216 in other words, 
‘Eternal Blessedness will be the appropriate object of Natural Instinct’.217 As the first 
faculty of the inner faculties, conscience, especially the satisfaction of it, is necessary 
for obtaining salvation.218 In De Religione Gentilium Herbert likewise stated that ‘a 
good conscience, then, is the beginning of eternal salvation, and an evil one of future 
punishments’.219 Furthermore, as a faculty, conscience is ‘to judge between good and 
evil’ and ‘produces the hope of a better life to come’.220 
 In practice Herbert held the view that the five religious common notions could 
secure the peace of conscience and guide individuals to salvation. Showing his 
concern that people are ‘encompassed by the terrors of divers churches militant 
throughout the world’,221 Herbert advised people to ‘search out doctrines which are 
analogous to the internal faculties’; they would find then the five religious common 
notions which ‘are divinely inscribed in the understanding itself, and are subject to no 
traditions written or unwritten’. 222 The five religious common notions are the key to 
salvation since ‘in matters relating to eternal salvation no model of Faith, or even of 
Reason, is given, beyond what is common to all mankind’.223 Transcribed in the 
conscience by God, these notions can also protect us from the oppressions of religious 
sects and of clergymen.224 In De Religione Gentilium Herbert intended to show ‘how 
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the most enlightened pagans got out of the labyrinth [of the superstition designed by 
priests]’ by keeping the five religious common notions in their mind.225 Similarly, in 
A Dialogue he stated that pagans, by following the five religious common notions, 
could ‘find some means to keep a good conscience, and from thence to assure 
themselves of the attaining of a better life hereafter’.226 
 
 This section has shown that Herbert’s theory of conscience shared many ideas 
with those of English casuists, including that conscience is a rational faculty and an 
intellectual activity, that conscience holds higher authority than worldly institutions, 
and that moral principles come from nature, Scripture, and church traditions. By 
establishing a strong connection between Herbert’s thought and the ideas of his 
contemporaries, this section broadens our understanding of Herbert’s thought and its 
connection with his historical context. This, however, is not to deny that Herbert 
developed his own distinctive theory of conscience. He prioritized the common 
notions as the most reliable source of moral principles, and gave inferior positions to 
Scripture and teachings of church traditions. Moreover, echoing his theory of truth, 
Herbert maintained that a troubled conscience should seek help from both the 
common notions and from grace, since together they will lead people to live moral 
lives and obtain salvation. 
 The key points of Herbert’s theory of conscience are closely related to the 
arguments of the following chapters, all of which show that Herbert was deeply 
concerned with the moral dilemmas people met during this era, that he laid great 
emphasis on the freedom and authority of individual conscience, and that he held that 
it should not be oppressed by worldly institutions and authorities. Chapter 3 argues 
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that in Herbert’s thought conscience weighs more heavily than the royal supremacy, 
and that this is best shown in Herbert’s deep sympathy for the martyrs of the royal 
supremacy and its related enactments such as the Six Articles. Chapter 4 suggests that 
Herbert supported the authority of Parliament, since he believed that it could best 
protect the people’s conscience from the oppression of the King’s unlawful commands, 
such as non-parliamentary taxations and imprisonments without showing cause. 
Chapter 5 argues that Herbert agreed with the parliamentarians’ argument that 
conscience grants that the people could lawfully resist a tyrant. 
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Chapter 3: The Controversy over the Royal Supremacy 
 
One of the main cases of conscience of concern to Herbert was the impact of the royal 
supremacy on individual conscience, which he discussed in The Life and Raigne of 
King Henry the Eighth and ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the Church’. As we will see, 
the king’s religious policies enacted and enforced in the name of the royal supremacy 
were not always compatible with individual subjects’ religious beliefs, and hence may 
prove oppressive to individual conscience. For instance, the royal supremacy 
established by King Henry VIII brought many moral dilemmas to Catholics, a classic 
example being the case of Thomas More, who was sentenced to death due to his 
conscientious dissent from the King’s claim to be the head of the Church. This kind of 
moral dilemma had its origins in the late medieval period and experienced 
transformations from that time to the early Stuart era.  
During the early seventeenth century, James I and Charles I succeeded the royal 
supremacy established during the reign of Queen Elizabeth – according to which the 
Crown had the highest authority over church affairs, but no sacerdotal powers – and 
used their powers and prerogatives to control Church affairs and impose their 
religious policies. At the time Herbert was composing the two abovementioned 
historical works, many of Charles’s ecclesiastical policies faced opposition from the 
so-called Puritans, especially his reform of the worship and theology of the Church – 
a notable example being the controversy over the placing and arrangement of ‘altars’ 
or the Lord’s Table.1 Moreover, the legality of the courts of High Commission and 
Star Chamber was called into question by Charles’s opponents, who regarded them as 
                                                     




religious institutions lacking authority from the common law and Parliament.2 This 
chapter argues that although Herbert supported the royal supremacy against the papal 
supremacy, he believed that the power of the Crown over the Church was limited. He 
stressed the sacerdotal powers kings should not assume in ‘On the King’s Supremacy 
in the Church’, and argued that the laws enacted by the royal supremacy should not 
coerce the individual conscience in matters of religious belief. 
 
3.1 The royal supremacy and its moral dilemma 
 
It was never easy to advocate the King’s supremacy and his powers over the Church 
without any scruple. In the Middle Ages clergymen often faced a dilemma: on the one 
hand, they were members of the Church who should obey the hierarchy with the pope 
as head; on the other hand, they were subjects in a specific country with civil 
magistrates as their governors. Since clergymen had this dual character, a dilemma 
existed when popes and kings had different opinions on religious or temporal matters.  
 From the late Middle Ages to the early sixteenth century the English kings had 
limited power over the Church, while popes, as the head of the English Church, still 
had the highest authority over it, including its theology and liturgy. Although the 
English royal supremacy had not yet been established, the kings kept enlarging their 
influence on religious issues by trying to reduce the revenue sent to Rome, filling 
vacant bishoprics and minor benefices with their nominees, and giving royal 
permission and guidance to convocations.3 In the 1530s King Henry VIII established 
the royal supremacy by expelling the powers of popes from England. When 
                                                     
2 Jacqueline Rose, Godly Kingship in Restoration England: The Politics of The Royal Supremacy, 
1660-1688 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 61. 
3 Leo F. Solt, Church and State in Early Modern England, 1509-1640 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), 8–9. 
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Parliament passed the Act in Restraint of Appeals to Rome in 1533, the pope lost his 
power of spiritual jurisdiction in England, and from then on he became the bishop of 
Rome with no more privilege than other bishops. The statute’s preamble stated that 
the body politic of this ‘empire’ was divided into two realms, the English Church and 
the English State, both of which were governed by ‘one supreme Head and King’.4 
The subsequent statutes passed in the same year, the Act Restraining the Payment of 
Annates and the Act of Submission of the Clergy, strengthened Henry’s supremacy. 
 Although the Henrician Reformation ended papal jurisdiction over both civil and 
religious matters in England, it did not remove the moral dilemma of the clergymen. 
When the clergymen spoke of things concerning spiritual matters on grounds of 
conscience, they still faced a predicament when the king disagreed with their opinions. 
In other words, although Henry VIII became the supreme head of the English Church, 
Christ was still the head of the universal Church, and the clergymen sometimes faced 
a conflict between their public duties for the royal supremacy and their private 
consciences. When King Henry, for example, demanded that the Canterbury 
Convocation admit that the cure of souls was ‘committed’ to the king in 1531, it 
reluctantly obeyed the King’s order by stipulating that the clergy ‘exercised the cure 
of souls by the king’s authority’. The clergymen thus rephrased the demand of the 
King so that he would not assume any sacrodotal power while according him the 
highest authority over spiritual affairs.5 And when Thomas Cranmer, the archbishop 
of Canterbury, was asked by Henry why the consecration of the clergy should be 
exercised only by them, he answered ambiguously that God’s law did not prohibit 
                                                     
4 J. R. Tanner, Tudor Constitutional Documents, A.D. 1485-1603 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1922), 41–42. For the meaning of the word ‘empire’ in the statute, please see G. R. Elton, 
England Under the Tudors, 3rd ed (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2012), 160–61; Mortimer Levine, 
‘Henry VIII’s Use of His Spiritual and Temporal Jurisdictions in His Great Causes of Matrimony, 
Legitimacy, and Succession’, The Historical Journal 10, no. 1 (1967): 3.  
5 Solt, Church and State in Early Modern England, 1509-1640, 17. 
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kings from consecrating priests in the event that all clergymen were dead.6 Cranmer 
thus struck a delicate balance between satisfying the King’s pleasure and retaining 
clergymen’s sacerdotal power, by neither directly affirming nor directly denying that 
Henry had the arbitrary power to ordain priests. Both examples show the dilemma 
faced by clergymen when the King attempted to assume the priestly power.7 In fact, 
as soon as the separation of England from Rome was accomplished, the clergymen 
started to define the scope and limit of the king’s power over the Church, 
foreshadowing the huge tension this topic would cause. The clergymen preached and 
published to define the king’s power whenever a new successor took the throne during 
the Tudor and the Stuart dynasties. 
 During the reign of Elizabeth more decisive progress concerning the limits of the 
royal power over the Church was made, which was to stipulate that the Crown 
possessed no purely spiritual powers.8 When Parliament revived the Henrician Acts 
of Appeals, Annates, and Submission, the queen was termed supreme governor rather 
than supreme head by the new Act of Supremacy enacted in 1558, and her visitatorial 
power was delegated to and exercised by a Commission. The appendix of the royal 
injunctions in 1559 stated that ‘her majesty forbiddeth all manner her subjects to give 
ear or a credit to such perverse and malicious persons… how by the words of the said 
oath it may be collected, that the kings or queens of this realm, possessors of the 
crown, may challenge authority and power of ministry of divine offices in the 
church’.9 One of the Thirty-Nine Articles, ‘Of Civil Magistrates’, stated the same 
point that ‘we give not to our princes, the ministering either of God’s Word, or of 
                                                     
6 Solt, Church and State in Early Modern England, 1509-1640, 39. 
7 In 1536 Henry examined and commented on the Bishop’s Book, while in 1539 he presided over the 
heresy trial of John Lambert. Solt, Church and State in Early Modern England, 1509-1640, 34-41.  
8 J P. Sommerville, ‘The Royal Supremacy and Episcopacy “Jure Divino”, 1603-1640’, Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History 34, no. 4 (1983): 549. Rose, Godly Kingship in Restoration England, 50-52. 
9 Edward Cardwell, Documentary Annals of the Reformed Church of England; Being a Collection of 
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Sacraments, the which thing, the Injunctions also lately set forth by Elizabeth our 
Queen, doth most plainly testify’.10 Supremacy was hence a jurisdictional rather than 
a sacerdotal matter. As John Jewel (1522-1571) put it, ‘We commit the keys of the 
kingdom of heaven only unto the priest, and to none others’.11 Ambiguous dialogue 
such as that between King Henry VIII and Archbishop Cranmer disappeared. 
 Although the king possessed no spiritual power, he had supreme authority over 
ecclesiastical matters. This means that the king had the power to enact laws regulating 
the exercise of spiritual power, to accept appeals from the people about the corrupt 
deeds of clergymen, and to appoint, depose, and restore bishops. By defining the 
king’s power, the clergymen retained their spiritual powers, and the king regulated 
only the temporal side of things spiritual. The king could appoint bishops but not 
consecrate them; the king could deprive a bishop of his bishopric but not of his 
intrinsic spiritual power to minister. In other words, although the king could not give a 
bishop spiritual power, he could give him the external power to preach freely in his 
dominion.12 If the king intended to amend doctrines or rites, he should do so through 
the hands of clergymen. And if the clergymen planned to enact a new canon, they 
should do so with the permission of the king. As for excommunication, the king could 
not excommunicate a subject, but he could enact a law such that a subject could be 
excommunicated if he or she disobeyed it. From the Elizabethan settlement to the 
reigns of James I and Charles I, the power of the king over the Church was situated 
                                                     
10 Solt, Church and State in Early Modern England, 1509-1640, 75–76; R. E Head, Royal Supremacy 
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within this framework.13  
 However, by defining the powers of the crown and of the clergymen, the 
Elizabethan settlement still did not remove the moral dilemma of the clergymen. The 
potential for conflict between the demands of the king and the consciences of 
clergymen still existed, though it transformed into another kind of situation. In order 
to control ecclesiastical affairs, James I and Charles I needed a group of obedient 
clergymen to enforce their wills, and the way to achieve this was to make use of their 
prerogatives to influence their clergymen,14 something that often put pressure or 
brought problems to them. When clergymen tried their best to obey and flatter the 
King, they were usually criticized by others for sacrificing conscience for political 
expediency, since God, the lawgiver of conscience, was above the King. But when 
their deeds could not satisfy the King, they could be deprived of their bishoprics or 
their political positions. 
 Commissioned by King Charles I to write ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the 
Church’ and The Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth, Herbert faced the 
abovementioned dilemma. On the one hand, Herbert had his religious beliefs, such as 
the five religious common notions and his theory of truth based on the judgement of 
conscience. On the other hand, Herbert was seeking a higher position at court after he 
left the ambassadorship to France, and writing both works was the chance to obtain 
royal recognition. Thus both works should satisfy the needs or requirements of the 
King, including supporting the royal supremacy over the Church. Hence, the extent to 
which Herbert supported the King’s power over the Church in these two works 
provides the main theme of this chapter. 
 Although no extant material shows the reason Charles I commanded Herbert to 
                                                     
13 Rose, Godly Kingship in Restoration England, 61–64. 
14 For some notable cases, see Head, Royal Supremacy and the Trials of Bishops, 1558-1725. For cases 
of Herbert’s friends, see section 3.3. 
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write these two works, the King’s intentions can be surmised. A letter by Francis 
Bacon to Charles dated 22 October 1623 indicated that Charles had been interested in 
the history of King Henry VIII before he ascended the throne.15 At that time, having 
been commissioned to write the history of King Henry VII for Charles, Bacon also 
received the request to write the history of King Henry VIII; however, Bacon declined 
it since he ‘did so despair of my [his] health this summer,’16 and several years later 
the task to write the history fell to Herbert, who had proved himself as a royal 
historian after completing The Expedition to the Isle of Rhe for Charles I in 1630. In 
addition to personal curiosity and interest in the history, Charles might have desired to 
learn the experiences of Henry’s political achievements, including his control of 
Parliaments, managing the Church and State issues, and launching successful church 
reforms.17 Charles’s intentions to bring reforms into the Church is evident from the 
dialogue between Bishop Wren, a chaplain of the King and an anti-Calvinist, and 
Bishop Andrewes in 1623. Wren said that ‘for upholding the Doctrine and Discipline, 
and the right Estate of the Church, I have more Confidence of him [Charles], than of 
his Father’.18 After Charles became king, he did show much passion concerning 
religion, and put much effort into managing Church issues and maintaining its unity 
and order of worship.19 Holding that the Church issues belonged to the first place of 
                                                     
15 Jackson, ‘“It Is Impossible to Draw His Picture Well Who Hath Several Countenances”:  Lord 
Herbert of Cherbury and The Life and Raigne of King Henry the VIII’, 136; Francis Bacon, The 
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princely office,20 Charles I might be eager to know Henry VIII’s experience of 
establishing the royal supremacy over the Church. 
 When Herbert was commanded to write ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the Church’ 
in 1635, Charles I had ruled without the help of Parliament for six years. During the 
Personal Rule, Charles continued promoting the Laudian reform programme with the 
royal supremacy.21 Contrary to the style of James I, who tolerated varied practices in 
the Church, Charles used visitations and the ecclesiastical courts to impose changes 
on church interiors – it is worth noting that the Laudian reform focused mainly on the 
unity of worship, not on the unity of doctrines –22 without considering the scruples of 
some local parsons and ministers.23  The reform programme consisted of some 
controversial regulations of worship, including that altars should be placed 
permanently at the east end of churches and surrounded by rails, that people should 
bow in the direction of the altar, and that people should receive communion kneeling 
at the altar rails.24 In the eyes of Puritans, these regulations were popish rules; 
Puritans also disliked calling communion tables altars. Charles also used the Star 
Chamber to punish the disobedient subjects who opposed his Church policies.  
William Prynne, John Bastwick, and Henry Burton – all of whom were well-known 
anti-episcopal pamphleteers – were sentenced to life imprisonment and having their 
ears cropped in 1637.25 In requiring Herbert to write ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the 
Church’, Charles might have intended not only to seek Herbert’s support for his 
                                                                                                                                                        
preference for elaborate religious ceremonies and baroque art’. See Norah Carlin, The Causes of the 
English Civil War (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 68. 
20 Sharpe, The Personal Rule of Charles I, 280. 
21 There is a modern debate about who, Charles I or Archbishop Laud, should be responsible for the 
Church reforms of the 1630s. The traditional view held that the real initiator was Laud, while the 
revisionists, such as Kevin Sharp, thought that it was Charles. A moderate view is that they worked as a 
partnership. Cust, Charles I: A Political Life, 133–35. 
22 Marshall, Reformation England, 1480-1642, 200; Sharpe, The Personal Rule of Charles I, 288. 
23 Marshall, Reformation England, 1480-1642, 208. 
24 Ibid., 199-208; Carlin, The Causes of the English Civil War, 64–66. 
25 Marshall, Reformation England, 1480-1642, 209. 
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religious reform programme, but also to test his view on it.   
102 
 
3.2 Royal supremacy versus papal supremacy 
 
Both ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the Church’ and The Life and Raigne of King 
Henry the Eighth presented general support for the royal supremacy of English kings. 
Dated 14 May 1635, ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the Church’ was written at the 
command of the King,26 and the title indicates its support for the supremacy. Its 
general support made Lee believe that it was a slavish and badly-written short treatise, 
and a part of Herbert’s campaign to attract royal patronage. 27  Similarly, 
commissioned by the King, Herbert in The Life and Raigne shows his support for 
King Henry VIII’s supremacy over the Church against the papal supremacy. In the 
general narration of Herbert, popes were often depicted as aggressive, selfish and 
ignorant, and thus ill-suited to claim the supremacy. For instance, when Pope Clement 
VII was preparing to attack King Henry by asking for the help of Charles V, the 
emperor finally disappointed him, and Herbert said that the Pope was in fact 
deceived.28 Also from Herbert’s record, when Pope Paul III succeeded in 1534 and 
prepared to adopt measures against HenryVIII – including excommunicating Henry, 
depriving him of his realm, forbidding allegiance to his subjects, dissolving the 
leagues of princes, commanding the clergy to depart from England, and even 
encouraging nobles to wage wars against Henry – the King, having heard of so many 
weapons against him, did not express any anxiety but still entertained his friendship 
with Protestant princes.29 Herbert gave readers the impression that the King enjoyed 
his supremacy with the support of the people, while popes tried everything to regain 
supremacy but gained nothing in the end. This section will show that Herbert 
                                                     
26 KSC, 183.  
27 AB, 143.  
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supported the royal supremacy against papal supremacy, and that his grounds fitted 
the main arguments proposed in the Henrician Reformation. It will also show that 
Herbert used his philosophical theory presented in De Veritate to justify his support, 
revealing that Herbert applied his philosophical theory to The Life and Raigne. 
However, a close analysis of Herbert’s support for the royal supremacy against papal 
supremacy will further reveal that this support was in fact limited, contrary to Lee’s 
statement that his treatises aimed only to flatter the King. 
 ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the Church’ and The Life and Raigne used different 
approaches to defend the royal supremacy. In the opening of the former treatise 
Herbert stated that his arguments were based on the Old Testament while in the latter 
work he showed his views through a fictional speech made by a member of 
Parliament who argued according to ‘common reason’ and ‘without insisting upon any 
thing urg’d out of either Testament, or controverted by the theologians of this time’.30 
Herbert adopted these two different approaches to argue his points at nearly the same 
time; ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the Church’ was dated 14th May 1635 while the 
fictional speech in The Life and Raigne was added after he had finished the first draft, 
i.e. during 1634-1638.31 Although it is not certain which work was completed first, 
Herbert composed them with different purposes. ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the 
Church’ was mainly an extract of Bishop Andrewes’s Tortura Torti,32 and it was King 
Charles who asked Herbert to write it and present it to Archbishop William Laud. As 
mentioned in the first section of this chapter, the King might have expected to see 
Herbert’s strong support of the royal supremacy and the Laudian reform programme. 
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As I will argue in the next section, Herbert in fact carefully discussed his points 
perhaps because he intended not to cause any displeasure to the King and the 
Archbishop. In the The Life and Raigne Herbert had no such reservation, and he was 
writing the work for more general readers. By arguing his points according to 
common reason with some historical illustrations, Herbert’s fictional speeches 
intended to appeal to every reader’s reason to consider the priority of the royal 
supremacy. 
 Before further analysing Herbert’s approaches to supporting the royal supremacy, 
it is worth noting that there had been basically four ways to defend royal supremacy 
since the Henrician Reformation, and these arguments were continuously used over 
the following century. The first approach was to contend that the King, as the head of 
the body politic, should logically be the head of the Church of his realm. Meanwhile, 
Christ was the head of the universal Church.33 Stephen Gardiner (1483-1555), Bishop 
of Winchester, was of this opinion. This approach first proclaimed the independence 
of a particular church, and then justified the king having the headship over everything 
in that particular realm. The first defence was strengthened by the second argument 
that the specific regulations of worship, such as the place and the time, were not 
specified by divine law.34 Since the details of the rites and ceremonies were not fixed 
in the Bible, these things were in fact adiaphora (or indifferent things), and hence the 
king had the privilege to decide and have worships practiced uniformly, decently, and 
piously in his realm. Thomas Starkey (1495-1538) argued this point in his Exhortation 
to the People. The third defence was to accuse papal supremacy of being an invention 
that was not part of the primitive Church. By reinterpreting church history, the royal 
supporters tried to prove that papal supremacy was iure humano rather than iure 
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divino. Popes acquired their supremacy, as royal almoner Edward Foxe (c.1496-1538) 
argued, due to the negligence of some emperors, or, as Thomas Starkey maintained, 
by usurping their power.35 This kind of accusation was not new, but still it reinforced 
the defence of royal supremacy.36 Under such an argument, popes were just bishops 
of Rome, not the heads of Christendom. The fourth argument claimed that royal 
supremacy was itself ancient. By quoting texts of the Bible, especially verses about 
Israelite kings, defenders maintained that the royal supremacy was a biblical 
doctrine,37 and that the aim of the Henrician Reformation was simply to restore the 
lost royal supremacy. The works of Bishop Gardiner and Edward Foxe (1496-1538) 
contained such arguments.38 
Herbert used this fourth argument in his ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the 
Church’ to justify the claim that kings rather than popes were entitled to the supreme 
authority over both temporal and spiritual matters. By introducing many examples of 
Israelite kings such as David, Solomon, Asa, Iosaphat, Joas, Ezechias and Josias, he 
first argued that ‘noe Change of Religion, during the Reigne of their Kings did follow, 
which was not procured by their immediate power’;39 it was kings who held authority 
over spiritual matters from the beginning of church history.  
 In addition to showing the ancient nature of the royal supremacy, Herbert then 
added other arguments that were not extracted from Tortura Torti to justify the king’s 
claim to supremacy. He maintained that it was unsafe to ‘diuide the people, between 
temporall, and spirituall obedience, or suspend them, betwixt the Terrours of a secular 
death, and Eternall punishments’, and that it was also dangerous that ‘a Subject 
                                                     
35 Rose, Godly Kingship in Restoration England, 31. 
36 Ibid., 30. 
37 Ibid., 32. 
38 Andre A. Gazal, Scripture and Royal Supremacy in Tudor England: The Use of Old Testament 
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should partake a supreme Authority with them [kings] in Ecclesiasticall Affayres’.40 
The subject Herbert referred to was the pope, who was ‘obnoxious’ and ‘may 
sometymes want the Power, and sometymes the meanes of giuing that Order’.41 This 
criticism of the popes was later enlarged in The Life and Raigne and became a more 
solid argument based on the judgement of ‘common reason’. Revealing the same 
concern for the dilemma of choosing between popes and kings, Herbert said, through 
a fictional speech, that there was no peace ‘if the Secular Magistrate command one 
thing and the Spiritual another’.42 Moreover, ‘it will be dangerous to Constitute him 
[pope] our Supreme Judge’ or ‘Arbiter of the Temporall Causes betwixt us, and any 
other Christian Prince’, he insisted, since popes were often selfish and greedy and 
deeply involved in political strife, of which the Babylonian Captivity of the Papacy 
was an example.43 Furthermore, Herbert claimed in another passage that ‘the Papal 
Authority was first derived from the Emperors of those times, and not from Christ,’ a 
claim that echoed the first argument of ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the Church’ that 
the Pope has no authority from the primitive church.44 
In The Life and Raigne Herbert raised two additional points to support the royal 
supremacy against the papal supremacy: the distance between England and Rome and 
the pope’s invention of new religious articles. By the first point Herbert meant that 
because of the great distance ‘people had rather let fall their Sutes, then be at the cost 
of bringing their Witnesses with them to so remote a Place, as neither their health or 
means can reach unto’.45 In brief, the royal supremacy could bring more justice to 
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people’s lawsuits than the papal supremacy. By the second point Herbert meant that 
since popes ignored ‘general Notions both written in our hearts, and Received in all 
Religions’, they were not entitled to the supremacy of spiritual affairs.46 Though 
Herbert did not specifically state any article which was an invention of popes, he 
seemed to imply that popes ignored the five religious common notions, which 
comprised the foundation of religion and were ingrained in the hearts of every human 
being. 
 It is reasonable to expect Herbert’s arguments for the royal supremacy to be 
unique, since his unusual and controversial religious common notions were based on 
the same common reason. Quite to the contrary, however, Herbert’s arguments for the 
royal supremacy corresponded with arguments widely accepted in the Henrician 
Reformation. First, arguments about the corruption of popes were not new in English 
history, and had been used for example by the early reformer John Wycliffe (c. 
1331-1384) and his followers the Lollards, who denied the papal supremacy by 
attacking the pope’s religious abuses. In the sixteenth century, the hatred of the 
English people towards popes was no weaker than that of the German people, and 
they resented a pope who drained their money for his own worldly pursuits.47 Royal 
supporter Thomas Starkey (c. 1498-1538) in his A Dialogue between Pole and Lupset 
criticized the pope’s usurpation of the power of Convocation to satisfy his greedy 
needs, and also called for greater autonomy for the English Church by restraining the 
pope’s authority to appoint bishops and the right of appeal.48 
 Herbert’s argument based on the great distance between England and Rome was 
also not new. In fact, the Act in Restraint of Appeals (1533) presented the same reason. 
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It stated that appeals to Rome over matters of wills, marriages and divorces and tithes 
and church offerings led 
not only to the great inquietation, vexation, trouble, costs, and charges of the King's Highness and 
many of his subjects and resiants [residents] in this his realm, but also to the great delay and let to 
the true and speedy determination of the said causes, for so much as the parties appealing to the 
said court of Rome most commonly do the same for the delay of justice: And forasmuch as the 
great distance of way is so far out of this realm, so that the necessary proofs nor the true 
knowledge of the cause can neither there be so well known nor the witnesses there so well 
examined as within this realm.49 
This content corresponded exactly with the argument concerning distance in Herbert’s 
fictional speech, which purported to be an address for King Henry VIII before his 
decision on the separation of Rome. 
 Although the arguments Herbert presented were not new, it was of much 
importance that they were justified by the epistemological theory presented in De 
Veritate. This fact not only confirms the close connection between De Veritate and 
The Life and Raigne, but also shows that Herbert intended to gain more publicity for 
his philosophical theory through his historical work. The fictional speech was given 
by an anonymous member of Parliament, and before he made his points, he said that 
he ‘shall according to common reason’ consider the supremacy question ‘without 
insisting upon any thing urg’d out of either Testament, or controverted by the 
Theologians of this time’.50 While, strictly speaking, the phrase ‘common reason’ 
was not used in De Veritate, it is very likely that this speech was an application of 
Herbert’s philosophical theory, for four reasons. First, he mentioned the religious 
common notions written in every human being’s heart in the latter part of the same 
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speech, and said that he intended to present uncontroverted points without resorting to 
any authority. 51  Both the religious common notions and arguments based on 
individual’s judgement rather than on any particular authority were characteristics of 
Herbert’s theory of truth.52 Secondly, the meaning of ‘common reason’ was close to 
that of a human ‘faculty,’53 which was a more accurate term in Herbert’s theory, and 
among four fundamental faculties there was natural instinct, the highest class of all, 
which conformed with the common notions.54 It was likely that Herbert, in order not 
to let readers notice the application of his theory in the work or not to use any 
philosophical term, chose to use ‘common reason’ to supplement ‘faculty’. Thirdly, 
the term ‘common’ also had a specific meaning in Herbert’s philosophical system. By 
‘common’ he meant that they were ‘shared by every man and could be excited by 
every type of object’, and if one principle was in the highest degree common, it was 
common to all men and was common even beyond our species.55  Finally, the 
‘common reason’ was used many times in Herbert’s A Dialogue between a Tutor and 
His Pupil when he argued the prevalence of the five religious common notions.56 
Hence, Herbert did not use the phrase ‘common reason’ in The Life and Raigne 
without philosophical implications.  
 Since Herbert justified the royal supremacy against the papal supremacy by his 
theory of truth, his justifications could be viewed as universal truths, according to his 
theory. The ‘common reason’ explained above implied that Herbert’s justifications 
could be obtained by every ‘normal human being,’ as Herbert wrote in De Veritate. 
                                                     
51 L&R, 366. CF: ‘My reflections are free of authority and side no party and treat issues in the light of 
my independent judgment.’ DV, 73. 
52 CF: ‘I desire the reader to know that my philosophical reflections are free of authority, [and] that I 
side with no party’. DV, 73.  
53 ‘By faculty I mean every inner power which develops the different forms of apprehension in their 
relation to different forms of the objects’. DV, 108.  
54 DV, 116. 
55 DV, 126. 
56 Dialogue, 6-7, 11, 78. For illustrations, see the second section of chapter 2 where I have cited some 
sentences of this work. 
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Furthermore, if they could be obtained by everyone, they were, actually, widely 
accepted and left no room to be controverted. And if they were widely accepted, they 
hence enjoyed general consent, and thus were truths.57  In brief, that the royal 
supremacy had its legitimacy, while the papal supremacy did not, was a truth that 
could be attained by anyone through the use of common reason. 
 After the above discussion it may be tempting to ask whether Herbert blithely 
assumed the law of Parliament, the Act in Restraint of Appeals, to be the 
representation of universal consent without actually examining it. In other words, the 
question is whether Herbert accepted every law of Parliament as universal truth. The 
answer, however, is negative since Herbert examined every law of Parliament in the 
reign of Henry VIII and gave them different comments. When Herbert mentioned the 
Six Articles, which were enacted in 1539 and reaffirmed the Catholic doctrine of 
transubstantiation, he denounced it as a law ‘called by some the Bloody Statute’ and 
as a law prejudicial to individual’s liberty of conscience.58 This illustration shows that 
Herbert judged laws according whether their content could pass the examination of 
the common reason of all human beings. This confirms the above argument that 
Herbert used his philosophical theory as support for the justifications presented in the 
Act in Restraint of Appeals. 
To compare the deistical controversy Herbert was involved in with the 
supremacy controversy presented by him, the latter was obviously less controversial 
since many points were close to the general opinion in that time in England. However, 
his presentation of the royal supremacy against the papal supremacy can still shed 
light on Herbert’s philosophy. Whereas the scholar W. R. Sorley said in 1894 that 
                                                     
57 Herbert recognised whatever is universally accepted as the truth and thought that his theory was 
derived from universal consent or a theory with which every normal human being will agree. For his 
universal consent, see DV, 77, 117-21, 295. 
58 L&R, 446-48.  
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Herbert applied his theory of common notions only to religion,59 this chapter has 
confirmed that Herbert also applied it to the supremacy controversy in The Life and 
Raigne, and that he intended to disseminate his philosophical theory to more general 
readers. 
Herbert’s support for the royal supremacy was justified mainly by the need to 
protect the people against the popes’ corruption, their invention of new religious 
articles that contradicted the five religious common notions, and the distance between 
England and Rome. This meant that the royal supremacy should be supported because 
the alternative, the papal supremacy, was worse, not because the royal supremacy 
itself could secure the happiness of the people. In brief, Herbert provided negative 
support for the royal supremacy. This finding will also echo the main arguments of the 
following two sections: the King’s power over the church was limited and the royal 
supremacy weighed less than individual conscience. 
 
  
                                                     
59 W. R. Sorley, ‘The Philosophy of Herbert of Cherbury’, Mind 3, no. 12 (1894): 506. 
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3.3 The scope and limit of royal power over the Church 
 
Following the demonstration in the previous section of Herbert’s support for the royal 
supremacy against the papal supremacy, this section investigates Herbert’s views of 
the scope and limit of the royal supremacy over the Church. It will show that although 
‘On the King’s Supremacy in the Church’ was composed at the command of King 
Charles I, its support for the king’s power over the Church was limited, in two 
respects: first, Herbert agreed with the contemporary views that kings had no priestly 
powers; and second, Herbert stressed that kings had no power to change some 
fundamental doctrines of religion.  
 As mentioned above, Herbert wrote ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the Church’ 
and The Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth in the 1630s when Stuart kings 
tried to use royal prerogatives to influence or even control clergymen and courtiers. 
To gain a prominent position at court or at the Church often meant that one could not 
be the ‘rashheadie preachers’ James denounced in his Basilikon Doron.60 During the 
reign of Charles I, the King cooperated with William Laud to control the matters of 
the Church, protect royal supporters such as Richard Montagu and the Duke of 
Buckingham, 61  and attack the disobedient, among whom George Abbot, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, was a notable case.62 Facing the repressive climate of the 
Stuart reign, people sometimes had no alternatives but to either obey the command of 
kings and receive preferment, or obey the voice of conscience but suffer possible 
punishment.  
                                                     
60 Henry Morley, A Miscellany Containing Richard of Bury’s Philobiblon, the Basilikon Doron of 
King James I.; Monks and Giants (London: G. Routledge, 1888), 92–93. 
61 Solt, Church and State in Early Modern England, 1509-1640, 169–76. 
62 Head, Royal Supremacy and the Trials of Bishops, 1558-1725, 50–58. For the other two cases of 
Lord Keeper Williams, who lost the favour of the King, and Bishop Goodman, who refused to endorse 
the 1640 canons, see Ibid., 59-72. 
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Before Herbert accepted the commissions to compose his works, he had 
witnessed the abovementioned moral dilemma from the experiences of his family 
friend John Donne (1572-1631) and of Bishop Lancelot Andrewes (1555-1626), the 
‘learned Andrewes’, as Herbert called him.63 Both men were invited to preach before 
King James I, but in each case the invitation was in fact a double-edged sword, 
bringing them either political enhancement or political downfall. Both of them, at 
least temporarily, chose to obey faithfully the king’s order and to show their support 
for the King’s supremacy and the King’s favourite theory of the divine right of kings. 
In the first case, John Donne, who was confident of acquiring a position like the 
embassy to Vienna his friend Henry Wotton (1568-1639) held, had long been 
searching for a position at court, but his early career had proved unpromising. While 
his work Pseudo-Martyr (1610), in which he spoke against the Roman Catholic 
Church during the Oath of Allegiance controversy, had impressed King James, Donne 
was still waiting for a position in the State, and he did not become an Anglican 
preacher as James I suggested.64 However, he finally chose to convert to Anglicanism 
from Catholicism in 1615 after his hope of gaining a position in the State had perished, 
and he told the King that he was willing to follow the directions the King had given 
before. From then on Donne’s career in the Church began.65 Throughout Donne’s 
career, his Anniversaries (1611-12) lamenting the death of the daughter of Sir Robert 
Drury (1575-1615) with a thousand lines of verse, his Epithalamion (1613) 
celebrating the scandalous marriage of Robert Carr, first Earl of Somerset (1587-1645) 
                                                     
63 Jeanne Shami, ‘Kings and Desperate Men: John Donne Preaches at Court’, John Donne Journal: 
Studies in the Age of Donne 6, no. 1 (1987): 9–21. Paul A. Welsby, Lancelot Andrewes 1555-1626 
(London: S.P.C.K, 1958), 203. Herbert mentioned ‘the learned Andrewes’ twice in his works. See KSC, 
184; L&R, 381a.  
64 David L Edwards, John Donne: Man of Flesh and Spirit (London; New York: Continuum, 2001), 
63–82. 
65 Edwards, John Donne: Man of Flesh and Spirit, 96-7. 
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and Frances Howard (1590-1632),66 his Pseudo-Martyr and his defence of King 
James’s Directions to Preachers (after receiving the place of Dean of St. Paul’s in 
1621) were often criticized as decline or degeneration, some of which he admitted 
to.67 Both Robert Drury and Robert Carr were Donne’s former patrons, and Donne 
had paid a high price for their favour, though modern scholars have also noticed that 
he had some scruples when he was doing so.68 In the second case, a study by Paul 
Welsby has argued that Andrewes’s ‘great moral mistake of his life …was due almost 
entirely to exaggerated respect for monarchy, both in theory and in the person of 
James I’.69 Moreover, Welsby pointed out that Andrewes was more submissive to the 
King after he was appointed Bishop of Chichester and Lord Almoner in 1605.70 
Likewise, Maurice Reidy has argued that during the Oath of Allegiance controversy 
of 1606 Bishop Andrewes reluctantly but faithfully wrote two works, Tortura Torti 
and Responsio ad Bellarminum, for James.71 After reading Andrewes’ Tortura Torti, 
James promoted Andrewes to Bishop of Chichester. Afterwards, Andrewes became a 
firm supporter of James’s religious policies,72 and of the theory of the divine right of 
monarchy, despite having shown his disagreement with it in his earlier work, the 
Pattern of Catechistical Doctrine.73 
                                                     
66 Before they got married, Frances Howard was already married to the young Earl of Essex. The 
divorce case was then referred to a committee, but George Abbot, the Archbishop of Canterbury, 
opposed this case while the King favoured it. It was said that James helped Carr by adding some 
obedient bishops, Lancelot Andrewes included, into the committee and finally permitted the divorce. 
Edwards, John Donne: Man of Flesh and Spirit, 87-8.  
67 His Anniversaries was criticized by Ben Jonson, Herbert’s lifelong friend, as ‘full of Blasphemies’ 
for overemphasizing the death of this obscure girl. Edwards, John Donne: Man of Flesh and Spirit, 
84-6. 
68  Shami, ‘Kings and Desperate Men: John Donne Preaches at Court’, 9; Annabel Patterson, 
‘Misinterpretable Donne: The Testimony of the Letters’, John Donne Journal, no. 1 (1982): 39–54. 
69 Welsby, Lancelot Andrewes 1555-1626, 203–4. 
70 Ibid., 204.  
71 Maurice Francis Reidy, Bishop Lancelot Andrewes, Jacobean Court Preacher (Chicago: Loyola 
University Press, 1955), 7–10. 
72 An example is shown in footnote 66 of this chapter. 
73 It is worth noting that propagating the theory of the divine right of monarchy is not equal to 
flattering the king since it can used either as a theory enhancing the authority of kings, or as a theory 
limiting the power of kings. This theory is quite common in the early seventeenth-century. See Conrad 
Russell, “Divine Rights in the Early Seventeenth Century,” in J. S. Morrill et.al. ed., Public Duty and 
115 
 
 When Herbert wrote ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the Church’ and The Life and 
Raigne, he must have been confronting the same kind of pressure Donne and Bishop 
Andrewes experienced, and he had good reasons to submit himself to the King’s 
demand. Having lost his office as ambassador to France, Herbert was as eager to gain 
a position at court as Donne had been. Although he was created the Baron Herbert of 
Cherbury in 1629 and completed The Expedition to the Isle of Rhe in 1630 in defence 
of the military failure of Duke of Buckingham in 1627, he still longed for a higher 
position. Holding that Herbert’s historical treatises were of little value, Sir Sidney Lee 
assumed that Herbert did submit himself to the King, and that as a result he gained a 
‘long-sought-for place’ on the Council of War in 1632.74 However, this was not 
necessarily the case, and in fact Lee’s statement on the date Herbert acquired the 
position is incorrect, as Kimmelman found that Herbert had already obtained the said 
position in 1625.75 
 ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the Church’ provides general support for the 
principle of royal supremacy but lacks positive arguments on any specific power the 
king should assume. As mentioned in the previous section, Herbert’s main strategy 
was to justify the royal supremacy over the Church by citing the examples of the 
Israelite kings in the Old Testament. These illustrations, however, only showed the 
ancient nature of royal supremacy, but could not explain the content of the King’s 
power over the Church. This meant that Herbert did not specifically denote the scope 
and limit of the power, though the treatise aimed to support the royal supremacy. As 
Herbert confessed at the end of the treatise that it was ‘beyond [his] Scope’ to define 
                                                                                                                                                        
Private Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England: Essays Presented to G.E. Aylmer (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993), 101–120. To make a comparison, royal supporters stressed the meaning of the 
sacred power of kings (obedience to the king) while the others emphasized the meaning of God-given 
power of kings (obedience to God). 
74 AB, 140.  
75 Elaine Escoll Kimmelman, ‘Lord Herbert of Cherbury as Historian’ (PhD Thesis; Harvard 
University, 1977), 10. 
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the detailed powers of princes and of clergymen,76 he seemed to have no interest in 
defining the king’s positive power. A comparison between Herbert’s work and Bishop 
Andrewes’s Tortura Torti, from which much of Herbert’s treatise was extracted, 
confirms this point. Bishop Andrewes provided many specific points of the King’s 
power over the Church, including the power to enact laws regarding the Church and 
the power to appoint bishops, to regulate adiaphora, and to pull down false worship;77 
however, Herbert’s treatise provided none of the above. 
 Although ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the Church’ lacks positive arguments for 
the king’s power, in the end it particularly lists powers that kings should not claim. 
They are ‘Not to arrogate any power of Creating new Articles of Faith, or bringing in 
strange, & different forms of Religious worship’, ‘Not to sacrifice, or administer 
Sacraments, or use any misteriall [mysticall] Rites,78 which belong to Priesthood, nor 
yet to teach the Pulpit, or expound the hard Places of Scripture’, and ‘Not to 
consecrate Ecclesiasticall Persons, or interdict divine service to any Body, or 
excommunicate them, And finally not to use any Jurisdiction, apperteyning to the 
Keys’.79 By listing these limits Herbert’s treatise shows that kings should not have 
the power to create new doctrines and forms of worship, to administer the Word and 
Sacraments, or to give or remove the spiritual power of clergymen. The limits in fact 
correspond with the boundary of the King’s power of the Elizabethan settlement. The 
Queen made nearly the same points in A Declaration of the Queen’s Proceedings 
Since Her Reign (1569), where she denied that ‘we do either challenge or take to us, 
as malicious persons do unduly surmise, any superiority to ourselves to define[,] 
                                                     
76 KSC, 186.  
77 For the main argument of Tortura Torti on the rights of royal supremacy, also see T. Lyon, The 
Theory of Religious Liberty in England 1603–39 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 
55–56. 
78 See Hutcheson’s note in KSC, 186n. 
79 DRL, 186.  
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decide or determine any article or point of the Christian faith and religion, or to 
change any ancient ceremony of the Church from the form before received and 
observed by the Catholic and Apostolic Church, or the use of any function belonging 
to any ecclesiastical person being a minister of the Word and Sacraments in the 
Church’.80 This similarity reveals that Herbert was of the same opinion that the 
King’s power over the Church was limited, and that kings possessed no purely 
spiritual power.  
 After Herbert finished ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the Church’, he presented it 
to King Charles. It is likely that the King had little interest in it, for the following two 
reasons. First, Herbert’s statement on the restrictions of the King’s power over the 
Church was not new to Charles I. The King had already presented the same point in 
‘A Proclamation for the establishing of the Peace and Quiet of the Church of England’ 
dated on 14 June 1626. The proclamation declared the King’s ‘full and constant 
resolution, that neither in matter of Doctrine, or Discipline of the Church, nor in the 
government of the State, he will admit of the least innovation’.81 This meant that 
Charles I had already accepted that he should not invent any religious tenet or practice, 
at least in his sense. Secondly, Herbert’s treatise provided no support for the Laudian 
reform programme, which Charles, as mentioned in the first section of this chapter, 
might have wanted Herbert to defend. After reading the treatise, the King forwarded it 
to Archbishop William Laud several months later, and gave no reward to Herbert.82 
Similarly, Laud left no comment on it.83 
                                                     
80 William Edward Collins, Queen Elizabeth’s Defence of Her Proceedings in Church and State with 
an Introductory Essay on the Northern Rebellion (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 
1899), 42–44.  
81 James Larkin, Stuart Royal Proclamations, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 91–93. 
82 AB, 143.  
83 In his works of 7 volumes, Laud in 1635 only briefly mentioned his taking care of Herbert’s eldest 
son, Richard Herbert. See William Scott and James Bliss, eds., The Works of the Most Reverend Father 
in God, William Laud, Sometime Lord Archbishop of Canterbury (Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1847), 
vol.7, 214. Sir Sidney Lee said that Herbert ‘maintained a formal intimacy’ with Laud, but he provided 
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 In The Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth, Herbert’s description of King 
Henry VIII’s power over the Church echoed the abovementioned points of ‘On the 
King’s Supremacy in the Church’: Henry did not have the power to create any new 
doctrines or minister any sacrament though he had much knowledge and many 
opinions on theology. According to Herbert, during 1536 to 1538 when Henry and his 
ministers made several important declarations of faith, Henry, ‘having taken on 
him[self] the title of supreme Head in his Dominions, would shew how capable he 
was of it’. Therefore, Henry ‘devised’ eight religious articles, but later ‘recommended 
[them] afterwards to the Convocation house by Cromwell’.84 This means that Henry 
did not declare religious articles arbitrarily, but left it to the clergymen to consider 
whether these articles could be sanctioned as doctrines. 85  Moreover, when 
mentioning the fifth article concerning the use of images and the eighth article 
concerning purgatory, Henry was of the opinion that ‘the true use of them should be 
taught by Bishops and Preachers every where’.86 King Henry VIII neither used nor 
encroached on priestly power, according to Herbert. One religious matter Henry could 
decide arbitrarily was about honouring the saints, which was a part of adiaphora. As 
                                                                                                                                                        
no further evidence about their relationship. AB, 144. Comparatively speaking, Sir Edward Herbert 
(1591-1657), nephew of Herbert of Cherbury, attorney-general to the Queen in 1635, and 
solicitor-general in 1640, was a much closer ally of Charles I and Laud. 
84 For these eight articles, see L&R, 402b-405. It is well worth noting that the eight devised articles 
were blended with Herbert’s religious views, especially his conspicuous emphasis on Penance, his view 
that the controversies concerning Eucharist and Baptism cannot be studied in one’s life, and his view 
on sacraments and rites. It is very probable that he listed these in the name of Henry VIII to influence 
Charles I and even the more general readers. Surely Herbert did not say that the eight articles were 
accepted by the Convocation, but the point here is that he distorted some of Henry’s opinions. For 
instance, in 1537 when Henry examined the Bishop’s Book, he intended to increase the importance of 
the sacrament of marriage, not Penance. See Solt, Church and State in Early Modern England, 
1509-1640, 35–36. Moreover, the earliest manuscript of The Life and Raigne, i.e. Jesus College 
Manuscript 71-74, showed that Herbert put much effort into displaying these eight articles. Many 
corrections and supplements were found in these paragraphs. See MS Jesus College 73, pp. 
776/132-784/141. Here we see two series of page numbers. The first series starts from MS Jesus 
College 71, while the second starts from the first page of MS Jesus College 73. The second series was 
added after the first series, since it gave page numbers for those small paper notes which originally had 
no page numbers. 
85 L&R, 405.  
86 L&R, 403b.  
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Herbert stated, it belonged to the King’s power to decide whether to keep or abolish 
the holy days.87 
As to the duty of the King to protect the true religion, which was an important 
point of royal supporters from Elizabeth’s reign: Herbert did mention this when he 
discussed the supremacy controversy between popes and kings. Herbert stated that 
princes were obliged to ‘extinguish Usurpations in Religion, and together, vindicate 
her from Errour and neglects’ when popes continued to ‘Intermix and trouble all 
things’, ‘confound and Joyne together the certaine, and the uncertaine, and compell 
Men equally to the belief of all they teach’.88 Herbert’s argument, however, seemed 
to indicate that the king had this power mainly as a result of the pope’s corruption. 
 In contrast to Herbert’s lack of positive points on the King’s power, his other 
works reveal some specific powers of the priestly class. The clergymen, according to 
Herbert, had the right to preach, to administer the sacraments, and to explain the 
difficult or obscure passages of Scripture.89 Herbert presented their first two rights 
when listing six social functions of clergymen in De Religione Laici,90 while he 
mentioned the third right in a fictional speech of an anonymous MP in The Life and 
Raigne.91 Moreover, in addition to showing the powers of the clergymen, Herbert in 
The Life and Raigne stated that the Pope could hold a kind of supremacy on spiritual 
matters. The supremacy the Pope could retain came from ‘his ancient Patriarchall 
                                                     
87 L&R, 408.  
88 L&R, 366.  
89 Herbert thought that there were some ‘errors’ in the Scriptures. See DRL, 91, 99-101 and Dialogue, 
especially 77, 239-250. 
90 They ‘retained the right of opening and clothing the temples, of playing the part of public 
intercessors with God, of initiating the people into the truly holy rites, of delivering sermons from 
pulpits, of declaring the remission of sins by virtue of true penitence, of comforting the sick and 
burying the dead, and of receiving the offerings made them’. DRL, 111. Since these six social functions 
of the clergymen are quite limited or redundant in appearance, it is tempting to think that they could 
show Herbert’s distaste for the priestly class. It could be said so, but I believe that Herbert limited the 
powers of the clergymen, as he put much limit on the King’s power over the Church, in order to enlarge 
the freedom of the individual conscience. 
91 ‘I shall be content, that the Illustration or Explication of some points, may be worth the Churches 
labour’. L&R, 366.  
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Right, without intermedling yet with that [the King’s] Supremacy,’ on condition that 
he abide strictly by the religious common notions and encouraged the people to ‘Piety, 
Charity, Good life, Repentance, and what ever else may conduce to everlasting 
happiness’.92  In other words, Herbert held that if the pope abandoned corrupt 
behaviour and supported the fundamental principles of religion he suggested, he could 
hold the honour or even the authority of the primacy in spiritual matters. 
 During the reigns of James I and Charles I, royal supporters often used the theory 
of the divine right of the monarchy when they discoursed on the power of the King. 
They often stressed the God-likeness of the monarch, and described kings as god, 
shepherd, riverbank (keeping back the waves), head (ruling the body politic), mighty 
tree (shielding against the tempest), or gardener (cleaning out the hogweed and thistle, 
i.e., rebels).93 John Donne, for instance, often paralleled King James with Christ in 
his court sermons.94 Royal supporters said that the King was entitled to claim his 
God-given powers, and that subjects should obey the commands of kings.95 However, 
Herbert’s ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the Church’ and The Life and Raigne adopted 
no such arguments or implications. He did not affirm the theory of the divine right of 
monarchy and was unlike Donne, who became an advocate for the theory after the 
King became his patron. Moreover, Herbert’s thought seemed to contradict some 
points of the theory of the divine right of monarchy. First, one important idea of the 
theory was that the King is an intercessor between God and people, but Herbert in his 
De Religione Laici ascribed the role only to the priestly class.96 Secondly, the theory 
stressed the absolute obedience to the King, as Laud had claimed that disobedience to 
                                                     
92 L&R, 367.  
93 Elena Kiryanova, ‘Images of Kingship: Charles I, Accession Sermons, and the Theory of Divine 
Right’, History 100, no. 339 (2015): 29–31. 
94 The most striking case was his preaching before the dead king’s body. See Shami, ‘Kings and 
Desperate Men: John Donne Preaches at Court’, 11–12. 
95 As stated in the footnote 73 of this chapter, though this theory could enhance the authority of the 
King, it could limit his power as well. 
96 See footnote 90 of this chapter. 
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the monarch was the most horrible sin a man could ever commit,97 whereas this point 
is not compatible with Herbert’s thought. What Herbert valued the most was the 
independent judgement of individuals, and in De Veritate he made many appeals for 
not accepting or adhering to what the authorities said, though the King was the 
highest authority in the State.98 
 It is worth noting that Herbert maintained that neither kings nor clergymen had 
the right to interfere with the foundation of religion, i.e. the five religious common 
notions. In ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the Church’ Herbert had suggested that kings 
should not claim the right to create new doctrines, rites and ceremonies.99 Again, as 
mentioned above, in The Life and Raigne Herbert wrote that the condition of the 
pope’s holding his primacy was to leave the fundamental principles of religion intact. 
In De Religione Laici, De Religione Gentilium and A Dialogue Between A Tutor and 
his Pupil, Herbert strongly critiqued the priestly class since he believed that they 
invented new articles to perplex the people in all ages. The above illustrations also 
show that Herbert held firm to his religious beliefs and that, perhaps due to his distrust 
of priests,100 he did not mention any point relating to the bishop’s responsibility to 
criticise the misdeeds of the King, nor the King’s obligation to seek advice from his 
bishops concerning religious matters; both points had been very important issues 
since the Elizabethan settlement.101 
 There is no doubt that Herbert generally supported royal supremacy, but his 
                                                     
97 Kiryanova, ‘Images of Kingship: Charles I, Accession Sermons, and the Theory of Divine Right’, 
27. 
98 DV, 72-73.  
99 KSC, 186.  
100 See footnote 182 of chapter 2. 
101 CF: ‘we are by this [God’s] authority bound to…and consequently to provide, that the Church may 
be governed and taught by archbishops, bishops, and ministers according to the ecclesiastical ancient 
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Defence of Her Proceedings in Church and State with an Introductory Essay on the Northern Rebellion, 
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support for it over the Church was limited. Unlike Donne and Andrewes, Herbert did 
not exploit the theory of the divine right of kings to affirm and uphold the monarchy’s 
authority, and he specifically stressed the powers kings should not have in the Church. 
His arguments also show that he was not a person who would try his best to flatter his 
patrons, or who was willing to pay a high price in exchange for the King’s reward. He 
stood firm in face of the King’s demand that he write in support of the royal 
supremacy over the Church,102 and even tried to influence the King by The Life and 
Raigne.103 His arguments for royal supremacy were carefully weighted and presented, 




                                                     
102 For Charles’ possible intention of asking Herbert to write this treatise, see section 3.1. 
103 Herbert’s ambassadorship to France reveals the similar attitude; that is, with his independent 
judgement Herbert tried to influence James I on some issues. Concerning James’s proposal to match 
Prince Charles with the Spanish Infanta in 1617, for example, Bishop Andrewes was inclined to agree 
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Lynne Zaice, “Lord Edward Herbert of Chirbury: ‘Being’ and Creating the True Renaissance Courtier” 
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against James’s will again by opening the discussion of whether the French King, who was ‘actually 
making proffers of friendship to the Elector’s worst enemy, the Duke of Bavaria,’ could really help the 
recovery of the Elector-Palatine’s territory (this is part of the content of the marriage), and finally 
Herbert lost his place for his ‘free speech’. AB, 136. 
104 AB, 143.  
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3.4 The royal supremacy and its martyrs 
 
The section above having established that Herbert provided only limited support for 
the King’s power over the Church, this section will focus on discussions of the 
Henrician Reformation in the The Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth. As 
discussed in the first section, a moral dilemma often existed for those clergymen who 
supported the royal supremacy over the Church because the King’s power might 
encroach on their consciences. This was also the case with Herbert. He had such 
scruples because on the one hand he supported the royal supremacy over the 
Church,105 but on the other hand he greatly valued the independent judgement of 
conscience. When Herbert was writing The Life and Raigne, his scruples became 
stronger because in this history there existed many conflicts between allegiance to the 
King as the head of the Church of England and personal conscience. When Henry 
VIII established the Anglican Church with his supremacy, many martyrs, because of 
their refusal to overrule their religious conscience, infringed the laws of supremacy, 
and were therefore executed. In the later reforms of the late 1530s, more people were 
killed or faced the terrors of losing their lives because the King’s religious policies 
swayed between Protestantism and Catholicism. In The Life and Raigne, Herbert did 
in most of the cases defend Henry’s executions of those who disobeyed the laws of 
supremacy and his religious policies, but he did not justify all of them. In some cases 
he showed his sympathy for the martyrs. The inconsistent discourses of Herbert show 
the conflict between his support for the royal supremacy and his conscience.106 Hence, 
                                                     
105 Herbert said that if the King had not had the supremacy, people would have lived ‘betwixt the 
Terrours of a secular death, and Eternall punishments’. See KSC, 185. 
106 Herbert left numerous corrections, deletions and supplements in the earliest version of The Life and 
Raigne (Jesus College Manuscript 71-73) when discussing the royal supremacy and its martyrs, 
implying that he had some scruples here. To be more specific, many corrections, deletions and 
supplements existed when Herbert discussed the execution of John Fisher and Thomas More (MS Jesus 
College 73, pp. 664/4-672/13), the death of Anne Boleyn (MS Jesus College 73, pp. 730/80-744/94), 
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it could be said that Herbert’s endorsement of the royal supremacy suffered a crucial 
test especially when he narrated the Henrician Reformation. The purpose of this 
section is to show how Herbert coped with this internal conflict, and to show that 
Herbert regarded conscience as the limit of the King’s power over individuals. 
 This section does not include all the executed figures in the Henrician 
Reformation, mainly because they do not reflect Herbert’s inner conflict between the 
royal supremacy and conscience. In Herbert’s view, some victims of the laws of 
supremacy did not qualify as martyrs since they disobeyed the laws not on grounds of 
conscience, but mainly on grounds of their false beliefs. John Forrest (1471-1538) and 
Elizabeth Barton (1506-1534), the so-called ‘Holy Maid of Kent’, who delivered a 
prophesy that the King would soon die after he married Anne Boleyn, were two 
examples of this type. Herbert depicted the former as a superstitious clergyman, while 
he described the latter as a woman who exhibited ‘divers feigned Miracles, 
accompanied with some Wisardly Unsoothsaying’ about King Henry’s death.107 Since 
neither of them were executed for their consciences, at least in Herbert’s sense, they 
do not belong in the focus of this section. Instead, the section will mainly focus on 
those who in Herbert’s judgement disobeyed the laws of supremacy for reasons of 
conscience, among whom Thomas More and John Fisher were two notable cases. 
Moreover, this discussion will include Herbert’s account of the death of Anne Boleyn 
                                                                                                                                                        
the dissolution of the monasteries (MS Jesus College 73, pp. 681/23-695/39) and the Six Articles (MS 
Jesus College 73, pp. 867/223-876/245). Some of the paragraphs are terribly amended. On the one hand 
it showed that many complex issues existed during the Henrician Reformation, while on the other hand 
it presented Herbert’s concern for these topics. 
107 L&R, 376a, 432. CF: Elizabeth Barton was ‘the grand imposture’ who made a profit by being in a 
‘counterfeit Convulsion’ imparting ‘the secret [of God] to the Curate of the Parish’ and relating ‘strange 
vision revealed by God to her in the time of her ecstasie’. Francis Godwin, Annales of England. 
Containing the Reignes of Henry the Eighth. Edward the Sixt. Queen Mary. (London: Printed by A. 
Islip, and W. Stansby, 1630), 130. CF: ‘At this time the name of the nun Anne Barton [i.e. Elizabeth 
Barton] was in all men’s mouths… Sir Thomas More, among others, had carefully tested the spirit of 
the nun, and was unable to discover in it any trace of that fanaticism which was maliciously laid to her 
charge at that time’. Nicholas Sander, Rise and Growth of the Anglican Schism, trans. David Lewis 
(London: Burns & Oates, 1877), 112. 
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(1501-1536), Henry’s campaigns of the dissolution of monasteries, and the enactment 
of the Six Articles. All of these topics not only were central to the Henrician 
Reformation, but also show Herbert’s conflict between the royal supremacy and 
conscience. The time period of the whole discussion began with the Henrician 
Reformation till 1541 when the Six Articles ceased to be strictly enforced. At that 
time, Herbert noted that ‘now a cruell time did passe in England’.108 
 By comparing The Life and Raigne with other sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
histories of King Henry VIII by the contemporaries, this section will also show that 
Herbert’s inner conflict between the royal supremacy and conscience is a 
characteristic of his work. It distinguishes his history from other sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century histories of King Henry VIII. When Herbert was writing it, he 
had access to many former studies on the history of the King, and they exhibited a 
wide spectrum of views. Rise and Growth of the Anglican Schism (first published in 
1585) by Nicholas Sander stood on one extreme of the spectrum. Favouring the 
Roman Catholic Church, it denounced Henry’s every deed and supported every 
martyr executed by Henry. On the other extreme of the spectrum was situated The 
Pilgrim: A Dialogue on The Life and Actions of King Henry the Eighth (first 
published in 1546) by William Thomas. Supporting King Henry, it condemned the 
disobedient clergymen and explained how they resisted the King and his laws. 
Similarly, Edward Hall’s The Union of the Two Noble Families of Lancaster and York, 
better known as Hall's Chronicle (two editions published in 1548 and in 1550) stood 
against any disobedient man.109 Herbert did not follow such extreme viewpoints of 
these works, but only accepted some records he believed to be true. If the 
abovementioned works stood on opposite extremes of the spectrum, Bishop Francis 
                                                     
108 L&R, 466.  
109 It was later banned by Queen Mary on 13th June 1555. 
126 
 
Godwin composed a work standing in between, Annales of England. Containing the 
Reignes of Henry the Eighth. Edward the Sixth. Queen Mary (first published in 1616). 
He denounced both the corruption of the Roman Catholic Church and the tyrannical 
deeds of Henry VIII.110 
 In May 1535 some clergymen who ‘openly spake against the King’s supremacy’ 
were executed by the order of the King, according to the earliest record of The Life 
and Raigne. The case shows Herbert’s two contradictory narratives. Herbert first 
presented Henry’s mercy and his reluctance to enforce the execution. Herbert wrote 
that Henry executed them after many considerations, and that the King ‘mourned 
inwardly’ after they were killed since ‘This piece of Justice was not yet so familiar to 
our King, but that it troubled him much, for he would have been glad not to be 
compell’d to such violent courses’.111 However, Herbert then discussed the King’s 
decision to execute more martyrs. The sorrows of the King, Herbert continued, could 
not stop his determined mind from continuing to kill the disobedient. Henry even 
punished ‘many pretended Reformers or Contradictors of the Roman Catholique 
Religion’. Furthermore, since Henry ‘found the terrours already given, did not suffice 
to keep the rest in awe, he resolved to make some great examples [i.e. the cases of 
John Fisher and Thomas More]’.112  
After having shown the above contradictory narrations, Herbert very briefly 
expressed his sympathy for those executed by commenting that this was a ‘bloudy 
                                                     
110 Maintaining the scope and limit of the King’s power over the Church set from the Elizabeth 
Settlement, Godwin applied this framework to his history of King Henry VIII. When Godwin 
introduced the act of supremacy, he said that ‘the King stiled himself Supreme Head of the Church of 
England, that the Archbishop of Canterbury executed all those offices which formerly the Pope only 
did, and that not as the Popes Legate, but as Primate of England, who under the King claimed chiefe 
authority in Ecclesiasticall affairs throughout his whole Province’. Godwin, Annales of England, 
127–28. 
111 L&R, 391a.  
112 L&R, 391a.  
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time’ for both Catholicism and Protestantism.113 The comment in fact showed that 
Herbert’s description of the King’s sorrow over the executed in the beginning was 
actually a defence of the King; i.e. Herbert intended to show the King’s goodness 
rather than his cruelty. Moreover, Herbert’s defence of the King is evident when it is 
compared to descriptions with other contemporary works. Godwin commented 
without any reservation that King Henry was afraid of being regarded as a man 
without faith when he persecuted not only the Catholics but also the Protestants.114 
Godwin did not say that the King mourned for the killed; nor could this kind of 
description be seen in the works of William Thomas or Edward Hall. In addition, 
although Herbert described this period as a bloody time for both the Catholics and the 
Protestants, Herbert only mentioned a specific group of martyrs, John Firth 
(1503-1533) and some ‘Hollanders’, who were burned at the stake since they ‘devised 
some different Opinions by themselves, concerning certain Articles of Christian 
Religion’;115 but John Firth was lamented by Godwin and Edward Hall.116 In brief, 
Herbert first tried to defend the King in the early persecutions, though he later also 
showed sympathy for the martyrs.  
 Unlike the above-mentioned disobedient clergymen, John Fisher, Bishop of 
Rochester, and Thomas More (Lord Chancellor 1529-1532) gained more attention 
from Herbert. Fisher had just been pardoned by the King for believing the words of 
Elizabeth Barton, the Nun of Kent, in 1534,117 but in 1535 he was tried again and 
                                                     
113 L&R, 391a.  
114 ‘But the king fearing that it might be thought, That hee tooke these courses rather out of a contempt 
of Religion, than in regard of the tyrannie of the Court of Rome; to free himselfe from all suspition 
either of favouring LVTHER, or any authors of new Opinions, began to persecute that sort of men 
whom the Vulgar called Heretiques’. Godwin, Annales of England, 133. 
115 L&R, 391a.  
116 CF: John Firth was the ‘learned and godly young man’. Godwin, Annales of England, 133. Edward 
Hall said that John Firth was ‘very well learned and had an excellent goodly witte’. Edward Hall, The 
Union of the Two Noble Families of Lancaster and York (London: Richard Grafton, 1550, facsimile ed., 
1970), fol. cc.xxv. 
117 L&R, 376a.  
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executed thereafter since he refused to take the oath of the Act of Succession 
regarding the King’s marriage, succession, and royal supremacy. Herbert tried to 
defend the King in this case, too. He first said that the new Pope Paul III accelerated 
Fisher’s death since he declared him Cardinal St. Vitale, and this declaration incurred 
the King’s anger. Henry was angered because he ‘knew of what consequence it would 
be, if his subjects were thus incourag’d to contemne his Authority’.118 Then Herbert, 
though he could not be certain about the content of Fisher’s accusation, found ‘that on 
the seventh of May last in the Tower of London before diverse Persons, Hee [Fisher] 
had falsely, Maliciously and Traiterously said, That the King is not Supreme head of 
the Church of England’.119 This meant that in Herbert’s view Fisher was guilty 
according to the law, implying that Henry could be justified in executing him. 
Moreover, Herbert found that Henry ‘did but unwillingly proceed [to the execution], 
as having held him ever in singular esteem, for his learning and good parts’. These 
descriptions all revealed that Henry was not a cruel and bloody king, and that he was 
to some extent stimulated by the Pope to execute Fisher. 
 Herbert’s description of Fisher’s trial was close to that of Godwin but far from 
those of Nicholas Sander, William Thomas and Edward Hall, and Herbert did provide 
more delicate descriptions than others, showing his carefulness and his concern for 
the case. Sander briefly said that Henry had resolved to kill Fisher before he heard 
that Fisher was promoted a Cardinal.120 In other words, the Pope did not accelerate 
the execution of Fisher. Sander’s opinion, however, was contrary to those of others.121 
                                                     
118 L&R, 392a.  
119 L&R, 392a.  
120 ‘He resolved at last to put to death the bishop of Rochester first, to see whether More afterwards 
could be made to change his opinion’ and ‘he [Henry] had heard by this time that the bishop had been 
made a Cardinal, and as for breaking his resolution, there was not the slightest hope that he could ever 
do it’. Nicholas Sander, Rise and Growth of the Anglican Schism, ed. David Lewis (London: Burns & 
Oates, 1877), 121. 
121 Modern study showed the contrary view against Sander, too. Solt, Church and State in Early 
Modern England, 1509-1640, 29. 
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William Thomas believed that Henry made his decision to kill Fisher after his 
promotion by the Pope since Henry was ‘fearing the example of his predecessor King 
John’.122 Edward Hall, who was wholeheartedly in favour of Henry, denounced 
Fisher as a traitor.123 Moreover, after Fisher was beheaded and his head was thrown 
into a hole on London bridge, Hall said cold-bloodedly that ‘it was sayd that the 
Pope…sent the Cardinalles hat as farre as Caleys, but the head it should haue stande 
on, was as high as London bridge or euer the hat could come to Bishop Fysher, & then 
it was to late and therefore he neither ware it nor enioyed his office’.124 Godwin 
briefly mentioned that Fisher was ‘a man much reverenced by the People for his holy 
life and great learning’, ‘but the Pope was the occasion of his death, who to ease the 
burthen of his now a years imprisonment, by the addition of a new title, had on the 
one and twentieth of May created him Cardinall’. 125  Again, compared to the 
abovementioned descriptions, Herbert’s narration is more careful and nuanced. 
Herbert not only considered Henry’s position in this case but also was concerned 
about the concrete proof used in Fisher’s trial. 
 Perhaps Fisher’s death could be blamed on the Pope and on his own ‘traitorous’ 
confession, making it easier for Herbert to defend the King, but the same did not hold 
true in the case of Thomas More, in which Herbert did not defend the King, but stood 
on More’s side. Herbert first claimed that More remained silent most of the time, and 
                                                     
122 The example denoted the conflict between King John and Innocent III. After King John was 
excommunicated, he surrendered to the Pope. William Thomas, The Pilgrim: A Dialogue on The Life 
and Actions of King Henry the Eighth, ed. James Anthony Froude (London: Parker, Son, and Bourn, 
West Strand, 1861), 31.  
123 ‘Ihon Fysher bishop of Rochester…hauyng knowlege of the false fained and dissimled reuelacions 
[from Elizabeth Barton], trayterously conspired against our sayd soueraigne lorde’. Hall, The Union of 
the Two Noble Families of Lancaster and York, fol.cc.xxiii. 
124 Hall, fol. cc. xxvi. The spelling has been double-checked with its modern edition. See Edward Hall, 
Hall’s Chronicle: Containing the History of England, during the Reign of Henry the Fourth, and the 
Succeeding Monarchs, to the End of the Reign of Henry the Eighth, ed. Henry Ellis (London: Published 
for J. Johnson, 1809), 817. 
125 Godwin, Annales of England, 136. 
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he did not receive any promotion or help from the Pope.126 Moreover, Herbert could 
not find other facts or proof supporting the indictment against More.127 Then Herbert, 
without mentioning the King – it could be said that the King faded out in Herbert’s 
narration of More’s trial –, described the dilemma More faced as followed: 
It being observ’d that both of them [Fisher and More] said, in their Examinations, the Act about 
the Supremacy was like a two edg’d sword, for if one answer one way, it will confound his Soule, 
and if the other way, it will confound his Body. 
The so-called ‘two edg’d sword’ meant that they would definitely be hurt no matter 
which option they took. If they took the oath of the Act to save their bodies, they 
would sacrifice their souls or their consciences; if they refused, they would die. The 
metaphor also meant that the origin of the dilemma was the unreasonableness of the 
law, and hence it implied that it was an evil law in Herbert’s view. 
 After describing the double-edged sword More faced, Herbert then presented the 
conversation between More and Richard Rich (1496-1567), Solicitor General at that 
time.128 In this conversation, More was of the opinion that the case of the primacy 
was not the same as that of the kingship since the former should be determined by 
conscience, while the latter was determined by the law. Telling Rich that ‘your 
conscience will save you, and my conscience will save me’, More said that he chose 
                                                     
126 L&R, 393a.  
127 CF: ‘But Sir Thomas More, (as his Indictment hath it) malitiose silebat’. ‘Hee was attained of 
misprision of Treason, as I find by the Parliament Rolls, was thought sufficient to condemn him’. L&R, 
393a.  
128 The Solicitor General tried to persuade More by asking him, if it ‘were enacted by Parliament, that 
Richard Rich should be King, and that it should be Treason for any one to deny it, what offence it were 
to contravene this Act’? And More replied that he would if he said no, but said that it was a trivial thing. 
More, then, proposed another question ‘suppose by Parliament it were enacted quod Deus non sit Deus 
[God was not God], and that it were Treason to contravene’? Richard Rich gave a positive answer but 
‘said withal, I will propose a middle Case, because yours is too high.’ And he continued to ask why he 
refused to accept the title of the King, the supreme head of the Church, to which More replied that ‘a 
Parliament can make a King and Depose him, and that every Parliament man may give his consent 
thereunto, but that a Subject cannot be bound so in the case of Supremacy’. L&R, 393a. For the full 
original Latin and English content, see Henry Ansgar Kelly, Louis W Karlin, and Gerard Wegemer, 
Thomas More’s Trial by Jury: A Procedural and Legal Review with A Collection of Documents 
(Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2011), 183–85. 
131 
 
to save his conscience and sacrifice his body.129 Since More refused to sacrifice his 
conscience, he was found guilty of high treason. At the final scene of More’s death, 
Herbert wrote: 
This great Person hereupon going shortly after, to the place of Execution, met among many 
friends one only Enemy, who openly revil’d him, for a Sentence heretofore given in Chancery, to 
which, yet, he made no answer, but that if it were to doe, he would do so again. And, now, being 
resolv’d to die, he returned to his wonted facetiousnesse. Therefore, being to goe up the Scaffold, 
he said to one; Friend help me up, and when I go down, again, let me shift for my selfe as I can. 
Being now mounted, the Executioner (as the custome is) asked him forgivenesse, which he 
granted, but told him withall, he should never have honesty by cutting off his Head, his Neck was 
so short. Then laying down his head on the block, he bid the Executioner stay till he had layd 
aside his Beard, for (said he) it never committed Treason. After which, comming to some private 
Devotions, hee received his death. This ended Sir Thomas More, with so little consternation, as 
even terrours of death could not take off the pleasure hee had in his conceited and merry 
Language, which many attributed to his Innocence. For certainly though hee fell into the danger 
of the Law, they thought his intentions were rather to elude it with ambiguous answers, and an 
affected Silence, than to declare himself any way.130 
From Herbert’s description, More was a great man who resolved to save his 
conscience at the cost of his life. Herbert knew that the primacy of the Pope was what 
More’s conscience believed,131 and he had tried his best not to offend the King both 
on his marriage with Ann Boleyn and on his supremacy. 
 The narration of ‘the double-edged sword’ dilemma Thomas More faced was not 
                                                     
129 Kelly, Karlin, and Wegemer, Thomas More’s Trial by Jury, 183. 
130 L&R, 394a. Italics mine. It is possible that the origin of the final words of Thomas More, which was 
before the italic words, was from Edward Hall’s record. See the same narration in Hall, The Union of 
the Two Noble Families of Lancaster and York, fol. cc. xxvi. 
131 ‘Hee could not deny the Pope a Primacy’. L&R, 394a.  
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found in other contemporary works on the history of King Henry VIII. This absence 
suggests that Herbert, who valued individual conscience, was particularly aware of 
the conflict between the royal supremacy and individual conscience in this case. 
Sander, who concentrated on slandering Henry’s cruel deeds and on supporting the 
martyrs, recorded that More publicly declared himself a Roman Catholic in the trial 
and argued that the papal supremacy was grounded not only in human law but also in 
divine law – but Sander’s record might not be reliable since it cannot be found 
elsewhere.132 William Thomas acknowledged that ‘the Bishop of Rochester, and 
More, among the rest, held with the negative part [refusing to take the oath of 
allegiance], according to their conscience, as I suppose’. However, Thomas was 
determined to defend King Henry, and disagreed with the conscientious grounds of 
Fisher and More. Thomas later claimed that Fisher and More ‘murmured against the 
King, provoking his displeasure’ even though the King had ‘supported their ignorance 
more than nine months’.133 William Thomas stressed the King’s generosity while 
casting Fisher and More as disobedient and traitorous. Like William Thomas, Edward 
Hall described More as ‘a great persecutor of suche as detested the supremacy of the 
bishop of Rome’. But he could not understand why More delivered some ‘tauntyng 
and mockyng’ words when he was mounting to the scaffold.134 Herbert recorded the 
same content of the last witty words of Thomas More,135 but he deemed it as More’s 
‘facetiousness’ not as his ‘tauntyng and mockyng’. Francis Godwin’s narration on the 
                                                     
132 According to Sander, More told the judges who sentenced him to death that he ‘have by the grace 
of God been always a Catholic, never out of the communion of the Roman Pontiff…and found out that 
the authority of the Roman Pontiff, which you rashly … have set aside, is not only lawful, to be 
respected, and necessary, but also grounded on the divine law and prescription. That is my opinion; that 
is the belief in which by the grace of God I shall die.’ Sander, Rise and Growth of the Anglican Schism, 
125. 
133 Thomas, The Pilgrim: A Dialogue on The Life and Actions of King Henry the Eighth, 31. 
134 ‘I cannot tell whether I should call him a foolishe wyseman or a wyse foolishman, for vndoubtedly 
he beside his learnyng, had a great witte, but it was mingled with tauntyng and mockyng…’. Hall, The 
Union of the Two Noble Families of Lancaster and York, fol. cc. xxvi. 
135 See footnote 130 of this chapter. 
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case of More was closer to Herbert’s, but still he did not touch the double-edged 
sword dilemma. Godwin commented that Fisher and More ‘were indeed very learned, 
but most obstinate stickers in the behalfe of the Church of Rome’.136 As to the last 
words of More, Godwin thought ‘the most censorious fault him in nothing, but his too 
too jesting (I will not say scoffing) wit, to which he gaue more liberty, then did 
beseeme the grauity of his person, not tempering himselfe in the midst of his calamity, 
no not at the very instant of death’.137 Compared to the other writers, Herbert showed 
more sympathy for Thomas More, placing his emphasis on the importance of 
individual conscience rather than on King Henry’s authority as supreme head of the 
Church; in contrast, Sander, Thomas and Hall described the case according to their 
more established opinions and did not show a conflict between conscience and royal 
supremacy. 
 But Herbert did not always show sympathy for martyrs who refused to accept 
Henry’s supremacy. Reginald Pole (1500-1558), later Cardinal Pole (1536), first had a 
quarrel with Henry in 1535 when he lived in Padua. At that time, Pole wrote Pro 
ecclesiasticae unitatis defensio (or Defence of the Unity of the Church), speaking not 
only against the King’s supremacy but also against the King’s marriage to Anne 
Boleyn; the King was furious. In this case, Herbert showed no sympathy for Pole. He 
recorded the conflict more objectively and calmly and did not, as William Thomas did, 
speak with irony or even slander Pole.138 After Pole published his work, Henry 
demanded that he come back to England ‘to explane some passages thereof,’ but Pole 
                                                     
136 Godwin, Annales of England, 133. 
137 Ibid., 136.  
138 ‘Now will I answer unto the persecution of Cardinal Pole, and unto the death of his mother and 
friends; which, in effect, is nothing so marvellous nor so cruel as it is made here in Italy…it had been 
better he [Pole] had died in his cradle than lived to be an occasion of so much mischief as hath 
followed for his sake, and is yet likely to follow.’ Thomas, The Pilgrim: A Dialogue on The Life and 
Actions of King Henry the Eighth, 61. 
134 
 
refused since he knew that ‘it was declared Treason there’.139 According to Herbert, 
although Henry was unable to seize the Cardinal, he found a chance to get his revenge 
three years later by executing Pole’s two brothers Henry, Lord Montagu, and Sir 
Geoffrey, and his mother, the Countess of Salisbury in an affair known as the Exeter 
conspiracy. Pole’s family members together with Pole were all ‘attainted of 
treason’. 140  Pole’s family could partly be regarded as the victims of Henry’s 
supremacy, but Herbert did not show any sympathy for them, perhaps because Pole 
was free from any trial or hurt, and perhaps because the trial of his family members 
was influenced by other political reasons. This case implies that Herbert had 
sympathy only for those who resisted the royal supremacy on grounds of conscience, 
not for those who appealed to other grounds. 
 In addition to the individual cases of Fisher and More, Herbert expressed 
significant scruples about the Six Articles enacted in 1539. In Herbert’s view, more 
people were entangled in this act, and some chose to listen to the judgement of 
conscience even though they could be risking their lives. Introducing the content of 
the Six Articles, which affirmed the doctrine of Transubstantiation and declared that 
anyone who denied it would be construed as a heretic and lose all his property, 
Herbert said that it was ‘called by some the Bloody Statute’.141 Furthermore, after the 
enforcement of the said law, Herbert could not refrain from criticising it: 
The Six Articles being now published, gave no little occasion of murmure; since to revoke the 
conscience not only from its own Court, but from the ordinary ways of resolving controversies, 
to such an abrupt decision of the common Law (as is there set down) was thought to be a 
deturning of Religion from its right and usuall course; since the Conscience must be taught, not 
                                                     
139 L&R, 390a.  
140 L&R, 447.  
141 L&R, 446.  
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forced… Besides, to make the contravening of Doctrines to be capitall, before they be fully 
proved, is prejudiciall to that liberty, without which no man can justify himself before God or 
man.142 
‘The deturning of Religion from its right and usual course’ did not criticise the 
proclamation of Transubstantiation itself, but rather the cruel punishments it brought 
to the people, since Herbert expressed no particular opinion on this controversial 
doctrine.143 It was the heavy penalty, not the doctrine itself, that left people no way to 
follow their consciences, except by risking their lives. Most importantly, the criticism 
showed that Herbert maintained that conscience should be persuaded, not forced.  
 Herbert then compared the victims of the Six Articles with John Fisher and 
Thomas More. Writing that ‘So that if Sir Thomas More and the Bishop of Rochester 
had their scruples about the Supremacy; These men were as Conscientious about the 
six Articles’,144 Herbert thought that the victims also encountered the double-edged 
sword dilemma, and that they could save either their bodies or their consciences. Then, 
through some consecutive rhetorical questions, one of which was that ‘if Infidels and 
Heathens should do the like [use laws to force people to accept a religious belief], 
who would ever turn Christian?’, Herbert implied that authority should not supress 
scruples.145 In the end of the discussion, Herbert stated that ‘now [in 1541 when the 
law was not strictly enforced] a cruell time did passe in England, for as few durst 
protect those who refus’d to subscribe to the 6 Articles, so they suffered daily’.146 
The above discussions all showed Herbert’s deep concern about individual 
                                                     
142 L&R, 447-48.  
143 Herbert most of the time avoided discussing it. See Dialogue, 250-51.  
144 L&R, 449.  
145 This example was also quite a common point in his works, especially in De Veritate, De Religione 
Laici, and his Dialogue. DV, preface and Chapter 1. CF: ‘Tutor: But what if the divines in any country 
tell you, that you must reject all other faiths, and trust only to theirs? Pupil: I should reply, that this 
imposition was merely tyrannical and unjust; as taking away from man the liberty of finding out the 
truth’. Dialogue, 9. 




 That Herbert was especially concerned about the Six Articles encroaching on 
individual conscience can also be seen by comparing his narration with those of 
others. Godwin condemned the statute, but only mentioned briefly that many suffered 
by it.147 Hall wrote that King Henry granted so many pardons to those who infringed 
the law, and that it was ‘the rigour of that lawe’ (not the malice of Henry) that brought 
‘many an honest and simple persone to there [their] deathes’.148 Hall’s statement was 
in fact a defence of the King since he intentionally separated the cruelness of the law 
from Henry, and presented Henry’s mercy for victims. Commenting on the enactment 
of the Six Articles, Sander said that it was a case of ‘the king and the bishops striving 
to save the schism they had begun from issuing in the Lutheran or Calvinistic 
heresy’.149 Neither Godwin, nor Hall, nor Sander discussed the double-edged sword 
dilemma in the minds of people, nor did they emphasize the importance of individual 
conscience, though they all agreed that the Six Articles was a cruel statute. 
 But Herbert did not blame Henry for the threat of the Six Articles to individual 
conscience. The object of Herbert’s criticism was the law itself, not the King. 
Moreover, he found an excuse for Henry’s enactment of the law, namely his facing 
the rebellion at home and the invasion abroad that compelled the King to ‘keep an 
unity with the Roman Church’.150 Herbert even showed Henry’s support for the 
liberty of individual conscience. According to Herbert, Henry, facing the objection of 
Thomas Cranmer (1489-1556) against the act, responded by sending him ‘a Copy of 
them [the Six Articles], and misliked not his freedom, as knowing all he spake was 
                                                     
147 ‘These Lawes like those of Draco written in bloud, were the destruction of multitudes, & silenced 
those who had been hitherto furtherers of Reformation’. Godwin, Annales of England, 172. 
148 Hall, The Union of the Two Noble Families of Lancaster and York, fol.cc.xxxiii. 
149 Sander, Rise and Growth of the Anglican Schism, 135. 
150 L&R, 448.  
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out of a sincere intention’. 151  This record showed the King’s generosity and 
liberalness, while it contradicted Herbert’s earlier criticism of the law. If King Henry 
did not dislike Cranmer’s straightforward and sincere objection, he should not have 
strictly enforced this bloody statute, as Herbert described it. It was likely that Herbert 
defended the King by separating the cruelness of the statute and the personality of 
Henry. 
 As the discussion above of the series of martyrs or victims of the royal 
supremacy shows, Herbert had two levels of description. In the first level or in 
appearance, he intended to defend the King’s personality and his supremacy over the 
Church. The disobedient such as Fisher and More were executed for infringing upon 
certain laws, and Henry was ‘reluctant’ to proceed with the executions. In this way, it 
seemed that Henry was a merciful king and did not force anyone’s conscience. 
However, a closer look at Herbert’s descriptions reveals that Herbert had much 
sympathy for the martyrs, especially those who refused the supremacy on grounds of 
conscience. This sympathy forms Herbert’s second level of description. His lament 
for the deaths of More and of those who risked their lives before the Six Articles 
reflected Herbert’s true and deep concern. Moreover, in this level of description it 
could be said that Herbert implied criticism towards King Henry since the enactments 
of the laws of supremacy, such as the Succession Act or the Six Articles, could not in 
fact be separated from Henry’s will. The Succession Act, for instance, regulated not 
only the royal supremacy but also the King’s personal marriage and succession. 
Moreover, the King was also responsible for the unstable religious stance of the 
established Church during the 1530s, which swung back and forth between 
Protestantism and Catholicism.  
 It is very interesting that Herbert at first glance presented King Henry as a person 
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who valued individual conscience more than the authority of the royal supremacy, if 
one focuses only on his narrations about the King’s response towards these executed 
figures. As mentioned above, Herbert said that the King felt sorrow for the executions 
of John Fisher and of the first group of clergymen who spoke against the King’s 
supremacy. This sorrow implied that, like the martyrs, Henry felt the force of his 
conscience, and thus felt remorse for those who saved their consciences but refused to 
take the oath of supremacy. Conscience could not be appeased even after the King’s 
authority was established. Moreover, again, when facing Cranmer’s objection against 
the Six Articles, Henry showed a kind of tolerance and liberalness. These descriptions 
of Henry could be the ideal image of a king in Herbert’s mind. Supporting individual 
conscience, a king should feel sorrow for those executed, and a king should tolerate 
dissent in his subjects.  
 That individual conscience precedes the authority of the royal supremacy echoes 
the main theme of Herbert’s De Veritate; i.e., individual conscience has greater 
authority than worldly institutions. In the preface of De Veritate, Herbert appealed to 
people not to follow any authority, but to use their God-given faculties to obtain truths. 
Moreover, he maintained that worldly institutions often abused their authority, stirred 
disorder, and prevented people from finding refuge for their consciences.152 As 
Chapter 2 of this thesis has shown, conscience holds high authority in Herbert’s 
theory of truth. ‘By the high authority of the Common Notions’ conscience examines 
‘not only what is good and evil, but also their different degrees’.153 Furthermore, as 
the highest inner faculty, conscience is not only ‘the court of the spirit and the body,’ 
but also ‘the court of God’.154 Since the royal supremacy is a worldly institution, it 
                                                     
152 ‘My reflections are free of authority and side no party and treat issues in the light of my 
independent judgment’. DV, 73.  
153 DV, 184.  
154 DV, 185.  
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has less authority than conscience in Herbert’s theory. 
 Presenting both a defence of King Henry’s royal supremacy and sympathy for 
the consciences of martyrs, Herbert’s two levels of descriptions could not be found in 
other contemporary works. Sander’s descriptions of martyrs always showed their 
fearlessness and carelessness about their deaths, and their expectation of the coming 
reward from God.155 His narrations did not touch martyrs’ struggles between saving 
their souls and saving their bodies.156 When discussing the death of John Fisher, 
Sander stated that Fisher’s final words were ‘Te Deum laudamus, Te Dominum 
confitemur’.157 Sander likewise wrote that when Thomas More was apprehended and 
taken into the Tower of London, he did not feel dread but entered it as if he were 
attending a feast.158 More was like a man who was unconscious of the pain of his 
coming death. Moreover, the judges, who were eager to condemn More, showed only 
the evilness of human nature.159 Furthermore, among all the martyrs, Sander paid 
more attention to Fisher’s trial than to More’s, which formed a sharp contrast with 
Herbert, who thought that More did not deserve to be killed since he kept silent during 
the trial. In Sander’s mind, Fisher was the ideal representative of a holy Catholic, 
while More was not since he was appreciated much by Henry VIII and, according to 
Sander, he had two marriages in his life.160 In addition, Sander used miracles or 
providential explanations to show the evilness of Henry’s royal supremacy against 
                                                     
155 For example, when the King threatened to throw two friars, Elston and Peto, into the sea, they were 
not afraid because they were of the right religion. Sander, Rise and Growth of the Anglican Schism, 114. 
The martyrs were, according to Sander, the ‘blessed company’ who ‘entered the glorious lists for Christ’ 
and ‘obtained the reward of the heavenly calling’. Ibid., 117-8. 
156 In addition to Fisher and More, Sander also listed 21 martyrs in his works. See Ibid., 113-21.  
157 Ibid., 122. 
158 ‘Thus this saintly man, at the very doors of the prison, which to most men is full of terror, amused 
himself as if he were at a feast.’ Ibid., 111.  
159 ‘The judge lost his temper and said, “Now I see, you dispute the law, for you are silent.”’ Ibid., 124. 
160 ‘He [Fisher] was the light not of England but of Christendom, a model of holiness, the salt of the 
people, and a doctor of the Church’ and ‘there was not in England a more holy and learned man than 
John Fisher, bishop of Rochester’. Sander, Rise and Growth of the Anglican Schism, 66, 121.  
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martyrs, and the experience of More’s daughter was an example.161 Since Sander was 
committed to showing the goodness of Catholic religion and the evilness of Henrician 
Schism, contradictory narrations existed when he discussed the suffering of 
martyrs.162 
 Since both William Thomas and Edward Hall took defending King Henry as 
their priorities, their works did not touch on the double-edged sword dilemma of 
martyrs. Attaching himself to the Protestant party, but later executed by Queen Mary 
in 1554, Thomas condemned all the martyrs who disobeyed King Henry and his laws, 
including Fisher, More, and Cardinal Pole.163 His established stance made him defend 
Henry’s every policy and deed.164 Like Thomas, Hall had no sympathy for the 
disobedient. Showing extreme hatred against Elizabeth Barton, who prophesied that 
Henry would soon die after he married Anne Boleyn, Hall spent more than three 
quarters of the chronicles of 1533 condemning Elizabeth Barton.165 Moreover, as 
mentioned, Hall spoke cold-bloodedly of John Fisher, who traitorously believed in 
Elizabeth Barton’s words. 
 Herbert’s two levels of descriptions could also be seen from his discussions on 
the death of Anne Boleyn and on Henry’s dissolutions of monasteries, both of which 
belonged to important issues of the Henrician Reformation and illustrated Herbert’s 
                                                     
161 According to Sander, More’s daughter, who ‘gave large alms to the poor,’ was a woman with great 
personality. When her father was executed by Henry, she found that she had no money to buy the 
shroud. At this time, a miracle occurred: suddenly there was enough money in her purse. ‘But lo! She 
who knew too well that a few minutes before there was nothing in her purse, now found in it the price 
of the linen, nether more nor less than the sum she was then bound to pay. Comforted by the miracle, 
she took up the linen, wrapt her father’s body therein, and honourably buried the martyr of Christ.’ 
Ibid., 127.  
162 For example, after Sander showed the cruelness of the judges in the trial of Thomas More, he said 
that ‘all England mourned the dead [More]’ – but Sander had just shown the cruelness of the English 
judges. Ibid., 126. Modern historians have also noticed Sander’s inconsistency. See E. W. Ives, The 
Life and Death of Anne Boleyn (Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 39. 
163 Thomas, The Pilgrim: A Dialogue on The Life and Actions of King Henry the Eighth, 63. 
164 In order to justify Henry’s marriage, William Thomas became well known for his slander of Anne 
Boleyn, who was usually attacked by Catholics such as Sander. Eric Ives described William Thomas as 
‘pseudo-intellectual hustler’. Ives, The Life and Death of Anne Boleyn, 48. 
165 Hall, The Union of the Two Noble Families of Lancaster and York, fol. cc.xviii-cc.xxiiij. 
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emphasis on conscience. In addition to the first level of description defending King 
Henry’s policy, the second level showed Herbert’s sympathy for the death of Queen 
Anne due to his belief in the innocence of her conscience and in her moral character, 
and his disagreement with the second wave of the dissolution on grounds of 
conscience. In the case of the execution of Queen Anne in 1536, Herbert first 
separated her death from Henry, which formed the first level of description. He 
doubted that the Queen’s death was the result of Henry’s falling in love with Jane 
Seymour (1508-1537), 166  ‘for I [Herbert] do not find him bloudy, but where 
Law…did countenance his Actions’.167 By this statement it seemed that the Queen 
died because she infringed the law, not because Henry lost his loyalty to her. However, 
Herbert spent nearly six pages discussing the case, and gave a positive evaluation of 
the personality of Queen Anne, which formed the second level of description. He 
quoted the Queen’s letters and confessions claiming her absolute innocence and 
recorded her last words when she was taken to the scaffold. In her last words, Anne, 
according to Herbert, not only did not blame Henry for her death but also blessed the 
King.168 Even though it might not be a sincere speech, it was presented by Herbert for 
its goodness. In the end, Herbert said that the Queen’s death was ‘lamented by many, 
both as she was desirous to advance Learned men…and as she was a great Alms-giver; 
in so much, as she is said in three quarters of a year to have bestowed 14 or fifteen 
thousand pounds in this kinde, besides moneys intended by her towards raising a 
                                                     
166 Different narrations on Jane Seymour were provided by Herbert’s contemporaries. Edward Hall was 
happy to welcome this ‘noble and gracious mother queen Iane’, and when Jane died after she gave birth 
to Edward, Hall recorded that Henry was the most aggrieved person in the realm. Hall, fol. cc. xxxii. 
Sander, however, recorded that when ‘the king was asked [by the doctor] which of the two lives [Queen 
Jane or Edward] was to be spared; he answered, the boy’s, because he could easily provide himself 
with other wives’. Sander, Rise and Growth of the Anglican Schism, 138. 
167 L&R, 381b.  
168 ‘But I pray God save the King, and send him long to reigne over you [the witnessed people].’ L&R, 
385b. It is possible that Anne Boleyn’s last blessing for Henry VIII recorded by Herbert originates from 
Edward Hall’s chronicles, who also recorded the same content. Hall, The Union of the Two Noble 
Families of Lancaster and York, fol. cc. xxviii. 
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Stock for poor Artificers in the Realme’.169 This description of the charitable activity 
of Anne Boleyn likely came from the records of John Foxe’s The Acts and Monuments 
(better known as The Book of Martyrs), and Herbert, after reading the records, chose 
to use these records.170 Although Herbert did not blame Henry’s cruelty, he did show 
his sympathy for Queen Anne and seemed to believe in the innocence of her 
conscience on grounds of her confession and good character.171 
 Sander and William Thomas still followed their established stances when 
discussing the case of Anne Boleyn, and did not take her conscientious confessions 
into consideration. Sander not only denounced Henry’s lust but also propagated a 
monster legend of Anne.172 Sander recorded that Anne Boleyn was lustful and evil; 
she ‘had a projecting tooth under the upper lip, and on her right hand [there were] six 
fingers’.173 Moreover, Sander said that she committed incest with her brother George 
Boleyn, intending to obtain a male heir for Henry.174 Although William Thomas had a 
different political stance from Sander, he slandered Anne with the same fervour. He 
was likely to speak with exaggeration that she committed incest with her brother and 
other courtiers due to her lust, and Henry ‘was forced to proceed therein by way of 
open justice’.175 Godwin was reserved to the accusation laid against Anne Boleyn, 
                                                     
169 L&R, 386b.  
170 The statistic is exactly the same. ‘Also, how bountifull shee was to the poore, passing not only the 
common example of other Queenes, but also the reuenues almost of her estate: in so much that the 
almose which she gaue in three quarters of a yeare, in distribution, is summed to the number of xiiij. or 
xv. thousand pounds. Beside the great peece of money which her grace intended to impart into foure 
sundry quarters of the Realme, as for a stocke there to be employed to the behoofe of poore artificers 
and occupyers’. John Foxe, The Unabridged Acts and Monuments Online or TAMO, 1583 (third edition) 
(HRI Online Publications: Sheffield, 2011), 1106, Available from http://www.johnfoxe.org [Accessed: 
09.07.2015]. 
171 Herbert had felt it hard to gather reliable materials of Anne Boleyn. He was also unsure about the 
authenticity of an ‘elegantly written’ letter he quoted. See L&R, 384b. Herbert recorded some useful 
materials which were used by modern scholars since they were not extant. See Ives, The Life and Death 
of Anne Boleyn, 58. 
172 Ives, The Life and Death of Anne Boleyn, 39. 
173 But a memoir by George Waytt (1550-1623) said ‘the sixth finger’ was a ‘grace to her hand’. See 
footnote by David Lewis in Sander, Rise and Growth of the Anglican Schism, 25. 
174 Ibid., 132-33.  
175 ‘Inwardly she [Anne Boleyn] was all another damn than she seemed to be; for in satisfying of her 
carnal appetite, she fled not so much as the company of her own brother, besides the company of some 
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but he had neither sympathy nor interest in the truth of the case.176 What concerned 
Godwin was the capricious and cruel nature of Henry,177 and he even stated that 
German princes, ‘having heard of the lamentable and vnworthy (as they iudged it) end 
of the Queene, loathing the King for his inconstancy and cruelty,’ gave up their idea of 
cooperating with Henry on religious matters.178 
 Similarly, Herbert’s second level of description concerning Henry’s dissolution 
of the monasteries showed that Herbert’s conscience disagreed with the coercion 
involved in the second wave of the dissolution. In the first level, Herbert defended 
Henry’s decisions by inventing two fictional speeches of members of Parliament who 
provided justifications for the first wave of the dissolution of the monasteries. Their 
justifications included that monasteries possessed too much land, that they became the 
lodges of idle people, and that they nourished ‘a Seminary of factious Persons that 
oppose your Supremacy’, and made many disorders by ‘stirring sedition in your 
Highnesse Kingdome, at the same time that some forreigne Power should invade 
it’. 179  However, when Herbert found that the monasteries suffered too much, 
especially after Cromwell’s furious attacks on them,180 he refused to justify the 
second wave of the dissolution approved by Parliament in 1534, i.e. the Act of 
Suppression of Religious Houses. His conscience could not agree with the attacks of 
the second wave of the dissolution on the monasteries. Instead, he showed his 
                                                                                                                                                        
three or four others of the gallantest gentlemen that were about the King’s proper person’. Thomas, The 
Pilgrim: A Dialogue on The Life and Actions of King Henry the Eighth, 56. 
176 Godwin put more effort into narrating the cruelness of Henry and the calamity of Henry Norris, 
who was accused of having an affair with Queen Anne. ‘That in his [Norris’s] conscience he thought 
her [Anne] guiltless of the obiected crime, but whether she were or no, he could not accuse her of 
anything: and that he had rather vndergo a thousand deaths, then betray the Innocent. Vpon relation 
whereof the King cryed out, Hang him vp then, Hang him vp then.’ Godwin, Annales of England, 139. 
177 ‘At what time the King so hot in the pursuit of his loue, preferred the enioying of this Lady beyond 
his Friends, his Estate, his Health, Safeguard, and his onely Daughter…So that the Court of England 
was now like a Stage, whereon are represented the vicissitudes of ever various Fortune.’. Ibid., 141, 
143.  
178 Ibid., 141-42.  
179 L&R, 396a-398a.  
180 L&R, 398a-399a.  
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sympathy for those who had suffered by the act. He said that these monasteries were 
‘lamented by many, and no waies so excused that I know’.181 Moreover, Herbert 
stated that some money taken from the dissolution of the monasteries was taken for 
secular pursuits, and that this was one of the causes of the northern rebellion that 
occurred in 1536.182 Furthermore, when the actions of the dissolution were ‘being by 
some openly called Rapine and Sacriledge,’ Herbert showed his disappointment about 
the outcome of the dissolutions, and confessed that ‘I will no way excuse’ these 
violent deeds.183 This confession formed the second level of his descriptions. In brief, 
Herbert was, at least in the beginning, in favour of the dissolution of the monasteries, 
but the developments that followed exceeded his expectation, and the cruel actions 
against monasteries could not be accepted by his conscience. In the end, Herbert had 
no choice but to write ‘So that although I cannot but pity the ruine of so many pious 
Foundations…yet I have thought fit to mention these particulars, that it may appear to 
forreign Nations wee are not destitute of many Monuments of Devotion’. Those 
particulars were that Henry did use some money he gained from the dissolutions to 
increase the numbers of Colleges and professors in some universities, and to erect 
some new bishoprics.184 On the one hand, he conceded that Henry had caused some 
damage, but on the other hand, Herbert consoled himself that the King had saved 
some money to do something good. 
 Herbert’s two levels of descriptions on the King’s reform of the monasteries were 
also absent among other contemporary authors. Opposed to every action of Henry’s 
dissolution of the monasteries, Sander was of the opinion that Henry coveted the 
                                                     
181 L&R, 375b. Also see Jackson, ‘Lord Herbert of Cherbury and the Presentation of the Henrician 
Reformation in His Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth’, 147. 
182 L&R, 377b, 410-11.  
183 L&R, 444.  
184 L&R, 444.  
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possessions and that ‘all the monasteries were destroyed’.185 Supporting every deed 
of Henry, William Thomas said that Henry dissolved the monasteries since ‘there 
were discovered hypocrisies, murders, idolatries, miracles, sodomies, adulteries, 
fornications, pride, and not 7, but more than 700,000 deadly sins’, and that the King 
was so kind that he granted pardons to many clergymen.186 Neither justifying nor 
denouncing Henry’s deeds, Godwin said that Henry chose a dangerous step by 
demolishing ‘all the Monasteries throughout England’ since the ‘coronation of the 
new Queene, and other passages of entertainment, had exhausted the Treasury’.187 
Besides, ‘few were found guiltless’ under the tyrannical actions of Cromwell and 
‘these things of themselves were distastfull to the vulgar sort’.188 
The presentation of the conflict between the royal authority and conscience sheds 
some light on Herbert’s The Life and Raigne. This was not ‘an unmeasured eulogy of 
Henry VIII’s statesmanship, and a laboured endeavour to condone the crimes of his 
private life,’ as Sir Sidney Lee commented,189 nor was it a work which ‘palliated the 
enormities of Henry VIII,’ as Horace Walpole wrote.190 As shown above, although 
Herbert in appearance often chose to defend the King, he did insert his implicit 
criticism in the second level of description. A typical example was the decision of 
Henry to remove the relic of Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury in the time of 
Henry II. Though Herbert agreed with Henry’s decision, he did not forget to record 
Henry’s greediness by saying that the King ‘seised on that immense Treasure and 
Jewels which were offered to his Shrine…among which, there being one stone 
                                                     
185 Sander, Rise and Growth of the Anglican Schism, 130, 136. 
186 Thomas, The Pilgrim: A Dialogue on The Life and Actions of King Henry the Eighth, 43–44. ‘The 
friars and nuns were as whores and thieves in the open street, and there were saints that made the 
barren women bring forth children,’ and ‘if all the substance had been converted to the poor, the poor 
should have become richer than the princes and nobles’. Thomas, 50. 
187 Godwin, Annales of England, 135. 
188 Godwin, 145. 
189 AB, xxxviii, 142-43.  
190 Horace Walpole, A Catalogue of the Royal and Noble Authors of England, vol. 1 ([Twickenham]: 
Printed at Strawberry-Hill, 1758), 191. 
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eminent…[and] our King wore it afterwards’.191 Moreover, Herbert was fully aware 
that he defended the King in some aspects only, implying that he had limited support 
for the King and his royal supremacy. After recording a series of the statutes about the 
King’s marriage and succession in 1536, Herbert said that ‘I wil not yet take on me 
every where to defend the actions of a Prince’,192 and then he commented that Henry 
did not always obtain his glory during his life: 
I cannot but observe him, that if where he did ill, he made or found many Complices; where he 
did well, he had almost the Glory alone; as being so active and knowing in all he undertook, that 
he was capable of both: Only towards his latter time, as he was thought to decline in his singular 
perfections of Nature, so all things almost fell to the worse; while divers of those ill accidents 
which befel him, were reveng’d sometimes with so severe a justice, as might be called Summum 
Jus. … In procuring [his wants] whereof, though he lost much of his former love and esteem, yet 
he kept himself still upon the high steps of Authority, without stooping either to fear or necessity; 
so that his most irregular actions represented such a Type of greatnesse.193 
To Herbert, Henry was certainly not an ideal king, but he admitted that King Henry 
was a great king because he was superior to others in some ways, or because he was 
protected by providence when he was young. Secondly, since Herbert valued the 
individual’s conscience, the conflict between the royal supremacy and conscience 
makes it possible to investigate the extent to which he supported the royal supremacy. 
The same investigation could not be applied to other contemporary works on the 
history of King Henry VIII since they either gave full support for Henry, or aimed to 
condemn him. Since ‘conscience must be taught not forced’ by the possible death 
penalty of laws of the royal supremacy,194 in Herbert’s view conscience precedes the 
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194 L&R, 447.  
147 
 
authority of the royal supremacy, and this consideration marks the limit of the King’s 
power over the Church. Just as this chapter argues that Herbert displayed only limited 
support for royal supremacy, so the next chapter will suggest that Herbert had a 
similar view on the royal prerogatives. He believed that the royal prerogatives were 
not unlimited and that Parliament had the authority to prevent the consciences of the 
people from being coerced by the King’s unlawful commands. 
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Chapter 4: The Relationship between the King and Parliament 
 
After Charles ascended the throne in 1625, he clashed with Parliament on many 
occasions, including over taxes levied without parliamentary consent and over the 
imprisonment of subjects without cause shown. In response, Parliament used its 
power to impeach royal favourites such as the Duke of Buckingham, Herbert’s patron, 
and Richard Montagu, while Charles protected them and attacked disobedient subjects 
by using his royal prerogatives.1 The conflicts between the two powers raised various 
constitutional questions, such as whether Parliament was created by the King and 
could only provide suggestions when the King requested them, or whether Parliament 
had the power to examine and adjudicate on every issue in the kingdom, including the 
commands issued from the royal prerogatives.2  
As a member of the Council of War from 1625 till around 1640,3 Herbert was a 
first-hand observer of these conflicts. John Selden, Herbert’s life-long friend, helped 
draw up the Petition of Right, protesting the King’s illegal taxations and 
imprisonment of subjects without showing due cause.4 In 1642, shortly before the 
outbreak of the Civil War between the King and Parliament, Herbert left for York to 
join the King, but later retired to Montgomery castle when his career at the royal court 
ended.  
                                                     
1 David L. Smith, The Stuart Parliaments, 1603-1689 (London: Arnold, 1999), 113–19; Leo F. Solt, 
Church and State in Early Modern England, 1509-1640 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 
169–78. 
2 Ulrike Müßig, ‘Constitutional Conflicts in Seventeenth-Century England’, The Legal History Review 
76, no. 1–2 (1 March 2008): 27–47. 
3 As indicated in footnote 75 of Chapter 3, Kimmelman, based on a letter dated 6 May 1625, 
discovered that Herbert became a member in this year. Eugene Hill, in the chronology of Herbert’s life, 
also stated that Herbert became a member of the King’s Council of War in 1624. See Hill, Edward, 
Lord Herbert of Cherbury, preface. The record in the Calendar of State Papers supported this statement. 
It shows that on 12 December 1626 Herbert had participated in discussing an abuse in the navy with 
other members such as Sir Robert Cotton. William Douglas Hamilton, ed., Calendar of State Papers, 
Domestic Series, of the Reign of Charles I (London, Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, & Roberts), 
vols XLI, 494–495. 
4 Smith, The Stuart Parliaments, 1603-1689, 116. 
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Herbert’s view of the relationship between the King and Parliament has never 
been thoroughly examined. His attitude on that subject has remained unclear, since 
scholarly interpretations of Herbert have focused on his conduct at court, rather than 
his ideas about contemporary issues of religion and politics.5 Sir Sidney Lee’s 
influential ‘A Continuation of the Life of Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury from 
1624 to 1648’ devoted much space to Herbert’s conduct at court, and maintained that 
Herbert was anxious to obtain royal recognition. 6  Lee’s work did not discuss 
Herbert’s opinion on the conflicts between Charles and his Parliaments. Similarly, for 
the period of the English Civil War, interest has been concentrated on Herbert’s 
personal conduct – Herbert joined the King in the beginning, but surrendered without 
resistance to the parliamentary army in 1644, in return for a pension from the Long 
Parliament –7 rather than on his view of the war. Lee argued that Herbert was 
‘determined to save his property at the expense of his honour,’8 while Ronald Hutton 
wrote that Herbert ‘was escorted happily into retirement at London, out of reach of 
the enraged Royalists’.9 They both focused on Herbert’s abandonment of the King 
and of his kinsmen who remained in the royalist camp such as his eldest son Richard 
                                                     
5 After Herbert was recalled by King James from the ambassadorship to France in 1624, his career 
shifted to the court where he stayed for the following two decades. 
6 Lee’s work argued that when Charles I had conflicts with his Parliaments during the 1620s, Herbert 
exploited every opportunity to obtain royal recognition. Moreover, Lee wrote that in 1630 Herbert 
completed The Expedition to the Isle of Rhe, a work in defence of Buckingham’s disastrous military 
campaign in 1627, and he ‘apparently expected a fee for the performance’. AB, 142. To see how later 
scholars were influenced by Lee’s work, see the first section of Chapter one above. Lee’s argument can 
be challenged, since seeking and taking an office at court did not mean that one had to agree with 
opinions of the King. In the seventeenth century it was common, as Powers-Beck has shown, to see 
members of aristocratic families to seek positions at court, and this was also the case of the Herberts, 
who had been a court family since the fifteenth century. Herbert, being the eldest son, was expected to 
acquire some political achievements, and he had to shoulder his other five brothers’ annuities. Jeffrey P 
Powers-Beck, Writing the Flesh: The Herbert Family Dialogue (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University 
Press, 1998), 5–6, 126. 
7 AB, 153.  
8 AB, 153.  
9 Ronald Hutton, The Royalist War Effort, 1642-1646 (London: Routledge, 1999), 150. Gardiner also 
wrote that ‘the brilliant and versatile owner [Herbert] spent the remainder of his days as a pensioner of 
that Parliament’. Samuel Rawson Gardiner, History of the Great Civil War, 1642-1649, vol. 2 (London: 
Longmans, Green, 1889), 33. 
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Herbert and his brother Sir Henry Herbert. What these commentators did not notice 
was that Herbert shared many ideas with parliamentarians, as this chapter will 
demonstrate. 
 Focusing on Herbert’s view of the relationship between the King and Parliament, 
this chapter argues that Herbert agreed at least to some extent with those 
parliamentarians who emphasized that Parliament held the highest authority in the 
kingdom, that the King should seek the advice of Members of Parliament on matters 
of Church and State, and that Parliament, not the King, was best able to protect the 
people’s consciences from the oppression of the King’s unlawful commands. The first 
section in this chapter will analyze Herbert’s career and his personal relationships to 
see who had an intellectual connection with him during the latter part of his life. 
Herbert not only maintained friendships with scholars he had been acquainted with 
before, but also continued broadening his networks, including among members of the 
Lower House who upheld the authority of Parliament and denounced Charles’s abuse 
of his prerogatives. By examining The Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth, the 
second section will discuss the interactions between King Henry and members of 
Parliament and the authority of both Houses. Herbert argued that Henry put much 
effort into persuading members of Parliament, and that he greatly respected 
Parliament’s advice. Moreover, Herbert exploited the authority of parliamentary 
speeches to show his viewpoints, indicating that he thought their speeches held high 
authority. The third section will examine Herbert’s private collections currently 
deposited in the National Library of Wales. These collections strongly suggest that 
Herbert was concerned about the abuse of the King’s power, and believed that 
Parliament could save the people from the moral dilemmas caused by the abuse. 
 The discussion of Herbert’s thought should not be confined to his philosophical 
work De Veritate (published in 1624) and his three religious works completed in his 
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later years,10 because Herbert’s history of King Henry and his manuscripts are crucial 
to understanding his view on the clashes between King Charles and Parliament.11 The 
general impression among modern scholars has been that Herbert spent most of his 
energy on seeking positions at court and paid little attention to developing his thought. 
Yet this chapter will show that Herbert was deeply interested in, and thought carefully 
about, contemporary constitutional issues.  
                                                     
10 De Religione Laici, De Religione Gentilium, and A Dialogue Between A Tutor and his Pupil. 
11 See section 1.1 above. 
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4.1 Herbert’s career and personal relationships, 1624-1648 
 
After Herbert was recalled from the position of Ambassador to France in 1624, he 
started providing service and obtained some achievements at court. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1 above, he was created Baron of Cherbury in 1629, and was a member of the 
Council of War from 1625 to 1640 and a member of the House of Lords in the Short 
Parliament.12 During this period, one of the main focuses of Herbert’s scholarly and 
antiquarian interests was the history and authority of Parliament. Before leaving the 
office of Ambassador to France, he had been acquainted with many Continental 
scholars such as Isaac Casaubon, Gerard Vossius, Hugo Grotius, Pierre Gassendi, and 
Marin Mersenne.13 This network of scholars lasted into the later years of Herbert’s 
life.14 Herbert was also acquainted with contemporary English scholars, among 
whom Sir Robert Cotton was an important one. Herbert met Cotton while he served 
on the Council of War,15 since Cotton was also on the Council in the 1620s. Moreover, 
Herbert used the resources of the Cotton Library when writing the history of King 
Henry VIII. Herbert must have been influenced by Cotton in various ways, especially 
in his antiquarian interest in Parliament. A manuscript of Herbert’s collection entitled 
‘Of the Antiquity of Parliament’ (E5/3/30) revealed this influence, since it contained a 
small treatise written by Cotton. Herbert also collected Judicature of Parliament 
(E5/3/35 and E5/3/36) and Modus Tenendi Parliamentorum (E5/3/41), both of which 
                                                     
12 Thomas Birch, The Court and Times of Charles the First: Containing a Series of Historical and 
Confidential Letters, Including Memoirs of the Mission in England of the Capuchin Friars in the 
Service of Henrietta Maria, and a Variety of Other Particulars Not Mentioned by Our Historians, vol. 
1 (London: Henry Colburn, 1849), 20–21. On 8 May 1635 Herbert had proposed ‘projects of a 
Frenchman concerning inventions of ships, guns, and other devices’. See Hamilton, Calendar of State 
Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of Charles I, vols CCLXXXIII, 62. For other records of Herbert 
in the Council of War, see Hamilton, vols CCXCV, 322; CCCLVII, 158; CCCLXI, 224. 
13 AB, 56, 132-33, 158; R. W. Serjeantson, ‘Herbert of Cherbury before Deism: The Early Reception 
of the De Veritate’, The Seventeenth Century 16, no. 2 (2001): 218–20.  
14 In 1647 Herbert visited Gassendi in France. AB, 158. 
15 Hamilton, Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of Charles I, vols XLI, 494–495. 
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were written by Cotton’s friend Henry Elsyng (bap. 1577-1635), clerk of the 
parliaments.16 This selection indicated that Herbert shared with them an interest in 
Parliament. 
 John Selden, who devoted much effort to opposing the King’s abuse of power in 
the Commons, was another important figure who probably greatly influenced Herbert 
in the latter part of his life. The two men had started sharing many ideas and 
exchanging frequent letters from the time of Herbert’s embassy to France.17 For 
instance, in a letter dated 3 February 1619, John Selden complained to Herbert about 
the King’s suppression of his History of Tithes (published in 1618).18 In the 1620s 
Selden became an important figure of the parliamentary opposition. Selden helped to 
impeach the Duke of Buckingham, Herbert’s patron, in the 1626 Parliament.19 In 
1627 Selden was the counsel defending Sir Edmund Hampden, who was imprisoned 
by way of royal warrant without cause shown, since he refused to pay the Forced 
Loan.20 Resisting the abuse of royal prerogatives, Selden held that Hampden should 
be bailed, and insisted that imprisonment be made ‘by the constant and settled laws of 
this kingdom’.21 In the 1628 Parliament, again, Selden opposed King Charles in 
levying tonnage and poundage without the consent of Parliament, and he helped to 
                                                     
16 The Cotton Library had copies of both manuscripts (Colin G. C Tite, ‘The Cotton Library in the 
Seventeenth Century and Its Manuscript Records of the English Parliament’, Parliamentary History 14, 
no. 2 (2008): 131.), and Herbert must have had access to them in the 1630s. For Cotton and Elsyng’s 
intellectual connection, see Elizabeth Read Foster, The Painful Labour of Mr. Elsyng (Philadelphia: 
American Philosophical Society, 1972), 37. Moreover, both works circulated from mid 1620s in the 
hands of those who were interested in Parliament, see Elizabeth Foster, ‘Introduction’, in Henry Elsyng, 
Judicature in Parlement, ed. Elizabeth Read Foster (London: Continuum International Pub. Group, 
1991). 
17 A letter from Selden to Herbert, February 1620, survived. See British Library Add MS 32092, f. 
314.  
18 John Aikin, The Lives of John Selden, Esq., and Archbishop Usher (London, Printed for Mathews 
and Leigh, 1812), 29–30. For the controversy derived from this work, see Solt, Church and State in 
Early Modern England, 1509-1640, 156–57. 
19 Richard Tuck, ‘“The Ancient Law of Freedom”: John Selden and the Civil War’, in Reactions to the 
English Civil War, 1642-1649, ed. J. S Morrill (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 141. 
20 This belonged to the Case of the Five Knights or Darnel’s Case. 
21 Samuel Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1906), 59. 
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draw up the Petition of Right.22 Herbert was very likely to be concerned about the 
parliamentary opposition’s effort in the Commons, since he collected a manuscript 
entitled ‘Arguments in [the 1628] Parliament concerning the liberty of the subject’ 
(E5/3/34) with Selden’s statements.23 Herbert maintained friendship and intellectual 
connection with Selden, even though they belonged to different camps in the English 
Civil War. Herbert’s religious treatise De Religione Gentilium (completed in the 1640s) 
was influenced by Selden’s De dis Syris,24 and Selden was one of the executors of 
Herbert’s will after he died.25 
 Another piece of evidence also suggests that Herbert continued building his 
networks of contemporary scholars and collecting manuscripts related to Parliament 
during the 1630s and the 1640s. According to William Lewis, Herbert had complained 
‘to the Famous Archbishop Usher, of the Difficulties and Obstructions he met with, in 
procuring the Learned Mr. Camden’s Books’. 26  These complaints implied that 
Herbert had some interactions with James Ussher (1581-1656), a well-known scholar, 
during that period, though Ussher must have known Herbert when he joined the Irish 
peerage and was created Lord Herbert of Castle Island in 1624.27 Their common 
friends included John Selden, Sir Robert Cotton, and Gerardus Vossius.28  The 
statement of Lewis also showed that Herbert was interested in the works of William 
Camden, an antiquarian and historian. Herbert in fact also collected Camden’s treatise 
                                                     
22 Smith, The Stuart Parliaments, 1603-1689, 116. 
23 For a more detailed discussion on the content of the manuscript, see section 1.2. 
24 Woolf, The Idea of History in Early Stuart England: Erudition, Ideology, and ‘The Light of Truth’ 
from the Accession of James I to the Civil War, 137. 
25 See the letter from John Selden to Sir Henry Herbert, dated on Nov. 1, 1648. Rebecca Warner, 
Epistolary Curiosities: Series the First: Consisting of Unpublished Letters of the Seventeenth Century, 
Illustrative of the Herbert Family, and of the Reigns of James I., Charles I., Charles II., James II., and 
William III. (Bath: Printed by R. Cruttwell, 1818), 39–40. 
26 Herbert, The Antient Religion of the Gentiles, ix.  
27 See the letter from Sir Henry Bourgchier to James Ussher, 5 January 1624 in Charles Richard 
Elrington, ed., The Whole Works of the Most Rev. James Ussher, D.D., Lord Archbishop of Armagh, 
and Primate of All Ireland, vol. 16 (Dublin: Hodges, Smith, and Co., 1864), 417–18. 
28 Herbert’s friendship with Ussher lasted to the end of Herbert’s life. Ussher was recorded as the 
person who refused to do the sacrament for Herbert before his deathbed. John Aubrey, Aubrey’s Brief 
Lives, ed. Oliver Lawson Dick (London: Secker and Warburg, 1950), 135. 
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on the antiquity of Parliament (a part of E5/3/30), indicating that they had this 
common interest. In addition to Lewis’s statement, Herbert collected various 
parliamentary materials when he was a Member of the Lords in the Short 
Parliament.29 
 It might be objected that Herbert, on the other hand, had friends such as John 
Donne, who faithfully supported the King’s policies,30 and that Herbert’s patron the 
Duke of Buckingham was a great enemy of the Commons. However, these facts do 
not contradict the argument that Herbert had a strong interest in Parliament, and that 
Herbert maintained a friendship with Selden, who denounced the King’s abuse of his 
prerogatives. Moreover, no evidence showed that Herbert shared with Donne and 
Buckingham any opinion regarding the relationship between the King and Parliament. 
As the third section of Chapter 3 above has shown, Herbert did not accept the theory 
of the divine right of kings, while Donne obediently preached it after King James 
gave him positions in the Church. Herbert carefully answered the King’s requests as 
he had done in the case of ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the Church’,31 while Donne 
often gave way to the King’s demands.32 Similarly, Herbert had no intellectual 
connection with Buckingham, though they maintained the patron-client relationship 
till Buckingham was assassinated in 1628.33  
                                                     
29 These materials included ‘Resolutions in Parliament against Ship Money 1640, December 7’ 
(E5/3/17), ‘The King’s Speech to Both Houses of Parliament 1641, January 23’ (E5/3/22), and four 
other resolutions and proceedings of the Short Parliament. 
30 By 1606 Herbert might have been acquainted with Donne in the social circles in London, when 
Donne frequently visited his mother Magdalen Herbert. R. C Bald, John Donne, a Life (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1970), 184. Donne was the preacher in the funeral of Lady Herbert. They had 
also exchanged verses before entering the court. For the poem written for Herbert (‘To Sr Edward 
Herbert at Iulyers’), see Herbert John Clifford Grierson, ed., The Poems of John Donne, vol. 1 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1912), 193–95. 
31 Herbert stressed the powers kings should not assume, as chapter 3 has shown. 
32 In 1622 Donne was enlisted by King James to defend Directions Concerning Preachers, which 
imposed restrictions on speeches of ministers and Church lecturers, and he obediently defended it in his 
sermon. Annabel Patterson, ‘Misinterpretable Donne: The Testimony of the Letters’, John Donne 
Journal, no. 1 (1982): 39–53; Jeanne Shami, ‘Kings and Desperate Men: John Donne Preaches at 
Court’, John Donne Journal: Studies in the Age of Donne 6, no. 1 (1987): 9–23. 
33 AB, 98n.  
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 This section has argued that Herbert maintained intellectual connections with 
Cotton and Selden, and that he had an interest in collecting manuscripts related to 
Parliament. In The Life and Raigne he also provided lengthy narrations on parliaments’ 







4.2 The concord of King and Parliament in The Life and Raigne of King 
Henry the Eighth 
 
Herbert started writing The Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth in 1632 when 
Charles’s Personal Rule entered its fourth year.34 Charles I, the patron of the work, 
distrusted his Parliaments, and he often resorted to violent measures to silence 
disobedient subjects. In the 1628 Parliament Charles clashed fiercely with the 
Commons when it strongly opposed his religious policies, his imprisonment of 
subjects without showing cause, his levying of tonnage and poundage, and the Forced 
Loan.35 Faced with this opposition, Charles used his royal prerogatives to dissolve 
Parliament and to imprison nine ringleaders of the Commons.36 After the clash, 
Charles’s distrust of Parliament deepened, and he was determined not to summon 
another Parliament for as long as he could.37 Charles’s relationship with Parliament 
formed a sharp contrast with Henry’s in the history of King Henry VIII Herbert was to 
write – Henry successfully controlled Parliament, and from 1529 till Henry’s death 
Parliament sat almost every year.38 In the following paragraphs this section will show 
that Herbert used The Life and Raigne to express his disagreement with Charles’s 
                                                     
34 For Charles’s intention to commission Herbert to write the history of King Henry VIII, see the last 
two paragraphs of section 3.1. In the 1630s Herbert completed three versions of The Life and Raigne. 
They are now Jesus College MS 71-74, Ashmole 1143, and Bodleian Library MS 910.  
35 The ending scene of this Parliament was particularly dramatic. Holding down the Speaker Sir John 
Finch in his chair, Denzil Holles prevented him from announcing an adjournment by the King’s 
command. Smith, The Stuart Parliaments, 1603-1689, 118; Cust, Charles I: A Political Life, 118. Sir 
John Eliot, then, read the Protestation of the Commons, stating that anyone introducing ‘Popery or 
Arminianism,’ levying tonnage and poundage or paying them should ‘be reputed a capital enemy to the 
kingdom and commonwealth’. Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 
1625-1660, 82.  
36 Charles intended ‘to prevent the finishing of that Remonstrance, and other dangerous intentions of 
some ill-affected persons’. See ‘The King’s Declaration Showing the Causes of the Late Dissolution,’ 
in Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660, 86. 
37 After the 1628 Parliament Charles agreed with the hardliners in the Privy Council, including the Earl 
of Dorset and Bishop William Laud, that summoning a Parliament could not provide the money he 
needed, but only gave a political battlefield to the opposition. Richard Cust, Charles I, the Privy 
Council and the Parliament of 1628 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1992), 26. 
38 Parliament continued to sit annually till 1559. See Jennifer Loach, Parliament under the Tudors 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 4. 
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treatment of Parliament and its Members, and to draw attention to the high authority 
of Parliament. 
 Herbert devoted much more space to the role of Parliament than contemporary 
historians of King Henry VIII, revealing his strong interest in Parliament. As we saw 
in Chapter 3 above, Herbert devoted lengthy paragraphs of The Life and Raigne to 
showing how Parliament helped King Henry establish the Anglican Church and dispel 
the papal supremacy.39 By contrast, Parliament’s role in the Reformation was largely 
omitted by Nicholas Sander, William Thomas, and Edward Hall. Sander in his Rise 
and Growth of the Anglican Schism strove hard to blame Henry for subverting the 
Pope’s authority, and ignored the role of Henry’s parliaments. William Thomas, who 
concentrated on demonstrating the clemency and ability of Henry, mentioned 
Parliament only three times in his The Pilgrim: A Dialogue on The Life and Actions of 
King Henry the Eighth. Even Edward Hall, who was elected more than three times as 
a member of the Commons during Henry’s reign, only occasionally discussed the 
actions of Parliament in his chronicle,40 focusing instead on defending the King’s 
deeds. 
In The Life and Raigne, Parliament received much respect and attention from 
King Henry. Herbert stated that Henry, who enjoyed Parliament’s full support, laid 
great emphasis on his relationship with it since ‘he accounted it as his most loyall 
Spouse: and not without reason, since there was nothing I [Herbert] know desired by 
him, which they performed not’.41 This statement could be taken to mean that 
Parliament has a responsibility to give its full support for the policies of the Crown, 
and that Herbert intended to reproach Charles’s parliaments for putting insufficient 
                                                     
39  For examples of Herbert’s discussions of the main issues of the Reformation Parliament 
(1529-1536), see L&R, 292-297, 319-321, 329-331, 344-346, 362-367, 380-382, 389-391, 375b-376b. 
40 Peter C. Herman, ‘Hall, Edward (1497–1547)’, The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
accessed 13 June 2016, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/11954. 
41 L&R, 503.  
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enough effort into satisfying the King. As we will see, however, it is much more likely, 
that Herbert’s intention was to call on the Crown to respect Parliament and accept its 
advice, rather than to demand that Parliament accept the King’s every policy and 
demand. In addition, Herbert argued that Henry summoned his Parliament because he 
was seeking its suggestions, its implementimation of his policies, or a grant of 
subsidy.42 This argument suggests that the key to King Henry’s success was his close 
cooperation with Parliament. 
According to Herbert, Henry responded to parliamentary opposition with 
persuasion rather than violence. This response showed that Henry respected Members 
of Parliament’s different opinions, and it also formed a sharp contrast with the 
conduct of King Charles I, who imprisoned disobedient members and dissolved 
Parliament arbitrarily. In 1523 when Henry asked Parliament to grant a taxation of 
four shillings in a pound – the highest rate ever – some in the House of Commons 
worried that the commerce and ‘the shipping of the Kingdom must decay’. 43 
However, after Thomas More, the speaker of the Commons at that time, asked 
everyone to ‘lay aside those poore scruples, and doe what may be worthy the dignity 
and honour of our Nation’,44 the Commons finally granted a taxation of two shillings 
in the pound.45 Similarly, in 1532 a Member of Parliament ‘motion’d that they all 
should petition the King, to take his Queen Kathrine [Catherine] againe’;46 however, 
his opposition subsided after the King sent Thomas Audley, who succeeded More as 
the speaker of the Commons, to persuade him and by exhibiting the studies of several 
                                                     
42 Similar conclusions have been reached by scholars. See for example Loach, Parliament under the 
Tudors, 5. 
43 L&R, 144. Similar presentation could be seen in Hall’s chronicle, see Edward Hall, Hall’s Chronicle: 
Containing the History of England, during the Reign of Henry the Fourth, and the Succeeding 
Monarchs, to the End of the Reign of Henry the Eighth, ed. Henry Ellis (London: Published for J. 
Johnson, 1809), 656–57. 
44 L&R, 145.  
45 In this session, the Commons gave Henry the largest grant of his reign so far. See Loach, Parliament 
under the Tudors, 59. 
46 L&R, 335. Similar presentation please see Hall, Hall’s Chronicle, 788. 
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European universities and ‘a Hundred books of several Doctors confirming the same 
opinion [that the marriage was unlawful]’.47 In brief, according to Herbert, Henry put 
much effort into persuading those Members of Parliament who expressed their 
reservations or even disagreement with the King’s requests.48 
In Herbert’s view, Parliament did not lose its power and authority even though 
Henry controlled Parliament successfully. 49  Herbert thought that Parliament’s 
resolution could not easily be overthrown. This was especially the case in the 1523 
Parliament when it finally resolved to grant a taxation of two shillings in the pound to 
the King. Cardinal Wolsey was dissatisfied with the result and rushed to the 
Commons to say that ‘he desire’d to reason with those who oppos’d his demands 
[four shillings in a pound]’. However, the Commons answered that ‘it was the order 
of that House to heare, and not to reason, but among themselves’.50 Although he was 
the most powerful person under Henry, Wolsey was not able to change the decision of 
the Commons. 
 Herbert also thought that laws enacted by Parliament held high authority. In his 
view, once a law was enacted, it could not be changed or repealed without 
Parliament’s permission even if it were a bad law; the only solution was to resort to 
                                                     
47 L&R, 324-25.  
48 L&R, 325. Edward Hall had a very similar presentation about the above-mentioned two instances. 
Hall showed that Henry was able to court members of Parliament who disagreed with his plans. 
However, their presentations still had some differences. Hall, unlike Herbert, did not refrain from 
showing his defence of Henry and his dislike of the priestly class. As a member of the Reformation 
Parliament, Hall wrote that after the King’s divorce was settled by Parliament ‘all wyse men in the 
Realme moche abhorred that marriage’. Hall, Hall’s Chronicle, 780. Furthermore, he described his 
colleagues who favoured the laws – the mortuary bill, a bill concerning probate, and a bill restraining 
pluralism and non-residence – as ‘the learned men’, a description Herbert did not adopt. Ibid., 766. 
Loach wrote that Hall was more hostile to the clergymen than his colleagues were, something that 
might distort his records. See Loach, Parliament under the Tudors, 64. 
49 Herbert thought that Henry’s policies were naturally welcomed by his people and Parliament until 
1536; by that year when the seventh session of the Reformation Parliament opened, Henry still enjoyed 
‘the Love and Obedience of his subjects’. L&R, 404a. Henry continued receiving Parliament’s support 
in his later years, since Henry’s authority and prestige remained in the minds of subjects. L&R, 
399b-400b, 571.  
50 L&R, 146. CF: ‘Wherefore the Cardinall came again to the common house, and desired to be 
reasoned withall, to whom it was answered, that the fasshion of the nether house was, to heare and not 
to reason, but emong themselfes’. Hall, Hall’s Chronicle, 656. 
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the enactment of the subsequent parliaments. When Herbert commented on those who 
suffered from the Act of Suppression of Religious Houses under 200 pounds yearly, 
he said that it was ‘lamented by many, and no waies so excused that I know’ since it 
was an established law.51 Similarly, when it came to the Six Articles, ‘the Bloody 
Statute’, Herbert suggested that the people’s best solution was to endure it and to hope 
that it was not strictly enforced –52 in addition to criticising the law itself, Herbert 
only explained Henry’s reason for enacting the law and stressed his clemency towards 
Thomas Cranmer’s open objection to it.53 
 The point in the last paragraph in fact reflected Herbert’s own view on the 
authority of the laws of Parliament, since it was not an established view in Henry’s 
reign. Before Henry VIII ascended the throne, Henry VII used his prerogative power 
twice to amend bills passed by Parliament in 1497 and in 1504.54 The King’s 
prerogative discretion was passed over in silence by Herbert. Moreover, modern 
scholar Jeffrey Goldsworthy has found that the authority of law became firmer after 
Queen Mary repealed the anti-Catholic laws through the authority of Parliament – at 
the same time that the Queen rejected Cardinal Pole’s idea that repealing the laws was 
unnecessary since they were in themselves invalid.55 After Elizabeth succeeded, she 
followed the same procedure to repeal Mary’s laws favouring the Catholics, which 
reinforced both the authority of Parliament and its laws.  
 In The Life and Raigne, Herbert seemed to avoid using the phrase ‘the high court 
of Parliament’, a phrase which could be commonly seen in his sources.56 Edward 
                                                     
51 L&R, 375b.  
52 L&R, 446-49.  
53 ‘Onely I finde the King sent to him [Cranmer] for a Copy of them [the Six Articles], and misliked 
not his freedom, as knowing all he spake was out of a sincere intention’. L&R, 448.  
54 Loach, Parliament under the Tudors, 3. 
55 Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament History and Philosophy, 54–55; D. M Loades, Tudor 
Government: Structures of Authority in the Sixteenth Century (Oxford, UK; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1997), 45–46. 
56 Herbert used the phrase ‘the high court of Parliament’ only once when transcribing the whole speech 
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Hall in his chronicle used ‘the high court of Parliament’ frequently,57 which Herbert 
must have been very familiar with, since Hall’s chronicle was the basis of his work. 
Moreover, when introducing the enactment of the Act in Conditional Restraint of 
Annates in 1532, Herbert transcribed some sentences from original records,58 but he 
did not transcribe the phrase ‘the high court of Parliament’.59 Herbert continued 
omitting the phrase in the later enactment on the succession.60 However, Herbert’s 
avoidance of the phrase does not indicate that he had any less regard for Parliament’s 
authority. Herbert’s lengthy discussion on Parliament could not be denied, and, as I 
will show in the next section, Herbert owned various manuscripts on the authority of 
Parliament, including one entitled ‘Discourse on the high court of Parliament and the 
authority of the same’. Herbert avoided using the phrase ‘the high court of Parliament’ 
most likely because he was aware of Charles I’s dislike of Parliament’s restraint of his 
power – the concept of Parliament as a high court implied that Parliament could 
examine any issue within the kingdom, including a command from the King, and 
contradicted the idea that ‘the King can do no wrong’; based on this concept, in 1642 
the Long Parliament also claimed it had the final say on the public good.61 
 In The Life and Raigne, Members of Parliament’s opinions held high authority. 
Several times Herbert inserted his personal opinions into the fictional speeches 
addressed by Members of Parliament. Herbert first put a fictional speech into the 1529 
Parliament after John Fisher openly attacked the Commons’ enactments against the 
abuses of the clergy. Through the mouth of an MP, Herbert presented his five religious 
                                                                                                                                                        
of Henry in the 1545 Parliament, but by that transcription he did not mean to stress the meaning of the 
phrase. See L&R, 534.  
57 Hall, Hall’s Chronicle, 527, 535, 555, 580, 583, 764, 816, 818.  
58 L&R, 331. For the original text, see J. R. Tanner, Tudor Constitutional Documents, A.D. 1485-1603 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), 25–27. For the full text, please see The Statutes of the 
Realm, vol. III (Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1817), 385–88. 
59 The Statutes of the Realm, III:387. 
60 For textual comparison, see L&R, 396-99;The Statutes of the Realm, III:655–60. 
61 Müßig, ‘Constitutional Conflicts in Seventeenth-Century England’, 41–46. 
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common notions: that ‘there [is] no Nation, that in some kind or other doth not 
worship God’, that the supreme Deity must be worshipped, that ‘Good life, Charity, 
Faith in, and love of God, [are] such necessary and essentiall parts of Religion’, that 
‘a true Repentance towards God’ is needed to expiate one’s vice, and that there were 
‘Rewards and Punishment’ after this life.62 Herbert invented two additional speeches 
supposed to have been made in 1533 when Parliament debated the divorce issue of the 
King and his first wife, and the royal supremacy. The former supported the supremacy 
of the Pope over the English crown, while the latter justified the royal supremacy via 
Herbert’s philosophical theory developed in De Veritate.63 The last time Herbert 
adopted fictional speeches to present his opinion was when Parliament advised the 
King to dissolve monasteries, which later became the first wave of the dissolution 
Herbert supported. Two speeches supported the dissolution of monasteries.64 The 
authority of Members of Parliament and their licence for free speech were probable 
reasons why Herbert presented his opinions through their mouths. 
In the works of Edward Hall and William Thomas, Parliament was usually used 
as a defence or even as a scapegoat for King Henry’s violent deeds (as defined by Hall 
and Thomas), and Parliament’s role did not receive full attention. Responding to the 
suggestion that Henry broke from Rome to satisfy his personal ‘beastly appetite’,65 
Thomas said that ‘without [Parliament] he determined no great matter’.66 In his 
account, the separation from Rome was performed by the enactment of Parliament, 
not arbitrarily by the King. Similarly, Thomas claimed that violent measures such as 
the dissolution of the monasteries were adopted by Parliament, not by Henry;67 
                                                     
62 L&R, 294-95.  
63 L&R, 362-67. For the content of the debates, please see chapter 2. 
64 L&R, 396a-398a.  
65 William Thomas, The Pilgrim: A Dialogue on The Life and Actions of King Henry the Eighth, ed. 
James Anthony Froude (London: Parker, Son, and Bourn, West Strand, 1861), 10. 
66 Thomas, The Pilgrim, 30.  
67 Thomas, The Pilgrim, 11.  
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moreover, several times the King even graciously ‘pardon[ed] them [the monks of the 
monasteries] their sins’.68 In brief, Thomas attributed the dissolution of monasteries 
to Parliament and showed Henry’s clemency.69 Hall’s chronicle adopted a similar 
strategy. Though he personally disagreed with the enactment of the Six Articles and 
even made a speech against it in the 1536 Parliament,70 Hall ascribed the death of 
‘many an honest and simple persone’ to ‘the rigour of that lawe’.71 Like Thomas, he 
did not denounce Henry’s cruelty but said that ‘if the kynges maiestie had not 
graunted his pardon…, a greate many of them whiche all ready was in prison’ would 
have been executed.72 
 Contrary to Thomas and Hall, Herbert did not use Parliament to excuse Henry’s 
cruel deeds. Herbert agreed with the first movement of the dissolution of the 
monasteries, but he refused to justify the second wave (the Act of Suppression of 
Religious Houses under 200 pounds yearly).73 He admitted that he was unable to 
defend Henry on the second wave of the dissolution, and that he could only console 
himself with the thought that Henry did use the money acquired from the dissolution 
to erect ‘divers new Bishopricks, increase the number of Colledges, and the stipend of 
Readers in the Universities, and did many other pious works’.74 Herbert, facing the 
bloody statute of the Six Articles, openly attacked the enactment and said that it was 
‘prejudiciall to that liberty [of conscience]’.75 Lamenting the people who suffered 
from it, Herbert did not take Parliament as Henry’s excuse but only tried to explain 
                                                     
68 Thomas, The Pilgrim, 45.  
69 I suppose letting Parliament shoulder the responsibility of the King’s violent deeds, from a particular 
standpoint, echoed the doctrine of evil counsellors. Both Thomas and Hall pointed to the prevalent idea 
that the King was the fountain of honour.  
70 Herman, ‘Hall, Edward (1497–1547)’. 
71 Hall, Hall’s Chronicle, 828. 
72 Ibid.  
73 See section 3.4. 
74 Herbert mentioned Henry’s reparation many times, see L&R, 376b, 444, 573. ‘All which being by 
some openly call’d Rapine and Sacriledge, I will no way excuse.’ L&R, 444.  
75 L&R, 447.  
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why Henry approved the law.76 
 Parliament therefore held high authority in Herbert’s thought. He believed that 
Henry respected Parliament and its Members’ opinions and that Parliament’s laws 
were authoritative. Moreover, he did not justify Henry’s cruel deeds with Parliament’s 
enactments, and he inserted his five religious common notions in the fictional speech 
of Members of Parliament. Herbert held that the relationship between King and 
Parliament was at its best when both cooperated with each other, in the sense that the 
Crown sought and accepted the advice of Parliament. His account of Henry’s 
relationship with his parliaments formed an implicit suggestion to Charles I, who 
imprisoned disobedient members of Parliament without cause and dissolved 
Parliament arbitrarily.  
 
  
                                                     
76 The explanation was that ‘the King was both in that danger of Rebellion at time, and invasion from 
abroad’ See L&R, 448.  
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4.3 Herbert’s collections and the authority of Parliament 
 
Herbert’s collections now deposited in the National Library of Wales reflect his strong 
interest in Parliament and its authority. Among 49 items concerning King, Parliament 
and affairs of state (catalogue reference code E/5/3), 23 manuscripts are related to 
Parliament. These manuscripts consist of many contemporary parliamentary speeches, 
records, resolutions, and works.77  
From this library’s collection, I will use five manuscripts which best show that 
intellectually Herbert was in favour of Parliament’s sovereignty over the King, and 
this will echo the arguments of the previous sections. These manuscripts are ‘Of the 
Antiquity of Parliament’ (E5/3/30), ‘Arguments in Parliament Concerning the Liberty 
of the Subject’ (E5/3/34), ‘Discourse on the High Court of Parliament and the 
Authority of the Same’ (E5/3/42), ‘Treatise on the Powers of King and Parliament’ 
(E5/3/46), and ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative and the Right of Parliament to 
Resist Royal Power’ (E5/3/49). Most of these manuscripts have hitherto remained 
unidentified and have rarely been noticed by modern scholars.78 ‘Of the Antiquity of 
Parliament’, completed between 1604 and 1605,79 consists of five short treatises 
written by Sir John Dodderidge, Francis Tate, William Camden, and Joseph Holland, 
and Sir Robert Cotton respectively. ‘Arguments in Parliament Concerning the Liberty 
of the Subject’ comes from the Parliamentary debate during April 7–May 16 1628 
                                                     
77 E5/3/1, 5, 6, 13, 17-18, 22-23, 26-28, 30-31, 34-37, 41-42, 44-46, and 49. 
78 Only Mario M. Rossi published his transcription of E5/3/49 with his notes. Rossi, La vita, le opere, i 
tempi di Edoardo Herbert di Chirbury, vols III, 492–504. It is worth noting that I will not include 
Elsyng’s Judicature of Parliament and Modus Tenendi Parliamentorum in the argument of this section, 
since both works carried no political implication. In other words, Elsyng wrote both works for his own 
pleasure and use, and he, unlike Sir Robert Cotton, Sir Edward Coke and others in the House of 
Commons, refused to turn his historical writings into a political account. Foster, The Painful Labour of 
Mr. Elsyng, 36, 45–46. Hence, Elsyng’s works could not be used to support the main argument of this 
section, but could only show that Herbert shared with him a strong interest in Parliament. 
79 Although the actual date of the Society’s session on the tracts of the antiquity of Parliament is 
unknown, Croft has suggested 1604-1605 as the most likely period. Croft, ‘Sir John Doddridge, King 
James I, and the Antiquity of Parliament’, 105. 
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when the Commons resolved that the liberty of the subject should be protected. 
‘Discourse on the High Court of Parliament and the Authority of the Same’ was 
extracted by an anonymous author mainly from Sir Edward Coke’s Reports 
(1572-1617).80 ‘Treatise on the Powers of King and Parliament’ is the first part of The 
Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes (1643) by William Prynne. 
‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative’ was extracted from The Glorious Name of God, 
the Lord of Hosts (1643) by Jeremiah Burroughs. For a more detailed discussion of 
the origins and contents of each manuscript, please refer back to section 2 of Chapter 
1 above. 
 These five manuscripts, according to their themes and the dates of their 
composition, can be further divided into three related parts. The first part, consisting 
of ‘Of the Antiquity of Parliament’ and a portion of ‘Discourse on the High Court of 
Parliament and the Authority of the Same’, focuses on the antiquity of Parliament. 
The second part is composed mainly of ‘Arguments in Parliament Concerning the 
Liberty of the Subject’, a topic that was debated in 1628 when Parliament was 
preparing the Petition of Right. Surrounding a very important constitutional issue – 
who, the King or Parliament, held the highest sovereignty of the kingdom –, the third 
part is made up of ‘Treatise on the Powers of King and Parliament’, and ‘Treatise on 
the Royal Prerogative’. Both works belonged to the classical works representing the 
stance of the Long Parliament during the English Civil War. These three parts, as the 
following paragraphs will show, all point to the idea that Parliament, not the King, 
held the highest sovereignty, and together they strongly suggest that Herbert agreed 
with it. 
 
                                                     
80 Edward Coke, The Selected Writings and Speeches of Sir Edward Coke, ed. Steve Sheppard, 3 vols. 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2003). 
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4.3.1 The antiquity of Parliament 
 
The treatises which make up ‘Of the Antiquity of Parliament’ contain three main 
arguments. The first concerns the composition of Parliament, which is composed of 
the nobles, the clergy, and the commons (citizens and burgesses), with the King as the 
head of Parliament. The King is thus a part of Parliament, not outside of it,81 and 
Members of Parliament who enact and amend laws are the advisors of the King. The 
second point concerns the ancient nature of Parliament. The authors all agreed that the 
history of Parliament could be traced back at least to the Saxons. As Francis Tate said, 
for instance, ‘the assembly of three estates to consult for the affaires of the 
Comonwealth is as anntient as the Brittains, and contynued here in the tyme of the 
Saxons, Danes, and Normans’, and as William Camden maintained, ‘there were such 
like assemblies as Parliaments now are, before the Romanes arrival here’.82 The third 
contention is about the King’s role in Parliament. Although the King is the highest 
member, he is neither personally nor actively involved in enacting laws. The King’s 
duty, according to Francis Jate, is to ‘bee advised whether hee will assent or not’. 
Dodderidge added that ‘the King never requires aide but for war; or to make his sonne 
a knight or to marry his daughter’. He also mentioned that the King has the 
responsibility to be present in the Parliament if he is not sick.83 
 At first glance, the treatises in ‘Of the Antiquity of Parliament’ are purely 
historical in nature, and indicate only that Herbert had an interest in Parliament’s 
history. However, these treatises in ‘Of the antiquity of Parliament’, written between 
                                                     
81 Francis Jate stated that ‘the persons which meete at the Parliament are 3 states of the Realme, ffirst 
the King, Second by the Nobles Sp[irit]uall and Temp[or]all; Thirdly the Com[m]ons of the Lands. See 
‘Of the Antiquity of Parliament’, fol. 5r. 
82 ‘Of the Antiquity of Parliament’, fols 8, 10. Also see Doddridge, The Several Opinions of Sundry 
Learned Antiquaries, 65–66, 74; Thomas Hearne, A Collection of Curious Discourses, 301, 303. The 
spelling I used followed Herbert’s collection.  
83 ‘Of the Antiquity of Parliament’, fols 3r-3v. 
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1604 and 1605, were located in a historical context wherein the King and some 
members of Parliament quarrelled over the nature of Parliament. At that time, James 
repeatedly asserted that the Crown antedated Parliament, and maintained that the King 
was the creator of all laws.84 Moreover, in a speech in Parliament dated 9 November 
1605, James argued that since Parliament’s privileges came from the grace of kings, 
they were revocable. Stating that ‘as to the nature of this high Court of Parliament, it 
is nothing else but the Kings great Councell’,85 James told members of Parliament 
that ‘you must remember, That you are here assembled by your lawfull King to giue 
him your best aduises, in the matters proposed by him vnto you’.86 In response, a 
committee of the Commons in the 1604 Parliament, led by Sir Thomas Ridgeway, 
drew up The Form of Apology and Satisfaction, protesting against some policies of 
King James, including his viewpoint on the nature of Parliament. This document 
stated that the King had some ‘misinformations’ concerning ‘the rights and liberties of 
your subjects of England and the privileges of this House’.87 It also argued that the 
privileges of Parliament were not gifts from the monarchy, but owed to members as 
birthrights and ‘due inheritance, no less than our very lands and goods’, which 
‘cannot be withheld from us, denied or impaired’.88 
 Once this historical context is taken into account, it becomes clear that the 
treatises in ‘Of the Antiquity of Parliament’ in fact aimed to uphold the authority of 
Parliament, at least to a position no lower than that of the King. Even if Herbert had 
                                                     
84 Before he ascended the throne, James in The True Law of Free Monarchies (published in 1598) had 
claimed that kings existed ‘before any Parliaments were holden, or lawes made,’ and that ‘the kings 
were the authors and makers of the Lawes, and not the Lawes of the kings’. Charles Howard McIlwain, 
ed., The Political Works of James I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918), 62. Also see another 
reprinted version: J. P. Sommerville, ed., King James VI and I: Political Writings (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 73. Although the work was written mainly in the Scottish context, 
James stated that this was the same case in England. McIlwain, The Political Works of James I, 62–63. 
85 Sommerville, King James VI and I: Political Writings, 155. 
86 Ibid., 156.  
87 J. R. Tanner, ed., Constitutional Documents of the Reign of James I, A.D. 1603-1625 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960), 220. 
88 Ibid., 221.  
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been interested only in the history of Parliament, he must have been aware of this 
political implication. The authors of the excerpted treatises were all members of the 
Society of Antiquaries founded in the reign of Elizabeth,89  and three of them 
(Dodderidge, Cotton, and Tate) were members of the Commons in the 1610s. This 
meant that they likely shared with other members of the Commons concerns about 
James’s ‘misinformations’. Although Dodderidge, Cotton, and Tate did not join the 
committee to draw up The Form of Apology and Satisfaction, they tried to provide 
theories of the history of Parliament to counter James’ assertion that the crown 
antedated Parliament. They traced the history of Parliament either to the Saxon age or 
to the time before the Roman occupation. Soon after human beings experienced the 
state of nature, Dodderidge maintained, ‘the calling of yearly councils, the original no 
doubt of our later parliaments’ came into being because of ‘new springing mischiefs 
standing remediless by the elder customs’;90 then, from the Roman occupation to the 
time of William the Conqueror ‘Parliament’ came into existence through a succession 
of different forms.91 Francis Tate held that ‘the assembly of three estates to consult 
for the affairs of the comonwealth is as ancient as the Britains, and continued here in 
the time of the Saxons, Danes, and Normans’.92 Both Dodderidge’s and Tate’s 
treatises argue that Parliament was not an invention of the King, but that it preceded 
monarchy. It is worth noting that King James paid attention to the Society of 
                                                     
89 The actual date of the establishment of the Society of Antiquaries seems uncertain. It was believed 
that the Society was founded in 1572. See Tobias Smollett, ed., The Critical Review; or, Annals of 
Literature, vol. 31 (London: Printed For A. Hamilton, 1771), 31; Linda Van Norden, ‘Sir Henry 
Spelman on the Chronology of the Elizabethan College of Antiquaries’, Huntington Library Quarterly 
13, no. 2 (1950): 136–37. The Society experienced a lively period during 1598-1602, but faded away 
after 1607. Croft, ‘Sir John Doddridge, King James I, and the Antiquity of Parliament’, 99, 105. 
90 John Doddridge, The Several Opinions of Sundry Learned Antiquaries, 5; Thomas Hearne, A 
Collection of Curious Discourses, 282. 
91 John Doddridge, The Several Opinions of Sundry Learned Antiquaries, 6–18; Thomas Hearne, A 
Collection of Curious Discourses, 282–287. 
92 John Doddridge, The Several Opinions of Sundry Learned Antiquaries, 65–66, 74; Thomas Hearne, 
A Collection of Curious Discourses, 301, 303. CF: William Camden said that ‘there were such like 
assemblies as parliaments now are, before the Romans arrival here’.  
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Antiquaries and its related works against his viewpoints. In 1614 when Sir Henry 
Spelman (1562-1641) tried to revive the Society, he reported that the King showed ‘a 
little mislike,’93 and in the end he did not successfully revive it.94 This report 
confirms that treatises on the antiquity of Parliament were not just historical articles, 
but documents that carried political implications. 
 In addition to the argument that Parliament preceded monarchy, ‘Of the 
Antiquity of Parliament’ expressed a radical viewpoint that may also have influenced 
Herbert: the claim that the Commons were indispensable when summoning a 
Parliament. As Dodderidge put it, ‘if the Comons doe not appeare, there can be noe 
Parliament though all the great peeres of the Parliament were present with the King; 
For the proctors, knighte, Cittizens and Burgesses of the Realme doe represent the 
whole’.95  This point was so radical that it could be said to have implied the 
supremacy of the Commons over the Lords, which was later put into practice on 4 
January 1649 when the Commons declared its absolute sovereignty and abolished the 
Lords. 
 The presence of these materials in Herbert’s collections shows that he had, at the 
very least, a keen interest in arguments about the antiquity and authority of Parliament. 
Further support for this view comes from the two later collections ‘Discourse on the 
High Court of Parliament and the Authority of the Same’ (E5/3/42) and ‘Treatise on 
the Powers of King and Parliament’ (E5/3/46). Not only do these manuscripts contain 
similar arguments to ‘Of the Antiquity of Parliament’, but they also set out the 
authority of Parliament more clearly by exploiting Parliament’s history. ‘Discourse on 
                                                     
93 See Van Norden, ‘Sir Henry Spelman on the Chronology of the Elizabethan College of Antiquaries’, 
155–56. 
94 Probably facing pressure from the King, Doddridge did not rejoin the Society. Croft, ‘Sir John 
Doddridge, King James I, and the Antiquity of Parliament’, 105.  
95 ‘Of the Antiquity of Parliament’, fol. 3v. Also see John Dodderidge, The Several Opinions of Sundry 
Learned Antiquaries, 38; Thomas Hearne, A Collection of Curious Discourses, 292.  
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the High Court of Parliament’, after asserting that Parliament held the highest 
sovereignty in the kingdom and that the King had no arbitrary power, argued that 
Parliament originated in the Saxon time, and that the form and jurisdiction of 
Parliament remained unchanged after William the Conqueror became King of 
England.96 Moreover, the discourse maintained that ‘in the antient Brittaines & 
Saxons dayes, King of this Realme, the ArchB[isho]pps and B[isho]pps were called to 
the P[ar]liament and assemblies of states’.97 The passive voice of this sentence 
implied that the King was only a part of Parliament and that it was not the King who 
called or created it – contradicting a very important claim of those who held that the 
King preceded Parliament. 
 ‘Treatise on the Powers of King and Parliament’ (E5/3/46), the first part of The 
Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes (1643) by William Prynne, 
exploited Parliament’s antiquity to defend its sovereignty. Prynne, who widely cited 
evidences in English history, shared two arguments with ‘Of the Antiquity of 
Parliament’ concerning the composition of Parliament. The first shared point is that 
the King is obliged to attend Parliament; and if he cannot, Parliament should send 
twelve people to visit the King who would then grant his power to the Archbishop and 
Steward of England to start Parliament.98 The second point is a radical one: the 
Commons represents the kingdom, and without the Commons there could be no 
Parliament, although the King could hold the Parliament without the Lords.99 As 
Prynne said, ‘no Parliament can be kept by the King and Peeres, if all the Commons 
should absent from themselves’.100 Prynne’s interpretation of this point was more 
                                                     
96 ‘Discourse on the High Court of Parliament and the Authority of the Same’, fols 1r-1v. 
97 Ibid., fol. 27v.  
98 Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes, 43; ‘Treatise on the Powers of King 
and Parliament’, fol. 6v. ‘Of the Antiquity of Parliament’, fol. 3r; Thomas Hearne, A Collection of 
Curious Discourses, 291–92; Doddridge, The Several Opinions of Sundry Learned Antiquaries, 36–37. 
99 See section 1.2.  
100 Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes, 43–44; ‘Treatise on the Powers of 
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detailed than that of Dodderidge presented thirty years before. He claimed that ‘every 
Baron in Parliament, doth represent but his owne person, and speaketh in the behalfe 
of himselfe alone. But in the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses are represented the 
Commons of the whole Realme’.101 Furthermore, even though the King now [during 
the Civil War] was absent from Parliament, Parliament had already lawfully convened 
and before it formally adjourns the King ‘is still Legally present in Parliament, (called 
the Kings presence) as he is a King; as he is in all other his Courts of Justice, led the 
Kings presence’. Prynne’s interpretation suggested that the earlier opinion of 
Dodderidge intensified during the Civil War. The presence in Herbert’s collection of 
so many works arguing for the antiquity of Parliament strongly suggests that he 
agreed that Parliament antedated the crown, and that he was influenced by the 
political implication of this claim – that Parliament, not the King, held sovereignty 
over the commonwealth. 
 
4.3.2 The liberty of the people 
 
The second group of Herbert’s manuscripts, consisting mainly of ‘Arguments in 
Parliament Concerning the Liberty of the Subject’ (E5/3/34), presents the point that 
the liberty and property of the people should not be encroached upon without the 
consent of Parliament. The birth of this manuscript came from King Charles’s 
imprisonment of subjects without showing cause and levying non-parliamentary 
                                                                                                                                                        
King and Parliament’, fol. 7r. It is tempting to think that Prynne copied Dodderidge’s point, but in fact 
Prynne’s view came from John Vowel [Hooker], Order and Usage How to Keepe a Parliament (1571). 
Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes, 44. John Hooker maintained that the 
three estates should assemble together when enacting new law; however, he made an exception by 
saying that when the Lords ‘absent from’ or ‘obstruct the daily deliberations’, the King together with 
the Commons could hold a Parliament and enact laws. This exception was based on Hooker’s belief 
that in early days there was no upper house. Hooker’s statement was not an orthodox view in 
Elizabethan time. See Vernon F Snow, Parliament in Elizabethan England: John Hooker’s Order and 
Usage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 64–66, 182. 
101 Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes, 43. 
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taxations, including impositions, the Forced Loan, and tonnage and poundage. Charles 
also impounded the goods of those who refused to pay, and a well-known case was 
Darnel’s case, or the case of the Five Knights, 1627-1628.102 In response, in April 
1628 the Commons resolved that the liberty of the subject should be protected, and 
before the House drew up the Petition of Right it sent four people, including Sir 
Dudley Digges, Edward Littleton, John Selden, and Edward Coke, to hold a meeting 
with the Lords in order to persuade them to support their resolution.103 The speeches 
of these four Members of the Commons make up the contents of the manuscript. 
 ‘Arguments in Parliament Concerning the Liberty of the Subject’ claimed that 
the liberty and property of the people should not be taken away arbitrarily. After 
addressing the antiquity of common law, Sir Dudley Digges maintained that ‘it is an 
undoubted and fundamental pointe of this soe antient Comon Lawes of England that 
the Subiect hath a true property in his goods and possessions’.104 Edward Littleton, 
after the introduction of Digges, cited British history, especially the signing of Magna 
Carta, to prove that individual liberty was beyond doubt and then to argue ‘that no 
man ought to be ymprisoned by speciall Comande without Indictment or other due 
process to bee made by the lawe’.105 Selden, a life-long friend of Herbert, shared the 
same view with Digges and Littleton and stressed that the ‘Writ of Habeas Corpus, or 
Corpus cum causa,’106 the mechanism to prevent the abuse of law by king’s council 
and protect individual liberty, should not be denied. 
 ‘Discourse on the High Court of Parliament and the Authority of the Same’ 
(E5/3/42) echoed the main point of ‘Arguments in Parliament Concerning the Liberty 
                                                     
102 Cust, Charles I: A Political Life, 117. 
103 Johnson et al., Commons Debates, 1628, 2:332; Rushworth, Historical Collections Of Private 
Passages of State, 1:525–27; The Parliamentary or Constitutional History of England, 7:407–9.  
104 ‘Arguments in Parliament Concerning the Liberty of the Subject’ (National Library of Wales, n.d.), 
4; A Conference Desired by the Lords and Had by a Committee of Both Houses, 3. 
105 ‘Arguments in Parliament Concerning the Liberty of the Subject’, fol. 9; A Conference Desired by 
the Lords and Had by a Committee of Both Houses, 17. 
106 A Conference Desired by the Lords and Had by a Committee of Both Houses, 32. 
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of the Subject’. Stressing that Parliament was the highest court, it maintained that it 
was Parliament’s duty to protect people from the encroachment of unlawful policies. 
It stated that the purpose of Parliament was to keep subjects from any offence without 
due process of law, and to ensure that people could ‘live safely in quiet’ and ‘receive 
Justice by certain laws and holy judgm[en]ts’ from Parliament. 107  Moreover, 
‘Discourse on the High Court of Parliament’, though saying that the King had his 
prerogatives such as summoning Parliament and Convocation and remitting the 
penalty of a subject by proclamations,108 asserted that the King’s prerogatives were 
not unlimited and that actions such as confiscating and forfeiting the property and 
land of a subject could ‘only [be done] by authority of this high Courte of 
Parliament’.109 Similarly, the King could not alter the laws by his proclamation, and 
‘the penaltie of not obeying his proclamacon may not bee vppon the paine of 
Forfeiture of his goods, his lande or his life without Parliament’s consent’.110  
‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative and the Right of Parliament to Resist Royal 
Power’ (E5/3/49), which as we recalled was extracted from Burroughs’ The Glorious 
Name of God, the Lord of Hosts, also echoed the main point of ‘Arguments in 
Parliament Concerning the Liberty of the Subject’ by saying that the King could not 
act arbitrarily but should protect the people’s well-being. Burroughs stated that ‘the 
Law of God, and Nature teacheth that being now the father of the K[ing]dom, hee is 
not to waste his childrens Inheritance, indeed the peoples right, but to preserve and 
uphold it’,111 since ‘the people are more antient then the King; and for the people 
                                                     
107 ‘Discourse on the High Court of Parliament and the Authority of the Same’, fols 2r-2v. 
108 Ibid., fol. 32r.  
109 Ibid., fol. 30r.  
110 Ibid., fol. 32r.  
111 ‘A Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’, fol. 5v. CF: Rossi’s transcription: ‘The law of God, & 
Nature teacheth that being now the father of the Kdome, hee is not to waste his childrens Inheritance, 
that is the popular right, but to preserve & enforce it’. Rossi, La vita, le opere, i tempi di Edoardo 
Herbert di Chirbury, vol. III, 495. 
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were kings ordained’.112 
 The point in the above three manuscripts corresponded with Herbert’s personal 
long-term concern for the liberty of the subject shown in his religious and historical 
works. A shared intention of De Veritate, De Religione Laici, and A Dialogue Between 
a Tutor and His Pupil was to protect laymen from religious oppression under the 
pretext of the clergy’s authority. In the previous chapter, we saw that, in The Life and 
Raigne of King Henry the Eighth, Herbert expressed his open objection to the Six 
Articles for endangering the individual’s liberty of conscience.113 Now his collection 
E5/3/34 and E5/3/42 aimed to oppose the King’s oppression of personal property and 
liberty. 
 
4.3.3 The sovereignty of the kingdom 
 
The following paragraphs focus on the last discussion group concerning the very core 
of the conflict between the King and Parliament during the Civil War: who, the King 
or Parliament, has the highest sovereignty in the kingdom? I will discuss ‘Treatise on 
the Powers of King and Parliament’ (E5/3/46) first, since it aimed to answer this 
question. Then the discussion will shift to ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative’ 
(E5/3/49). Although the latter manuscript concentrated on a related issue (whether 
subjects or Parliament have the right to resist a tyrant),114 it touched the core question 
as well. Both manuscripts were transcribed by Herbert,115 and, as the following 
paragraphs will show, they strongly suggest that Herbert in principle agreed that 
Parliament, not the King, holds the highest sovereignty. 
                                                     
112 ‘A Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’, fol. 5v. 
113 For more detail, see section 2.3 above. 
114 For Herbert’s view on the issue whether the people or Parliament could resist a tyrant, see Chapter 
5 below. 
115 As argued in the section 1.2 above. 
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 ‘Treatise on the Powers of King and Parliament’ (E5/3/46), which was the first 
part of Prynne’s The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes, argued that 
Parliament without the King’s personal consent, not the King without Parliament’s 
consent, held sovereignty.116 Prynne’s main theme was that Parliament was ‘the 
Highest Soveraigne power of all others, and above the King himselfe’.117 Under this 
theme came six main points: (1) Parliament, ‘as appeares by infinite precedents in this 
[Long Parliament] and all former Parliaments’, has lawful power to examine the 
King’s ‘Patents, Charters, Commissions, Proclamations, Grants, Warrants, Writs, and 
Commitments’. 118  Further, Parliament can determine the scope of the King’s 
prerogative, while the King had no such power.119 (2) Parliament’s power is the 
highest and ‘it is above the Law itselfe’.120 Moreover, it has power ‘upon just grounds 
to alter the very common Law of England’.121 (3) Parliament ‘is the highest Court’ 
where ‘the last appeale is to be made’.122 Thus Parliament is the highest sovereign 
and is entitled to investigate every matter in the kingdom. (4) The King’s power is not 
the highest authority since ‘Salus populi’ is the supreme law and the ‘end for which 
all royall power was instituted by God and Man’. Furthermore, ‘Kings were first 
constituted, and still continued for the protection, welfare, benefit, [and] service of 
their kingdomes’; thus the King’s power is beneath the law, the kingdom, and 
                                                     
116 Smith, The Stuart Parliaments, 1603-1689, 129–31. Regarding the various theory on the King’s and 
Parliament’s power, see Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament History and Philosophy, 78–141. 
117 For the writing structure of the first part of The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes, 
see footnote 93 of Chapter 1 above. 
118 Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes, 34–38. 
119 Ibid., 35.  
120 CF: ‘The chiefe power of enacting and making Lawes is onely in the people, Commons, and Peeres, 
not the King’. ‘Treatise on the Powers of King and Parliament’, fol. 8v; Prynne, The Soveraigne Power 
of Parliaments and Kingdomes, 48. 
121 Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes, 46; ‘Treatise on the Powers of King 
and Parliament’, fol. 7v.  
122 CF: ‘Now this is an infallible Maxime, both in the Common, Civill, and Canon Law, that The 
Courts or person to whom the last appeale is to be made, is the Supreamest power’. Prynne, The 
Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes, 92–93; ‘Treatise on the Powers of King and 
Parliament’, fol. 3v.  
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Parliament which represents it.123 The King is obliged to accept the laws passed by 
Parliament since he has given his pledge by his coronation oath.124 (5) While the 
King, as an individual, is superior to any subject, he is inferior to the associated body 
of the people. The reason is that ‘the whole, or greatest part in all politique or naturall 
Bodies is of greater excellency, power, and jurisdiction, than any one particular 
member’.125 (6) Parliament has ‘supreme power over the Crowne of England’. It can 
dispose of the king’s ‘mis-government’, depose him, ‘transferre it from the right 
heire’, or ‘set up others in the Throne’.126 To sum up, these six points must have left a 
strong impression on Herbert by continuously stressing that in principle Parliament 
was above the King. 
 The way in which ‘Treatise on the Powers of King and Parliament’ was 
transcribed indicates that Herbert also noticed that Prynne’s work vested sovereignty 
in the Long Parliament and not in the King, since it transcribed two justifications of 
the Long Parliament’s resolutions against the King. One was given after Prynne 
presented the principle that the whole was greater than any particular part (the fifth 
point from the above), a very common legal principle that the King is ‘major singulis 
minor universis’.127 Prynne then argued that the fact ‘that most of the Lords are 
                                                     
123 Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes, 45–46; ‘Treatise on the Powers of 
King and Parliament’, fols 7r-7v. 
124 Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes, 56, 75, and 78; ‘Treatise on the 
Powers of King and Parliament’, fol. 2v. Prynne’s published edition skipped page number 57-74 and 
76-77. It is just a small printing error and it does not impair the content. 
125 ‘The King though he be the chiefe and principall, yet he is onely one member of the Parliament and 
Kingdome, the least (because the one person) though the highest branch.’ Prynne, The Soveraigne 
Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes, 41; ‘Treatise on the Powers of King and Parliament’, fol. 5v. 
The same point is repeated in Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes, 104; 
‘Treatise on the Powers of King and Parliament’, fol. 4v. This point was commonly raised during the 
Civil War. 
126 Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes, 50, 78, 86; ‘Treatise on the Powers 
of King and Parliament’, fols 2v-3r. 
127 Henry Parker adopted the same argument in his Observations upon some of his Majesty's late 
answers and expresses. He said that ‘we see that [regal] power is but secondary and derivative in 
Princes, the fountaine and efficient cause is the people, and from hence the inference is just, the King, 
though he be singulis Major, yet he is universis minor’. Henry Parker, Observations upon Some of His 
Majesties Late Answers and Expresses (London: [publisher not identified], 1642), 2. 
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absent as well as the King’ could not make the Long Parliament unlawful since the 
whole Parliament was superior to any member of the house. ‘If these absent Members 
be the greater number,’ he criticized, ‘why doe they not come and over-vote the rest in 
the House in a peaceable, legall, usuall Parliamentary way, rather than challenge them 
into the field in a military, illegal, unusuall bloody manner, unheard of in former 
ages?’.128 And he condemned the King’s absence as a deed ‘against all precedents of 
his Royall predecessors, except King Richard’, and thus ‘hurtfull and dangerous to the 
whole commonalty of the Parliament’.129 The other justification transcribed was 
shown after Prynne claimed that Parliament had arbitrary power to dispose of the 
crown. He then described the present situation as an imminent danger to the Long 
Parliament and the King’s person since the ‘ill Counsellors’ brought ‘the most 
destructive policy’ to the King and ‘oppressed their Subjects’ extremely.130 The Long 
Parliament, therefore, was forced to ‘use the extremity of their Soveraigne power’ 
though they ‘never challenged nor exercised such jurisdiction’. 131  From the 
above-mentioned illustrations, we can see that Herbert was also conscious of the 
connection between Prynne’s principles and his justifications to the Long Parliament’s 
resolutions. 
 However, it seemed that Herbert was interested only in the principle, not in the 
present controversy between King Charles and the Long Parliament, since the space 
of his transcription of Prynne’s justifications of the Long Parliament’s resolutions was 
quite limited and he did not transcribe a paragraph with Prynne’s profession of his 
loyalty to the King. Before the end of the first part of The Soveraigne Power of 
                                                     
128 Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes, 42; ‘Treatise on the Powers of King 
and Parliament’, fol. 6r. 
129 Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes, 42–43; ‘Treatise on the Powers of 
King and Parliament’, fols 6r-6v. 
130 Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes, 86; ‘Treatise on the Powers of King 
and Parliament’, fol. 2v. 
131 ‘Treatise on the Powers of King and Parliament’, fol. 2v. 
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Parliaments and Kingdomes, Prynne said that his arguments were ‘not out of any the 
least intention to derogate from his Majesties just Supremacie and Prerogatives royall, 
which I have oft solemnly sworn to maintain to the utmost of my power…I love and 
honour both King and Parliament alike, and in the controversies now between them 
concerning their jurisdictions, stand as a man indifferent to do right to both, without 
prejudice to either’.132 Herbert skipped this profession perhaps because he considered 
this statement insincere, but most likely because he was only interested in the 
arguments Prynne presented. Whatever the case, the profession seems not to have 
carried much weight for him. 
 ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative and the Right of Parliament to Resist Royal 
Power’ (E5/3/49), which aimed to show that Parliament could resist a tyrant, used the 
argument that Parliament held the highest sovereignty in the kingdom. Burroughs said 
that the highest court in this kingdom was Parliament where the last appeal was to be 
made.133 Even though ‘the King saies that which is done [by the Long Parliament] is 
against Law’, ‘the King’s personall dissent’ was still inferior to the judgement of the 
highest court.134 Moreover, Burroughs maintained that ‘the determination of what is 
Law’ could be done ‘by both the houses, in the absence of, or without the knowledge 
of the King’. In brief, Parliament held the highest sovereignty since it had the last say 
on any issue in the kingdom. 
 It is very interesting that Herbert transcribed a point that the Long Parliament, 
since Parliament held the highest sovereignty, had the power to punish ‘Delinquents’ 
                                                     
132 Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes, 103. As mentioned above, the 
manuscript was transcribed till page 104. Thus page 103 is located in the range of the survived 
manuscript. 
133 Burroughs, The Glorious Name of God, the Lord of Hosts, 30–31; ‘Treatise on the Royal 
Prerogative and the Right of Parliament to Resist Royal Power’, fol. 1v. CF: ‘The Courts or person to 
whom the last appeale is to be made, is the Supreamest power’ in Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of 
Parliaments and Kingdomes, 93; ‘Treatise on the Powers of King and Parliament’, fol. 3v. 
134 Burroughs, The Glorious Name of God, the Lord of Hosts, 29; ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative 
and the Right of Parliament to Resist Royal Power’, fol. 1v.  
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without the consent of Charles I.135 In the eye of the Long Parliament Herbert was 
just such a delinquent due to his absence from the Lords when the Civil War broke out. 
The Long Parliament even confiscated and sold his property in London.136 This 
additional information suggests that Herbert’s support of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
was stronger than expected; it did not waver even after he was denounced by the Long 
Parliament. 
 The manuscripts discussed in this section reveal that intellectually Herbert was in 
favour of Parliament’s sovereignty over the King, and that he believed Parliament 
could save the people from the moral dilemmas caused by the oppression of the 
unlawful commands of the King. The first group of manuscripts showed Herbert’s 
interest in the history and authority of Parliament. The second group of manuscripts 
indicated that Herbert shared the same concern with the Parliamentarians on the 
property and liberty of the subject, which should not be oppressed by the King 
without the consent of Parliament. The third group of manuscripts argued that 
Parliament held sovereignty, a fundamental point of Parliamentary theory. At the same 
time, Herbert’s collections suggest that he was not interested in royalist theories on 
the power of the King, since no such manuscript survives in the National Library of 
Wales. Moreover, as I have argued in Chapter 3, Herbert’s thoughts were not 
compatible with the divine right theory of kings. These pieces of evidence all support 
the same argument that Herbert believed in Parliament’s sovereignty and in 
Parliament as the most important mechanism to protect the well-being of the people. 
The next chapter will discuss the resistance to tyrants, an issue debated by royalists 
and parliamentarians during the early 1640s, and will echo the main argument of this 
section by suggesting that in Herbert’s view Parliament could lead the people to resist 
                                                     
135 Burroughs, The Glorious Name of God, the Lord of Hosts, 32; ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative 
and the Right of Parliament to Resist Royal Power’, fol. 2r. 
136 AB, 150.  
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Chapter 5: Conscience and Resistance in the Early English Civil War: ‘Whether 
Conscience Grants that the People could Resist a Tyrant?’ 
 
Although the Personal Rule of Charles ended in 1640, his relationship with 
Parliament continued to deteriorate. The Short Parliament of which Herbert was a 
member neither satisfied the pecuniary need of the King nor relieved him of the 
grievances of Members of Parliament.1 In September 1640 the Long Parliament 
convened, and although it addressed many parliamentary grievances – rescinding 
non-parliamentary taxes, for example, and dissolving the Star Chamber and the Court 
of High Commission –2 the relationship between King and Parliament remained tense. 
The relationship deteriorated after Charles again tried to arrest six Members of 
Parliament on 4 January 1642 by his royal warrant, an action that was regarded as a 
serious breach of Parliament’s privileges.3 
In the summer of 1642, the Long Parliament sought a justification for taking up 
arms against the King. Royalists held that by no means could subjects resist their 
sovereign, not only because their consciences were bound by their oaths of allegiance 
to the King,4 but because conscience would also urge them to help their sovereign 
suppress the rebellion. In response, Parliament’s supporters argued that when the King 
became a tyrant, subjects were released from their oaths and conscience would allow 
them, or even require them, to resist. Under this circumstance, resistance was not 
                                                     
1 Charles was in need of money since he was launching a war against the Scots, but members of 
Parliament concentrated on their grievances about the unlawful imprisonments of Members of 
Parliament in 1629, the long intermissions of Parliament, and the financial expenditure and religious 
innovations of the Laudian reform programme in the Personal Rule. David L Smith, The Stuart 
Parliaments, 1603-1689 (London; New York; New York: Arnold; Co-published in the U.S.A. by 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 120-22. 
2 Samuel Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1906), 145-155, 179-192. 
3 David L Smith, The Stuart Parliaments, 1603-1689, 125-29. 
4 Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Struggle for Sovereignty: Seventeenth-Century English Political Tracts 




 Herbert, in addition to having an interest in Parliament (see Chapter 4 above), 
was concerned with the English Civil War, especially the question of whether 
Parliament and the people could lawfully take up arms against the King. A record in 
May 1642 shows that Herbert had delivered a statement after Parliament resolved that 
if the King made war upon Parliament, it was a ‘Breach of the Trust reposed in him by 
his People, contrary to his Oath, and tending to the Dissolution of this Government’, 
and that anyone who assisted the King was a traitor to the kingdom.5 Herbert stated 
that he would agree with Parliament’s resolution if the King launched the war 
‘without cause’.6 Although Herbert later withdrew his statement because it irritated 
Parliament – the reason remains unclear, but it is likely Parliament took offence at the 
reservations expressed by Herbert –7 it reveals that he participated publicly in the 
discussion of the issue. Moreover, although he retired to Montgomery Castle after the 
Civil War broke out, he still had a concern for whether Parliament or the people could 
lawfully resist a tyrant, as I will show in this chapter. 
 It is worth noting that although the questions of ‘whether Parliament could 
lawfully resist a tyrant’ and ‘whether the people could lawfully resist a tyrant’ might 
seem to be separate issues, during the English Civil War they were not discussed 
separately and were regarded as very closely related. As we will see, since the 
Royalists insisted that under no circumstance could princes be resisted, they usually 
did not discuss the above two issues separately, but sought to deny both at the same 
time. Neither were these issues separate for the Parliamentarians. They argued that 
                                                     
5 The Parliamentary Or Constitutional History of England, vol. 11 (London: William Sandby, 1762), 2. 
For this record, I am indebted to the anonymous editor of the Life of Herbert, 1826 version. Edward 
Herbert, The Life of Edward Lord Herbert of Cherbury. Written by Himself, 4th ed. (London: Saunders 
and Otley, 1826), 326. 
6 The Parliamentary Or Constitutional History of England, 11:3. 
7 Herbert was ‘commanded to withdraw,’ and the next day he delivered the petition, ‘declaring his 
Sorrow for letting fall certain Words in the Midst of a Period, which had given Offence’. Parliament 
was satisfied by it. The Parliamentary Or Constitutional History of England, 11:3. 
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tyrants could be lawfully resisted by the authority of Parliament, and not by private 
subjects – that is, Parliament should lead the people in resisting the King’s tyranny.8 
In practice, though the Parliamentarians sometimes presented their questions in both 
ways – as Prynne put it, the question was whether ‘Parliament or Subiects (especially 
when authorized by an Ordinance of both Houses)’ could lawfully resist a tyrant –9 
they did not see them as separate issues to be argued, but two presentations of one 
issue with slightly different emphases. When asking whether Parliament could 
lawfully resist a tyrant, their discussions focused more on constitutional issues, 
showing that Parliament had the authority to do so. When asking whether the people 
could lawfully resist, their discussions concentrated more on matters of conscience 
and on appealing to individuals to take up arms and join the Long Parliament. 
 Whether a tyrant could be resisted was particularly a problem of conscience. It 
was a moral dilemma, especially for the supporters of the Long Parliament, since on 
the one hand they had taken the oath of allegiance to King Charles as the supreme 
governor, but on the other hand they viewed Charles’s unlawful policies as tyranny. 
The dilemma was also a conflict between public duty and private conscience, as 
mentioned in Chapter 2 above. The people, as subjects, were required to obey the 
commands of King Charles, but might have scruples when obeying his unlawful 
commands. Some English casuists – notably Robert Sanderson, Jeremy Taylor, and 
Richard Baxter – discussed this topic explicitly and provided their guidance and 
answers according to their theories of conscience. Their discussions indicate that the 
issue was an important casuistical question at that time. 
 Some of Herbert’s private collections deposited in the National Library of Wales 
focus on the issue: the latter part of ‘A Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’ 
                                                     
8 See section 5.2. 
9 Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes Divided into Foure Parts, 3rd pt, 63. 
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(E5-3-44), ‘Treatise on the Powers of King and Parliament’ (E5-3-46), and ‘Treatise 
on the Royal Prerogative and the Right of Parliament to Resist Royal Power’ 
(E5-3-49). Herbert’s concern for this issue, like his interest in Parliament discussed in 
chapter 4, has never been carefully examined. This chapter will provide his viewpoint 
on this early English Civil War controversy. Herbert’s concern for this topic echoes 
his emphasis on individual conscience as presented in Chapter 2 above. In other 
words, because he valued individual conscience, Herbert quite reasonably paid close 
attention to this issue, which usually gave rise to serious moral dilemmas among 
subjects.  
 This chapter argues that it is very likely that Herbert agreed with the 
Parliamentarian claims that conscience supports resistance against tyrants, and that 
the Long Parliament’s resistance to Charles therefore was not a rebellion. The first 
section, based on the theory of conscience of the English casuists (presented in 
Chapter 2 above), investigates their answers to this dilemma. Though they belonged 
to different camps in the English Civil War,10 Sanderson, Taylor, and Baxter all 
maintained that subjects could passively disobey the King’s unlawful commands, but 
by no means could they resist by force. Mainly by citing Scripture and the theory of 
the divine right of kings, they warned the people that they should not touch the deputy 
of God and the Lord’s anointed. The second section analyzes both Royalists and 
Parliamentarians’ arguments and the viewpoints contained in Herbert’s collections. 
Both sides agreed with the English casuists that conscience held high authority. 
Moreover, the moral principles appealed to by both sides were derived from three 
sources that the English casuists had proposed in their theory of conscience: nature, 
Scripture, and human laws. On the issue of whether the people could resist a tyrant, as 
                                                     




well, both sides agreed on many points, including that the people could disobey the 
unlawful commands of the King, and that the King’s abuse of the law could not justify 
subjects’ in taking up arms against him. However, both sides reached different 
conclusions because they had varied interpretations on the laws of kingdom and 
Scripture. The King’s supporters, following the arguments of the English casuists, 
insisted that under no circumstance could the people resist their sovereign since the 
King was God’s anointed and was above the laws of the kingdom. In response, 
Parliament’s supporters reinterpreted verses of Scripture and human laws to justify 
their grounds. They justified the Long Parliament’s taking up arms by arguing that 
God’s anointment was not confined to kings only but could be bestowed on all kinds 
of people, that the King was inferior to both God and the laws of the kingdom, and 
that Parliament was the highest court in the realm – hence, Parliament had the power 
to dispose of the crown. Herbert’s manuscripts reflected the Parliamentarian 







5.1 The theories of the English casuists 
 
Based on their theories of conscience, the English casuists Robert Sanderson, Jeremy 
Taylor, and Richard Baxter discussed the obedience of subjects and the question of 
whether the people of the kingdom could lawfully resist a tyrant. By citing moral 
principles derived from nature, Scripture, and human laws, they concluded that 
subjects could disobey the unlawful commands of a tyrant, but under no circumstance 
could they take up arms against their prince.  
 Personally involved with the war, Sanderson and Taylor discoursed on the topic 
in their casuistical works. Sanderson, a rector of Boothby Pagnell in Lincolnshire for 
four decades, was reputedly skilled at ‘reconciling differences and preventing 
Law-suits’ and at resolving the clashes between landlords and their tenants.11 Since 
Sanderson’s casuistical skill was well-known, on the recommendation of Archbishop 
Laud he became Charles I’s chaplain in November 1631. According to Izaak Walton, 
Charles I once said ‘I carry my ears to hear other Preachers; but I carry my 
Conscience to hear Mr. Sanderson, and to act accordingly’.12 During the civil war 
Sanderson stood firmly with the King even after being seized by the Parliamentary 
army in 1644 in Lincoln. In 1646 Sanderson received the Regius professorship of 
divinity at Oxford and delivered seven lectures on the obligation of oaths.13 In the 
next year, he delivered ten lectures on conscience and human law before he was 
deprived of the position by the Long Parliament in 1648 for refusing to take the oath 
of Solemn League and Covenant and the Negative Oath.  
                                                     
11 Izaak Walton, ‘The Life of Dr. Sanderson’, in XXXV Sermons, 7th ed. (London: Printed by 
ThoHodgkin, 1681), 13. For his early career please see Walton, 4–10; Anthony Wood, Athenae 
Oxonienses, vol. 2 (London: Printed for Tho. Bennet, 1692), 214. 
12 Walton, ‘The Life of Dr. Sanderson’, 15. 
13 The seven lectures were later published in 1655 as De Juramento. King Charles I had translated 
them when he was imprisoned by the Long Parliament. Walton, 21; Wood, Athenae Oxonienses, 2:214. 
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Obtaining a promising academic achievement in his early career, Jeremy Taylor 
attracted the attention of Laud and became his chaplain in about 1638, later becoming 
Charles’s chaplain-in-ordinary in 1642.14 He sided with the King during the Civil 
War and preached frequently at the court of Oxford.15 In early 1645, he became a 
prisoner for two months after the defeat of a Royalist force in Wales; after his release 
he took shelter in the parish of Llanfihangel Aberbythych, Carmarthenshire. 
Completed during the 1650s and published in 1660, his Ductor Dubitantium: or, The 
Rule of Conscience was dedicated to Charles II.  
In addition to Sanderson and Taylor, Richard Baxter witnessed the civil war and 
served in the New Model Army. But he was not very devoted to the war, partly 
because his bad health held him down at this harsh time, and partly because he 
disagreed with the radical views of the New Model Army. Although Baxter aligned 
himself with the Long Parliament, he agreed with Sanderson and Taylor on many 
points regarding the question of whether the people could resist a tyrant. 
 In casuistical theory, the topic of the obedience of subjects and the question of 
resistance to tyrants belong to the category of human laws. Human laws include the 
laws prescribed by nations for their citizens, by parents for their children, by kings for 
their subjects, and by masters for their servants.16 Human laws also encompass the 
oaths, vows, contracts, and promises made by men.17 At first glance, there seems to 
be much room for disobedience to superiors and for resistance to tyrants since in 
theory God’s law alone binds man’s conscience directly while human laws only do so 
                                                     
14 Wood, Athenae Oxonienses, 2:282. Entering Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, in 1626, 
Taylor obtained his BA in 1631 and MA in 1634. He took holy orders in 1633 while still below the 
canonical age. Moreover, he was elected as a fellow at the Perse School, Cambridge.  
15 Ibid.  
16  Robert Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience: Discussed in Ten Lectures, trans. Robert 
Codrington (London: Printed by ThoLeach, 1660), 149-50.  
17 Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 149-50.  
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indirectly.18 Arguing that human law does not always bind the conscience of man, 
Taylor said that man must obey the commands of the divine law but could ‘seek to be 
freed from the band of any human law’.19 However, the English casuists, Protestants 
and Anglicans included, maintained that in most cases subjects are obliged to obey the 
commands of kings even if they are tyrants. 
 According to the English casuists, in principle subjects must obey the commands 
of kings since human laws were the extension of God’s laws. Sanderson wrote that 
human laws oblige the consciences of subjects ‘by the Consequent and by Vertue of 
the general Divine Commandement’.20 Sharing the same view with Sanderson, Taylor 
stated that ‘the law of man binds the conscience mediately, and by the interposition of 
the Divine authority: so that we must obey man for God’s sake, and God for his 
own’.21 Moreover, every subject is bound to obey ‘the just laws of his lawful superior, 
not only under fear of punishment from man, but under pain of the Divine 
displeasure’.22 In brief, since ‘all lawful power whatsoever it be, not only publick … 
but also all private power is constituted of God’,23 subjects must obey the commands 
of kings. 
 In one circumstance only could subjects disobey the commands of kings: when 
the command itself – not the intention of the commander, which should not be taken 
into consideration by subjects – is contrary to God’s law. In this case, the command is 
unjust since it contradicts the primary moral principles either shown in Scriptures or 
implanted in the mind of every human being. The unjust command or law does not 
bind the conscience of man, and anyone who obeys it commits a sin. This means that 
                                                     
18 ‘I say …that such [human] Laws doe not oblige by themselves, and directly; I prove first because, 
that God alone is that Law-maker, who hath a most peculiar and direct Command over the Conscience 
of men’. Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 176.  
19 Taylor, The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, 13:262. 
20 Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 177.  
21 Taylor, The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, 13:261. 
22 Ibid., 13:235.  
23 Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 152.  
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it is not merely the right but the duty of the people to disobey those commands 
contrary to God’s law.24 After presenting the abovementioned point, Sanderson stated 
that divine laws supercede human laws, and gave some examples of unjust commands 
such as ‘homicide, Perjury,’ and prohibiting ‘the worship of the true God’.25 Taylor, 
regarding this point as a rule of conscience,26 added that when a law causes ‘an 
imminent Danger of Death, or an intolerable or very grievous Evil in the Obedience’, 
it is an unjust law and thus does not bind the consciences of men.27 
 A king’s abuse of a lawful law does not justify a subject’s disobedience, however, 
according to the casuists. Even if a king issues his command ‘by the desire of filthy 
Lucre, or meer Lust of exercising his Tyranny, or by some other depraved affection of 
his mind’, subjects should still obey since they could only consider whether the 
command itself was just or not. Subjects were not entitled to judge the intentions of 
kings; this point, which I will explain below, is related to the casuists’ theory of the 
divine right of kings. If a command is issued from a lawful law, people are bound to 
obey.28 In other words, subjects could not disobey a law by claiming that the king had 
a bad intention; intention is another issue, and an issue particularly for the King 
himself – his conscience would finally be judged by God alone. Therefore, subjects 
must obey and endure the sufferings caused, for example, by a command to pay ‘a 
greater subsidy than the occasion doth require’.29 
 In all other cases the English casuists maintained that subjects must obey human 
laws and the commands of kings. When a human law is enacted in accordance with 
divine law – for instance, the law that evil and theft should be avoided – the 
                                                     
24 Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 155. ‘Human Laws if injust do not oblige unto obedience’. 
25 Ibid., 158.  
26 ‘The Laws of our Superior that are not just and good, do not oblige the Conscience’. Taylor, The 
Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, 13:274–76. 
27 Ibid., 13: 266. Sanderson had a similar opinion, see Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 156.  
28 Ibid., 155-57.  
29 Ibid., 157.  
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conscience of each subject is bound to obey. When a human law regulates indifferent 
things that are not specifically restricted by God’s law, the consciences of men are 
bound as well. Presenting such an opinion, Sanderson said that ‘human laws 
concerning things not unlawful, do by themselves, and directly, in the general oblige 
the Conscience’ because ‘God in the Holy Scripture doth command us to be subject 
unto those who are over us’.30  According to Taylor, ‘in things indifferent the 
command of the superior must need be accounted the will of God’,31 and thus to 
disobey such a command is a sin.32 But it should be noted here that the English 
casuists held different opinions on some ceremonial matters such as kneeling to 
receive the sacrament or wearing a surplice.33 
 The English casuists used Scripture and the theory of the divine right of kings to 
argue that in nearly all cases subjects should obey human laws and the commands of 
kings. Meanwhile, Sanderson used the theory of divine right to refute the Long 
Parliament’s claims that the governing power of kings comes from the people, that the 
people have the right to resist a tyrant, and that Parliament holds the highest 
sovereignty and jurisdiction.34 He argued instead that kings are inferior only to God 
but superior to all subjects and that they hold the sovereign power on the earth.35 We 
can see some very common statements in English casuistical works such as that the 
                                                     
30 Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 175-76.  
31 Taylor, The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, 12:23. 
32 ‘When an action, in itself indifferent, is by the law expounded to signify a sin, though in itself it do 
not, nor in the heart of him that does it, the disobedience to that law is an act of that sin, or at least of a 
scandal relative to it.’ Taylor, The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, 13:244. 
33 A spectrum could be made according to their religious stances. Anglican clergymen Sanderson and 
Taylor maintained that ceremonial matters are by themselves indifferent things while Protestant 
minsters Perkins and Baxter accepted them with reservation. Ames was well-known for denouncing 
them as popish things. See Slights, The Casuistical Tradition in Shakespeare, Donne, Herbert, and 
Milton, 28–29. Baxter provided a detailed list of things indifferent. See Baxter, A Christian Directory, 
683–84. 
34 Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 241-42, 253-54. CF: ‘The powers ordained, are ordained 
by God, not the people’. Sanderson wrote that even in an elective kingdom ‘the whole power of the 
elected King’ depends not on the people but on God. Ibid., 260.  
35 ‘Rulers therefore are God’s officers, placed under him in his kingdom, as he is the universal, 
absolute sovereign of the world.’ Baxter, A Christian Directory, part IV, 9. 
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King is delegated by God to govern subjects, that the King is God’s deputy, and that 
the King is like a god.36 These sayings were used to justify the obedience of subjects 
to the King. At the same time, in order to strengthen their point, the English casuists 
often cited Romans 13:5 and 1 Peter 2:13 to require subjects to obey the commands of 
kings for conscience’s sake.37 Based on the rule given by the Bible, resisting – as 
opposed to merely disobeying – became a sin, as Taylor argued that ‘it is a great crime 
by rebelling against or slighting the command of our rulers…and there can be no 
greater contempt done to them, than by undervaluing their judgement to prefer our 
own’.38 
 Subjects should obey the lawful commands of a tyrant because ‘the authority of a 
sinful ruler is of God, and must accordingly be obeyed’.39 Pointing out that subjects 
‘do live safe from slaughter, and rapine’ because of the protection of kings, Sanderson 
wrote that subjects should submit themselves to kings and even to tyrants ‘for there 
cannot be so great a Tyranny which doth not retain some shew of a just Government, 
and doth not, at least a little, conduce to maintain the society of men’.40 After asking 
what to do ‘if they [kings] be evil and unjust, cruel and unreasonable enemies of their 
people, and enemies of mankind’, Taylor answered: ‘let him be what he will, if he be 
the supreme, he is superior to me, and I have nothing to do, but something to suffer; 
let God take care, if he please, I shall be quickly remedied’.41 Moreover, the English 
casuists strengthened their argument by citing Ecclesiastes 10:20: ‘curse not the king; 
                                                     
36 Examples of this kind could very easily be multiplied. See Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 
175-76, 253-54, 349; Taylor, The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, 13:453; Baxter, A 
Christian Directory, part IV, 14-15. 
37 Romans 13:5 reads ‘Wherefore it is necessary that ye be subject, not only for wrath, but also for 
conscience sake…so be obedient to your masters, or temporal lords’ and 1 Peter 2:13 states ‘submit 
yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake’. The quoted version comes from Taylor’s 
work. Taylor, The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, 13:236; Sanderson, Several Cases of 
Conscience, 174–75; Baxter, A Christian Directory, part IV, 14.  
38 Taylor, The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, 12:23. 
39 Baxter, A Christian Directory, part IV, 15. 
40 Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 171.  
41 Taylor, The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, 13:465, 467. 
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no, not in thy thought’.42 Taylor added that ‘no man needs this last precept but he that 
thinks the king is an evil man, or hath done wrong: but suppose he have, or that he is 
supposed to have, yet curse him not’.43 This presents the casuists’ idea that since 
kings are inferior to God only, private persons are not allowed to criticize them and 
subjects should obey the commands of tyrants. 
 According to the English casuists, subjects could disobey the unjust commands 
of tyrants but by no means could they resist by force.44 Deducing their arguments 
firstly from the theory of the divine right of kings, the English casuists maintained 
that only God could punish an evil king – but Taylor added that subjects should not 
pray to God for this.45 Moreover, the casuists, quoting the Christian law ‘not to 
oppose evil to evil’, asserted that subjects should not seek revenge on a tyrant by 
force.46 Since the King is the deputy of God, resisting him – whether he is good or 
not – is equal to resisting God.47 Citing Romans 13:5, Taylor wrote that ‘whoever 
does in any case resist, shall receive damnation to himself, both here and hereafter’ 
and that ‘there is nothing in the world a greater destruction to its own ends, than the 
resisting or rebelling against government’.48 Taylor stressed that the history of the 
Church showed that Christians should submit themselves to a tyrant such as Nero, ‘for 
it is the will of God’.49 Therefore, it is not lawful for subjects to take up arms against 
                                                     
42 Ibid., 13:454. Baxter had the same quotation. See Baxter, A Christian Directory, part IV, 16. 
43 Taylor, The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, 13:455. 
44 Ibid., 13:461.  
45 God alone ‘will take care to punish evil kings sufficiently: only we must not do it; we must not pray 
him to do it’. Ibid., 13:456, 461. Also see Baxter, A Christian Directory, part IV, 18. The topic of 
obedience was written mainly for subjects, not for kings; the casuists seldom mentioned the 
consciences of kings. Only Baxter provided some brief reminders suggesting a good kingship for them. 
See ‘Memorandums to Civil Rulers for the Interest of Christ, the Church, and Men’s Salvation’ in 
Baxter, part IV, 5-8. Sanderson only touched it. See Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 208. 
Perhaps this is because they believed that the kingship is born to do good. 
46 Taylor, The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, 13:456; Baxter, A Christian Directory, 
part IV, 15. 
47 Taylor, The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, 13:463. 
48 Ibid., 13: 457, 464.  
49 Taylor, The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, 13:460, 466. 
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‘the supreme Power of the Nation, upon any Pretence whatsoever’.50 
 In brief, the answer the English casuists gave to subjects is that subjects could 
disobey but they must not resist.51 A subject could disobey only on the grounds that 
‘the law be manifestly and notoriously unjust’ or that the law ‘stood in competition 
with the honour of Christianity’, but a subject should not disobey ‘out of light doubt 
and scruple’, Sanderson added.52 Moreover, the English casuists maintained that 
when a subject disobeys the unjust command of the King, he is bound not only to 
‘make not the least resistance’ but also to ‘endure whatsoever injury or contumely 
shall be brought upon him by the superior powers’.53 This principle was based on the 
beliefs that the King is inferior to God alone but superior to every subject and that 
subjects could neither resist nor judge the King’s command. The English casuists in 
principle denied that subjects could resist a tyrant; even though they agreed that 





                                                     
50 Ibid., 13:453.  
51 ‘It is always necessary therefore to be subject, but not always necessary to obey’. Sanderson, Several 
Cases of Conscience, 199. ‘Though in some cases it is lawful not to obey, yet in all cases it is necessary 
not to resist’ Taylor, The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, 13:454. 
52 Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 215-16; Baxter, A Christian Directory, part IV, 15. 
53 Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 205.  
54 ‘If some private persons be hurt or injured, [or] If the Subjects have some publick Grievances of 
which they justly may complain, they must not presently have a recourse (as if the safety of the people 
were in the extremest Jeopardy) to extraordinary Remedyes’. Ibid., 362.  
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5.2 Herbert’s collections and the issue of conscience in the English civil 
war 
 
As we will see, the manuscripts in Herbert’s collections discussed the issue of 
resistance to tyrants within the framework adopted by the English casuists, 
particularly in relation to the authority of conscience and the sources of moral 
principles. Moreover, some of the viewpoints of the English casuists presented in 
section 5.1 above were shared by both the Royalists and the Parliamentarians, 
including that subjects were bound to obey any lawful command of a tyrant and that 
subjects could disobey the unlawful command of a tyrant, though they did not reach 
the same conclusions on the issue. 
As mentioned in the introduction, three manuscripts of Herbert’s collections – 
the latter part of ‘A Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’ (E5-3-44), ‘Treatise on the 
Powers of King and Parliament’ (E5-3-46), and ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative 
and the Right of Parliament to Resist Royal Power’ (E5-3-49) – focused on whether 
conscience grants that the people could resist a tyrant. Again, as analyzed in section 2 
of Chapter 1 above, ‘A Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’ comes from the third 
part of The True Difference Betweene Christian Subiection and Unchristian Rebellion 
(1586) by Thomas Bilson,55 ‘Treatise on the Powers of King and Parliament’ is the 
first part of William Prynne’s The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes 
(1643), and ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative’ is extracted from The Glorious Name 
of God, the Lord of Hosts (1643) written by Jeremiah Burroughs. Moreover, ‘A 
Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’ was probably a manuscript written by Herbert 
                                                     
55 As I have shown in the last chapter, a part of Bilson’s work favouring Parliament was printed in the 
early 1640s. See Bilson, A Discourse upon Questions in Debate between the King and Parliament. 
With Certaine Observations Collected out of a Treatise Called, The Diffrence between Christian 
Subjection, and Unchristian Rebellion, (London, [publisher not identified], 1643). 
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after he read Bilson’s work, and the other two treatises were transcribed by the same 
person.56 This section intends not to reintroduce these three manuscripts but to put 
them in the context of the controversy. I will analyze the word conscience as used by 
both Royalists and Parliamentarians during the Civil War, including their views of the 
moral principles of conscience, i.e. God’s law and its extension, human laws,57 and 
discuss how these human laws were connected with such basic constitutional issues as 
the natures of the people, Parliament, and the King. At the same time, I will show how 
Herbert’s manuscripts fit within the controversy. These manuscripts present the ideas 
that the safety of the people is superior to the King’s prerogatives, that Parliament and 
inferior magistrates, like kings, are higher powers and are entitled to lead the people 
against tyranny, and that Parliament holds sovereignty of the kingdom and could 
lawfully bridle the tyrannical deeds of princes. The manuscripts strongly suggest that 
Herbert agreed with Parliament’s arguments that resistance to tyrants may be justified 
on grounds of conscience.  
 In the early 1640s when the civil war broke out, conscience was discussed in 
relation to the question of whether people could lawfully resist a tyrant and not on 
other constitutional questions such as who – the King or Parliament – held the 
sovereignty in the kingdom.58 In addition to being a practical understanding giving 
judgement to a particular act, conscience was, at the same time, a practical power 
urging people to devote their resources and lives to the war. Facing the Long 
Parliament taking up arms against the King, Henry Ferne published The Resolving of 
Conscience upon This Question (1642) and maintained that ‘no man in Conscience 
                                                     
56 See section 1.2. 
57 For example, these moral principles were revealed in the following question: whether the people 
denoted the private men or the whole people of the commonwealth, whether Parliament was created by 
and for the king or for the commonwealth, and whether the King was the deputy of God or the servant 
of the people? 
58 As I will show in the following paragraphs, constitutional arguments usually played a secondary or 
supporting role in addressing the question of lawful resistance to tyrants. 
198 
 
can be truly perswaded’ by Parliament’s justifications of taking up arms; instead, 
people should join the King on grounds of conscience to put down Parliament’s 
rebellion. 59  Sharing Ferne’s view, Dudley Digges wrote The Unlawfulnesse of 
Subjects Taking up Armes against their Soveraigne (1643), denouncing the Long 
Parliament for misleading the consciences of the people, who ‘do not rightly 
apprehend what is truely advantageous’ when taking up arms against the sovereign.60 
On the other side, William Prynne, whose treatise was written against that of Ferne, 
stressed that ‘Parliaments present necessary Defensive Warre, is Iust and Lawfull both 
in point of Law and Conscience, and no Treason nor Rebellion’.61 Similarly, Jeremiah 
Burroughs’s The Glorious Name of God, the Lord of Hosts (1643) and ‘A Briefe 
Answer to Doctor Fernes Booke Tending to Resolve Conscience about the Subjects 
Taking up of Arms’ (1643) were also responses to Ferne. Burroughs maintained that 
‘the satisfaction of the consciences of men in this thing is of great consequences in 
this time, that every man is bound to afford what help hereunto he is able’.62 Sharing 
the same stance, Henry Parker published Observations upon Some of His Majesties 
Late Answers and Expresses (1642) while William Bridge completed Wounded 
Conscience Cured, the Weak One Strengthened, and the Doubting Satisfied (1642). 
Both Parker and Bridge appealed to the consciences of the people to persuade them to 
take up arms. Conscience was thus an important theme in all the abovementioned 
works. Those supporting the King insisted that conscience could not be convinced to 
take up arms against the King, while the Parliamentarians held the contrary view. It is 
worth noting again that Prynne’s and Burroughs’s works provided the basis for the 
                                                     
59 Ferne, The Resolving of Conscience, cover page. 
60 Dudley Digges, The Vnlavvfulnesse of Subjects Taking up Armes against Their Soveraigne in What 
Case Soever (Oxford: sn, 1643), 1. 
61 William Prynne, The Treachery and Disloyalty of Papists to Their Soveraignes: Together with the 
First Part of the Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes (London: Printed For Michael 
Sparke Senior, 1643), 3rd part, 1. 
62 Jeremiah Burroughs, The Glorious Name of God, the Lord of Hosts (London: Printed for R. 
Dawlman, 1643), to the Reader. 
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contents of Herbert’s manuscripts ‘Treatise on the Powers of King and Parliament’ 
and ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative and the Right of Parliament to Resist Royal 
Power’. These works focused on conscience and supported the arguments of 
Parliamentarians. 
 The issue of taking up arms linked up closely with conscience since it not only 
granted a moral and intellectual judgement but also generated a practical power 
dictating an individual’s action; in other words, people would be motivated to take up 
arms if their consciences were persuaded. This means that conscience was not a word 
of rhetoric – neither sides used the word meaninglessly –, but a word of power 
directing people’s actions. Defining conscience as ‘a faculty, or a habit of the practical 
understanding’, the English casuist Sanderson said that ‘the mind of Man doth by the 
discourse of reason apply’ this understanding to his particular moral actions –63 
particular moral acts, including taking up arms, are the objects of the conscience.64 
Like Sanderson, Jeremy Taylor argued that conscience is ‘used for directions in all 
cases of dispute of question or action’, and that ‘by it we are taught our duty’.65 The 
issue of taking up arms is an object of conscience because conscience, by applying 
God’s law and human laws to the issue, informs individuals of the actions they have 
to take. Hoping to ‘give testimony to the truth for the directing of your [people’s] 
Consciences’, Ferne maintained that subjects should not ‘carry on against all rules of 
Conscience’ by taking up arms against the King so that they could be away from ‘the 
Apostles prohibition, and damnation laid upon it’.66 Defending the Long Parliament 
in taking up arms, Burroughs said that ‘every man is bound to afford what help 
hereunto he is able’ when his conscience is persuaded.67 Both Ferne and Burroughs 
                                                     
63 Sanderson, Several Cases of Conscience, 3.  
64 Ibid., 26.  
65 Taylor, The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, 11:385. 
66 Ferne, The Resolving of Conscience, the Epistle. 
67 Burroughs, The Glorious Name of God, the Lord of Hosts, to the Reader. 
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show the close tie between conscience and the action of taking up arms. 
 Since conscience directs and motivates people’s actions, both Royalists and 
Parliamentarians agreed that conscience holds a high authority. As Ferne said, ‘I must 
speak for truth and conscience sake, from which neither King nor Parliament should 
make us swerve’;68 moreover, ‘all Ages have asserted’ the truths confirmed by 
conscience.69 Except the statement of Ferne, no other obvious comments of the 
authority of conscience, as far as I know, could be found from either side; this absence 
does not mean that conscience holds no authority, but means that its authority, in their 
view, is so high that it was unnecessary to demonstrate it. When both sides argued 
their points, they assume the authority of conscience as a premise – Royalists argued 
that people should not resist a tyrant since conscience prohibits such kind of deeds 
while Parliamentarians held the contrary opinion on grounds of conscience as well.70 
 Having shown that conscience was closely connected to the issue of resistance, 
and that both sides agreed on the high authority of conscience, this section will now 
consider the moral principles used when debating the question of whether the people 
could lawfully take up arms against the King. As we saw in the first section of this 
chapter, Sanderson held that the moral principles came from three sources – the light 
of nature, the light of Scripture, and the light of doctrine – and that these three lights 
revealed the law of God and its extension, human laws. Neither Parliamentarians nor 
Royalists proposed anything beyond the scope of what Sanderson wrote, though each 
reached different conclusions on the question. Royalists usually cited Scripture and 
reason as their grounds when arguing their viewpoints.71 As Ferne maintained, ‘the 
                                                     
68 Ferne, The Resolving of Conscience, the Epistle. 
69 Ibid.  
70 For example, Prynne said that ‘I conceive affirmatively, that they [the people] may justly do it 
[taking up arms], both in point of Law and Conscience’. Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments 
and Kingdomes Divided into Foure Parts, pts 3, 2. 




clear light of Divine Scripture and rectified Reason’ were ‘the onely rules of 
Conscience’.72 By the light of Scripture Ferne stressed that Romans 13 has clearly 
shown that resisting kings is unlawful and that 1 Peter 2:13-14 demands the 
submission of subjects to their kings, while by the light of reason he denoted some of 
‘the Fundamentalls of this government’ that were not written into law – these 
fundamentals of the government, according to him, included the theory of the divine 
right of kings and the belief that ‘the originall of power’ is from God.73 Similarly, 
when Digges argued that subjects by no means could resist their sovereigns, he 
appealed to both Scripture and nature. On the one hand Digges demonstrated that 
kings should not be resisted by citing 1 Peter 2:13, Proverbs 24:21-22, and Psalms 
82:6,74 while on the other hand he argued that kings are supreme in the world and 
‘non-resistance to the supreame power [is] essential to the preservation of order’.75 
 Likewise, supporters of Parliament, such as Prynne and Burroughs, grounded 
their arguments and viewpoints on the light of nature, the light of Scripture, and 
human laws. Burroughs argued that people could lawfully resist tyrants by focusing 
mainly on the interpretations of the Bible – such as 1 Samuel 23, which stated that 
King Saul was resisted by David – and on human laws.76 Likewise, Prynne cited 
several passages of the Bible when he was arguing the same opinion.77 Moreover, 
saying that human laws ‘must direct the conscience’, Prynne maintained that the laws 
of this kingdom grant that the people and Parliament could take up arms against a 
                                                     
72 Ferne, The Resolving of Conscience, the Epistle. 
73 Ibid., 13-16. In other words, Ferne separated the sources of the moral principles into two: Scripture 
and reason. By Scripture he meant laws given by God while by reason he meant the structure or order 
of the human powers. It is worth noting that when Ferne discussed the moral principles of reason, he 
usually cited Scripture as his illustrations – he mixed the two sources when arguing. 
74 Digges, The Vnlavvfulnesse of Subjects Taking up Armes against Their Soveraigne, 33–34, 60. 
75 Ibid., 32.  
76 Burroughs, The Glorious Name of God, the Lord of Hosts, 27, 115. 




tyrant.78 Criticizing the viewpoints of Ferne, Bridge in the opening of his work stated 
that ‘some [of his arguments were] drawn from nature, some from Scripture, some 
from the fundamentall lawes of the Kindomes, some from the being of Parliaments, 
and some from the common trust reposed on Princes’. 79  Although Bridge 
distinguished five sources of moral principles, these five sources did not go beyond 
the light of nature, Scripture, and human laws. It is worth noting that by the word 
nature, Bridge meant the natural instinct of each creature ‘to preserve it self’, whereas 
Ferne used the word in a different sense: in brief, by the light of nature, Ferne denoted 
the nature of the fundamental government rather than the nature or inclination of 
creatures. 
 Both sides agreed that the people must obey the commands of the King. 
Royalists took this point for granted, while Parliamentarians added the caveat that the 
commands must be lawful. Prynne wrote that the people could not ‘disobey, or 
violently with force of Armes resist the Kings, or any other lawfull Magistrates just 
commands, warrented either by Gods word, or the Law of England’.80 Citing 1 Peter 
2:13 and Romans 13, Goodwin argued that ‘the King is to be obeyed’, and agreed that 
‘in this sense a King, or Kingly power and government may be said to be from 
God’.81 
 Both sides also agreed that the people could disobey the King’s command when 
it was contrary to God’s law. This point was not important for Parliamentarians since 
they maintained a harsher stance: in this kind of case the people could resist, as I will 
discuss in the following paragraphs. Arguing that the people’s obedience to their 
                                                     
78 Ibid., 3rd pt, 9.  
79 William Bridge, The Wounded Conscience Cured, the Vveak One Strengthened, and the Doubting 
Satisfied.: By Way of Answer to Doctor Fearn (London: Printed for Benjamin Allen, 1642), 2. 
Henceforth, The Wounded Conscience Cured. 
80 Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes Divided into Foure Parts, 3rd pt, 61. 
81 John Goodwin, Anti-Cavalierisme, or, Truth Pleading as Well the Necessity, as the Lawfulness of 
This Present War (London: Printed by G. B. and R. W. for Henry Overton, 1642), 7. 
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sovereigns ‘was never intended by God to be universall, but with limitation’, 
Goodwin wrote that ‘a mans obedience to the King should not be found disobedience 
against God’.82 ‘Kings are not to be obeyed in any of those commands that are 
unlawfull’,83 Goodwin added, since ‘no King is himself invested with any authority 
or power to doe any thing which is unjust, or unrighteous’.84 Similarly, Royalists 
agreed that the people could disobey the unlawful commands of kings – but they did 
not agree with Parliamentarians that they could violently resist, as I will show later. 
Moreover, Royalists stated that this was the only circumstance in which the people 
could lawfully disobey their sovereigns, and this point echoes the opinions of the 
English casuists.85 When speaking of the tyrannical command of sovereigns, Ferne 
maintained that subjects could give ‘denials of obedience to his unjust commands’.86 
Like Ferne, Digges wrote that subjects had ‘the liberty of denying obedience’ in this 
kind of case since the obedience we owe to God precedes the obedience we owe to 
kings.87 
 Both sides also agreed that the abuse of the law by the King, in cases when the 
command itself is lawful but the intention of the monarch was evil, could not justify 
subjects in taking up arms against him. Royalists advocated and propagated this point. 
Like the English casuists Sanderson and Taylor, Ferne cited Scripture and used the 
theory of the divine right of kings to show this point.88 Saying that the King’s 
‘powers are ordained of God’, Ferne maintained that subjects must not resist a tyrant; 
                                                     
82 Goodwin, Anti-Cavalierisme, 9.  
83 Ibid., 10.  
84 Ibid., 17.  
85 For the opinions of the English casuists, see section 1 of this chapter. 
86 Ferne, The Resolving of Conscience, 23, 31. 
87 ‘Magistrates can challenge no more right over our actions, then God gives them or we ourselves had, 
before we submitted them to their commands’ and ‘no inconveniencies from this doctrine rightly stated; 
God to be obeyed rather then men’. Digges, The Vnlavvfulnesse of Subjects Taking up Armes against 
Their Soveraigne, 13.  
88 For Sanderson’s and Taylor’s viewpoints and arguments, see section 1.2 above. 
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even when the resistance was ‘made against abused Powers’, it was unlawful.89 
Moreover, Ferne wrote that according to Romans 13, ‘the Apostle gave his reasons 
against resisting even of abused Powers’.90 Facing a tyrant abusing the law, subjects 
should view ‘the abuse of that Power as a judgement and scourge of God upon the 
people, and will use not Arms to resist the Ordinance under pretence of resisting the 
abuse’; instead, they could offer ‘cryes and prayers to God, petitions to the Prince, 
denials of obedience to his unjust commands, denials of subsudies, aids, and all fair 
means that are fit for Subjects to use’.91 And if the tyrant continued abusing the law 
after his subjects had tried all the above fair means, they ‘will rather suffer then resist’, 
and this will be the judgement of ‘a truly informed Conscience’.92 Digges concurred, 
arguing that ‘tyrannicall abuse of power doth not make taking up armes against the 
supreame governour lawfull’.93 
Although most supporters of Parliament did not deal with this particular issue – 
they merely passively agreed, and, moreover, they neither held that they were 
resisting a tyrant who abused the law, nor said that King Charles I abused the law, as I 
will show later –94  Burroughs, the author excerpted in ‘Treatise on the Royal 
Prerogative’, did address this issue directly. He agreed with the Royalists that subjects 
could not take up arms against the King on the grounds of his abuse of laws. It is 
worth noting, however, that Burroughs did not cite the theory of the divine right of 
kings to support the point, but rather argued that lawful commands should not be 
resisted. To the question ‘may wee resist authority abused’, he answered that ‘that is 
                                                     
89 Ferne, The Resolving of Conscience, 12. 
90 Ibid., 30.  
91 Ibid., 31.  
92 Ibid.  
93 Digges, The Vnlavvfulnesse of Subjects Taking up Armes against Their Soveraigne, 97. 
94 For example, answering Ferne’s statement that the Long Parliament ‘resist not the power, but the 
abuse of the power’, Burroughs wrote that this was not the stance the Long Parliament took. He 
insisted that the Long Parliament ‘is resisting no power at all’. Jeremiah Burroughs, ‘A Briefe Answer 
to Doctor Fernes Booke Tending to Resolve Conscience about the Subjects Taking up of Arms’, in The 
Glorious Name of God, the Lord of Hosts (London: Printed for RDawlman, 1643), 124. 
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abused Authority, when those to who[m] power of making Lawes belong, shall make 
evill Lawes; in this case no helpe, but passive obedience, or flying, vntill some way 
may be taken for rectifying that Authority that is abused’.95 Burroughs meant that 
when the King abuses the law, issuing a lawful command out of a bad intention, 
subjects could only accept and endure it. As he put it, ‘if indeed some unjust Law 
should give him [the King] any power to doe wrong, the execution of this would be 
the abuse of his power, and therein it is granted a true informed conscience would 
rather suffer than resist’.96 Burroughs agreed that people should obey ‘whatsoever 
was commanded by the King’ unless the commands were against God’s law and ‘the 
Laws of the Countrey over which they are’. In brief, people must yield to all lawful 
commands ‘for conscience sake’.97 
 Both sides also agreed that subjects or private men and Parliament should not 
take up arms against the King’s person. This point was also presented in ‘A Treatise 
on Obedience to Magistrates’ by Herbert. It is worth noting here that this was the 
general viewpoint of Parliamentarians in the early 1640s before the idea of regicide 
emerged. After Prynne asked whether ‘Parliament may lawfully raise an Army to goe 
immediately and directly against the very person of the King’, he answered that the 
Long Parliament ‘and their Army too, have in sundry Remonstrance, Declarations, 
Protestations, and Petitions, renounced any such disloyall intention or designe at 
all’,98 and he stressed that ‘no defying language was given, [and] no act of violence 
was used’ against the King.99 Claiming that the Long Parliament’s violent resistance 
was ‘not properly or directly against the King’, Goodwin wrote that we ‘never 
                                                     
95 ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative and the Right of Parliament to Resist Royal Power’ (National 
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96 Burroughs, ‘A Briefe Answer’, 139.  
97 Ibid., 111.  
98 Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes Divided into Foure Parts, 3rd pt, 62. 




travelled with any desires or thoughts that way’; at the same time, Goodwin disagreed 
with the Jesuits and maintained that neither Parliament nor subjects could ‘take away 
his [the King’s] life’.100 Goodwin argued that ‘we conceive it to be a just Prerogative 
of Kings in what case soever, to be secure from the violence of men’ and that the 
King’s life could ‘be reaped and gathered only by the hand of God himselfe’.101 
Likewise, ‘A Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’ stated that ‘no Private Person is 
warranted to lay his Hand vpon the Lords anointed, or to make Publique talke of his 
faults’ and that ‘the golden scepter hath not called every man to speake in such a case, 
except to God on his knees’.102 It is worth noting, however, that Parliamentarians did 
not exclude lawful resistance against the armies of the King, especially when they 
consisted of papists and the malignant.  
 The above analysis shows that both sides’ arguments, including those contained 
in Herbert’s manuscripts, shared many points concerning the sources of conscience 
and the obedience of subjects. However, the two sides reached different conclusions 
on the question of whether the people could resist a tyrant.  
Both sides claimed that they had launched a defensive war, being driven by 
necessity to persuade the people’s consciences to choose their side and take up arms.  
The Long Parliament argued that theirs was a defensive war to justify resisting the 
King, while Royalists used that argument to appeal to the people to help put down the 
rebellion. Although this argument in principle belongs to the light of nature – the idea 
of necessary defence was close to a natural instinct of creatures – both sides, as we 
will see, combined appeals to nature, Scripture and human laws when arguing this 
point. 
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 Appealing to subjects to help protect the King’s power to raise the army against 
Parliament, the Royalists maintained that the King had launched a defensive war. 
Insisting that the Long Parliament was the first to take up arms against the King, 
Ferne wrote that the resistance the Long Parliament claimed was pointless since 
‘resistance doth in the word itself and in their pretence presuppose a power and force 
first made against them’.103 Moreover, Ferne maintained that it was ‘His Power of 
Arms and ordering the Militia of the kingdome, His Power of denying in Parliament, 
His disposing of the offices of State, and such like’; hence, the King, facing the 
violent resistance, ‘is upon the defensive, for the maintaining of what he justly holds 
his right, or is bound by Oath to defend’.104 Meanwhile, after quoting 1 Samuel 26, 
which indicated that David ‘offered no act of violence to Saul, but still gave place and 
withdrew from him’, and returned the spear of Saul, Ferne wrote that ‘but now the 
Kings Spear and his Cruse, his Ammunition and his necessary Provisions are taken 
away, intercepted, not restored though often demanded’. By the above arguments 
Ferne maintained that the King launched a defensive war against the Long 
Parliament’s encroachments on the King’s power and properties. Likewise, Digges 
maintained that ‘His Majesty [is] fighting onely to preserve Himselfe, and the rights 
of the Subjects’ since the Long Parliament had taken away ‘his civill power’, and that 
the Parliamentary army was ‘actually raised against his personall strength’.105 Ferne 
and Digges echoed ‘The King’s Proclamation Condemning the Militia Ordinance’ 
issued on May 27, 1642. Claiming that the power of raising the army to protect the 
kingdom belongs to the King alone and that ‘it is by his royal seigniory straightly to 
                                                     
103 ‘Armed men were thrust into Hull, the Kings Arms seized against his will, the Militia set up, and by 
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defend wearing of armour and all other force against the peace’, the proclamation 
denounced the Long Parliament and its supporters ‘as violators of the laws and 
disturbers of the peace of this kingdom’.106 At the same time, the proclamation stated 
that ‘all subjects are bound to aid the King as their sovereign lord’.107 
 The Long Parliament and its supporters, including two authors of Herbert’s 
manuscripts Prynne and Burroughs, also claimed that they had launched a defensive 
war. They appealed to the people to join their side to protect the religion, liberty, and 
property from the invasion of the northern army, papists, and delinquents – though 
they carefully excluded the King from this list of opponents.108 After asking whether 
the Long Parliament was taking up arms against the King, Burroughs answered that ‘it 
is not against the King, it is defensive onely, to defend our lawfull liberties, our 
estates’.109 ‘The Law of nature and Script[ure] teaches us to defend ourselves from 
violence, and wrong’, Burroughs added.110  Citing Ferne’s statement that David 
resisted Saul by force ‘to save his person from Cut-throats’, Burroughs claimed that 
the same applied to the Long Parliament, and that the army they were raising was ‘to 
save Parliament and People from Cut-throats’.111 Agreeing with Burroughs, Prynne 
maintained that the ‘necessary Defensive Warre’ of the Long Parliament was lawful 
both in point of the laws of the kingdom and in conscience.112 Moreover, after 
claiming that ‘this Majesty first began this warre’ and summoned ‘an Armie of 
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Malignants, Papists, Forraigners; against his Parliament, Kingdome, [and] People’, 
Prynne ‘conceive[d] affirmatively, that they may justly do it [launch a defensive war], 
both in point of Law and Conscience’.113 Prynne maintained that the people, by 
taking up arms under the direction and command of Parliament, could lawfully 
‘preserve the Priviledges of Parliament, their Lawes, lives, liberties, estates, properties, 
[and] Religion’. 114  Furthermore, Prynne insisted that the Long Parliament’s 
‘necessary defence’ was not an ‘active offence’,115 and the resistance had ‘no one 
Text, nor Example in Scripture to impeach its lawfulnesse’.116 Categorizing the 
necessary defensive war as an argument of nature, Bridge said that the people by all 
means could lawfully resist on grounds of ‘selfe preservation’ since ‘it is the most 
naturall work in the world for everything to preserve itselfe’ and ‘no humane power is 
above the law of nature’.117 Bridge did not mean that subjects or private men 
themselves could resist the King on their own; they could do so when they were led 
by Parliament.118 Adopting a similar argument, Goodwin told the people that ‘you are 
to stand up in the defence of your Lives, your Liberties, your Estates, your Houses, 
your Wives, your Children, your Brethren’ and that they also acted ‘in defence of his 
Majesties royall person, honour, and estate; all these are now in eminent danger to 
suffer by that accursed retinue of vile persons’.119 Moreover, Goodwin stressed that 
the people should follow ‘the honourable Senate of both Houses of Parliament’ to 
defend their lives, liberties, religion, and estates, and ‘here is nothing in all this but 
what the manifest Law of God, and the common light of nature, not only warranteth 
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and alloweth in all men [to resist]’.120  Goodwin even described this necessary 
defence as ‘a Martyrdome too, or suffering for Christ’.121 These statements echo the 
‘Militia Ordinance’ issued by Parliament in March, 1642. Warning that ‘the bloody 
counsels of Papists and other ill-affected persons’ had been rising in rebellion in the 
kingdom, the Long Parliament, according to this ordinance, decided to take up arms 
‘for the safety therefore of His Majesty’s person, the Parliament and kingdom in this 
time of imminent danger’.122 
 Having shown the appeals to nature made by both sides to justify their wars as 
defensive, I will now present arguments from both sides deriving from Scripture. 
Since the Bible was a crucial source of moral principles, both Royalists and 
Parliamentarians often cited verses to justify their stances, and they often reached 
different conclusions even when citing the same verses. Again, as the following 
paragraphs will show, the two authors of Herbert’s manuscripts ‘Treatise on the 
Powers of King and Parliament’ and ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative’, Prynne and 
Burroughs, supported Parliament’s grounds. Moreover, ‘A Treatise on Obedience to 
Magistrates’ specifically cited biblical cases as illustrations. 
A very common controversy came from the different interpretations on the 
interactions between David and King Saul in 1 Samuel. Supporters of Parliament 
stressed that David resisted Saul by force while Royalists emphasized that David gave 
no harm to Saul. Noting that David summoned an army of 600 to resist Saul, 
Burroughs argued that the people could stop the King’s unlawful command as David 
and his army had done.123 Moreover, Burroughs maintained that Parliament and 
people could lawfully take up arms in order ‘to save Parliament and People from 
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Cut-throats’, as I have mentioned above. 124  However, insisting that Scripture 
provides no ground for people to resist their sovereigns, Ferne said that even though 
David raised an army, the army ‘was onely to secure his person against the cut-throats 
of Saul’, and they did not do any harm to the very person of Saul.125 Furthermore, 
describing this case as an ‘extraordinary’ one, Ferne said that David ‘was anointed 
and designed by the Lord to succeed Saul, and therefore he might use an 
extraordinary way of safeguarding his person’.126 Another common controversy came 
from 1 Samuel 14:45, which stated that Saul spared the life of Jonathan because of the 
intervention of the people of Israel. By claiming that the people had ‘lawfully rescued 
innocent Ionathan, from that unjust death which his Father King Saul twice vowed 
hee should undergoe’, Parliamentarians Prynne and Goodwin stressed that the verse 
indicated that people could refuse, and even resist, the unlawful command of a 
king.127 However, quoting the same verse, the Royalist Ferne stressed that ‘the people 
drew not into arms of themselves, but being there at Sauls command, did by a loving 
violence and importunitie hinder the execution of a particular and passionate 
unlawfull command’. 128  Similarly, in this case Parliamentarians stressed the 
lawfulness of resistance to unlawful commands while Royalists emphasized the 
submission of the people, who did no harm to the King. 
 Other verses of the Bible were also debated;129 however, this section intends not 
                                                     
124 Ibid.  
125 Ferne, The Resolving of Conscience, 6. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes Divided into Foure Parts, 3rd pt, 71. 
For Goodwin’s statements, see Goodwin, Anti-Cavalierisme, 11–12. After discussing Jonathan’s case, 
Prynne wrote that ‘some mens patient suffering death and injuries without resistance, is no better an 
argument, that all therefore must so suffer without opposition, then that all men out to yeeld their 
purses up to high-way theeves, or their persons, goods, ships, to Turks and Pyrates, without fight or 
resistance’. 
128 Ferne, The Resolving of Conscience, 6. 
129 Exodus 1:15-20 was another example where the verses showed that midwives refused the command 
of King Pharaoh to kill the male children of the Hebrew people. 2 Kings 6:32 was also a controversial 
verse where the prophet Elisha shut the door against the King’s messengers that came to take away his 
head. See Ferne, The Resolving of Conscience, 6-8; Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and 
212 
 
to introduce additional illustrations for the following two reasons. First, from the 
above two examples of 1 Samuel, I have shown that both sides had preconceptions 
about the verses they aimed to interpret; each side stressed the point they intended to 
argue and refuted the other side’s interpretation. Their preconceptions made their 
additional interpretations of Biblical verses redundant. The second reason is that the 
two examples I have given are sufficient for illustrating how both sides used Scripture, 
and, more importantly, for showing Herbert’s possible viewpoints – these two 
illustrations were particularly mentioned by Herbert’s collection E5/3/44 ‘A Treatise 
on Obedience to Magistrates’. 
 After discussing the question of what could be done when ‘a Prince shall sett 
himselfe professedly ag[ains]t the whole k[ing]dome’ – this was also the definition of 
tyrant implied in the works of parliamentary supporters and of the English 
casuists –,130 ‘A Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’ then cites the two illustrations 
in 1 Samuel.131 Revealing ‘the Case betweens Saul, and Jonathan, when the people 
delivered the good sonne out of the bad father’s hands. 1 Sam[uel] 14. 45’,132 the 
treatise states that ‘though one may not lay hands vpon the Lords anointed, yet one 
may hold a mad man’s hand’ – by one it means ‘the Nobles, and Peeres of a state,’ 
who could resist and bridle the tyrannical deeds of princes.133 Moreover, ‘A Treatise 
on Obedience to Magistrates’ describes taking up arms to control the tyrannical 
governance as the necessary defence of David against Saul, when there was no other 
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remedy.134 Meanwhile, the treatise emphasizes that in such a case we could not say 
‘David by this [resistance] did rebell ag[ains]t Saul’ since David ‘would not lay a 
hand vpon the king, though having him twice in his power’.135 In brief, it cites the 
conflicts between Jonathan and Saul and between David and Saul to justify taking up 
arms against a tyrant, and such resistance would be as lawful as that done by David.136 
 That ‘A Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’ uses 1 Samuel is, by itself, 
revealing of Herbert’s viewpoint. Although both Prynne’s and Burroughs’s works 
discussed the verses of 1 Samuel and other verses of the Bible, we see Herbert’s 
corresponding manuscripts ‘Treatise on the Powers of King and Parliament’ and 
‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative’ – again, the former came from Prynne’s work 
while the latter from Burroughs’s – did not transcribe any biblical discussion from 
their works. Only when Herbert came to write ‘A Treatise on Obedience to 
Magistrates’ did he discuss the abovementioned verses of 1 Samuel.137 And from the 
discussion of the two cases of 1 Samuel we can see that this treatise is in favour of 
Parliamentarians’ interpretation of the same cases: though people could not do any 
harm to a tyrant, they could bridle his tyrannical deeds. The treatise thus strongly 
suggests that Herbert personally agreed with the viewpoints of parliamentary 
supporters. 
 Having discussed both sides’ arguments derived from Scripture, I now turn 
finally to how both sides exploited the third and final source of the moral principles, 
i.e. human laws, to argue their positions. Although both sides agreed that human laws 
are extensions of God’s law, they held different opinions about the content of the law, 
especially concerning fundamental constitutional issues. These issues mainly 
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concerned three domains: (a) the natures of the King and of the people of the 
kingdom – is the King inferior to God alone, or is he subordinate both to God and to 
human laws (and hence the servant of the kingdom and the people)? (b) the higher 
powers – on whom has God bestowed the power and obligation to govern, the King 
only or the King and also other inferior magistrates and Parliament?138 (c) the 
sovereign of the kingdom – who is the sovereign, the King or Parliament? The 
different opinions of both sides of the above constitutional issues will reveal their 
different interpretations of how human laws derived from God’s law. It is worth 
noting that in the following discussions, although both sides frequently cited Scripture 
to support their arguments, I do not categorize these points as arguments derived from 
the light of Scripture since they debate the theoretical basis of human laws and not the 
import of Biblical verses. 
 
5.2.1 The natures of the King and of the people 
 
Both sides had different viewpoints of the nature of the King, an issue of much 
importance for human laws. Royalists maintained that the King is subject to God 
alone and above both the laws of the kingdom and his subjects. Moreover, deriving 
their viewpoint from the theory of the divine right of kings, they held that the King is 
the representative of God, and hence could not be resisted. Thus Ferne and Digges 
argued that the King, according to 1 Peter 2:13 and Romans 13, is ‘the higher Power 
according to St Paul’, ‘the Supreme according to St Peter’, and ‘the Father of the 
Commonwealth’; therefore, subjects must obey the King. 139  Furthermore, they 
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described kings as ‘Gods’, following Psalms 82:6, and also cited Romans 13:2 
(‘whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist 
shall receive to themselves damnation’).140 Jeremy Taylor had made just the same 
statement, as I have shown in the first section of this chapter. By demonstrating the 
place of the King, Digges maintained that the King ‘is Dei Minister, not the peoples 
servant, not their creature’.141 ‘All are under the King, and the King is under God 
only’, Digges added.142 It is worth noting that although Digges later said that the 
King ‘is under God and the [human] Law, because the Law makes him King’, there 
was no paradox for him. As Digges added later, the King basically agreed to govern 
according to the established laws for convenient reasons, but he by all means could 
surpass human laws when necessary.143 Stating a similar viewpoint, Sanderson said 
that it is lawful for the King ‘without order, and in case of necessity, for the defence of 
his Country, to do some thing either besides, or against the Law’ since the King is 
superior to human laws.144 
Since the King is under God only, Digges maintained that the King is not only 
above any particular subject – i.e. major singulis – but also ‘hath greater right, and 
larger power, then even all the people could bestow upon him’ – i.e. he refuted minor 
universis, an important Parliamentary argument that the King is subservient to the 
people considered as a whole.145 Stressing that ‘the supreame Magistrate hath more 
power then the whole people, and is vice Deus, [and] Gods vicegerent’, Digges was 
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opposed to calling ‘Gods minister the peoples Servant’, as parliamentary supporters 
did.146  
Moreover, Digges insisted that the King, being the supreme magistrate, ‘is the 
representative of all, he is legally the whole people’, and that only by not resisting the 
power of kings could subjects obtain their well-being.147 Stating that some people 
were misled by the Long Parliament, Digges said that they ‘do not rightly apprehend 
what is truely advantageous’ since their well-being depends on the King and his 
governing power.148 People are able to obtain the greatest happiness on condition that 
they give ‘up of every mans particular power into his [the King’s] disposal, so that he 
may be inabled to force those who are unwilling upon some private ends, to be 
obedient for the common good’.149 Although Digges confessed that sometimes unjust 
judicial sentences might exist in the legal system, he maintained that only by enduring 
‘this possible evill’ could ‘a farre more considerable good’ be obtained.150 Moreover, 
he claimed that the King’s ‘interests are the same with the Subjects, which is strong 
State security’,151 and that ‘the King alone is sworne to protect us’.152 In brief, by 
submitting all to the King and trusting him subjects could obtain the greatest 
happiness. Thus Digges argued, subjects should not resist their sovereigns; had this 
governing system collapsed, the happiness of subjects would have faded away as 
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 Proceeding from the belief that subjects could only obtain happiness by not 
resisting their sovereigns, Royalists objected to the idea that Populi salus, suprema lex, 
i.e. the welfare of the people is supreme law, a very important argument of supporters 
of Parliament, as I will show later. Describing the idea as ‘the Engine by which the 
upper roomes are torne from the foundation, and seated upon fancy onely, like Castles 
in the aire’, Digges maintained that if the King were to be resisted, the people would 
not have their happiness.154 Likewise, Sanderson in 1646 bemoaned the fact that 
recently some people ‘under the pretence of Conscience, or of Christian liberty’ tried 
to ‘overthrow all the force and frame of the Ecclesiastic Government, so under the 
pretence of Civil liberty, or the liberty of the Subject’; moreover, they ‘presently 
defend[ed] themselves, and their manners, with this safety of the people’, and 
maintained that ‘this alone [was] to be preferred to all Laws, Kings, Ordinances, and 
Customs whatsoever’.155 Sanderson implied that the Long Parliament, being ‘factious 
Citizens’, abused the maxim of the safety of the people ‘to despise all Laws and 
Ordinances’, and ‘to revenge themselves upon the oppressors by force of Armes’.156 
Sanderson then explained that in this maxim the people denotes ‘the Prince and 
Subjects together’, not excluding the King.157 Moreover, he added that since ‘the 
Kings Majesty is sacred’, ‘the safety of the King alone, was to be preferred above the 
safety of them all [subjects]’; hence, to protect the safety of the people one should 
protect the safety of the King first.158 The goal of Sanderson’s argument was to say 
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that the maxim could not be used as a justification for people to resist the King; 
instead, the safety of the King is always the priority since the ‘the Care of the publick 
safety…depend[s] wholly on the will of the Prince, and nothing at all on the will of 
the people’.159 
 Since royalists believed that the King, being the deputy of God, receives his 
power from God, they also objected to the idea that the people of the kingdom could 
take back the power of the King. Responding to the Long Parliament’s argument that 
‘if the Prince, say they, will not discharge his trust, then it falls to the people or the 
two Houses to see to it, and to reassume that power, and thereby to resist’, Ferne 
denied that the people or Parliament could do so since the King’s power is not from 
the people.160 When a man becomes a king either by election or by succession, ‘the 
Lords hand also and his oyl is upon the person’ and he is then ‘the Lords anointed, 
and the minister of God’; at this time, ‘those hands of the people which were used in 
lifting him up to the Crown, may not again be lifted up against him, either to take the 
Crown from his head, or the sword out of his hand,’ Ferne added.161 
 In the eyes of Parliamentarians, the King, though he is supreme, is still a member 
of the kingdom, and his place is under both God and human laws. Agreeing with 
Royalists that the King is the supreme governor,162 Burroughs argued that ‘in the 
same place he is made an ordinance of man, and therefore to be limited by man’.163 
Citing 1 Peter 2:13,164 Burroughs maintained that the King and all inferior governors, 
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according to St. Peter, belonged to ‘human Ordinance’ or ‘human creation’. 165 
Moreover, Burroughs added that ‘kingdomes were not made for Kings, but Kings 
rather for kingdomes’.166 Showing the idea of the limited monarchy, Burroughs said 
that the King ‘is supreame, but not absolute’.167 William Bridge also said that the 
King is an ordinance of man. Quoting and interpreting Judges 8:22 and Judges 9:6, 
Bridge maintained that the King receives his power ‘originally from the people 
themselves, as appears by the government of the Judges and Kings of Israel’.168 
Emphasising the importance of the people and of the law of the land, Parker said that 
‘power is originally inherent in the people’, and ‘man is the free and voluntary Author, 
the Law is the Instrument, and God is the establisher of both’.169 Parker’s statements 
weakened the Royalists’ argument that the King is above everything except God. 
 After showing that the King is under human laws and a human ordinance – not a 
superior or creator of the kingdom –, Parliamentarians then explained the duty or the 
trust of the King: the King was entrusted by the kingdom and the people to protect 
their safety. Parker wrote that ‘all good Princes without any expresse contract betwixt 
them and their Subjects, have acknowledged that there did lie a great and high trust 
upon them’, and the trust requires the King to protect the safety of subjects.170 The 
King, therefore, is not entitled to ‘have so unconditionate and high a proprietie in all 
our lives, liberties and possessions’, and if he did, he would be ‘not borne for the 
                                                     
165 Burroughs also wrote ‘that such and such men should have this power, and how much of this power 
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people’, but merely for himself.171 Bridge likewise argued that the people have 
trusted the King for ‘the safety and security of the Kingdome, [and] the safety and 
welfare of the State, [but] not that the King might be great and the subjects slaves’.172 
Parker and Bridge thus held that when a prince violates the trust and does not protect 
the safety of the kingdom and of the people, the people could lawfully resist. As 
Parker put it, ‘wrong and violence may be repressed by one for the good of all, not 
that servilitie and drudgerie may be imposed upon all, for the pomp of one’.173 Bridge 
also commented that people would intend to be slaves if they ‘should have no power 
to take up armes for their owne defence because they had trusted the prince 
therewithall’.174 
 Meanwhile, parliamentary supporters maintained that Parliament, like the King, 
is trusted by the kingdom to protect the safety of the people. Paralleling Parliament 
with the officers in King David’s time, Bridge wrote that ‘the Parliament are trusted 
by the Common-wealth’ to protect the safety of the kingdom and that of its members, 
including the people and the King.175 Similarly, Parker argued that ‘Parliaments have 
the same efficient cause as monarchies, if not higher’, and that ‘God and the Law 
operate as the same causes, both in Kings and Parliaments, for God favours both, and 
the Law established both, and the act of men still concurres in the sustentation of 
both’.176 By arguing that the Parliament, like the King, is favoured by God, the law of 
the land, and the people, Parker maintained that the people have reserved some trust 
to the King, and some to Parliament; moreover, ‘this reservation [to Parliament] is not 
at all inconsistent with the Princes trust’, but ‘it is very ayding and strengthning to that 
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trust’, added Parker.177 
 Parliamentarians also held that populi salus, suprema lex, i.e., the safety of the 
people is the supreme law. As Parker emphasized, ‘the safetie of the people is to bee 
valued above any right of his [the King’s]’.178 Depicting the royalty as the means and 
the people as the end, Parker wrote that the royalty is not for itself, but for ‘the 
prosperitie of Gods people, and that end is more sacred then the means’.179 Likewise, 
describing the King’s prerogative as the means and the people’s welfare as the end, 
Parker said that ‘wee must rank the Lawes of libertie [i.e. populi salus, suprema lex] 
in the first Table, and Prerogative in the second, as Nature doth require’.180 Since 
Parker held that the King ‘was erected to preserve the Commonaltie, [and] the 
Commonaltie was not created for his service’, it followed that the King’s power is 
‘secondary and derivative’, not primary and original, and that ‘though he be singulis 
Major, yet he is universis minor’. 181  The power of the King, Parker insisted, 
originates from the people of the kingdom. 182  Arguing that the kingdom was 
governed ‘not onely by Stat[ute] law, but Co[mmon] law’, Burroughs said that the 
most important law of the common law is ‘Salus Populi’, a law upon which the 
determinations of all the courts in the kingdom must rely.183 
 Responding to the royalist argument that the King ‘is the Lords anointed’,184 
Parliamentarians asserted that anointment is not a prerogative of the King alone; it is 
given to people as well. Stressing that ‘anointing is not proper to Kings, but belongs 
                                                     
177 Parker, Observations upon Some of His Majesties Late Answers and Expresses, 8.  
178 Ibid., 8.  
179 Ibid., 18.  
180 Ibid. CF: ‘The Law of Prerogative it selfe, it is subservient to this Law [Populi salus, suprema lex]’. 
Ibid., 3. 
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182 Ibid., 2. ‘As for the finall cause of Regall Authorities, I doe not finde any thing in the Kings papers 
denying, that the same people is the finall [origin of the power]’.  
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to others as well as Kings’, Burroughs, quoting 1 Chronicles 16:22 and Psalm 105:15, 
wrote that God warned not to do harm to the anointed prophets.185 Moreover, 
Burroughs added that not only kings but also prophets, priests, inferior magistrates, 
and captains could be anointed, ‘as truely Gods anointed, as Kings are’.186 Once 
individuals are anointed, they are ‘of the people of God, of the Church, of the Saints’, 
and ‘God gives here a charge, that none, no not Kings should touch them to doe them 
any hurt’.187 In addition to insisting that anointment is not a prerogative of kings, 
Burroughs also weakened the sacredness of the anointment of kings by showing ‘the 
difference between Kings anointing then, as David, and Solomon, and others were, 
and Kings anointing now’; the former group are God’s direct ordinance while the 
latter group are the ordinance of both God and man, i.e. ‘the people first agree that 
such a one shall be King, [and] the Kingly power shall be in such a family 
successively, and then God establisheth this choise or agreement’.188 In brief, those 
kings who were anointed now are created not by ‘God’s immediate choise’, but ‘by 
way of compact or covenant’.189 
 Herbert’s collection ‘A Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’ (E5/3/44) also 
presents the idea of limited monarchy and the claim that the safety of the people 
precedes the King’s prerogative. As discussed in section 2 of Chapter 1 above, the 
manuscript was written after Herbert read Bishop Bilson’s work. 190  Echoing 
                                                     
185 Burroughs, The Glorious Name of God, the Lord of Hosts, 36. A printing error exists here. 
Burroughs intended to cite 1 Chronicles 16:22 – ‘Touch not mine anointed, and do my prophets no 
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authority of a sinful ruler is of God, and must accordingly be obeyed: of this read Bishop Bilson at 
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Parliamentarians’ arguments, the treatise states that ‘the law of God, and Nature 
teacheth that being now the father of the K[ing]dome, hee is not to waste his 
children’s Inheritance, indeed the people’s right, but to preserve and uphold it’; the 
King is bound to protect the people’s right ‘at his first entrance vpo[n] the state of the 
K[ing]dome’.191 Moreover, the manuscript proposes strikingly that ‘the people are 
more antient then the King; and for the people were kings ordained, not the people for 
them’.192 Furthermore, it stresses that when the King ascends the throne, he ‘is taken 
with Covenants’ to protect the people and the kingdom, and he could not ‘vniversally 
and wilfully violate’ it.193 Similarly, Herbert’s collection ‘Discourse on the High 
Court of Parliament and the Authority of the Same’ (E5/3/42) echoes the same theory 
of limited monarchy and maintains that the King had no arbitrary power over the 
kingdom: the ‘acte of Parliam[en]t and statute in England are not made only by the 
Prince pleasure but alsoe by the assent of the whole Realme’194. 
 
5.2.2 The higher powers in Romans 13:1 
 
In addition to the issue of the nature of the King and of people, supporters of 
Parliament had different interpretations of the ‘higher powers’ in Romans 13:1, which 
reads ‘let every soul be subject unto the higher powers’. On the one hand, 
Parliamentarians distinguished between the legal power of the King’s office and his 
personal power, maintaining that the King’s legal power represents the true higher 
power and the regal power. On the other hand, they maintained that the higher powers 
                                                                                                                                                        
large in his excellent treatise of Churistian Subjection; against the Papists that excommunicate and 
depose princes whom they account heretics, or favourers of them’. Baxter, A Christian Directory, part 
IV, 15. 
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193 Ibid., fol. 5r-5v.  
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were not confined to kings, but included inferior governors and Parliament. Both 
arguments, as the following paragraphs will show, are presented by Herbert’s 
collections, especially by ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative’ and ‘A Treatise on 
Obedience to Magistrates’. 
Differentiating between the King’s legal power and his personal power, 
Burroughs argued in ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative’ that the differentiation is 
necessary since ‘a man in authority may co[mma]nd what auth[ority] co[mma]nds 
not’.195 He defined the regal power as ‘that which the Lawes of the Land invest him 
[the King] with’ – this definition also reveals that the King is under the law of the 
land –, and then claimed that the Long Parliament fought ‘onely against his personall 
Co[mma]nd, not his legall power’.196 Commenting on Romans 13:1, Burroughs 
wrote that the verses does not require us to submit ‘to the wills of those who are in 
highest place’:197 rather, ‘if wee be either actively or passively subject to the Lawes 
of that Countrey wherein we live, we fulfil the very l[ett]re of that Scrip[ture]’.198 
Furthermore, the King’s legal power ‘consist[s] not in his personall verball 
co[mma]nds’ but ‘in his Co[mma]nds by his Officers seales, and Courts of Justice’ – 
and the highest court in the kingdom is Parliament, Burroughs added.199 In brief, 
according to Burroughs, the personal command of the King differs from the regal 
power of the King, and since the Long Parliament resisted not the latter but only the 
former, they were not in violation of the precept of Romans 13:1. 
 Parliamentarians, then, claimed that they were not resisting the King since they 
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did not resist the King’s legal power.200 Reiterating the above paragraph’s argument, 
Burroughs added that they ‘desire not that he [the King] should have lesse power then 
God and Laws hath given him’, but instead denied that the King had ‘any further 
power’.201 Agreeing that Parliament and its supporters were all the King’s subjects, 
Burroughs argued that we were bound to submit to his legal power, but not ‘to his 
will’.202 When the Long Parliament carried everything ‘according to the constitution 
of the Government of our Kingdome’, they did ‘not sinne against Authority’.203 At 
the same time, Burroughs, agreeing with the Royalists that the abused authority 
should be obeyed, maintained that the Long Parliament was not resisting the abused 
authority of the King because of the ‘differences betw[een] the Co[mma]nds that are 
from abused authority, and the Co[mma]nds that are from the wills of men in 
Authority’.204 If we resist the ‘command out of his [the King’s] own will, and not by 
Law’, ‘it is not resisting abused power, for it is resisting no power at all’, he added.205 
Burroughs explained that the abused power ‘is the ill use of what is given to him’, but 
when tyrants command out of their own wills, they commit ‘abuse of their wils, but 
not abuse of their power’; in this kind of case, people could resist tyrants without 
fighting against the authority of the King.206 After reading Burroughs’ work, Prynne 
agreed that the Long Parliament did not resist ‘any kingly, lawfull royall Authority’, 
but only ‘these illegall oppressions, tyrannicall actions, not warranted, but prohibited 
                                                     
200 Among Royalists only Digges answered this point. He maintained that Parliamentarians were 
misleading the people when they differentiated between the legal power of the King and his personal 
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by the Laws of God, and the Realme’.207 Although Prynne implied that King Charles 
I, by delivering unlawful commands, ‘is no lawfull King, nor Majestrate, but an unjust 
oppressing Tyrant, and a meere private man’,208 he insisted that their resistance did 
‘neither oppose the Kings royal person, nor [his] lawfull Authority’, and hence the 
resistance ‘must certainly be lawfull in point of conscience’.209 Similarly, Goodwin 
insisted that when a king oppressed the people with an unlawful command, subjects 
could not only disobey it but also take up arms, though ‘not properly or directly 
against the King’; moreover, in such a case, resisting the unlawful command of the 
King by force ‘is not only lawfull, but even a matter of duty and obedience unto 
God’.210 
 The ‘Declaration of the Houses in Defence of the Militia Ordinance’ issued on 6 
June 1642 echoes the Parliamentarian arguments described above. The declaration 
states that the King ‘is the fountain of justice and protection, but the acts of justice 
and protection are not exercised in his own person, nor depend upon his pleasure, but 
by his courts and by his ministers’.211 Moreover, the jurisdiction of courts represent 
the authority of the King, and even the King’s personal objection cannot annul them – 
as it states that ‘if judgements should be given by them against the King’s will and 
personal command, yet are they the King’s judgements’.212 Furthermore, since the 
King’s ‘supreme and royal pleasure is exercised and declared in this High Court of 
law and council’, the determination and jurisdiction of Parliament outweighs the 
‘personal act or resolution of his own’.213 
 In addition to distinguishing between the legal power of the King and his 
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personal power, Parliamentarians argued that the ‘higher powers’ include not only the 
King, but also Parliament and other inferior governors – hence, people are also bound 
to obey their lawful commands. Responding to Ferne’s argument that the power of the 
King comes from God and that the King is an ordinance of God, Burroughs wrote that 
‘we grant that the power not onely of Kings, but of all lawfull authority is Gods 
Ordinance’, and hence these other lawful authorities are also, like the King, higher 
powers.214 Similarly, addressing Ferne’s statement that ‘the supreme Magistrate is 
called the Minister of God, Rom.13’, Burroughs argued that ‘this is true of inferior 
Magistrates as well as superiour’.215 Parker similarly insisted that although the King 
is the chief member of the kingdom and the ordinance of God, he is not the only 
higher power since God also creates inferior magistrates as higher powers. 216 
Likewise, Goodwin wrote that since ‘subordinate Authority, and inferior Magistracy 
and power is as much the Ordinance of God, as Soveraignty and supreame Authourity 
it selfe is’, God requires us ‘to submit ourselves to inferior Magistrates or Governours’ 
as we do to the King.217  
 Herbert’s collection ‘A Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’ agreed with the 
Parliamentarians that inferior magistrates or governors are entitled to lead the people 
in bridling the unlawful commands of kings. The treatise states that when a king ‘shall 
breake out by an vniversall force, and Tyranny vnsufferable’, inferior governors ‘were 
ordained to bee bridles to an ill governor, to pull him, and to hold him to the duties of 
his kingly place’, as the ‘the Consulls, Praetors, and other Governors of the Citty, and 
Presidents of the Providences of Rome’ and ‘the Elders of the people in Israell’ did 
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before.218 Moreover, when inferior magistrates – i.e. ‘the Dukes, Marquesses, Earles, 
Viscounts of this Land, who (antiently) were deputed to roomes of Authority in the 
state’ – bridle the unlawful commands of a tyrant, ‘they serve not the king, but the 
Crowne, and Countrey’.219 Showing that tyrant’s wilful deeds could be halted, ‘A 
Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’ states that the wall of a kingdom could not 
stand ‘if hee that is possessed of the supreme authority therein would wilfully pull it 
downe’.220  
  
5.2.3 Parliament as the highest power in the kingdom 
 
Claiming that inferior magistrates are also the ordinances of God, however, could not 
perfectly justify taking up arms against the King since he is, at least nominally, 
superior to inferior magistrates. If the King could not act as judge when in a quarrel 
with inferior magistrates, there would need to be a third party to judge the lawfulness 
of inferior magistrates’ resistance against the King. Hence, the next and the most 
crucial step of the Parliamentary argument was to establish that Parliament is the 
highest court in the kingdom and the highest power of the realm – i.e., Parliament 
holds sovereignty in the kingdom. By doing so Parliament is entitled to deliver its 
jurisdiction over everything, including the deeds of both the King and inferior 
magistrates.221 As we will see below, Herbert’s collections E5/3/42 and E5/3/46, 
‘Discourse on the High Court of Parliament’ and ‘Treatise on the Powers of King and 
Parliament’, make this argument strongly. 
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 Responding to King Charles I’s claim that what the Long Parliament did was 
against the law of the kingdom, Burroughs answered that ‘when the most inferior 
Court of Justice determines any thinge to be Law, it is not the K[ing]’s personall 
dissent, and saying it is not law that disannuls it, but the judge[men]t of some 
superiour Court’; moreover, since Parliament is the highest court in the kingdom, ‘the 
personall dissent of the King cannot disannul it [the determination of Parliament]’.222 
Burroughs’s statement echoes his former argument that the legal power of the King 
differs from the personal power of the King, and that the King’s office seal and courts 
of justice – not his personal command – represent the King’s legal power. Moreover, 
since Parliament is where the last appeal lies, this means that ‘Parliament is supreme 
Judges’.223 Sharing the same opinion, Prynne in his first part of The Soveraigne 
Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes – i.e. Herbert’s collection E5/3/46, ‘Discourse 
on the High Court of Parliament’, discussed in Chapter 4 above – focused on 
establishing that Parliament is ‘the Highest Soveraigne power of all others, and above 
the King himselfe’.224 When Prynne in the third part of his work justified the Long 
Parliament’s resistance, he used the same argument: he said that the ‘necessary 
forcible resistance which is Authorised, and Commanded by the Supreamest lawfull 
power and highest Soveraigne Authority in the Realme, must infallibly be just and 
lawfull, even in point of Conscience, by the expresse Resolution of Rom. 13’.225 
Moreover, maintaining that Parliament is the highest power in the realm, Prynne 
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argued that the King ‘is but the Parliaments and Kingdomes Publicke Royall Servant 
for their good’.226 Describing Parliament as the ‘great Councell of the Kingdome’ 
who holds ‘supreame judicature’,227 Parker wrote that Parliament represents the 
kingdom, and ‘sit[s] in a far higher capacitie than inferior Judges doe’.228 Quoting 
and interpreting ‘Romans 13. 1. Wee are commanded to be subjected to the higher 
Powers’, Bridge said that ‘Parliament[,] being the highest court of Justice in this 
Kingdome[,] must needs bee the higher powers of England, though the King be 
supreame, yet they have the high power of declaring the law’; therefore, the subjects 
are bound to obey the commands of Parliament.229 
 That Parliament, not the King, holds the sovereignty of the kingdom is one of the 
main points of the ‘Discourse on the High Court of Parliament’. When speaking of 
‘the soveraigne power of this high Courte of Parliament’, the Discourse stated that 
although the King has ‘very many great prerogatives, yet diverse thing[e]s there are, 
which are not effectuall in lawe, to passe by the Kinge Charter vnder the great Seale 
of England, but only by authority of this high Courte of Parliament’.230 Moreover, 
Parliament, as the best means to preserve the public safety and tranquillity, is created 
to protect the safety of the people. The work further argues that Parliament holds 
higher authority than the King because it precedes monarchy and because the King is 
only a part of Parliament.231 
 
By analyzing Herbert’s collections ‘A Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’, 
‘Discourse on the High Court of Parliament’, and ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative’ 
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(E5/3/44, E5/3/46, and E5/3/49, respectively), this section has shown that he was very 
likely to agree with the Parliamentarians’ argument: Parliament or inferior magistrates 
could lawfully lead the people to resist a tyrant. These manuscripts must have been 
collected by Herbert in the 1640s, and their viewpoints not only support the main 
argument of Chapter 4 above that Herbert had a strong interest in Parliament’s 
authority,232 but also reflect his agreement with Parliamentarians on the legitimacy of 
lawful resistance against a tyrant. Moreover, among Herbert’s other political 
collections, no manuscript belongs to the writings of the Royalists, implying that 
Herbert was not interested in their cause. Again, as discussed in the second section of 
Chapter 1 above, it is worth noting that although another manuscript in Herbert’s 
collection – ‘Notes on the King, Parliament and the Civil War’ (E5/3/45), composed 
during the English Civil War by an anonymous author – argued that the English Civil 
War would not bring happiness to the Common Wealth, its existence in Herbert’s 
collection does not in any way contradict the argument of this chapter. It only reveals 
that Herbert was aware of the viewpoints of those moderators who disagreed with the 
value of the Civil War. 
 Transcribed from Prynne’s first part of The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments 
and Kingdomes and from Burroughs’ The Glorious Name of God, the Lord of Hosts 
respectively, ‘Treatise on the Powers of King and Parliament’ (E5/3/46) and ‘Treatise 
on the Royal Prerogative and the Right of Parliament to Resist Royal Power’ (E5/3/49) 
belong to the classical works of Parliamentarians. Also supporting Parliamentarians’ 
arguments, ‘A Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’ (E5-3-44) is a reflection written 
by Herbert after he read Bilson’s The True Difference Betweene Christian Subiection 
and Unchristian Rebellion. Like the English casuists and Royalists, the authors of 
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these three manuscripts used moral principles derived from nature, Scripture, and 
human laws. They agreed with the Royalists on several points: that the people could 
disobey the unlawful commands of the King, that the King’s abuse of a law does not 
justify the people in taking up arms, and that private men by no means could take up 
arms against the King’s very person. Nonetheless, showing the main arguments of 
Parliament’s side, these three manuscripts resolved that conscience agrees that a tyrant 
could be resisted by the people. Citing cases in 1 Samuel, ‘A Treatise on Obedience to 
Magistrates’ maintains that when a king becomes a tyrant and goes against the 
well-being of the whole kingdom, the nobles and inferior magistrates could lead the 
people to resist his tyranny. It further states that the safety of the people precedes the 
prerogatives of the King, since ‘the people are more antient then the King; and for the 
people were kings ordained, not the people for them’. ‘Treatise on the Powers of King 
and Parliament’ argues that Parliament and the people could resist a tyrant, since 
Parliament holds the highest sovereignty and it is the demand of the conscience to 
obey the highest power. Differentiating between the King’s legal power and his 
personal power, ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative’ asserts that resisting a tyrant does 
not equate to resisting the regal power; it only resists against the tyrant’s personal 
command. Like ‘A Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’, ‘Treatise on the Royal 
Prerogative’ insists that Parliament and inferior magistrates, like kings, are higher 
powers, and are trusted by the people to protect the safety of them. Hence, when a 
king becomes a tyrant, people have both the right and the responsibility to resist, 
though they are not entitled to do harm to the King’s very person. The above three 
manuscripts strongly suggest that Herbert agreed with the Parliamentarians’ argument: 
conscience grants that the people could resist a tyrant. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has shown that Herbert’s views on contemporary matters of religion and 
politics reflected his emphasis on the freedom and authority of individual conscience. 
Chapter 2 provides Herbert’s theory of conscience, which forms the basis of the 
following chapters. According to him, conscience is founded in the universal 
providence, a faculty ingrained by God in the mind of every human being. The 
supreme guide to an individual’s actions, conscience is ‘a guardian of divine justice’ 
and ‘the court of God’.1 Moreover, the satisfaction of conscience is necessary for 
obtaining salvation and eternal blessedness,2 and the authority of conscience is higher 
than those of other worldly institutions, including the authority of a king. By focusing 
on Herbert’s views of contemporary issues, Chapters 3, 4, and 5 echo Herbert’s theory 
and his concern for the satisfaction of individual conscience. Chapter 3 argues that 
Herbert supported the royal supremacy against the papal supremacy, since he believed 
that the former could protect individual conscience from the corruption of popes. It 
also shows that in his view the royal supremacy must not interfere with the freedom 
of individual conscience. In The Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth, Herbert 
expressed his sympathy for those martyrs who refused to accept the king’s supremacy 
on grounds of conscience, among whom Thomas More was the best example. 
Moreover, Herbert delivered his open objection to the Six Articles enacted by the 
name of the royal supremacy, since he thought that it was harmful to the liberty of 
conscience.3 Chapter 4 argues that in Herbert’s view the safety and liberty of the 
people precede the prerogatives of the crown, and that Parliament, as the highest court 
                                                     
1 DV, 185.  
2 Conscience is where ‘the great contract of salvation is expressed and eternal blessedness assured’. 
Herbert, 184. 
3 L&R, 447-48.  
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in the kingdom, could best protect the people’s consciences from oppression by the 
King’s unlawful commands. Chapter 5 reveals Herbert’s concern for the moral 
dilemmas of the people during the early English Civil War, particularly whether they 
could lawfully resist a tyrant. Herbert’s manuscript collections strongly suggest that 
his answer was positive, and that conscience grants that a tyrant’s misdeeds could be 
resisted. 
 Broadening the scope of the research on Herbert is the first main contribution of 
this thesis. As mentioned in the literature survey in Chapter 1, he has been labelled 
‘the father of English deism’ since the mid eighteenth century, and modern research 
has devoted much effort to his philosophical and religious thought, especially the five 
religious common notions. However, this thesis sets aside this label and focuses on 
the connection between his thought and his historical context. It does so largely 
through an analysis of ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the Church’, The Life and Raigne 
of King Henry the Eighth, and Herbert’s collection currently deposited in the National 
Library of Wales, all of which have rarely been examined by scholars. Herbert’s 
historical works have been neglected and underestimated for quite a long time, and Sir 
Sidney Lee’s influential edition of Herbert’s autobiography, as Chapter 1 indicates, 
provided an unfair evaluation on them. By discussing Herbert’s views on the royal 
supremacy, the relationship between the King and Parliament, and the issue of 
resistance to tyrants during the early English Civil War, this thesis widens the research 
on Herbert and balances modern studies’ disproportionate attention to Herbert’s 
religious thought. 
 This thesis shows that Herbert’s thought needs to be understood in its 
early-seventeenth-century political context; placing Herbert in that context results in a 
different and more complete understanding of him than that offered by his reputation 
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as a forerunner of eighteenth-century deistical thought.4 Herbert was concerned with 
the individual conscience, which was a very important topic of the seventeenth 
century, or, the ‘age of conscience’. In this era, many people were afflicted by many 
moral dilemmas, struggling between their public duties and private consciences, 
between taking the oaths of allegiance to royal supremacy and retaining their religious 
stances, and between accepting the prescribed teachings of national churches and 
retaining their religious beliefs. As discussed in Chapter 3, Herbert met with similar 
moral dilemmas when writing ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the Church’ and The Life 
and Raigne. On the one hand, he should take King Charles’s intentions into 
consideration, while on the other hand he intended to retain his own judgements based 
on conscience. Similarly, Herbert experienced the conflict between his public duty 
and his private conscience during the English Civil War, when each side called on the 
people to take up arms for the kingdom. In addition to showing that Herbert was 
deeply involved in the issues of conscience in this century, Chapters 3, 4, and 5 
provide detailed arguments regarding the connection between Herbert’s thought and 
that of his contemporaries. Chapter 2 reveals that he shared many viewpoints with the 
English casuists on the theory of conscience, including the definition of conscience 
and its authority. Chapter 3 shows that Herbert, when arguing for the royal supremacy 
against the papal supremacy, provided the same reasons as those in the Act in 
Restraint of Appeals (1533). Moreover, Herbert’s view of the King’s power over the 
Church fitted that of his contemporaries: supremacy was a jurisdictional rather than a 
sacerdotal matter. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 argue that Herbert shared an interest in 
Parliament and its authority with many Parliamentarians, and that he agreed with 
                                                     
4 Diego Lucci, Scripture and Deism: The Biblical Criticism of the Eighteenth-Century British Deists 
(Bern; New York: Peter Lang, 2008), 23–30; Justin Champion, ‘Deism’, in The Columbia History of 




them that Parliament could best protect the liberty and safety of the people and save 
their consciences from moral dilemmas. By revealing Herbert’s theory of conscience 
and his emphasis on the freedom of individual conscience, this thesis also challenges 
the assumption that his theory of common notions represents the whole picture of his 
thought.5 
 It is worth noting that to say Herbert’s thought belonged to the seventeenth 
century and shared many ideas with his contemporaries does not deny the fact that his 
thought had its characteristics and contributed to seventeenth-century intellectual 
history. Although his theory of common notions did not constitute the whole picture 
of his philosophical thought, common notions play a prominent role in his theory of 
truth. Although the idea of the common notions was shared by contemporaries such as 
Robert Sanderson, for Herbert they were absolutely essential as not only the most 
reliable source of moral principles, but also the most solid truths human beings can 
rely on – whithout the common notions people ‘should never come to distinguish 
between things, or to grasp any general nature’.6 Although Herbert acknowledged the 
existence and importance of grace or particular providence, the role of grace was 
diminished and that of common notions or universal providence enlarged. In brief, the 
prominent role of the common notions still forms a characteristic of Herbert’s theory 
of truth. Herbert’s thought had its contemporary influence. His De Veritate was 
commented on by more than a dozen scholars in his own time, including René 
Descartes and Thomas Hobbes.7 His The Life and Raigne retained its influence after 
its publication,8 and it was only when Herbert obtained his well-known title as the 
                                                     
5 See section 1.1 above. 
6 DV, 105. For more detailed argument, see Chapter 2 above. 
7 R. W Serjeantson, ‘Herbert of Cherbury before Deism: The Early Reception of the De Veritate’, The 
Seventeenth Century 16 (2001): 219–20. 
8 James Granger stated that ‘Lord Herbert stands in the first rank of the public ministers, historians, 
and philosophers, of his age’. See James Granger, A Biographical History of England, from Egbert the 
Great to the Revolution, vol. 2, 319. William Nicolson (1655-1727) said that Herbert ‘may be truly said 
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father of English deism that its good reputation started to diminish.9 
 The second main contribution of this thesis is to better unify Herbert’s De 
Veritate, his religious treatises, and his historical works. It provides a more 
comprehensive and coherent picture of Herbert’s thought. Chapter 2 has shown that 
studies that focus only on Herbert’s five religious common notions are prone to cause 
fallacy, since, according to Herbert, common notions are not themselves sufficient and 
truths could only be obtained by the guidance of both common notions and grace, or 
universal providence and particular providence. As Herbert stated in the preface of De 
Veritate, his theory was the product of both.10 Similarly, in Herbert’s theory of 
conscience, only by following the guidance of both common notions and grace could 
an individual achieve the satisfaction of conscience. The above argument also points 
out that some scholars, such as Horace Walpole and Sir Sidney Lee, mistakenly 
thought that Herbert contradicted his theory of common notions because he recorded a 
personal experience of receiving the divine imprimatur of De Veritate in the end of his 
Autobiography.11 In fact, Herbert’s experience of receiving grace did not contradict 
his theory, but was a presentation of it. 
 The fundamental connection between Herbert’s works of philosophy, religion, 
and history is his theory of truth. This thesis has demonstrated that Herbert’s theory 
not only applied to religion, giving birth to the five religious common notions, but 
also applied to his historical work The Life and Raigne and to his theory of 
conscience.12 In his history of King Henry VIII, Herbert used his theory to argue that 
                                                                                                                                                        
to have written the Life and Reign of King Henry the Eighth; having acquitted himself with the like 
Reputation as the Lord-Chancellor Bacon gain’d by that of Henry the Seventh’. See William Nicolson, 
The English Historical Library (London: Printed for Abel Swall and T. Child, at the Unicorn, in St. 
Paul’s Church-Yard, 1696), 226. 
9 For those who denounced Herbert as a deist, The Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth was not a 
good work. See Charles Mills’ comment in section 1.1. 
10 DV, 77. For more detailed information, see chapter 2. 
11 See section 2.2. 
12 As mentioned in the end of section 3.1, Sorley held that Herbert only applied the theory of common 
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every human being will in principle agree with the royal supremacy, not the papal 
supremacy. In his theory of conscience, common notions form the most reliable 
source of moral principles, and a troubled conscience, according to Herbert, should 
seek help from both the common notions and grace. 
 The common concern of Herbert’s works of philosophy, religion, and history, 
considered alongside his collections of religion and politics, is with solving the moral 
dilemmas faced by the people in the first half of the seventeenth century. De Veritate 
aims to save the consciences of the people from deceptive words and oppressions of 
religious sects or ‘the cunning authorities’, and his five religious common notions 
have the same goal. 13  Likewise, Herbert’s De Religione Laici, De Religione 
Gentilium, and A Dialogue Between a Tutor and His Pupil intend to search for the 
best religion for the laymen, so that their consciences could be free from sectarian 
strife and ‘the terrors of divers churches militant throughout the world’.14 Herbert’s 
historical works also reveal that the peace of the people’s consciences supercedes the 
royal supremacy. Aiming to save the people from any invention of the religious 
articles, Herbert in ‘On the King’s Supremacy in the Church’ stresses that kings 
should not assume sacerdotal powers and that neither the King nor clergymen could 
change the foundation of religion.15 Echoing the same idea, Herbert in The Life and 
Raigne disagreed with the executions of those who refused to accept the royal 
supremacy on grounds of conscience. As he wrote, conscience should be persuaded, 
not forced. Likewise, Herbert’s political collections, again, show that he was in favour 
of Parliament’s sovereignty, since he believed that it could save the people from the 
moral dilemmas caused by the unlawful commands of the King. 
                                                                                                                                                        
notions to religion. Sorley, ‘The Philosophy of Herbert of Cherbury’, 506. 
13 DV, 73, 290.  
14 DV, 87; DRG, 51-54; Dialogue, esp. 1-5.  
15 See section 3.3. 
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 A topic worth further researching is Herbert’s attitude towards King Henry VIII 
presented in The Life and Raigne. As mentioned in Chapter 1 above, scholars have 
different opinions on this issue: Horace Walpole and James Granger commented that 
Herbert palliated Henry’s tyrannical deeds, while Mario Rossi, W. Merchant, and 
Eugene Hill held that Herbert described Henry with irony. However, none of the 
above scholars provide detailed analysis. When Chapter 3 argues that Herbert 
displayed limited support for Henry’s royal supremacy, it touches this unresolved but 
very interesting topic. Chapter 3 reveals that Herbert had two levels of description 
when writing the Henrician Reformation: in the first level, Herbert defended Henry’s 
policies in many cases, while in the second level he showed his disapproval of some 
policies of Henry, such as the Six Articles, and revealed his sympathy for some of 
those executed, such as Thomas More. Herbert’s descriptions of Henry are careful and 
nuanced, and a more comprehensive study is worth carrying out in the future. 
 This thesis hopes to show that examining Herbert exclusively in the context of 
the deistical controversy in the eighteenth century is anachronistic and incomplete. As 
mentioned, Herbert’s thought belonged to the seventeenth century, not the eighteenth. 
Moreover, separating his five religious common notions – often regarded as tenets of 
deism – from his theory of truth distorts his theory and obfuscates his original 
intention. Chapter 3 has demonstrated that no controversy arose when his theory of 
common notions was applied to the issue of the royal supremacy, implying that his 
theory of common notions was not itself religiously subversive, which is contrary to 
the statements of those who accused Herbert of intending to subvert Christianity. 
Similarly, Herbert’s theory of conscience, derived from his theory of truth, caused no 
obvious objection. The above applications, in fact, echo Herbert’s irenic intention; 
that is, he was searching for universally accepted truths to allow people to navigate 
moral dilemmas with clear consciences.  
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 This thesis not only points out that modern scholars’ understandings of Herbert’s 
aims is incomplete, but also seeks to fill that gap in the scholarship. Other researchers 
have grasped portions of Herbert’s intention without realising that the common idea of 
Herbert’s works is to save the people from contemporary moral dilemmas. Focusing 
on Herbert’s five religious common notions, Pailin argues that Herbert aimed to save 
people from the abuse of clergymen.16 After examining De Veritate, Butler held that 
it ‘is an eirenic religious treatise as much, if not more, than it is an epistemological 
work.’17 Similarly, Johnson concentrates on De Veritate, especially its five religious 
common notions, and maintains that they were the response to the contemporary 
religious strife.18 This thesis agrees with their efforts to reexamine Herbert’s De 
Veritate and to separate Herbert’s thought from the deistical controversy in the 
eighteenth century. However, their descriptions of the intention of Herbert’s writing 
are incomplete, since they did not consider Herbert’s other religious treatises, his 
historical works, or his views on matters of religion and politics. By unifying 
Herbert’s works of philosophy, religion, history, and his private collections, this thesis 
shows that Herbert aimed to solve the people’s moral dilemmas, including those 
caused by religious wars, oppressions of clergymen and religious sects, the royal 
supremacy, the prerogatives of the King, and the English Civil War. In brief, the 
common concern of Herbert’s works is the freedom and authority of individual 
conscience. 
 
                                                     
16 Pailin, ‘Should Herbert of Cherbury Be Regarded as a “Deist”?’, 132. 
17 Butler, Lord Herbert of Chirbury (1582-1648): An Intellectual Biography, 173. 






This appendix consists of two parts. Part I contains new transcriptions of four 
manuscripts from Herbert’s manuscripts of religion and politics deposited in the 
National Library of Wales: ‘A Treatise on Obedience to Magistrates’ (part of E5/3/44), 
‘Notes on the King, Parliament and the Civil War’ (E5/3/45), ‘Treatise on the Powers 
of King and Parliament’ (E5/3/46) – especially including another part of E5/3/46 
misplaced in the manuscript E5/3/21, ‘Mr St John’s Speech in the Upper House of 
Parliament 1641, January 14’ –,1 and ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative and the Right 
of Parliament to Resist Royal Power’ (E5/3/49). These manuscripts are used in 
Chapters 4 and 5. Although much of this material was previously transcribed by 
Mario M. Rossi in the 1940s, there remains room for improvement, including some 
obscure words and abbreviations and one incomplete transcription (E5/3/45). 
Furthermore, having identified the texts which provide the bases of E5/3/46 and 
E5/3/49, I am in a position to provide a more accurate transcription of these 
manuscripts and to decode some particular conventions of the copyist.2 Where my 
transcription diverges from Rossi’s, I have provided his transcription in the footnotes. 
Finally, a photograph is included for each manuscript, to illustrate the hand used and 
the physical condition of the manuscript. 
 Part II is a transcription of a letter from Herbert to Rouse, a Bodleian Librarian, 
conserved in the opening of MS. Bodl. 910, the second version of the surviving 
manuscripts of The Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth. 
 
  
                                                     
1 I discovered this issue in the summer of 2016, and reported it to a librarian when I visited the Library 
the next year. 





E5/3/44: Account of 'ye present troubles'; and a Treatise on Obedience to 
Magistrates 
 
As explained in chapter 1, this manuscript contains two parts. The first part is entitled 
‘A Short Narration of Occurrences in the Kingdom of Scotland, and of the Present 
Troubles, Together with Their Causes, and Progression’, and is written in 2 folios. 
However, the second folio has been misplaced and the content is different from the 
transcription provided by Rossi in the 1940s; I reported this problem to the National 
Library of Wales on 23 July 2016. The following transcription encompasses the 
second part of this manuscript, beginning with folio 3.  
 
fol. 3r 
Questions Touching vpon Obedience to Magistrates in Eminency 
 
Quest[ion] 
What if Princes become Tyrants, are they then to bee obeyed? 
 
Answ[er] 
They are by Private Persons, though they should become as wolves in the 
evening. Servants must so obey their M[aste]rs.3 1 P[e]t[er] 2:18 Private Persons 
therefore much more their Soveraine.4 No Private Person is warranted to lay his Hand 
vpon the Lords anointed, or to make Publique talke of his faults. The golden scepter 
hath not called every man to speake in such a case, except to God on his knees.5 
 
Q[uestion] 
But what if a Prince shall sett himselfe professedly ag[ains]t the whole 
k[ing]dome,6 at least the greater part thereof, with the old Nobility, and Gentry of the 
same to cast them out of the Land, and to send the gospell after them; what should bee 
                                                     
3 CF: ‘They are by Private Persons, though they should become slaves as Servants must so obey their 
Mrs’. Italics are by Rossi. When Rossi thought the specific word was too obscure to transcribe and he 
provided a word of his own, he used italics. See Mario M. Rossi, La vita, le opere, i tempi di Edoardo 
Herbert di Chirbury (Firenze: G.C. Sansoni, 1947), vols 3, 493. 
4 1 Peter 2:18 reads ‘Servants, be subject to your masters with all fear; not only to the good and gentle, 
but also to the froward’. I am indebted to Dr. Felicity Green on help decipher this very implicit 
abbreviation. 
5 CF: ‘The golden scepter has not called every man to speake in such a case but as to God on his 
knees’. Ibid., vols 3, 493. ‘but as’ should be ‘except’. 
6 CF: ‘But what if a Prince shall sett himself to destroy the Kingdom’. Ibid., vols 3, 493. ‘to destroy the 
Kingdom’ should be ‘professedly ag[ains]t’. 
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done in this case? 
 
A[nswer] 









moderately bee resisted, as in the Case betweene Saul, and Jonathan, when the people 
delivered the good sonne out of the bad father’s hands. 1 Sam[uel] 14. 45. or if this 
moderate course prevaile not the vnreasonable and have king prince is by the Nobles, 
and Peeres of the land to bee kept short, as the wolfe of prey; yet with this 
remembrance, that the sanguine complexion of a Prince is not to bee dealt with as 
com[m]on blood. An example is Jehu, in whose eyes even the vile person of Jezebel 
was honorable because she was a king’s daughter.7 2 Kings 9. 34. And heere, though 
one may not lay hands vpon the Lords anointed, yet one may hold a mad man’s hand.8 
But if this tollerable remedy, bee thought to[o] much, or please not; Covenante 
between him, and his Vassalls must bee lookt into. It may bee the infringing of his 
oath taken at his Coronation, may dethrone him; so may hee as Saul fall vpo[n] his 
owne sword. 1 Samuel 31. 4. 
 
Q[uestion] 





Those by their first Justification, and proper place were ordained to bee bridles to 
an ill governor,9 to pull10 him, and to hold him to the duties of his kingly place, when 
he shall breake11 out by an vniversall forces, and Tyranny vnsufferable. For in such 
cases, they serve not the king, but the Crowne, and Countrey. Such were the Consulls, 
Praetors, and other Governors of the Citty, and Presidents of the Providences of Rome. 
Such were the Rulers of the Tribes, the Captaines of thousands of hundred, of fifties, 
of tennes. And such the Elders12 of the people in Israell. Further, and such ones were 
the Dukes, Marquesses, Earles, Viscounts of this Land, who (antiently) were deputed 
                                                     
7 CF: ‘An example in Josia in which –– the vile person of Jezeble was honorable because she was a 
kings daughter’. Rossi, La vita, vols 3, 493. ‘Josia’ should be ‘Jehu’. Moreover, if we consider the 
content of 2 Kings 9:34, it was Jehu that commented Jezeble in this way. 
8 CF: ‘yet one may held away mans hand’. Ibid. 
9 CF: ‘and proper place were ordained to bee enemies to an ill governor’. Ibid., vols 3, 494. ‘enemies’ 
should be ‘bridles’.  
10 CF: ‘restain’. Ibid.  
11 CF: ‘breache’. Ibid. 
12 CF: ‘leaders’. Ibid. 
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to roomes of Authority in the state, though now changed13 into Dignities14 that run in 
inheritance, but what this against, and to any impeach[men]t of their first and antient 
powers? And now since it appeareth that there is such a Correspondence between a 
king, and other governors of the state, it is manifest that the reins15 are not (all) in his 




Soueraign com[mand]16 and onely, and that therefore the offending king may bee 
pulled in of the other officers of state, joyned with Him, though in an inferior 
Com[m]ission. And therefore as they in fault are to bee chastised by the king, so the 
king so deadly offending (as was said) is by the said subjoyned authority to bee delt 
with, curbed, and pulled in, and what doubt but that such subordinates with the 
Countrey is to them com[m]itted, may and ought to stay the –––17 king though it 
should be by armes. Else how should the wall of a k[ing]dome stand if hee that is 
possessed of the supreme authority therein would wilfully pull it downe.18 In this 




But what one example have you for this? 
 
A[nswer] 
David after king then a subject under Saull defended himselfe, and the 
companies with him in armes, when there was no other remedy. Yet so as that hee 
would not lay a hand vpon the king, though having him twice in his power. Now shall 




rebell ag[ains]t Saul? Wise Abigail saith that (for all this) hee fought the Lords battells. 
1 Samuel 25. 21. 
                                                     
13 CF: ‘have gone’. Rossi, La vita, vols 3, 494. 
14 CF: ‘Disuetude’. Ibid. 
15 CF: ‘powers’. Ibid. 
16 The word is obscure. It looks like ‘com’ with an abbreviation signal. Rossi replaced it with another 
word ‘power’. Ibid. 
17 Rossi left this word blank. Ibid. It seems to be ‘haveking’.  
18 CF: ‘Also where should the ––– of a Kdome stand if hee that is possessed of the supreme authority 





But what warrant for such as are private persons to follow such leaders, and in 
such a case? 
 
Answer 
The Comandement of their Leaders, and the –––19 necessity doe in such manner 
of arming give them a sufficient calling;20 Their Leaders now standing as Protectors, 
and defenders of the just Rights of a K[ing]dome, and professing onely to keepe the 
King in his duty whiles21 hee goes about and resolves to depopulate the states by 
insufferable Anarchie. For heere the people are more antient then the King; and for the 
people were kings ordained, not the people for them. Nor is any made King (I speake 
not of any22 coming in by conquest) but hee is taken23 with Covenants, and vpo[n] 




vniversally and wilfully violated, have not they power who conferred the authority, to 
take it away againe. Ob[jection:] You will say that in Imperio firmato, the Crowns 
comes by discent and runs in blood to the next heire, and how25 then can hee bee said 
vpo[n] Covenants to come in? An[swer:] I say his succession doth not take away the 
originall conditions vpon which all crowns are sett on, and which is entayled to the 
Crowne, as the Crown to him. The law of God, and Nature teacheth that being now 
the father of the K[ing]dome, hee is not to waste his children’s Inheritance, indeed the 
people’s right, but to preserve and uphold it.26 Which being so, is it not reason, and 
conscience, hee should be taken bound to such a matter at his first entrance vpo[n] the 
state of the K[ing]dome. Or shall hee thinke Jezebels lawless speech a good Text:27 
Doth thou now govern the K[ing]dome of Israell. 1 Kings 21. 7. That is what their28 
King, and not able to com[m]and and what thou wilt? 
                                                     
19 The word is obscure, but looks like ‘protect’. 
20 CF: ‘The Comandement of their Leaders, and the liege right doe in such manner of arming give 
them a sufficient calling’. Rossi, La vita, vols 3, 494. 
21 CF: ‘whether’. Ibid. 
22 CF: ‘their’. Ibid. 
23 CF: ‘subiect’. Ibid. ‘Subiect’ here makes no sense since he is king with covenant not a subject with a 
covenant. 
24 CF: ‘those’. Ibid. 
25 CF: ‘here’. Ibid. 
26 CF: ‘hee is not to waste his childerns Inheritance, that is the popular right, but to preserve & enforce 
it’. Ibid., 495. ‘that is’ should be ‘indeed’ and ‘popular right’ does not make sense, and ‘enforce’ should 
be ‘vphold’. 
27 CF: ‘Or shall hee ––– Jezabels ––– speech a good –––:’. Rossi missed many words here. 







And to doe what pleaseth thee? The K[ing]dome was borne for thee, not thou for it. 
 
Read B[isho]p Bilson of the true difference  
between Xian29 Subjection, and vnxian Re- 
bellion the 3rd p[ar]t and 16 leaves before the end. 




                                                     
29 i. e. Christian. 
30 An obscure word. It seems to be ‘froer’. Rossi left it blank. 
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The Moderator endeavours to prove that the decision by the sword, hath, and will bee 
destructive to vs: which hee saies, will appeare fro[m] the first overtures of it, and in 
euery thinge that hath happened since. 
 The putting the Militia, the Navy, and the Ports into new hands begate Jealousy 
in the Head, which divided it fro[m] the members, and the members amongst 
themselves. The Parl[iamen]t (the Genius of the state) being thus poysond31 with 
Jealousy, it subtilly mingled itselfe with euery County as deriving it from their 
Representatives.  
 Heere saith hee, the people might take the first notice of the Contestation; Then 
followed the invective Declarations on both sides; which heightened the quarrell and 
invited the amused people to lay aside their peace, and shew themselves on one side. 
The Gentry who were removed fro[m] their Commands in their County grew opposite 
to the Parliamentary proceedings: and the Com[mon] people (according to your 




discours[e]d themselves into a resolute conceit of things, which (as their passions, and 
humours led them) they have all this while prosecuted. 
 The subjects being now stirred, and divided; the great Gamesters of the State goe 
higher; The more active of the Parl[iamen]t are accused by the K[ing] of Treason: The 
K[ing’]s Advisers are impeached by the Parl[iamen]t for Traitors: So that it is time 
that they bee further asunder: for distance affords many advantages to worke a 
designe higher, or else maybee a means to compose those differences, which are still 
renewing whilst the Antagonists are together. The K[ing] therefore removes 
Northwd32 to gaine33 a Party to ballance those who[m] already hee accounts his 
enemies. 
 Thus the Scene begins to alter; and in stead of reforming (the proper worke of a 
Parl[iamen]t) wee shall see it busied, and always puzled in saving (for so they call it) 
a distressed Church, and State; And from henceforth wee must looke on it as a 
Councell of Warre, and must not expect to finde it punctuall in the observance of any  
                                                     
31 i. e. poisoned. 
32 Northwd got an abbreviation signal in the end, probably it should be read ‘Northw[ar]d’. 









any fixed Law: but that com[m]on Law called Salus Populi must bee produced as a 
g[ene]rall warrant for all their vndertakings: and that Statute Law enacted euen by 
nature itselfe called Lex necessitatis, must be made to iustifie all manner of severity, 
and violence. 
 The most eminent discouery of this warre which openly offred itselfe for the 
consideration of the people, was that great contention about the towne of Hull; and 
although it cost not much bloud, yet was it made an occasion to engage34 the 
businesse very farre. The warre was sooner seen to the people then the reason of it; 
and though they could not define what the quarrell was, yet they begin to finde that 
they must end it, and feele the effects of it. And to startle them that more, their35 
doubts are nourished and increased by the well-penned papers fro[m] the North; and 
in a few moneths are persuaded to vnbelieve that which the actions, and the sense of 
many years before had almost confirmed in them. Thus, the King perceives, that to 
defend the property, and liberty of his subjects (though but with the shadow of them) 





almost recovers, and fixes them in their obedience. How much then will they bee his, 
when those promised blessings shall bee theirs in earnest? 
 And what advantage have wee had by any thinge hath yet bene acted by the 
sword? What present reparation, or what likely hopes &c. 
 Hee layes downe this Conclusion go,36 That a peace warily concluded by an 
accommodation must be the happiest issue that can be given to these differences.37 
 Hre (says hee) I setled myselfe in this opinion, I inquired out all the 
conveniences, and inconveniences that warre, or peace may beget, to see which weigh 
heaviest by such considerations in these. 
 First, what probably this warre aimes at. In this conjecture, (saith hee) it will 
befit vs to be very modest, and rather to thinke, then speake out; Not inquiring what 
alliance (in the birth of it) there is betwixt this, and that which the Scotts; Nor whether 
                                                     
34 CF: ‘ingage’. Rossi, La vita, vols 3, 500. 
35 CF: ‘theyr’. Ibid. 
36 Rossi transcribed it as ‘yn’, but it clearly was ‘go’ which, as I have shown in E5/3/46 and E5/3/49, 
means ‘ergo’ and ‘therefore’.  
37 Rossi’s transcription skipped the following paragraphs and folios until folio 5v. See Ibid. 
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the Prerogative com[m]enced it, to protect itselfe ag[ains]t an invading power, which 





designe of many yeares before, to bee absolute in of the people, (as others conceive) 
or whether the Parl[iamen]t began it to secure themselves, and fetch in delinq[uen]ts, 
(as wee are bid believe) or to confirme that by the sword, which no other assurances 
could euer make good vnto them; and to bring the gouernm[en]t somew[ha]t neere to 
an Aristocracy, (as some have suggested) or whether indeed the reason of the warre 
bee a miscellany of all these. But how justifiable, how necessary, and on which side 
this warre was defensive, or offensive, I shall not (saith hee) vndertake to debate, or 
determine. Dangerous misteries, not to bee pried into. It wilbe enough for vs to 
inquire how farre it tends to the g[ene]rall good, by what hath already happened, and 
what must happen in the prosecutio[n] of it. 
 It is confessed (though not agreed on) by both Armies, that our Religio[n], lawes, 
&c. ly at the stake, and that they weare their swords to defend these: and that this 
cannot be safe, vnlesse one of them prove victorious. 
 Thus our Cause is much like a riddle; It were surely better for vs, to have it 
understood by the deliberatio[n], and wisdom of a parley, then by such means as 




vsed to vnty38 the Gordian knott, that violence of the sword. If Religion bee the 
principall reason, how few hopes haue wee to see it rectified by Warre, the nurse of 
barbarisme &c. Religion is a child of peace. &c. 
 It may happen otherwise (some have thought) if the designe bee advisedly laid, 
and so vigorously prosecuted, that the execut[ion] of it shalbe suddaine. 
 But suppose the Parl[iamen]t Conquer; a good reformation is very doubtfull: 
Successe may somew[ha]t heighten their religious designes, and suggest such things 
as duty ––39 which before, their very imagination durst not reach at. &c. Then it is 
likely neither roote, nor branch of our old Church-order shalbe left, nor any signe 
where it grew: And though the[m]selves could bee contented with a more even and 
moderate reformation, it may bee feared, that the loud people delighting in change, 
                                                     
38 i. e. untie. 
39 A too obscure word. 
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and will call for a mutation in every circ[um]stances, and when they have found their 
strength, will thinke nothing enough if they have not all that their wild and vnlimited 
Zeale approves of.40 And then the interest of the Parl[iamen]t will be to settle a more 
rigid govern[men]t (to say no more) in the Church, then will now satisfy the[m], and 




 On the Contrary, if &c. Doe wee believe the Prelacy, and the other ambitious 
Clergy will then bee any whit lesse insolent then they haue bene? Will they not rather 
adde to then diminish their ceremonies? Will they not pretend that preaching hath 
seduced the people, and beget Heresies? That the pulpit was the late Incendiary to the 
great mischiefe, and go take a pious occasion to bee idle, and make the abused people 
believe, that the Co:41 Pr[elacy] tende more to their Saluation then the frequency of 
preaching? Will these men of the Cassock be lesse vicious in their lives? Lesse 
corrupt in their doctrine? Lesse exacting in their Tithes, and pretended dues? And to 
conclude, will it ly in the interest or the power of the K[ing] (when busied to settle the 
confused Co[mmon] W[ealth] for his best advantage) to bridle his Clergy, which ever 
were, are, and wilbe the most considerable sticklers, when any bustle or mutat[ion] 
happens in a state? Wee must then looke to finde these sort of men still like 
them[selve]s so busy as if their employm[en]t were rather to improve Prerogative then 
salvation. Their predecessors (History tells vs) were almost allwaies opposers of their 
Prince, And some are of opinion that they do otherwise now not because their 
Religion, but their interest is altered. And it has been allwaies vnhappily observed that 
their Conscience follows their dependency; and that they put their cases, and state 
their questions as much by the motions of the latter, as the former. 
 And if there were ever any reason to bee jealous of the incroaching power of 




through necessity, the reasons now vrged vpon this occasion) bee driven to make vse 
of the[m], to do his busines &c. the Com[mon] people may fear that they shall 
hereafter see asmuch Popery mingled in their worships, as in their Armies: and those 
of better judgm[en]t cannot but conceive that when Papists have merited so much 
                                                     
40 For two very hard words ‘wild’ and ‘Zeal’ in this sentence, I am indebted to my two supervisors, Dr. 
Thomas Ahnert and Dr. Felicity Green. The letter ‘Z’ is very hard to recognize but we can find a similar 
pattern of the word ‘Citizen’ in fol. 8r. 
41 Probably Co[mmon]. 
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fro[m] the K[ing] that they wilbe more modest with him then with God, from whom 
they dare challenge requitall for their merits; and vpon such a turne as this, it wilbe 
for their great advantage that the people (to whom the reputed Puritans, and 
Roundheads must by all means bee made odious) wilbe lesse troubled, if some of 
those seven Statutes ag[ains]t them, bee repealed, or dispensed with, and some other 
things bee done in their favour: for being trustier subjects to the K[ing] of E[ngland] 
(the first time it was ever thought they could bee so) then many of his Pro[testan]t 
subjects. 
 Such consequences as these wee must looke for on both sides, if the partiall 
sword and not the indifferent Synod must bee the Eccl[es]ia[stica]ll reformer. 
 The Religion which all moderate men (and I think most, and best) desire, is that 
which both sides promise; and yet that which wee cannot well expect fro[m] either 
side, should it become absolute. It is such a one as may bee found out betwixt the[m] 





then bound, and perhaps necessitated to gratify their party with that kinde of 
Discipline which their humours call for: they must looke to fasten themselves by that 
power, and those principles by which they gained it. Who[m] as it is like to be quite 
otherwise, if peace suspend these differences; both sides must then goe on in an even, 
and well tempered Course, that they may politiquely hold fast that party, which their 
promises, and faire protestations won to them. &c. 
 In the next place examine how the State shalbe bettered by a mastery of either 
side. 
 Would wee have the laws better exercised which our predecessors left to vs? 
How much out of Countenance Law is, when the sword domineeres, wee need not bee 
informed by History. And when this Warre shall see an end, with how much difficulty 
shall wee be rendered capable of the vsuall course, and benefit of it? And wee know 
not who by that time may become Patron, and M[aste]r of our Law, and Nation: Or 
would wee haue new Lawes to serve our turnes now? Or confirme those wee haue 
gained this Parl[iamen]t? If that the sword shall draw vp new Statutes, it is likely they 
would be put short lived, or vse lesse; for no Politique ties, no not the most sacred 
assurance of an oath could ever make Princes observe the execution of them. And it 
may bee feared, that such violent gaining vpo[n] the Crowne, may bee an occasion 
hereafter, to wrest fro[m] vs all those advantages which the subject hath dearly bought 






 Our libe[r]ties are not like to bee much enlarged, or secured by it, Martiall Law 
will erelong disseize vs of our Possessions, our Estates, and Lives; and what Judge 
shalbe able to redresse vs? and wee must run a hazard, what kinde of free men, or 
Slaves wee must bee heereafter.  
 But supposing wee shalbe bettered in all, when the Warre is ended, let vs with an 
intentive eye looke vpon the miseries which must bee our entertainment while the 
warre continues. Every County Like to bee the Seate of Warre. And so many Armies 
must neede consume Cattle and Sheepe, and the farmers stock, and so beget a famine 
with its companions, the plague, small pox, flux &c. And The treasure of the Land 
wilbe consumed, trade vtterly decayed; Arts Lost; Learning changed into martiall 
Discipline. &c. 
 Do reflect more closely vpon our owne more peculiar mischiefes; If wee must 
put off peace vntill another time, how desperate are wee? For those that ingage vs in a 
Warre, are not able to tell vs, who, where, how, and by whom it shall end; (this yours 
late, and sad experience of others may tell vs) The question heereafter wilbe not so 
much where is the right, but where is the power? For the right of Power must carry the 
busines. And it wilbe beyond probability that this K[ing]dome ever recover the purity 
of its Religion, its Lawes, its Customes, its Govern[men]t which haue bene setling 




for I cannot assure myselfe who shall live to strike the last blow. And it hath in all 
Ages bene observed, that designes in warre change like Scenes in a masque, where 
wee see new apparitions ere44 wee are aware of them and the events of one year may 
beyond all expectati[on], vary or heighten the quarrell. And it is allwaies found that 
success lifts men vp about themselves; for a prevailing power seldome knowes any 
bounde, or modesty, the subject will want his old sanctuary then which our 
Predecessors provided. For Lawes are but the Ligaments of peace, and the souldiers 
will break them like threeds. 
 See how gradually wee must come to such a Condition as this. 
 And first, because wee will not vndertake to define the quarrell as it now stands, 
Largely, nor saucily, we will conceive it thus; A Working iealousie fixed in a divided 
                                                     
42 From this folio Rossi restarted his transcription. 
43 Rossi then stopped transcribing the following sentences and folios until fol. 6v. 
44 i. e. before.  
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K[ing]dome, both sides choosing rather to dy, then to trust one another. From this 
roote must necessarily spring these inconveniences; wee must execute the designes of 
our enemies vpon ourselves; the K[ing] may receive his death fro[m] the hand of a 
Subject, while it is reached forth (if you will believe his vowes) for his good, and 
safety. The father &c. No County, scarce any City, or Corporati[on] so vnanimous, but 
they haue division enough to vndoe the[m]selves. And it is evident enough, that this 




shalbe quite torne in peeces; for when the fatall sluce45 of bloud shalbe drawne vp 
higher, in all probability the veines46 of the remaining people swelling with revenge 
for their bettered (party) are likely to be drained dry throughout the K[ing]dome.47 If 
wee will leave our differences to the dispute of the sword, we shall not want an 
Vmpire; one that will come in to part vs, or to part stakes with vs. Let this mediatour 
chance to bee of a Religion like ours, or of one quite opposite vnto it, who shall pay 
the souldiers for their journey-worke? Must money be raised for the[m]? It must bee 
digged for them: I believe little wilbe found above ground. Or must promises serve 
the turne? &c. No wee shall finde the interest of that State must bee satisfied either 
with our ruine, or with mingling the[m]selves in our Estates, and govern[men]t. 
 Or Suppose our Neighbours winke on purpose &c. vpon whose purse shall our 
Armies live? Must the Countreys maintaine the[m]? It must bee then by the farmer: 
but he can neither sow, nor reap, nor breed vp, nor repair his stock in the heate of such 
a warre as ours. Else must the Clothier doe it? Whence shall he haue his many 
necessaries, and how shall hee vent his clothes? If these faile, the Countreys cannot 
bee long considerable &c. Is it expected that the City must do all this? That little 




is so impaired, that it will scarce maintaine the[m]selves, vulesse it bee by a continued 
course of trading, which as it is now languishing, so it wilbe ere that time quite dead 
and buried. The City is as it were the Stomack, which digests the trading of the whole 
K[ing]dome; and afterw[ar]ds returnes to every seuerall part of it, that nourishm[en]t 
which supports it: If weakens, and obstructions bee found there, a consu[m]ption 
soone steales vpo[n] the whole body. But suppose it were rich, and full enough to 
                                                     
45 i. e. sluice. See Oxford English Dictionary. 
46 i. e. the plural form of vein. 
47 From the following sentence, Rossi again restarted his transcription. 
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serve the turne; yet they will not let downe their milke to a violent hand; they must 
bee stroked, and humoured, else they wilbe stubborne. If they chance to bee at discord, 
it wilbe hard to collect any considerable summs; and if that discord bee hightened (by 
the cunning practice of any) into a mutiny among the[m]selves, they wilbe able to 
vndoe one another, without the help of a drayning Army. &c. After all, what face at 
best will their K[ing]dome haue? What a ruinous Nobility, what a decayed Gentry, 
what a beggarly Commonalty will it bee peopled with all? And what age shall euer 
see those fewds eaten48 out which these Civill broiles will beget? &c.49 Ireland, one 
of our main bulwarks, gained and fortified not without infinite expence of the treasure, 
and bloud of our Ancestors, ready to bee possessed by a dangerous enemy, who fro[m] 
thence will euer batter our peace; and it is likely may make such breaches as may let 




50as farre as wee can at distance, on which side advantages leave most.51  
 The ground of such a warre as this, is the affections of the people; and vpon this 
both Armes are built, and kept vp. We will go guesse which of them hath the surest 
foundati[on]. It hath bene observed, the Parl[iamen]t hath made little difference, (or 
not the right) between the Gentry, and Yeomanry, rather complying, and wining vpon 
the latter, then regarding, or applying the[m]selves at all to the former. And they may 
bee thus excused; they did not thinke Justice to looke vpon any man according to his 
quality, but as hee was a subject; I hope this was all the reason; but howsoeuer, it 
appeares not that they yet haue, or are likely to gaine by this policy. The Com[mon] 
people, could they bee fixed, were onely worth the courting, at such a time; but they 
are almost allwaies heady, and violent, seldome are lasting, and constant in their 
opinions. They that are to humour the[m], must serve many M[aste]rs who though 
they seeme, and indeed are their inferiours, yet grow imperious vpon many occassions; 
Many actions of merit how eminent soever, shall not prevaile with them to excuse one 
mistake; want of successe, though that bee all the Crime, makes them angry, 
murmuring, and jealous: whereas a gentleman is better spirited, and more resolute; 
and though hee suffereth by it, had rather stick to that power that will countenance 
him, then to that which makes no difference betwixt him, and a peasant. The 
gent[leman] followes his resolute[on] clo[se] and winns of his silly Neighbours many 
                                                     
48 CF: ‘baten’. Rossi, La vita, vols 3, 502. 
49 Rossi then skipped the following sentences until the next paragraph in folio 7v. 
50 Though the first word is different from the last word of the last folio, it seems to have no page 
missing here, since folio 7r and 7v are written in the same sheet. 
51 Rossi restarted from the next paragraph. 
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as they have an easy faith, quickly wrought vpon and vpon the next turne will fall off 
in sheles55. They are a body certainly of great Consequence, when they are headed, 
and ribbed by the Gentry; but they haue a craven, or a vnruly courage (which at best 
may rather bee called obstinacy, then resolution) and are farre lesse considerable 
when the most part of the Gentry, or chiefe Citizens divide the[m]selves fro[m] them.  
 The Parl[iamen]t hath nothing to cement itselfe, to increase, and fix their party, 
and keep it fro[m] staggering, but a little temporary reputati[on], and a resolution to 
hold fast to the publique good; and this (if things runne so high as they do now) wilbe 
called rebellious stubbornes, and bee branded with the fowle imputati[on] of treason. 
Whereas the K[ing] (as the chiefe master and dispenser of the Co[mmon] W[ealth]) is 
able to fit the humour of every man, that hee hath a minde to take off. Hee hath 
honour for the proud, places of trust for the ambitious, interiour offices for the busy 
men. &c.56  
 A Prince by his agents will keepe off the aid of forraine States fro[m] the[m], but 
is seldome denyed some contribution tow[ar]ds his owne defence. And if they 
contribute any thinge, it wilbe just so much as shall serve to hold vp the warre. And 




maintaine the fire, not as water to suppresse, and quench it; for they never yield 
assistance where their advantage shall not largely recompense it. And if it so fall out 
that the interest of an adjoyning State shall chance to bee mingled with the actions of 
the Neighbouring Subjects, their Prince will vse all arte (having the most expert 
instrum[en]ts for it) to disable, or take off that party; Hee may qualify that State 
before hand by parting with some thinge hee hath right vnto; or may do it by 
                                                     
52 The latter half of the word is missing since the folio was impaired, but according to the meaning of 
the paragraph it should be ‘either’. 
53 The word could not be recognised since the folio is impaired. 
54 It seems some folios are missing between folio 7v and folio 8r. From the physicial appearance, folio 
1r to 7v belongs to a booklet while 8r to 11v belongs to another. From the content of folio 7v and 8r, 
they do not closely match. The end of folio 7v describes the good characteristics of gentlemen who 
would insisted their beliefs, while the beginning of folio 8r depictes some people who had ‘easy faith’ 
and ‘vnruly courage’. 
55 CF: ‘shoales’. Rossi, La vita, vols 3, 502. 
56 From here Rossi skipped again until folio 10v. 
57 i. e. fuel.  
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Corrupting some eminent Engineeres there; some great Officers and some of the most 
popular men; or by kindling some divisions among the[m] so to busy the[m] at home, 
that whilst their owne house seems to bee on fire, and like to burne further, they may 
not bee at leisure to quench their Neighbours flames. 
 There is a president58 that seems to encourage very much the prosecuti[on] if 
this warre, (1) the late successe of the Scotts. But I fear, if wee parallel our present 
conditi[on], and theirs together, wee shall finde that wee shall differ point blanck in 
most circu[m]stances but the nature of the cause. 
 1. When their great worke first began, the 3 K[ing]domes were gra[dua]lly 
discontented: and they all did as it were conspire to its assistance either in secret or 




 2. Amongst our great men, heere, there were very few stood neere the sterne, and 
those not at all plausible with the people. And our chiefe Nobility and Gentry had no 
countenance shewed the[m] at Court, and could not on the sudden bee so farre 
engaged on that side as the service required, &c. 
 3. The K[ing’]s Councellors knew not how to bestir the[m]selves properly in a 
warre, very few of them being fit to bee military Statesmen. 
 4. The Papists (although their agents, and their purses were busy,) never shewed 
the[m]selves in a body. 
 5. The Cavalry both at home, and fro[m] abroad, (whence many come to a more 
vncertaine service) did belieue that they fought for their Countrey, and not ag[ains]t 
the King, whilst they opposed the[m]selves ag[ains]t his Army. 
 6. They fought ag[ains]t another Nation, (an old enemy scarce reconciled) and 
had no reluctancy, no feare of killing a father, &c. 
 7. The Scale of the warre was out of their owne confines &c. 
 8. They had not the controlling presence of awfull Ma[jes]ty; which takes off, 
prevents, and counterplotts the designes of any that are working neere to it. 
 9. And lastly, (not to looke into more private reasons which perhaps might be 




and Gover[n]m[en]t of Scotland well weighed with ours (at this time) wilbe very 
different, and may well divert vs fro[m] levelling at the same ends. &c. 
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 To goe on in our arguem[en]t of Advantage, or Disadvantage: when once the 
people shew the[m]selves to bee sensible of the smart of warre, nothing can so much 
wipe away the remembrance of former Injuries, and ingratiate any party as to bee 
forwardest (though but in mere shew) to an accom[m]odati[on]. &c. 
 The K[ing] the more likely to draw to him the affection of the people, in that the 
pressures, and miscarriages of his late Gover[nmen]t are passed, &c. 
 The K[ing] (a sillable of as much advantage as another Army) in his very name is 
sacred, and powerfull, and shakes the conscience of many, who would else have 
willing hands, and ready purses to oppose his Army. Hee hath the advantage of the 
written Law, which hee can vse now in his defence, &c. A Councell so well mingled, 
that hee hath some versed, and cunning in the law; and that knew how to turne it to 
the most necessary vse; some crafty in all the windinge of State, some experienced in 
all the designes of Warre. His intelligencers are in the very botome of the Antagonists, 
or else his Agents conjure: and his owne Councells are secrete, till hee thinks fit to 
divulge the[m]. &c. It is a fond thinge certainly to thinke his Army can want 
am[m]uniti[on], having any port open: or that it will want money, more then the other; 




may reach to the good of the people; and so far onely the affaires of the King; wee 
haue good reason to belieue that a peace would bee welcome to him. &c. 
 For the other, shall onely advise the[m] to remember what they are; of who[m] 
they are made; and why they are met. And because they want the winde, (the 
auspicious gale of complying M[ajes]ty) and enough of the tide (the full streame of 
the peoples affections) and seeing the storme growes high; and it is fowle weather, it 
may bee better to hale in, and betake the[m]selves to a harbour, lest the State suffer 
shipwrack, whilst the helme seems to bee in their hands. 
 But I may bee a little bolder which may follow Subjects, and shall enquire what 
truly is their interest now, whilst their safety is thus endangered. 
 Slavery, (the feare of which is accounted worse then death by such as haue bene 
borne freemen) could neuer befall vs, if wee did not helpe to binde ourselues by our 
owne hands, and admit it by our owne divisions; The people while they hold together, 
are like a vast Ocean; An absolute Power cannot possibly made through to its ends, 
vnlesse they fall back one fro[m] another, and become like those wonderfull walls of 
water, which gave the Israelite leave to passe through on dry Land; Should the fond 
English this farre sever the[m]selves, wee should also bee a wonder to Posterity. This 
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great, which being done, the other must neede bee too little.60 If the inferiour parts of 
the body, the members of it, be made to swell beyond their due proporti[on], wee 
presently dislike the symptomes, and feare a dropsy; and that Body whose head is 
swelled, and made greater by ill humours, then it should bee, is of a diseased 
constituti[on], hath but weake Limms61, and almost nothing but leannes every where 
else.  
 There may bee reaso[n] to bee aswell afraid of an extravagant popular power, as 
the exorbitancies of Monarchy. But whilst wee endeavour to avoid the one, let vs bee 
carefull, that wee do not engage ourselues in the other: It were well go, That when 
Propositions shalbe tendred to his M[ajes]ty That the Nobility, and Gentry (for I hope 
the former Delinquents, and Papists do not advise, though they assist) which haue 
separated the[m]selves fro[m] the Parl[iamen]t should discover the[m]selues without 
passion, according to their true Interests, &c. Let the[m] not revenge the[m]selves 
vpo[n] Posterity, by setting vp ag[ains]t the[m]selues, not onely a large power, but an 
Authority also, even by their owne Grants, by their owne swords62. It lies not in the 
power of the Subject, to conferre more tow[ar]ds their Slavery, then to pull downe a 
Parl[iamen]t (vpo[n] what necessity, or pretence soeuer) with their owne hands. This 
shalbe a lasting president, and disparagem[en]t in all Ages: and a warrant to all 
Princes to discountenance the[m], since they worke no better efforts vpon the State;63 




the guilt, which shalbe overthrown. A Parl[iamen]t wilbe said to bee the sole Author 
of these miseries; thus it wilbecome the disdaine, which was allwayes hitherto the 
Darling of the people; Thus a perpetuall prejudice shall stick vpon all hereafter, and 
then what vse shall the overvborne Subject haue of his Sanctuary? If it want reverence, 
it will want power; If it want power, it will onely serve to give away our Estates, not 
amend the[m] &c. Let them seriously consider to which side they ought in right 
                                                     
60 Rossi restarted his transcription from the next sentence. 
61 CF: ‘limbs’. Rossi, La vita, vols 3, 503. 
62 CF: ‘hands’. Ibid. At the first glance it might be recognised as ‘hands’, but actually it was ‘swords’ 
since the first character was certainly not a ‘h’. 
63 Rossi skipped again until folio 11v.  
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reaso[n] to give the most advantage, in these propositions. When a Prince winnes any 
thinge fro[m] his people, (much more when they vrge it vpon him) Hee wilbe sure to 
hold fast what hee hath, and many times improves, never diminishes it; Whereas if the 
Subject gaine any extraordinary thinge fro[m] the Crowne, (how necessary soeuer) 
with what difficulty is it enjoyed? How many tricke, and evasion have the 
Instrum[en]ts of State to cozen the people of the benefit of it? &c. yet it must bee 
averred, That hee that robs his Prince of His Honours, impaires the reputati[on] of his 
Countrey; bee com[m]unicable to the Co[mmon] W[ealth] sins ag[ains]t both. The 
punctuality, –– of the Honour, and Greatness of the K[ing] hath seldom bene enough 
to hold vp a war with wary Subjects, especially among the[m]selves; Let the[m] take 
care to do thinge safe, and honourable for the Co[mmon] W[ealth] (of which hee is 




Safety should not bee mingled with it.64 I hope he will finde as much Honour in 
saving a perishing K[ing]dome, as if hee were gaining a new one. And while hee thus 
makes a Conqueste on his peoples Hearts, hee renders himself greater, then his 
driving Councellors could make him, were they at the end of their Designes. It were 
worth our Joy to see him returne triumphy with but not over his people. 
 And as that party should do their Duty; so is their reaso[n], That they on the 
other side should do theirs. Let them remember that they haue a K[ing]; That whilst 
hee is in a cloud, wee are in the shade, and want that influence which may revive the 
State, and make it flourish, &c. Let the[m] lay aside all violent conceits, and 
expectations65; and let the[m] believe (having so good reasons for it) that they will 
sooner reach their destructi[on], then that through Reformati[on] which by many us 
aymed at. &c. Our sad case is now such, that wee haue an incensed god; and angry 
King, a thwarting Councell; a heady Clergy; a divided Nobility; a discontented Gentry; 
a distempered people; a distracted Religion; an vnhinged State; a confused 
government; vndermining Adversaries; a Civill War; an increase of Souldiers; 
Consumption of treasure; disunion in vnited K[ing]domes; lost reputati[on]; an 
vniversall jealousy; a defecti[on] from the principles of sound policy 
[The manuscript ends here; the remaining folios are missing]  
                                                     
64 Rossi restarted his transcription from the next sentence. 
65 CF: ‘dissertations’. Rossi, La vita, vols 3, 503. ‘dissertations’ should be ‘expectations’. 
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E5-3-46: ‘Treatise on the powers of king and parliament’ 
 
The surviving manuscript contains text from William Prynne, The Treachery and 
Disloyalty of Papists to Their Soveraignes: Together with the First Part of the 
Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes (London: Printed For Michael 
Sparke Senior, 1643), 40–105. A large number of sentences were shortened and some 
words replaced. A comparison with the printed version reveals that the copyist used 
the following conventions: 
(1) The signal ‘&c’ or ‘e’ with a long tail (here transcribed as ‘e.’ ) usually means 
that the copyist skipped some sentences or passage. For the latter signal I will 
use ‘e.’ to specify it.66 
(2) go = ergo = therefore. 
 
Some words are spelled differently in the manuscript and in the printed work. Here 
are some examples (the former is from the printed work while the latter is from the 
manuscript): just = iust / than = then / reigne = raigne / publicke = publique / usuall = 
vsuall / chuse = choose / Councels = Councells / anciently = anntiently. 
 
The following abbreviations are frequently met in manuscripts E5/3/46 and E5/3/49: 
 L: = Lo: = Lords   the(m)s = themselves 
 P: = Parlt = Parliament  Xn = Christian 
 Co: = Common(s)   agt = aganist 
 vp(o) = upon    Au(th) = Authority 
 Pap: = Papist    Scrip: = Scripture 
 Emp: = Emperour   Reg: = Regal 
 presidts = presidents = precedents 
 nre = nature 
 Rel: = Religion 
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allay, abolish, and resume some branches of the K[ing’]s Royall Power, and 
preroga[tive] if there be just Cause, as when it becomes onerous, mischieuous, and 
dangerous to the Subjects inconvenient to or inconsistent with the K[ing]domes 
welfare, peace, safety, liberty, or the Lawes. This [is] apparent by Mag[na] Ch[arta] de 
foresta, stat[utum] de Prerog[ative] R[oyal]s et de Talla[gio] non concedendo. The 
Pet[ition] of Right, most stat[ues] against purveyens, Pardons, Protections, the acts 
made this Parliament against Ship-money, K[nigh]thood, forrest-bounds, pressing of 
souldiers, the Starr-Ch[amber], High-Com[mission], Trien[iall] P[arliamen]t, 
contin[uance] of this P[arliamen]t. &c. which restraine, abridge, repeale, and resume 
diuerse real and pretended branches of the K[ing’]s Royall Prerog[ative], because they 
proved grievous, and mischievous to the people, and dangerous, and pernicious to the 
K[ing]d[om]. This then answers that irrationall, groundless posit[ion] of Dr. ferne, 
that the subjects neither lawfully may, nor ought in any case to resume all or any part 
of the Reg[al] power wherewith they haue once invested their K[ing’]s by Com[m]on 
consent, which as it is contrary to that received principle of nature and reaso[n]: 
eodem modo quo quid constituitur, dissolvitur. That all govern[men]ts created by 
men’s Consents may be altered, diminished, or repealed by their Consents, to sundry 
Presid[en]ts, and prophecies in Script[ure], concerning the alterat[ion]s, subversions, 
and diminutions of K[ing]s and K[ing]domes; to the constant practice of all Realmes, 
and States whatsoever, for Adam till this instant, who haue vndergone many strange 
alterations, Eclipses, diminutions, yea period of govern[en]t to the resolution of 
Arist[otle] and all other politicians, who hold all formes of Government, changeable, 
and revocable, without any injustice, if necessary or convenient; so likewise to the 
very end, for which K[ing]s haue Regall Power (aswell as other Governours and 
Governm[en]ts) were ordained, to wit, their K[ing]domes, people’s welfare, safety, 
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principall end for which all Royall Power was instituted by God and Man, and to 
which they must submit in case it becomes incompatible, and cannot consist together 
without damage or danger to the publique safety. &c. 
 Fifthly, The K[ing], though he be the chiefe, and principall, yet he is onely one 
member of the Parl[iamen]t and K[ing]d[ome] the least (because but one person) 
though the highest branch; the Lords and Commons (not elected by, but assigned 
Councellors to the K[ing] by the K[ing]d[ome] and people) being the greatest, and 
most considerable part, as representing the entire body of the K[ing]d[ome]. Now 
Common reaso[n], Law, and Experience manifests, that the whole, or greatest part in 
all politique, or n[atu]rall bodies, is of greater power, and jurisdiction then anyone 
particular member. Thus in all Corporations, the Court of Aldermen and Com[mon] 
Co[uncell] is of greater power then the Maior, though the chiefe officer. The Chapter 
of greater author[ity] then the Deane, the D[ean] and ch[apter] then the B[isho]p, the 
whole Bench, then the L[ord], chiefe Justice, the whole Councell then the Presid[en]t, 
the whole Par[liamen]ts, then either of the H[ouse] and by like reason then the K[ing]; 
especially, since one of the 3 Estates is lesser then the 3 Estates together, who in 
Par[liamen]t by the fundementall Constitutions of the Realme, are not subordinate, 
but Coordinate parts of the same great Com[mon] Co[uncell] of the K[ing]d[ome]. It 
is Arist[otle’s] expresse determinat[ion], that in an Oligarchy, Aristocracy, and 
Democracy, whatsoever seems good to the major part of the Governors of the 
Co[mmon] wealth, that is ratified, and that it is vnfit the part should be above the 
whole. And in all Courts of Justice, Coporations and elections, the Major p[ar]t haue 
allwaies had the greatest sway, and constantly overruled the lesse, though it be but by 
one Casting voice; as is evident in the Election of K[nigh]ts, and Burgesses, and in 
votes of the Pa[rliamen]t in which the K[ing], Lo[rds], and Co[mmons] by the 
Co[mmon] Law, making up but one intire Corporat[ion] since then even in 
Par[liamen]t itselfe, the major p[ar]t over-swayes the rest, yea the 
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the K[ing] himselfe, (67who hath no absolute negative voice, but onely in refusing to 
passe some kinde of Bills, not all, (of which more heereafter) doubtlesse the whole, or 
major p[ar]t of the P[arliamen]t (which in Law is the whole) is above the K[ing] the 
chiefe member of it. Which consideration together with the Stat[utes] of 5 R. 2. 
                                                     
67 This is a separate bracket without its corresponding ending bracket in this manuscript. 
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St[atutes] 2. c. 4. 6. H. 8. C. 16. Enacting, that none elected to be in any P[arliamen]t 
shall depart, or absent himselfe fro[m] the same P[arliamen]t till it be fully ended, or 
prorogued without speciall licence &c. completely answers that fond cavill of the 
&c.68  that the K[ing] and many of the other members haue wilfully absented 
thems[elves] from the H[ouse], of purpose to dissolve it if they could, notwithstanding 
the late speciall act made by their ioynt consents for its continuance. go, this vnlawfull 
action of theirs (to effect this pernicious designe) must nullifie, or at least invalid (in 
their new non-sense law and Logick) the lawfull p[ro]ceedings of those worthy 
faithfull members who continue in it. e. If these absent members be the greater 
number, why do they not come, and overvote the rest in the H[ouse] in a peaceable, 
legall, vsuall parliamentary way, rather then challenge them into the field in a military, 
illegal, vnusuall bloody manner, e. If the lesser p[ar]ty, then present or absent, the 
major p[ar]t must over-rule them volens nolens, as it hath ever vsed, vnless they will 
be willfuller (I cannot say wiser) then all their predecessors put together. 
 As for his M[jes]ty’s absence fro[m] P[arliamen]t.69 1. It was without any iust 
Cause given by the P[arliamen]t. 2. much ag[ains]t their wills who haue oft[en] 
petitioned for his returne. 3. His absence was p[ro]cured, and is continued those alone 
who most vnjustly taxe the P[arliamen]t for it, and would take advantage of this their 
owne wrong. 4. Though personally absent as a man, yet he is still legally present in 
P[arliamen]t (called the K[ing]’s presence) as he is a K[ing], as he is in all other his 
Courts of Justice where 
 
fol. 6v (Prynne, pp. 42-43) 
 
where all p[ro]ceedings are entered[,] Cora[m] Rege, though the K[ing] never yet sate 
personally in either of them, &c. yea, he must cease to be K[ing] of Engl[and], 
[wh]ere he can be legally absent from his P[arliamen]t of Engl[and]. This hee wilfull 
personall absence from e.70 is (as may conceived) an act of the highest injustice that 
ever any Prince could offer to his P[arliamen]t, worse then Reh[oboams] forsaking the 
Counsell of his anntient sages,71 to follow the hare-brained advice of his young 
                                                     
68 Here the copyist omitted the following words: ‘that fond cavill of Malignants and Royalists against 
this Parliament; that the King…’. See Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes 
Divided into Foure Parts, 1st pt, 42. The copyist may have intentionally omitted those who were 
accused by Prynne.  
69 CF: ‘As for his Majesty’s absence from Parliament by the pernicious advise of evill Counsellors; so 
much insisted on by Malignants’. Again, the copyist seems to have refrained from referring to royalists 
as evil counsellors or malignants. 
70 The following words were here omitted by the copyist: ‘his great Counsell which desires and needs 
it’. 




Cavaliers, for though he followed not their advice, yet he withdrew not him[selfe] 
fro[m] the[m], as his M[ajest]y doth now sever hims[elfe] fro[m] his P[arliamen]t, not 
onely without, but ag[ains]t all pres[ede]nts of his former predecessors, except King 
R[ichard] 2 (who once absented hims[elfe] fro[m] his P[arliamen]t above 40 daies, yet 
then returned to it vpon better advice) and the very Com[m]on custome and Law of 
the land (which he is oblieged by his Coronation oath, and many late P[ro]testations 
added to it, constantly to maintaine). This appears most clearly by the anntient 
Treatise, of the manners of holding P[arliamen]ts in Engl[and] which resolves thus, 
The King is bound by all means possible to be present at the P[arliamen]t vnless he be 
detained by sickness, and then he may keepe his chamber, yet so as he lye not without 
the Manour or towne at the least, where the P[arliamen]t is held; and then he ought to 
send for 12 persons of best account in P[arliamen]t (1) 2 B[isho]ps, 2 E[arles], 2 
B[arons], 2 K[nights] of the shire, 2 burg[esses] and 2 Citizens to looke vpon his 
perso[n], to witnesse his estate, and give Authority to the ArchB[isho]p of the place, 
the Steward of Engl[and], and chiefe Justice, that they iointly, and seuerally should 
begin the P[arliamen]t and continue the same in his name, expresse mention being 
made in that Commission, of the cause of his absence there, which ought to suffice. 
&c. 
 And whereas Malignants clamour, that most of the Lords are absent 
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absent aswell as the K[ing], go, this can be no lawf[ull] P[arliamen]t. The same Author 
will informe them, that if the Lo[rd] be once summoned to P[arliamen]t, and then 
appeare not or absent thems[elves], the King may hold the P[arliamen]t with the 
Commonalty, and Com[m]ons of the K[ing]d[ome] (every of which hath a greater 
voyce in P[arliamen]t then the greatest Earle in Engl[and], bec[ause] he represents a 
whole Country, towne, or City, the other himself alone) without B[isho]ps, Earls or 
Barons; bec[ause] in times past, before there was other B[isho]ps, E[arls] or B[arons], 
yet even then K[ing]s kept their P[arliamen]ts; but on the Contrary, no P[arliamen]t 
can be kept by the K[ing] and peers, if all the Com[m]ons (for the K[ing’]s 
misgovernment or such like casue) should absent thems[elves]. This is the judg[men]t 
of M[as]t[er] Jo[hn] Vowel too. &c. 
 Sixthly, It is most apparent both by Script[ure], the verdict of all Polititians, and 
writers of note, the Stat[utes] of our Realme, and Lawyers, that K[ing]domes, subjects, 
and P[arliamen]ts were not created by God for the wills, pleas[ures], profit, or benefits 
of K[ing]s, but kings were at first constituted, and still continued for the p[ro]tection, 
welfare, benefit, service of their K[ing]d[ome’]s people, whose publique Serv[an]ts, 
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ministers, shepherds, fathers, stewards, and Officers they are. Now natur[e], reason, 
and Scrip[tures] resolve that he who is instituted meerely for the benefit and service of 
another is of lesse dignity, power and jurisdict[ion] then the entire body of those for 
whose good he was instituted e. which considerat[ion] hath caused sundry K[ing]s 
and Emp[erours], not onely to adventure their lives in battle, but to lay downe their 
Crownes for the peace and saftey of their subj[ects]; witnesse Otho the first (see 
Eutropius, Grinstone and others in his life) with the examples of Moses &c. The 
K[ing] then being made K[ing] onely for e. must needs (in this regard) be inferiour to, 
not paramount them in absolute Soveraigne Power, though greater then any particular 
subjects. 
 Sevenly, the P[arliamen]t (as our law-bookes and writers resolve) is the most 
high and absolute power, the supreamest, and most anntient court of  
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 of the Realme of Engl[and], and hath the power of the whole Realme both Head 
and Body; And amongst other Priviledges this is the highest, that is aboue the Law 
itself, having power vpo[n] iust grounds to alter the very Com[mon] Law of Engl[and]; 
to abrogate, and repeale old lawes, to enact new, impose taxes, interpret &c. repeale 
patents, Charters &c. if erroneous or illeg[al], not onely without, but ag[ains]t the 
K[ing’]s personall consent, so far as finally to obliege both K[ing] and Subj[ects]. 
Now it is clear on the contrary side, that the K[ing] hath not the power of the whole 
Realme vested in his person, that he and his Prer[ogatives] are not above, but 
subord[inate] to the lawes, that he cannot by his absolute Reg[all] power alter the 
Com[mon] L[aw] in any particular point whatsoever, cannot repeale any old, nor 
enact new L[aw], nor impose &c. nor imprison [their persons]72, distraine [their 
goods]73, declare law, or reverse any judg[men]t in the meanest C[ou]rts, without or 
ag[ains]t his people’s ioynt Consents in P[arliamen]t; for potestas sua iuris est, et non 
injuriae, et nihil aliud potest R[ex] in terris, nisi id solum q[uo]d de jure potest. 
Bract[on] [l. 3. c. 9. f. 107] 74 , go, the Parliament in this regard is the most 
Sover[aingne] Auth[ority] and greater in jurisd[iction] then the K[ing] &c. whence it 
follows, that the K[ings] of Eng[land] are no absolute Princes, as some Court-Divines 
e.75 but meere mixt Soveraignes, inferiour to their L[awes] and Parliaments, the sole 
Law-makers and L[aw-] Alterers, though not ag[ains]t but with the K[ing’]s assents, 
considered not abstractively as K[ing’]s, but copulative[ly] as a branch and member 
                                                     
72 Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes Divided into Foure Parts, 1st pt, 46. 
73 Ibid.  
74 Ibid.  
75 CF: ‘(as some Royalists and Court Divines, most falsly averre them to be) but mere …’. Ibid. 
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of the Parliament. And indeed to speak impartially, though the K[ing’]s Royall assent 
be g[ene]rally requisite to passe and ratify L[awes], yet I hu[m]bly conceive, that the 
originall prime legislative power of making L[awes] to binde the Sub[jects] and their 
post[eri]ty, reste not in the K[ing’]s owne Royall perso[n], but in the K[ing]d[ome] 
and P[arliamen]t which represents it, for first 
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first, admit the K[ing] should p[ro]pound any L[aw] to his people (as K[ing]s and 
L[aw]-givers usually did at first) yet these L[awes] would no way obliege the[m], 
vnlesse they voluntarily consented and submitted to them in Parliament. &c. Q[uo]d 
o[mn]es tangit &c. the K[ing] doth but like a minister in marriage, declare it to be a 
Law, but it’s the parties consents which makes the Marriage, and the peoples onely 
that makes it a L[aw] to binde the[m]. Whence those in Scotl[and], Irel[and], Man, 
Garnsey, and Jersie are not bound by our English statutes (nor we by theirs) nor 
Tenants in Ancient Demesne, because they consented not to the[m]. go, the chiefe 
legisl[ative] power is in the people and both H[ouses] of P[arliamen]t, not in the 
K[ing]; as it was in the Roman Senate76, where the people had the Sover[aigne], 
Iuris[diction] of making and confirming L[awes], to binde the[m], not their K[ing]s, 
Emp[erours], or Senate, as I shall hereafter manifest. Secondly, this appears by the 
case of Customes, and By-Lawes in Corporations, and Mannours which binde all the 
Corporat[ion], and Tenants (if they be reasonable) without the K[ing’]s or L[ord’]s 
consents, by reaso[n] of their mutuall assent alone; And as these privates By-L[aw] 
obliege all those who Consent to them, by reaso[n] of their owne free assents onely, 
so do all publique Acts of P[arliamen]ts obliege all Subjects, onely because of their 
g[ene]rall assents to the[m] in their Knights &c.77 elected by and representing their 
persons. 
 Thirdly, All Acts of P[arliamen]t are usually made, framed, altered, thrice read, 
engrossed, voted, and fully ‘agreeed’ [sic] vpo[n] in both H[ouses] without the 
K[ing’]s personall knowledge or privity for the most p[ar]t, before they come to haue 
his Royall assent. And when they are thus agreed on by both H[ouses], the King 
cannot alter any one word or letter in them (as the H[ouses] may do) but must either 
absolutely assent to, or consider further of them, as the H[ouses] sendes the[m]. And 
if the K[ing] send any Bill he desires to haue passe, it must be thrice read and assented 
to in both H[ouses] (which haue  
 
                                                     
76 The printed version used ‘state’ not Senate. Ibid. 
77 The following words were here omitted by the copyist: ‘Citizens, and Burgesses’. 
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haue power to reject, alter, enlarge, or limit it as they thinke meete) else it can be no 
Act at all. A cleare demonstrat[ion] that the chiefe power of enacting and making 
lawes is onely in the people, Com[mons] and Peeres, not the King, who by his writ 
doth purposely sum[m]on them to meete, and erect laws, as the chiefe legislators. 
Witnesse this notable clause in the writ, Ita q[uo]d ijdem Milites plena[m] et 
sufficientem potestatem pro se et com[m]unitate comitatus predicti, et dicti Cives et 
Burgenses pro se et com[m]unitate civitatu[m] et Burgoru[m] p[re]d[ictorum] divisim 
ab ipsis h[ab]eant, ad faciendu[m] et consentiendu[m] hijs quae tunc et ib[ide]m De 
Co[mmun]I Consilio dicti Regni (not Regis) nostri contigerint Ordinari super negotijs 
antedictis. Ita quod pro defectu protestatis huiusmodi &c. dicta negotia infecta non 
remaneant quovis modo. 
 Fourthly, All publique Acts are the whole K[ing]d[ome’]s Lawes, made 
principally and solely for the subject’s benefit, if good, their prejudice if ill; go, they 
knowing better what is good or bad for the[mselve]s, then the K[ing] alone, it is iust 
and reasonable that they and not the K[ing] should be the Principall L[aw] Makers, to 
binde, or burthen them[selve]s with any new Lawes, penalties, or restraints. 
 Fifthly, It is clear, that all Acts which give any subsidy, Tax, penalties, or 
forfeitures to the K[ing] are made onely by the people in P[arliamen]t and not 
principally by the K[ing], since the K[ing] cannot be said in any propriety to give any 
thinge to himself. This vndeniable by the forme of pen[n]ing all subsidy Bills granted 
by the Com[m]ons, or Clergy. Your Com[m]ons assembled in e.78 humbly, presend 
your M[ajes]ty with the free and cheerfull gift of 2 intire subsidies, which wee 
hu[m]bly beseech your M[ajes]ty graciously to accept &c. your M[ajes]t[ie]s faithfull 
subj[ects], the Prelates, and Clergy &c. And by the King’s assent to these Bills 
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Bills, Le Roy remercy ses Loaulz subjects accept Lour benevolence, &c. The 
Com[mons] having the sole power to grant or deny subsidies and taxes when they see 
cause, and to limit the p[ro]port[ion] of the[m], the manner and time of paying them; 
and to order how and by who[m] they shallbe received and imployed, as all actes of 
this n[atu]re manifest. If then they be the chiefe L[aw] Makers in these Acts which lay 
any imposit[ion] vpon the subject’s goods, or restraint on his perso[n], then by like 
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reaso[n] in all other penall publicke lawes. 
 Sixthly, All Acts of P[arliamen]t made in the raignes of vsurpers who haue no 
Title to the Crowne, nor right to assent to Lawes, are firme, and good in Law, and 
shall binde the right heirs to the Crowne, as is evident by the L[aw] made by K[ing] 
John, H[enry] [the] 4. 5. [and] 6. (reputed vsurpers by E[dward] [the] 4) and R[ichard] 
[the] 3. acknowledged an vsurper, whose Lawes are yet in force. The reaso[n] is, (as is 
clear by 1 E. 4. c. 6.) because the Lawes, and all other Judiciall Acts in Courts of 
Justice, are the acts of the P[arliamen]t and Courts them[selve]s, which are Lawfull; 
not of the K[ing] who is vnlawfull. go, certainly the legislative power is more in the 
P[arliamen]t then in the K[ing], if not wholly in it, there being Lawes and 
K[ing]d[ome]s before K[ing]s were. 
 Seventhly, Admit the K[ing] should dy without Heire, no doubt the K[ing]d[ome] 
and Pa[rliamen]t haue a iust right either to alter the govern[men]t, or dispose of the 
Crowne, to what family they please, as the constant practice of all K[ing]d[omes] in 
such cases manifest. e. If the King be an Infant (as some of our K[ing]s were when the 
Crowne descended to the[m]), or non Compos mentis, or taken with a dead palsey80 
or Apoplexy, or an Idiot by birth or Age, or a Monk p[ro]fessed, or absent in a 
Pilgrimage to Rome or a Voyage to the holy land e. no doubt in all such cases, the 
right of creating a Protector to execute Regall power, Sum[m]on P[arliamen]ts 
 
fol. 1v (Prynne, pp. 50-51) 
 
Parliaments, assent to L[awes], is only in the P[arliamen]t, which may in these cases 
make any publique Acts without the K[ing’]s personall presence, or assent; and the 
assent of the Regent, or Protector vsually created by them, shall as firmely binde the 
K[ing], as if he had personally consented, as is evident by all the Acts of P[arliamen]t 
passed during the minority of H[enry] 3. E[dward] 3. R[ichard] 2. H[enry] 6. E[dward] 
5. H[enry] 8. E[dward] 6, and by all Acts made in the absence of K[ing]. R[ichard] 1. 
E[dward] 1. 2. 3. 4. H[enry] 3. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. and others out of the Realme; all good, as 
appears by 28 H. 8. C. 17, which altered, and 33 H. 8. C. 22. which declareth the Law 
in these particulars. A clear demonstr[ation] that the P[arliamen]t is the most absolute 
supreame power and L[aw] giver, not the King. 
 Eighthly, The King hath little or no hand in making, but onely in assenting to 
lawes when they are made by the H(ouses); as the vsuall forme of passing Acts (Le 
Roy le veult, the K[ing] wills (or assents to) it, not before, but after they haue passed 
both H[ouses], imports: which assent of his, if the Bills be publique and necessary for 
the Com[m]on good, is not meerely arbitrary at the K[ing’]s will, but the K[ing] by 
                                                     
80 i. e. palsy. 
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oath and duty is bound to give it, and the Lo[rds] and Com[mons] may in iustice 
demand it of meere right, as I shall shew anon. His Royall assent then though it be the 
last act which completes Acts, and makes the[m] Lawes, yet since it is but an assent to 
a L[aw] formerly made by both H[ouses], which he cannot alter in any point; yea an 
assent which in Honour, Law, Iustice, duty by vertue of his Coron[ation] oath, is 
bound to give, (as appears by the prefaces of the most Stat[utes], the Stat[ute] of 
Provisours, 25 E. 3. Par. 6. 20. E. 3 and other Acts) [it] is so farre from proving the 
K[ing] the supreme power, and L[aw] giver, that it manifests the contrary, that this 
power principally resides in both H[ouses], and not the K[ing].  
 Ninethly, this is apparent by those Coronation Oaths which P[arliamen]ts and  
the K[ing]d[omes] in King Edw[ard’s] daies even before the Conquest, have 
anntiently prescribed 
fol. 2r (Prynne, pp. 51-78) 
 
prescribed to our K[ing]s before they would accept of the[m] for their Soveraignes.81 
After the death of W[illia]m the Conq[uerour], W[illia]m Ruf[us] in the absence of 
Ro[bert], the elder bro[ther] hastens into Engl[and] to obtaine the Crowne; and 
finding the greatest p[ar]t of the Nobles ag[ains]t him. He gave his solemne oath and 
faith to Lanfranke Archb[isho]p of Cant[erbury] that if they would make choice of 
him for their K[ing], he would abrogate the over-hard Lawes of his father, &c. vpon 
which conditions, he was chosen and crowned K[ing]. &c.82 There hath bene a late 
vnhappy difference bet[ween] the K[ing] and P[arliamen]t about the word elegerit; the 
Parliament affirming the w[or]d to signifie, shall choose, according to sundry written 
Rolles, and printed copies in Lat[ine] and French, the King on the contr[ary] affirming, 
it should be hath chosen; But he that observes the w[or]d of the anntient Oathes: 
populo tibi com[m]isso recta[m] justicia[m] exercebis, makes Leges &c. delebis, et 
bonas observabis, all in the future sense: and the verbes, servabis, facies fieri, &c. all 
of the[m] in the future; with the whole Scope, intent, and purport of this p[ar]t of the 
oath, must necessarily grant shall chuse, to be the true reading; and that it refers to the 
confirmat[ion] of future lawes, not to those onely in being when the oath was 
administred; else K[ing]s should not be obliged by their oathes, to keepe any lawes 
made after their Coronations by their owne assents, but onely those their Predecessors 
assented to, not them[selve]s, which were most absurd to affirme.83 
 Fro[m] these seuerall oathes &c. It is apparent, first, that Popish P[arliamen]ts 
                                                     
81 This sentence comes from the middle of page 51, but the next sentence then jumps to the end of 
page 52. 
82 The copyist here jumps from line 2, page 53, to the last paragraph of page 56. Prynne, The 
Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes Divided into Foure Parts, 1st pt, 53–56. 
83 The next paragraph jumps to line 28, page 75. 
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haue deemed the Crowne of Engl[and], not meerely successive, and hereditary, 
though it hath vsually gone by descent: but arbitrary, and elective, when they saw 
cause &c. 2ly,84 that those K[ing]s who haue enioyed the Crowne by successi[on], 
descent, or electi[on], have still take it vp[on] the Conditions, and Cov[enan]ts 
contained in their coronati[on] oathes 
 
fol. 2v (Prynne, pp. 78-86) 
 
oaths; &c. And though in point of Law, those who enjoyed the Crowne by 
successi[on], be K[ing]s, before their Coronations; yet it is still vpo[n] those 
subsequent conditions in Law, contained in their Coronation Oathes, which impose no 
new, but onely ratifie the old Condition inseparably annexed to the Crowne by the 
Com[mon] Law, ever since E[dward] the Conf[esser’s] dayes, if not before, as the 
oathes of all our K[ing]s to their people; really to performe these Articles, and 
Conditions, fully demonstrate. 3ly, That these Oathes are not meerely arbitrary, or 
voluntary at the K[ing’]s pleasure to take or refute the[m], if he will, but necessary, 
and inevitable, by the Law, and constant vsage of the Realme, yea of all Xn85 
K[ing]d[omes] whatsoever, which prescribe like oathes to their K[ing]s. all which I 
may firmely conclude, that the whole K[ing]d[ome] and P[arliamen]t are the 
supreame Auth[ority] and paramount the K[ing], bec[ause] they may lawfully, and do 
vsually prescribe such conditions, terms, and rules of governing the[m] to him, and 
binde him by oath faithfully to performe the lawes. &c. 
 Tenthly, former P[arliamen]ts haue both challenged and exercised a supreame 
power over the Crowne of Engl[and] itselfe, to transferre it fro[m] the right Heire, and 
setled it on who[m] them[selve]s thought meete to elect for their k[ing]; and likewise 
to call their K[ing]s to an account for their misgovern[men]t and breach of Oath to the 
prejudice of their people, so far as to article ag[ains]t the[m], and either by force of 
Armes, or a Judiciall sentence in P[arliamen]t actually to depose the[m], as many 
fore-cited presid[en]ts evidence. 86  Those P[arliamen]ts then, and Nationall 
Assemblies which haue thus disposed of the Crowne, and K[ing]s the[mselve]s, and 
exercised such Jurisdict[ion] over the[m], must certainly be above the[m], and the 
highest Soveraigne Power. True, it is our Protes[tan]t Peeres[,] Com[mons] and 
P[arliamen]ts, never challenged, nor exercised such Jurisdict[ion], and I presume they 
will never do it. However, it is neither honourable, nor safe for K[ing]s, and the most 
destructive policy their ill Counsellors can suggest vnto the[m], so far to oppresse 
                                                     
84 i. e. secondly. The copyist here jumps to the last line. 
85 Xn = Christian. 
86 The copyist here jumps from the second paragraph of page 78 to page 86, omitting several historical 
illustrations presented by Prynne. 
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their subjects, or exasperate their  
 
fol. 3r (Prynne, pp. 86-89) 
 
their P[arliamen]ts as to p[ro]voke the[m] to vse the extremity of their power &c.87 
 11. All papists attribute far more divine Authority and Soueraigne Jurisdict[ion] 
over Emperours, Kings, Princes, K[ing]domes, Subjects, to the Pope their Lo[rd] and 
God, who[m] they make Supreame monarch of the world, and all K[ing]domes in it, 
and give him greater Authority to Sum[m]on, ratifie, and dissolve g[ene]rall 
Councells, then euer any Xn K[ing] or Emp[erour] challenged, or vsurped: yet, those 
who maintaine these Paradoxes of the Pope’s Supremacy, confesse, that a g[ene]rall 
Coun[cell] is above the pope, and may vpon iust Cause, not onely convent, and 
censure him for his misdem[eanou]rs, but likewise actually, depose him and set vp 
another in his stead. As the Councells of Pisa, Constans, Basil, (which depose 4 Popes. 
&c. Now the the Coun[cell] of Basil (as I shewed before) defined, That the whole 
P[arliamen]t and K[ing]d[ome] hath as great a Power over their K[ing]s, as a 
Co[uncell] ouer the Pope. go, by Pap[ist’s] verdicts it is above the K[ing] in point of 
Soveraigne Power, as a Co[uncell] above the Pope. &c. 
 12. That Court which may lawfully censure, question, depose, banish, execute 
the K[ing’]s greatest favourites, Officers, Judges, yea, Lo[rd] Protecters the[mselve]s, 
the highest Peers of the Realme, and that not onely with but ag[ains]t the King’s good 
will, must questionlesse be the highest power and Jurisdict[ion] in the Realme, else 
the K[ings] and their Auth[orities] might p[ro]tect them against its iustice. But the 
P[arliamen]t may Lawfully censure &c. these, not onely without but ag[ains]t e. 
witnesse the p[ro]ceedings in P[arliamen]t ag[ains]t W[illia]m Longchamp B[isho]p 
of Ely, chiefe Justiciar, Lo[rd] Chancerlor, L[ord] Vice Roy of Engl[and] in R[ichard] 
1. his raigne, during his absence in the H[oly] Land, fro[m] which offices he was by 
the Peeres and Com[mons] deposed for his misdemeanours, and oppressions, Pierce 
Gavest[on] e. And shall any delinquent then thinke to be p[ro]tected by any power 
ag[ains]t the P[arliamen]ts Justice now? 
 
fol. 3v (Prynne, pp. 90-104) 
 
 13.88 Not to speake of the P[arliamen]ts Power in making or p[ro]claiming warre 
or peace, in creating the highest Offices, in ordering the Militia of the K[ing]d[ome] 
                                                     
87 The copyist here jumps from the middle of the last paragraph of page 86 to page 88. 
88 The copyist skipped some paragraphs of this point first and started his transcriptions from the last 
paragraph of page 90. See Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes Divided into 
Foure Parts, 1st pt, 89–90. 
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by sea and Land, by setled Lawes (of which never anon) or in ordering the Coyne and 
money of the land, together with the Mint, or designing how the subsidies e. shalbe 
disposed of, of which there are sundry presid[en]ts. All which are strong evidences of 
its Sover[aigne] Auth[ority] with the Acts concerning his purveyance, and all 
Revenues Royall e.89 There is one cleare demonstrat[ion], yet remaining, to prove the 
supreame power of P[arliamen]ts aboue k[ing]s, (1) That it is the highest Court and 
Power to which all Appeales are lastly and finally to be made fro[m] all other Courts 
and Judges w[ha]tsoever, yea for the K[ing’]s owne personall resolutions, in or out of 
any other his Courts: and such a transcendent Tribunall fro[m] whence there is no 
Appeale to any other Court or pers[on], no not to the K[ing] hims[elfe], but onely to 
another P[arliamen]t. 90  Now this is an infalliable Maxime, both in the Civill, 
Com[mon] and Canon Law, that the Court or perso[n] to who[m] the last appeale is to 
be made, is the supreamest power &c. If there be any differences betw[een] King or 
subject, touching any Inheritances, Priviledges, or Prero[gatives] belonging to the 
Crowne itselfe, or any points of misgovern[men]t; yea which is more, if there be any 
suit, quarrell, or difference betw[een] our K[ing]s in act, and any other their 
Competitors, for the Crowne itselfe, the Lo[rds] and Com[mons] in P[arliamen]t are 
and ought to be the sole and finall Judges of it. Whereof many instances e.91 
 If any heere object ag[ains]t the premises, That the K[ing] is the onely supreme 
Governor of this Realme, That Bract[on], Fleta and our lawe books resolve: That the 
K[ing] hath no Peere in his K[ing]d[ome], for so he should lose his empire, since 
Peers (or equalls) haue no com[m]and over one another: much more then ought he not 
to  
 
fol. 4r (Prynne, p. 104) 
 
to haue a superiour or mightier; for so he should be inferiour to those who are subject 
to him; and Inferiours cannot be equall to Superiours. Tho[ugh] K[ing] ought not to 
be vnder man, but vnder God, and the Law. If then Justice be demanded of him by 
way of pet[ition] (because no writ runns ag[ains]t him, though anntiently some Writs 
did) if he do not justice, this punishm[en]t, may be sufficient to him, that he may 
expect God will revenge it. Nemo quidem de factis suis praesumat disputare, multo 
fortius contra factu[m] suu[m] venire &c. Therefore the K[ing] is above the 
P[arliamen]t and whole K[ing]d[ome], not they above him.  
                                                     
89 The copyist here jumps from the middle of the last paragraph of page 90 to the second paragraph, 
point 14, of page 92.  
90 The next sentence jumps to the first line of page 93. 
91 The copyist here jumps from the first paragraph of page 93 to page 104, mainly omitting historical 
illustrations provided by Prynne. 
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 I answer, first, that the meaning of all these books is, that the K[ing] is above 
every one of his subjects, and hath no Peer, nor superiour, if they be taken particularly 
and distributively, as single men, as the words Parem, Superiorem, in the singular 
nu[m]ber, and the like, explaine the meaning of the Bookes to be. But if we take 
the[m] Collectively in P[arliamen]t, as they are one body, and represent the whole 
K[ing]d[ome]; then these very Authors resolve (in their fore-quoted words), that they 
are above the K[ing], and may and ought to restraine and quest[ion] his actions, if 
there bee cause. 
 Secondly, Bract[on] explaines hims[elfes], how he is highest and without a Peer, 
to wit, in distributing Justices, that is, He is the highest Justiciar in the K[ing]d[ome], 
but as small as any in receiving Justice.92  
 3. Even in P[arliamen]t itselfe, the K[ing] is the supreame member, and in that 
regard, the P[arliamen]t in most Acts, and in all Pet[itions] or Addresses vsually stiles 
him Their Soueraigne Lord: Besides, the P[arliamen]t its[elfe] is euer sum[m]oned, 
dissolved by his writ, in his Name, by his Authority: And in passing all Acts and Bills 
of Grace, or such as are not simply necessary for the publique safty and vtility93 of 
his people, He hath an absolute negative voyce, and his Royall  
 
fol. 4v (Prynne, pp. 104-105) 
 
Royall assent is simply necessary for the passage of all binding lawes. In which 
respects he is, and maybe truly said to be above the P[arliamen]t itselfe and the onely 
supreame Governor; but yet in the forenamed respects, the P[arliamen]t &c. 
 Fourthly. The oath of Supremacy, That the King is the onely supreame Governor, 
relates onely, or principally to the Popes, and forainge Princes Authourities, formerly 
vsurped in this Realme, as the Title, words, and Scope of the Stat[ute] of Eliz[abeth] c. 
1. and the very next words in the Oath of Supr[emacy] manifest: (and that no foraigne 
power, perso[n], prelate, state or potentate hath or ought to have any Jurisdict[ion], 
power, superiority, preheminence94 or Authority, Ecclesiasticall or Spirituall whithin 
this Realme; And therefore I do vtterly renounce and forsake all foraigne Juisdictions, 
&c.) go, It refers not at all to P[arliamen]ts, or their Jurisdict[ion], power, Superiority, 
&c. not so much as once thought of by the prescribers of this Oath, which had its 
Authority fro[m] the P[arliamen]t, and made some addit[ion] to the K[ing’]s 
Prerogative. 
                                                     
92 CF: ‘but as low as any in receiving Justice’. See Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and 
Kingdomes Divided into Foure Parts, 1st pt, 104. 
93 i. e. utiliy. 
94 The printed version has the same spelling of ‘preeminence’ as we nowadays spelled it, but the word 
in manuscript is clearly spelled ‘preheminence’. 
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 5. Bodin, and others assures us that the Soueraigne Power and Jurisdict[ions] 
both in the Roman and German Emp[ires] and most foraigne Xn K[ing]d[ome]s, was 
and yet is in the Senate, people, Par[liamen]ts and Diets 95 , yet this is no 
impeachm[en]t at all to their supremacies, no more then the asserting of G[ene]rall 
Councells to be above Popes them[selve]s, by the learnedst Papists, is any derogat[ion] 
(as they hold it is not) to the Popes most absolute pretended Soveraignty, above all 
Emp[erours], K[ing]s &c. and the world its[elfe] of which they affirme him sole 
monarch. go, by the selfe-same reaso[n], this asserting of the 
 
[End of E5-3-46] 
 
The misplaced final part of E5-3-46 in E5-3-21 ‘Mr St John’s speech in the Upper 
House of Parliament 1641, January 14’.96 
 
fol. 1r (Prynne, pp. 105-106)97 
 
the whole K[ing]d[ome]s and P[arliamen]ts power to be above the K[ing]s, is no 
diminut[ion] at all, much lesse a denial of his Supremacy, iust Prerog[ative] Royall. 
 If then the P[arliamen]ts power to be thus higher and greater then the K[ing]s 
                                                     
95 CF: ‘Dyets’. Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes Divided into Foure 
Parts, 1st pt, 105. 
96 I reported this issue to a librarian on 23 July 2016 when I revisited the library. 
97 The content of this folio follows folio 4v. 
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personall power and Iurisdict[ion] out of P[arliamen]t, it will necessarily follow fro[m] 
hence. 
 First, That in these vnhappy times of divis[ion] and seperat[ion] of the K[ing]s 
personall presence (not legall, which cannot be severed) fro[m] the P[arliamen]t, the 
L[ords], and Co[mmons] Orders, Votes, and Ordin[ations] made legally in 
P[arliamen]t its[elfe] are to be prefered before any his M[ajes]t[y]s Procl[amations], 
Decl[arations], Com[m]issions &c. made illegally out of P[arliamen]t in affront of 
both H[ouses’] proceedings, and decrees, since when ever 2 distinct powers 
com[m]and different things, that are lawfull, or of the same n[atu]re, the higher power 
ought still to be obeyed; &c. yea the P[arliamen]t being the highest power, the K[ing] 
hims[elfe] ought to submit thereto, and to be ruled, and advised thereby. This 
conclus[ion] (though it may seeme a Paradoxe to most men) is an vndubitable verity 
both in point of Divinity and policy, as is most apparent by 1 Sam: 14. 38 to 46 and c. 
29. 1 to 11. 2 Sam: 18. 2. 3. 4. c. 19. 1. to 9. 1 Kings 12. 1. to 25. 1 Chr: 13. 1. to 6. 2 
Chr: 10 and 11. c. 30. 2, 3, 5. 23. Esther 1. 13. to 22. Jer: 38. 4. to 28. Dan: 6. 4. to 20. 
Jonah: 3. 7. Ezra. 10. 3. 8. Eccl: 4. 13. Prov: 11. 14. c. 15. 22. c. 25. 5. compared 
together with Josh: 22. 11. to 34. Judge: 20. 1. to 20. and in point of Law and 
Conscience, even in our owne K[ing]s and K[ing]d[ome], as is clear by 20. E. 3. the 
preface, and c. 1. 25. E. 3. P[arliamen]t 6. the Stat[ute] ag[ains]t Provisours 38. E. 3. 
Stat[ute] 2. c. 1. 2. 3. E. 1. c. 17. and 48. and other Stat[ute] which I shall hereafter 
cite at large in answer to the 4th ob[jection]98. And in Pauls time, the highest powers in 
Rome were not the Roman Emp[erour]s as ignorant D[octo]rs make the vnlearned 
world 
 
fol. 1v (Prynne, pp. 106-107) 
 
world believe, but the Roman Senate, who had full power not onely to elect, and 
com[m]and, but censure and depose their Emp[erour]s and adjudge the[m] vnto death, 
as Bodin acknowledgeth &c. 
 
2. That the P[arliamen]ts resisting the K[ing]s personall Com[man]ds, (especially 
such as are illegal, and destructive to the K[ing]d[ome]) or any private Subjects 
resisting the[m] by vertue of a Publique Ordin[ance] or Counterm[an]d fro[m] the 
P[arliamen]t, is no resisting of the higher Powers, but a direct Submiss[ion] to the 
highest p[ower] and those who resist the P[arliamen]ts Ord[inances] e. (especially 
such as send to the preservation of Rel[igion], Lawes &c.) though they do it by an 
extrajudiciall Counterm[an]d fro[m] the K[ing] or his ill Coun[sellor]s do both in 
                                                     
98 The following words were here omitted by the copyist: ‘concerning the Kings negative voice’.  
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point of law, divin[i]ty, Consc[ience] resist the highest p[ower] &c. 
 
3. That the resolutions, and Decl[arations] of the Lo[rds] and Co[mmons] in 
P[arliamen]t ag[ains]t the Com[mission] of Arr[ay], Arming of Pap[ists], raising 
forces, imposing taxes &c. ought to be obeyed, both by the K[ing] hims[elfe], the 
K[ing]d[ome], and every private subj[ect] w[ha]tsoever; and that the K[ing]s 
extrajud[icia]ll and illeg[all] Decl[arations] out of P[arliamen]t in direct opposit[ion] 
to &c. ought not to be obeyed; The K[ing] Hims[elfe] being no competent Judge (as 
our L[aw] books resolve) especially out of his Co[u]rts what is Law, or what not in 
those Cases, but the P[arliamen]t onely. &c. 
 
4. That the P[arliamen]t and whole K[ing]d[ome], being the highest power, or any 
member of the P[arliamen]t, cannot by any publique Acte or votes of theirs consented 
to in P[arliamen]t, become Traitors, or guilty of High Treaso[n] ag[ains]t the King, 
either by the Co[mmon] L[aw] or the St[atute] of 25, E[dward], 3, c[hapter], 2, which 
run[n]ing in the singular nu[m]ber; If a man &c. (that is, any private man, or men by 
their owne private Authority) shall levy warre ag[ains]t the K[ing] &c. it ought to be 
iudged high treason; extends not to the whole K[ing]d[ome] &c, of which no Treas[on] 
was ever yet presumed, and by this very Act is included within the words or meaning 
of any Lawe concerning Tre[ason] and go cannot be guilty of it. 5. 
 
fol. 2r (Prynne, pp. 108-112) 
 
5. That to conspire, or levy war ag[ains]t the P[arliamen]t or K[ing]d[ome] is no lesse 
then H[igh] treas[on], as hath bene solemnely adjudged in P[arliamen]t, 15. E. 2. 11. 
R. 2. c. 2. 3. 4. and in the P[arliamen]t Roll printed by Order of both H[ouses] Aug[ust] 
27, 1642 &c. If no lesse then high tr[eason] ag[ains]t the K[ing] to slay the Chancellor, 
Treasurer, or any of the Judges &c. then much more &c.99 
 
6. Hence likewise it necessarily followes, that the H[ouses] of P[arliamen]t being the 
Soueraigne Power, ought of right to enjoy, and may when they see just Cause for the 
K[ing]d[ome’s] safety and benefit, order and dispose the Militia, Navy, Ports, Forts, 
and Am[m]unit[ion] of the Realme, into such persons Custodies, as they may safely 
confide in; nominate both the great Councellors, publique Officers &c of right require 
(if not enforce, it willingly denied) the K[ing]s assent to all publique Bills of Right 
and Justice necess[ary] for the Co[mmon] W[ealth] late vp defensive Armes to 
                                                     
99 The copyist here jumped from the very beginning of page 109 to page 112, mainly omitting 
historical illustrations raised by Prynne.  
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p[ro]tect their Priviledges, Lawes &c. not onely ag[ains]t Malig[nan]ts &c. but the 
K[ing] hims[elfe], if he raise forces ag[ains]t the[m], yea impose taxes vpo[n] the 
Subject, and distraine &c. / 
 




E5-3-49: ‘Treatise on the Royal Prerogative and the Right of Parliament to resist 
Royal Power’ 
 
This manuscript contains text extracted from Jeremiah Burroughs, The Glorious 
Name of God, the Lord of Hosts (London: Printed for R. Dawlman, 1643), 27–32, 35. 
Some of the extracted sentences were further condensed by the copyist and some were 
rephrased.  
 
A comparison with the printed text reveals the copyist used the following 
conventions: 
(1) The signal ‘&c’ means the copyist skipped some sentences or passages.  
(2) go = ergo = therefore. 
(3) Cond: = command 
 
Some frequently met abbreviations: 
 L: = Lo: = Lords   the(m)s = themselves 
 P: = Parlt = Parliament  Xn = Christian 
 Co: = Common(s)   agt = against 
 vp(o) = upon    Au(th) = Authority 
 Pap: = Papist    Scrip: = Scripture 
 Emp: = Emperour   Reg: = Regal 





ob: Wee fight against the King. 
A: No, but for our Lawfull Liberties & which wee inherit as truly, as the King any 
thing he hath. for our Reli[gion] our chiefe inheritance. The Law of nature and 
Script[ure] teaches us to defend ourselves from violence, and wrong. 
2 [secondly] for the K[ing]: (1) for the preservat[ion] of true Regall Power in the 
King and his posterity. Also, to rescue him out of the hands of evill men. The 
Scrip[ture] bids the wicked should be taken from the throne of the King and If a 
represent[ative] K[ing]d[ome] hath not power who hath? 
3 [Thirdly] wee fight not against the power of the King. His power is that which 
the Lawes of the Land invests him with. But subj[ect] to and not to the wills of those 
who are in highest place.100 If wee be either actively or passively subject to the 
                                                     
100 CF: ‘The Scripture bids us be subject to the higher powers, Rom. 13.1. It doth not bid us to be 
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Lawes of that Countrey wherein we live, we fulfil the very lre [i.e. letter] of that 
Scrip[ture]. Therefore, that which now is done is not against the King, being onely 
against his personall Co[mma]nd, not his legall power. When wee speak of a King, 
wee meane such a man invested with a Regall power by the Lawes, and Constitutions 
of that Countrey hee is the King of. Now then if nothing be done against the power, 
nothing can be said to be done against the King. People [are] much mistaken who do 
not distinguish betw[een] a man in authority, and the auth[ority] of that man. A man in 
authority may co[mma]nd what auth[ority] co[mma]nds not. The authoritative 
Co[mma]nds of the King consist not in his personall verball co[mma]nds, His 
authority is in his Co[mma]nds by his Officers seales, and Courts of Justice, and 
whatsoever is his Co[mma]nd in one Court may be appealed fro[m] to a superior and 




ob: The King saies that which is done, is against Law. 
A: If when the most inferior Court of Justice determines any thinge to be Law, it is not 
the K[ing]’s personall dissent, and saying it is not law that disannuls it, but the 
judge[men]t of some superiour Court , then if the highest Co[urt] shall judge a thinge 
to be Law, the personall dissent of the King cannot disannul it.  
 
Ob: Tho[ugh] the Par[liamen]t tell us what they do is law, they shew not where that 
law is. 
A: Our C[ommon] w[ealth] is governed not onely by Stat[ute] law, but Co[mmon] law. 
(1) Recta ratio, so adjudged by Judges appointed thereto by law, and this is various, as 
cases occur, so that tho[ugh] some presidents [i.e. precedents], some g[ene]rall  
maximes of this Law be extant, yet if new cases arises, then there must be 
determination accord[ing] to the nature of such a new case, which determination by 
such as are appointed Judges, is now Law, altho[ugh] no where written before. And 
certainly wee hath now such things fallen out as no former time can show 
preced[en]ts of, as that a K[ing] should go from his Parliament, take vp armes &c., go 
we can expect no preced[en]t of what determinations there can be in these cases, and 
                                                                                                                                                        
subject to the wills of those who are in highest place’. Burroughs, The Glorious Name of God, the Lord 
of Hosts, 28. 
101 This is a very difficult sentence. CF: ‘Many, if not most men mistake in this, they think the 
authorative commands of the King chiefly consist in his personall verball commands, but the truth is, 
his authority is in his commands by his Officers seals, & Courts of Justice; we may appeal from his 
personall verball command, to his command in his Courts of Justice, & whatsoever is his command in 
one Court of Justice, may be appealed from to a superior Court, and so to the highest, and there we 
must rest.’ Ibid., 29.  
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some determ[inations] of necess[ity] we must have or else we shall run to Confusion. 
The determ[ination] then of the highest Co[urt], we must account Law in this case. 
The way of determining cases that fall out in the Co[mmon] Law is this. 1. The 
determination must not be against Stat[ute] Law. and so is it now; no stat[ute] against 
it.102 2. It must be accord[ing] to some g[ene]rall Maximes of that Law. Now this is 






                                                     
102 CF: ‘and so is the determination of Parliament now, there is no Statute Law against it’. Burroughs, 
The Glorious Name of God, the Lord of Hosts, 30. 
103 A very important point here, the sentence in the printed version goes ‘Secondly, it must be 
according to some generall Maximes of that Law. Now this is one great maxime of it, Salus populi 






3. When any inferiour Judge makes this determination against any party that thinks 
himselfe wronged, hee makes his appeale to the K[ing’]s bench, if he have not right 
ther[e], he hath a writ of appeale ad prox[imum] Parl[iamen]tum; so that it is apparent, 
that Parliament is supreme Judge of what is recta Ratio, in case of difficulty, and 
Controversy. 
 
Ob: A d[etermina]t[ion] that Parliament Judge, how can it iudge without the 
K[ing]?104 
A: True, for making a stat[ute], all the 3 est[ates] are required to be ioyned, but for the 
determination of what [i]s law, that may be done by both Ho[uses], in the absence of, 
or without the knowledge of the K[ing], as usually it is. In Cases that are brought 
before them, in the punish[men]t of delinq[uen]ts, they doe not send to the K[ing] for 
his assent to ioyne with them in their determinations, but in those proceed as a Co[u]rt 
of Justice themselves. 
 
Ob: May wee resist authority abused? 
A: Differences betw[een] the Co[mma]nds that are from abused authority, and the 
Co[mma]nds that are from the wills of men in Authority, but not from the authority of 
those men. That is abused Authority, when those to who[m] power of making Lawes 
belong, shall make evill Lawes; in this case no helpe, but passive obedience, or flying, 
vntill some way may be taken for rectifying that Authority that is abused. But when 
men that are in Auth[ority] co[mma]nd any thinge out of their owne wills, which is no 
law, it is not Autho[rity] that doth co[mma]nd it [;] in this case, there is no resisting of 
Auth[ority] at all, although the things be denied that is co[mma]nded; in such a case, 




wee cannot be said go to resist Authority. &c. 
 Every Countrey in the first Constitut[ion] of the govern[men]t, hath power to 
divide the Gover[nmen]t so much to the Nobiles, so much to the Commons, as they 
shall see best suitable to the condition of their Countrey.105 &c. That there should be 
                                                     
104 CF: ‘But yet it may be said, Grant the Parliament to be the Judge, how can it iudge without the 
King?’ Ibid., 31. CF: ‘y.e Part Judge, how can ut iudge without y.e K’. See Rossi, La vita, vols 3, 499. 
105 CF: ‘Every Countrey in the first constitution of the Government, hath power to divide the 
Government, so much to the Kings, so much to the Nobles, so much to the Commons, as they shall see 




Civill Govern[men]t G[od] hath appointed but &c. If the kinds of Civill Govern[men]t 
were of Divine institution, it must be all the same in every compleate Co[mmon] 
w[ealth], which no man &c. Eccle[siastic]all Govern[men]t, because it is Spir[itua]ll, 
and hath Spi[ritua]ll efficacy, it must go of necessity be of Divine institution, and so 









Letter from Lord Herbert to Rouse, a Bodleian Librarian, in MS. Bodl. 910 
 
Whereas Mr Thomas Master fellow of New Colledge in Oxford was desired by mee 
to deliuer vnto the University Library the History of Henry 8: written by my selfe; and 
a worke of Doctor Donnes called Biathanatos which was dedicated vnto me, the said 
bookes to bee locked vp in a Cabbinet and deposited in the University Library vntill I 
departed out of this life or gaue further order. All which (as I conceiued) was done 
according by; and whereas yet a Servant of myne, returning lately from Oxford tould 
me the said books and Cabbinet were not in the Library. I shall therefore take the 
bouldnesse to desire you to demannd the sayd books and Cabbinet of the Executors of 
Mr Tho[mas] Masters and to keepe them after the manner aboue specifyed in the 
Library, or if any difficulty bee made concerning the delivery of them to jnforme mee 
thereof, and to returne mee your answer if you please[,] which I shall desire you to 
leaue in S[i]r Edward Herbert his Ma[jes]ties Atturney Generalls hands, who will take 
care to send it to mee, soe I desiring you to excuse this Trouble I rest,  
 
Mountgomery Castle 
the last of January 
1643 
     your very resspectfull and affectionate friend 
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